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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines whether an understanding of the communication and 
safety culture of transit officers, who form part of a security section of a large state 
Rail Transport Organisation (RTO), can lead to strategies to reduce their risk of 
injury.  The core functions of the transit officer position are passenger safety and 
customer service.  This puts the officers in the front line of defence against the anti-
social behaviour from some patrons that occurs regularly on the railway system.  
Like urban railways the world over, this anti-social behaviour can range from bad 
language to severe violence.  Whilst these officers are not police, they do have many 
similar powers to police, such as the ‘power of arrest’ to deal with certain offences 
committed on railway property.  A key difference, however, is that transit officers 
tend to deal with issues as they arise, whereas the police are more likely to respond 
to an event after its occurrence.  Additionally, unlike many policing organisations, 
transit officers are not equipped with a taser or firearm, but rely on their 
communication skills and physical training to defuse a potentially threatening 
situation, and a baton and pepper spray for self-defence.   
Over the years an unacceptable number of injuries have been sustained by the 
RTO transit officers in dealing with anti-social behaviour.  Whilst the organisation 
requires that statistics for incidents and injuries remain confidential, it is nonetheless 
known that the incident rate is above that of workers in other traditionally hazardous 
industries, such as construction.  Further, surveys conducted on behalf of the RTO 
also indicate that passengers feel less safe at night due to the anti-social behaviour 
evident on the rail system.  This raises issues about the safety culture.   
The term ‘safety culture’ became important in safety science as a result of 
accident enquiries, analysis of safety failures and organisational disasters which 
attributed fault to the organisation’s internal attitudes to safety.  Many of these 
organisations had comprehensive safety systems in place; however these 
investigations identified the importance of human factors in the equation.  Safety 
systems did not mean that the organisation had a culture of safety.  To study the 
culture of a group it is necessary to understand their basic assumptions, espoused 
values and the artefacts that the group holds as important.  These play a significant 
ii 
part in determining people’s behaviour, their adherence to safety procedures and 
communication in the workplace.  In terms of the safety culture on the RTO trains, 
transit officers have commonly said that anyone wanting to understand the 
provocation and violence that they deal with in their work environment would need 
to work alongside them.  This research responds to that challenge to understand the 
cultural and communication dynamics that exist within the transit officer cadre and 
in exchanges between passenger and transit officers.  
An ethnographic protocol was chosen, which in this instance involved the 
researcher participating directly in the workplace and building close relationships 
with the transit officers.  Recognising the significance of obtaining ‘insider status’ 
the researcher commenced the fieldwork by joining a new intake of transit officers 
embarking upon the twelve-week training program.  Importantly, taking this path 
enabled the researcher to obtain credibility amongst the transit officers through their 
shared experiences.  Following graduation from training, the researcher spent a 
further month in the closed circuit television monitoring room obtaining an overview 
of the many activities involving transit officers that occur during the night 
throughout the metropolitan rail system.  From this communication heart, the Shift 
Commander can communicate directly by radio with all transit officers; and the 
video operators can monitor activities from cameras which are situated on all railway 
infrastructure.   
The researcher spent the following four months immersed in the transit 
officers’ world.  This included working alongside the officers during the evening and 
night, being rostered on their shifts and engaging with the variety of their duties on 
trains, stations and delta vehicle patrols.  The information gleaned during this time 
became the basis of the formal interviews which took place at the end of that period. 
The researcher later met with ‘best-practice’ transit policing organisations to 
determine what strategies these organisations had in place to reduce rail officer 
injury rates.  The collaborating organisations included transit policing agencies in the 
United States, Canada, Britain and interstate Australia.  Information obtained during 
the RTO field work was evaluated against safety practices and the safety culture in 
these high performing organisations.  Recommendations to reduce the risk of injury 
for transit officers and improve communication practices within the transit officer 
cadre were subsequently submitted to the industry partner for consideration. 
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A safer workplace for transit officers would reduce transit officers’ personal 
suffering, leaving more transit officers at work, reducing workers’ compensation 
costs, and providing a safer environment for passengers. 
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DEFINITIONS 
Accredited person A rail transport operator who is accredited under the Rail 
Safety Act 2010. It does not include any person whose 
accreditation has been surrendered, revoked, or otherwise 
not effective ("Western Australia Rail Safety Act," 2010)  
Boom gates Barrier arms either side of a railway crossing that descend 
across the road to prevent vehicles entering the level 
crossing when a train is approaching.  
Competence* The possession of defined skills and knowledge, and the 
application of them to the standards required to safely and 
efficiently perform work. 
Crank  handle A rigid metal lever which when correctly inserted into the 
points motor enables the operator to manually move the 
points‘ blades.  
Crank the points The manual operation of points, using a crank handle to 
move the blades and set the desired route for the train. 
Delta vehicle A form of van with two way radio, emergency light and 
siren,  and a separate enclosed back area where a person 
under arrest can be placed in safe custody. 
Human factors* The scientific discipline that is concerned with the 
application of information about human characteristics, 
capacities, and limitations to the design of human tasks, 
machines, machine systems, and environments. 
Just culture* An occurrence-investigation environment which 
acknowledges human error and encourages honest reporting 
of errors while establishing clear accountability for 
deliberate or culpably negligent actions. 
Occurrence* A general term for accidents and incidents which lead to 
injury or loss, or which are considered by the responsible 
authority to have the potential to compromise safety. 
On or near the track  Means three (3) metres from the edge of the closest rail 
when measured horizontally and at any level above or below 
the rail when measured vertically, unless in a position of 
safety (National Transport Commission Australia, 2004, p. 
viii).  
Pantograph A hinged metal rod which conducts the electricity to drive 
the rail car from the overhead electrical power lines to the 
rail car. 
 xiv 
Points Heavy moveable blades which change the direction of a 
train from one track (road) to the next.  Point blades are 
operated either by hand or by electric points motors (Public 
Transport Authority of Western Australia, 2007b, p. 13). 
Rail safety worker* A person performing or responsible for safety-related work, 
be that person a paid member of the staff of the railway, a 
contractor, subcontractor or an employee of either, or a 
volunteer. 
Risk  The combination of the frequency or probability of 
occurrence and the consequences of a specified hazardous 
event (National Transport Commission Australia, 2004, p. 
ix). 
 
Xyz/Xyzies Transit officer name for revenue protection officers.  They 
wear similar uniforms to transit officers, but deal mainly 
with fare evasion.  They do not have transit officer powers.  
They have an observe and report role only.   
 
*Australian Standard AS 4292.1-2006 Railway safety management. Part 1: General 
requirements. 
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ARA Australian Rail Association 
ARC Australian Research Council 
ARTBU Australian Rail Tram and Bus Union 
CCTV Closed circuit television  
CEW Controlled electrical weapon  
CMR Central monitoring room 
EMU Electrical multiple unit ie. Two or more rail cars semi-permanently 
coupled together and not normally uncoupled in service, having a 
driving cab at each outer end of the pair. 
EAP Employee assistance program 
HSE Health and Safety Executive Britain 
IFRS Incident fault reporting system 
JSA Job safety analysis 
NYPD New York Police Department 
OC Oleoresin capsicum spray 
ORR Office of Rail Regulation  
OSH Occupational safety and health 
RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
RISSB Rail Industry Safety and Standards Board  
RTO Rail Transport Organisation 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Learning is a process of ‗becoming‘ 
(Heslop, 2011, p. 327)  
 
This research was supported by a tripartite agreement between Edith Cowan 
University the Australian Research Council (ARC) and a State Government 
Transport Authority, which will be referred to as the ‗Rail Transport Organisation‘ 
(RTO).  It was funded through a national competitive ARC Project Grant.  The 
research involved an ethnographic investigation into the safety and communication 
culture of transit officers working in the RTO (Australian Research Council, 2005).  
From the findings of the investigation, the study sought to examine whether an 
understanding of the safety and communication elements of transit officer culture 
could provide opportunities for improving their safety.  The RTO transit officers, 
whose core functions are passenger safety and customer service on the railway 
system, are in many ways similar to police, although their powers are limited to the 
environs of the rail system.  The transit officers form part of the security arm of the 
Train Operating Division of the RTO.  The Train Operating Division (TOD) is itself 
a division of a large multi faceted transport organisation.  After the field work was 
completed, and following receipt of a final report of the research outcomes and 
recommendations, the RTO chose to withdraw from the tripartite agreement.  
Consequently, outcomes of this research and the recommendations do not reflect the 
views of the organisation.  The research team remains grateful to the RTO for their 
initial support of the project, and for their facilitation of the research.  Whilst all the 
activities referred to in this project are an accurate account of the research, 
pseudonyms have been used throughout the study to protect the identity of all 
persons who have contributed to the outcomes.   
This chapter will document the background and will provide an overview of 
the research project, as well as providing an outline of the structure of this thesis.  
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1.1 My Interest in the Research Topic 
My interest in the occupational safety of transit officers began during the years 
I worked in a fairly senior corporate management position within the RTO.  
Although my position had a responsibility for occupational safety and health within 
the organisation, I had no influence or input into the security area.  The security 
section of the RTO was run as a discrete entity, in isolation from the rest of the 
organisation.  I had no knowledge of what contributed to an incident occurring, what 
risk assessments may or may not have been completed, or any steps that may have 
been taken to mitigate any risk of injury.  At that time, whilst I was aware that 
management was concerned about the rate at which the injuries occurred, 
management thought that these injuries resulted from ‗the nature of the job‘.  I found 
this situation difficult to accept, and wanted to learn more about the transit officers‘ 
work and what contributed to an incident taking place.  
Over the years the injury rate of transit officers has continued unabated.  This 
led to the RTO executive commissioning this research, to gain in-depth information 
that might help reduce the rate of injury.  The RTO executive at that time were also 
interested to learn from ‗best-practice‘ transit policing organisations worldwide, 
especially as to how those organisations minimise the risk of injury to their officers.  
The tripartite linkage grant provided the finance for a PhD student to undertake the 
research, including a comparatively long period of international travel.  I was 
successful in obtaining the scholarship grant, and resigned from the RTO to 
commence the PhD research.   
As a beginning ethnographer, my only concerns starting out on this research 
related to my management background, plus being an older female.  I felt these 
factors could impede transit officers‘ acceptance of my presence amongst them.  I 
was also conscious of the need not to let my management thinking cloud any 
research outcomes, but to interpret how transit officers themselves construct their 
culture.  I was unfamiliar with the training undertaken by the transit officers, the 
duties they perform, and their rostering arrangements; and whilst I knew the 
management of the area, I did not know the officers themselves.  When I eventually 
returned to the organisation as a trainee transit officer, about to begin a twelve week 
immersion course like other trainees, it was all unfamiliar and I was starting from 
scratch.  Raeithal (1996, p. 320) aptly describes the process I embarked on: 
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The application of ethnographic methods to work research, then 
begins by our viewing each work group or organisation as a 
culturally alien community whose world-model and practices we 
must reconstruct from the utterances and situated actions of the 
working persons.  
The problems I anticipated occurring during the research, such as acceptance 
by the transit officers, did not turn out to be well-founded.  However, other issues 
materialised which I had not expected to occur.  For example, security managers 
were reluctant for me to work on track with the transit officers, citing ‗safety 
concerns‘ and saying that ‗the timing is not right‘.  There was also a lack of 
understanding from my previous peers as to why I chose to spend all my time with 
the transit officers.  Finally, the transit officer trainers assumed I was there to assess 
their performance.  Nevertheless, the problems I encountered had one big advantage: 
the more difficulties that were placed in my way, the greater was my acceptance by 
the transit officers as one of them.  
1.2 Background to the Research 
Initially when I commenced the research, the RTO had four main rail lines 
operating from the city to outer suburbia.  During the process of the research, a fifth 
line was completed and commenced operating on the system.  This new line was the 
longest of them all and triggered a major recruitment drive.  Transit officers are 
allocated to a team servicing one of these five lines and work out from the team‘s 
home base.  Home bases are located at the end stations on each line.  Transit officer 
rosters can include working at their home base station, or at other main stations 
along their route, some of which may also be bus transfer stations.  Officers can also 
be allocated to a station that is known to be busy at a particular time during their 
shift; or be asked to undertake train riding duties; or ride in the ‗delta vehicle‘ patrol.  
Delta vehicle patrol is where officers patrol the line in a vehicle similar to a secure 
police wagon, providing additional support if and when required, transporting 
arrested individuals to the police lockup, and monitoring any unmanned stations 
along the rail line.  Generally the transit officers work in pairs, and are responsible 
for customer service and safety of the passengers on the stations, platforms and trains 
on their particular line.  A further group of transit officers are assigned to a team 
based at the main security office in the central city station.  They service that station 
and the underground stations in the central city area.   
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Similar to other transport organisations worldwide, the RTO experiences anti-
social behaviour by some passengers which can range from bad language to severe 
violence and, as Dickson and Bevan (2005) identified, violence is a daily occurrence 
for some railway employees.  Transit officers form the front line of deterrence 
against this anti-social behaviour, and can often receive injuries themselves when 
dealing with such situations. These officers work mainly at night, when the anti-
social behaviour is more prevalent as passenger demographics change from the 
workday commuters to those following mainly recreational pursuits (Teague, Green, 
& Leith, 2010a).  If transit officers are to keep passengers safe, they need to remain 
safe themselves.  A transit officer who becomes injured when dealing with a violent, 
alcohol or drug affected offender, becomes unable to provide protection for 
passengers (Teague, et al., 2010a).   
The RTO is committed to ensuring that passengers feel safe on the train 
network at all times.  Nevertheless, exposure to anti-social behaviour on the trains, 
stations and platforms can leave passengers feeling worried about travelling at night, 
as demonstrated by the RTO passenger satisfaction surveys (Public Transport 
Authority of Western Australia, 2011, p. 29).  These indicate that people who feel 
safe travelling by rail during the day feel less safe at night.  This reduced sense of 
safety and security is also fuelled by local newspaper and television companies 
giving extensive publicity to any negative event that may occur on the night-time rail 
system.  Headlines include, for example, ―Safety on trains ‗a sick joke‘‖ (Spencer & 
Sadler, 2006, March 22, p. 51), and ―Train travel gets more dangerous‖ (Spencer, 
2009, July 11 p. 17).  Camera footage of an assault in or around a station can be 
shown on television, while the broadcast media may also carry an interview with an 
assault victim.  These add to passengers‘ disquiet. 
Previous passenger concerns led to a state government election promise in 
2001 (Western Australia Legislative Council, 2009b, [Hon Ed Dermer to Minister of 
Transport Hon. Simon O'Brien]), that every train leaving the city after 7pm would 
have two transit officers on board.  However, a shortage of transit officers, in spite of 
repeated recruitment drives, has meant that this promise has not materialised 
(Teague, et al., 2010a).  Even so, as previously discussed in Teague and Leith 
(2008b), the RTO has taken a number of steps to deal with the challenges resulting 
from the anti-social behaviour of some patrons.  Measures adopted include: closed 
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circuit television cameras (CCTV) located on all RTO stations, platforms and trains; 
‗real‘ time monitoring of the cameras on stations and platforms; the installation of 
emergency phones on all platforms; ticket barriers at most stations; an organisation-
wide comprehensive occupational health and safety system; a detailed transit officer 
induction training course and yearly retraining in certain components of the course; 
plus high levels of patrolling by transit officers at night.  These security initiatives 
have been supplemented by the introduction of revenue protection officers dressed in 
a uniform which is similar to transit officers‘.  The additional number of revenue 
protection officers gives the appearance of a greater presence of transit officers.  The 
responsibilities of the revenue protection officers, however, are confined to ticket 
checking and the issuing of fines.  Revenue protection officers are specifically 
instructed not to get involved in any disturbance, but to maintain a position of 
‗observe and report‘ only.  This is substantially different from transit officers who 
have extensive training for their law enforcement role, which includes the ‗power of 
arrest‘ for offences committed on railway property (Public Transport Authority 
Western Australia, 2006).   
In spite of all the above measures taken by the organisation, violence and anti-
social behaviour by patrons still occurs.  This was recently emphasised by the Hon 
Ken Travers, Shadow Minister of Transport who stated in Parliament:  
I believe this area is so important that we should set up a 
parliamentary committee to look at the issue of security on our 
public transport and how we can make it safer and better for the 
general community going forward because I do not think any of us 
should accept that the level of violence on our public transport is 
acceptable.  On certain rail lines and certain bus routes, the level of 
violence is simply unacceptable (Western Australia Legislative 
Council, 2011c, p. 1).  
The RTO wished to keep statistics for transit officer incidents and injuries 
confidential.  However,  Spencer (2009, July 11 p. 17) in an article published in the 
West Australian ―Train travel gets more dangerous‖, obtained some statistics under 
the Freedom of Information Act 1992 ("Freedom of Information Act (WA)," 1992), 
which highlighted the increase in violent attacks both on commuters and transit 
officers.  These statistics are discussed further in chapter six.  Following that 
newspaper article, questions were raised in parliament regarding the violence and 
anti-social behaviour on the rail system.  This resulted in incident statistics being 
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presented in parliament which are discussed later in this thesis.  Many of the violent 
episodes can escalate from simple triggers such as fare evasion, over-crowding or 
passengers exhibiting more demanding behaviours as a result of ‗alcohol, drugs, 
mental health or anti-social behaviour‘ (Dickinson & Bevan, 2005, p. 41).  As has 
been previously discussed in Teague and Leith (2008a), the research also identified 
that frustration with ticket vending machines being out of order, or change machines 
out of change, can also lead to incidents of violence from the travelling public which 
can result in a transit officer being injured.  As Stan, one of the experienced transit 
officers, said: 
If you‘ve got someone who has got nothing to lose, they‘ve got 
nothing to lose and they know it, they just keep going.  A lot of the 
ones that are really at rock bottom, they have nothing to lose, are 
quite happy to get locked up, and go to jail because they‘ll be given 
three square meals a day, they‘ll be given a lot of care.  And in a lot 
of cases I know, I think I‘ve come across two from memory, 
situations, they wanted to get locked up to go and visit their relatives 
in jail for Christmas. 
A number of transit officer injuries occur during an arrest, even though officers 
are trained in arrest procedures, commonly referred to as ‗baton and handcuff‘ 
training.  However, unlike many police agencies that arm their officers with tasers 
and/or guns, RTO transit officers do not have the use of these armaments.  The 
transit officers have to rely on the use of their communication skills to command 
respect and control a situation, as well as sometimes needing to use their physical 
skills in arrest procedures.  Additionally, they have the use of pepper spray and 
batons to defend themselves.  However, transit officers do not command the same 
respect from the public as afforded to police, with a small minority of the passengers 
referring to  the officers as ‗Wanna Be Cops‘, ‗Failed Cops‘ or even ‗Transit Pigs‘  
and worse (Teague & Leith, 2008a).  Even so, transit officers are more likely to face 
violence than police officers, as transit officers deal with situations as they arise, 
whereas police are usually called to an event after its occurrence. 
1.3 Significance of the Research 
There is an absence of specific studies relating to transit officers, however the 
nature of the job is in many respects similar to police officers, which over the years 
has claimed the attention of many researchers.  This interest in policing has 
generated a significant amount of research examining  issues such as police culture 
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(Chan, 1997; Crank, 2004), or specific aspects of their culture (Metzger, 2004; 
Reuss-Ianni, 1983); the use of force by the police (Aveni, 2000; Butler & Hall, 2008; 
Smith & Alpert, 2000); and the impact of closed circuit television cameras have on 
police practice (Goold, 2003, 2004).  Previous police investigations have identified 
the existence of a strong subculture of informal occupational norms and values, 
generally obscured by rigid organisational hierarchical structures (Chan, 1996; 
Manning, 1978).  This project has benefited and built on the factual and interpretive 
findings of a range of research projects investigating the culture of law enforcement 
officers.   
Schein (2004) has previously argued, that the importance of understanding an 
organisations‘ culture cannot be over emphasised.  Culture forms the framework for 
all beliefs and practices that take place within a work group (Schein, 2004).  
Although transit officers do not undertake the full range of duties required of police, 
nevertheless their law enforcement role predisposes them to similar cultural traits.  
These traits are triggered by issues such as: the dangers officers face both physically 
and mentally (Fridell, Faggiani, Taylor, Sole Brito, & Kubu, 2009); alienation from 
the public because of their law enforcement role, leading to social isolation 
(Waddington, 1999); solidarity amongst their ranks (Fielding, 1994) and a quasi-
military organisational structure (Crank, 2004).  This thesis differs from previous 
research, however, in that it examines whether an understanding of the 
communication and safety culture of transit officers, might provide opportunities for 
reducing their work-related injuries.   
When they examined the literature on violence in police/citizen interactions, 
Fridell et al., (2009), found there was a strong correlation between agency 
aggressiveness and community relations.  The more aggressive the agency 
behaviour, the worse the relations.  Departmental aggressiveness can be conveyed by 
overt and covert signals which can impact upon officers‘ culture, and their attitudes 
to the use of violence in the field.  Fridell et al., (2009) identified the lack of research 
examining violence against law enforcement officers, and the impact of agency 
communication policies to this area of operation.  As Fridell et al., (2009) argued, 
those responsible for safety recommendations for police officers failed to examine 
this phenomenon.   
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In other industrial environments‘ safety cultures have been investigated from 
many perspectives (M. D. Cooper, 2000; Hale, Guldenmund, van Loenhout, & Oh, 
2010), with the importance of safety communication practices also highlighted 
(Angiullo, 2009; Reason, 1997).  Some accident investigation research has also 
examined communication practices following major disasters.  In these events, a 
breakdown in communication processes was often identified as a contributing factor 
to the incidents occurring (Hopkins, 2005; Westrum, 2004).  Leith (2008), however, 
identified that existing research on communication practices was mainly from a 
management perspective.  When he undertook an ethnographic study into safety 
communication practices with employees in an Australian refinery, he found that 
management and shop floor employees held different understandings of safety. 
Recognising that managers and employees may have different perspectives 
upon safety, and different safety cultures, this thesis seeks to answer the following 
question: ‗In what ways can an understanding of communication and safety culture 
provide opportunities for improving the safety of transit officers?‘  This research will 
investigate whether the transit officer safety culture and communication practices 
contribute to violence against the officers in transit officer/citizen interactions, and 
whether a knowledge of the safety culture and communication practices could lead to 
a reduction in transit officers‘ work-related injuries.  To date, this understanding has 
been lacking.  This research will also examine the two-way safety communication 
flow between management and transit officers and whether such a flow may 
contribute to the development of a positive safety culture and reduced transit 
officers‘ injury rates.  
The findings of this thesis have the potential to significantly reduce the injury 
rate of transit officers, resulting in benefits for the health and wellbeing of the 
officers and contributing to academic knowledge on the impact communication can 
make in this area.  It may also reduce workers‘ compensation payments; the medical 
and rehabilitation costs for the rail transport organisation, and offer an increased 
sense of security for passengers.  These changes would make rail transport a more 
attractive travel option, with the potential benefit of a reduced transport carbon 
footprint.  Although the ethnographic findings are limited to one particular rail 
authority, the study has implications for rail authorities globally.  This analysis of the 
research findings, together with information gathered from ‗best-practice‘ agencies 
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worldwide, resulted in RTO‘s management being presented with a range of 
recommendations to reduce transit officer injuries.  These recommendations may 
have value for all transit law enforcement agencies nationally and internationally.   
1.4 Research Process 
Before the research began, transit officers would argue that any person who 
truly wished to understand the violence with which they are regularly confronted 
would need to work alongside them.  I quickly realised the best way to do this was to 
become one of them.  Whilst the proposal for the linkage grant funding this study 
predetermined that an ethnographic method of research would be used, the choice of 
ethnographic approach was left to my discretion.  It was up to me to decide which 
group of workers to study, and under which circumstances.  Ethnography originated 
in the practice of anthropology, where a researcher would immerse themselves for a 
considerable period of time in the community they wished to study.  Traditionally 
these were first nation communities and they were often located in remote areas.  
The three main methods of conducting ethnographic research involve direct overt 
observation, covert observation and participant observation. The differences between 
these various forms of ethnography are discussed in further detail in chapter three.  
Choosing to commence this research by becoming a trainee transit officer, however, 
meant that I also chose the research approach of participant observation. In this 
epistemology, the research is undertaken from within the community to be studied, 
as a result of the researcher becoming an integrated member of the society being 
observed, whilst openly declaring their motive for joining this particular group of 
people (Bernard, 2000).   
Over the past two decades researchers have shown an increased interest in the 
use of ethnography beyond the anthropological arena.  It has now been adopted as a 
methodological approach by researchers investigating new concepts in work and 
employee practices (Hodson, 1998; Monaghan, 2004; Orr, 1996; Tope, Chamberlain, 
Crowley, & Hodson, 2005). In the safety field, however, researchers traditionally 
advocate the use of safety surveys as the most suitable means of assessing safety 
culture.  The validity of this survey method has, however, been questioned by 
researchers such as Holmes and Gifford (1996) and, a few years later, Glendon and 
Stanton (2000), Guldenmund (2000), again Guldenmund (2007) and more recently 
Antonsen (2009).  These authors argue that surveys measure people‘s perceptions of 
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what occurs, rather than what actually takes place in the workplace.  Instead of 
survey methods, these researchers recommend the practice of ethnography as 
providing a more authentic picture of the safety culture of a group.  Nevertheless, 
ethnographic research is time consuming, so few studies have been available.  It is 
only in recent years that participant observation has been adopted as a valid method 
for investigating safety culture in a workplace (Brooks, 2005; Leith, 2008). 
As a result of choosing participant observation as the research approach for 
this study, I was able to view the culture as an ‗insider‘.  Starting with an embryonic 
stage of membership on the first day of the twelve week compulsory training school, 
where assumptions, values and beliefs begin to develop, I went on to complete the 
training and become a transit officer team member on the railway line.  I learnt how 
new recruits were socialised into the transit officer cadre, and was able to experience 
from their perspective the development of the culture that was unique to these 
officers.  As Van Maanen  (1978b) found, in terms of the police force, the 
development of a policeman‘s work personality begins in the officers‘ classroom.  
Later, working alongside transit officers on the railway system, I was able to note the 
subtle, and in some situations marked, changes in practice and in attitudes, that took 
place once transit officers left the training environment and needed to adapt to the 
work culture on their particular rail line.   
Training can be described as the process of acquiring the knowledge, skills and 
attitudes which equip a person to competently perform the tasks that are required for 
their position (Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001).  Taking this path as a rookie trainee 
enabled me to compare training with practice, and helped me determine whether 
changes in training could possibly improve work safety for transit officers.  One of 
the requirements of the ARC Linkage Grant had been to report findings to the RTO 
management, with recommendations for possible improvements in training.  As 
Dennis one of the trainers later informed me during my interview with him, none of 
the trainers go on track.  Once the trainees leave the classroom, the trainers do not 
see them again until they return for ‘baton and handcuff‘ refresher training, usually a 
year later.  Whilst this trainer acknowledged the benefit that a supervised track-work 
induction would have, the trainers were not in a position to offer this.  The RTO was 
accredited as a training organisation to deliver training under the Australian 
Qualifications Framework (AQF), but the actual delivery of training was contracted 
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out to a provider company.  The current research identified a number of changes in 
the training which could possibly enhance the safety of transit officers.  Although the 
RTO did not accept the findings of the study, transit offices themselves continue to 
view these areas as opportunities for improvements. As previous researchers have 
found, differences in perception around what constitutes safe practice may reflect the 
different roles of management and employees (Leith, 2008; Orr, 2006).    
On completion of the transit officer training course, I wished to accompany my 
fellow trainees in being allocated to a particular line to begin the next stage of my 
career as a transit officer.  However, management was reluctant to facilitate this 
process, raising concerns regarding my safety on the rail system at night.  An interim 
compromise was reached where I would spend time in the closed circuit television 
(CCTV) monitoring room, thus seeing what happened at night on the railway 
system, but not participating directly in events.  This CCTV area is where operators 
can view in ‗real time‘ the images transmitted by the cameras located on stations, 
platforms and railway infrastructure and alert the shift commander to any problem 
developing.  This is also the control centre for a first response to an incident, such as 
a fight, or a passenger pressing an emergency button on a station.  The shift 
commander keeps a watching brief from the back of the room ready to respond 
immediately to any incident that may develop, such as relocating transit officers to 
provide back up support for colleagues should that appear to be called for.   
I spent four interesting weeks in the CCTV monitoring room viewing the 
workings of the railway system at night, and watching the many problems that 
confronted my transit officer colleagues.  Whilst I had not anticipated including this 
step in the research process, it provided a wealth of background information.  All the 
staff there endeavoured to answer any questions I raised, and were eager to tell me 
about the problems they encounter.  They explained the stressful nature of their job 
watching transit officers having to deal with traumatic events.  Such events include 
witnessing suicides on track; watching and hearing transit officers ‗in trouble‘ until 
the arrival of backup support; and violence between passengers.  During the time I 
spent in the CCTV room monitoring trackside activities, there was a suicide on the 
track, another attempted suicide from an overhead bridge, an attempted knifing of a 
passenger, melées between and within family groups, a fall off the platform and 
graffiti vandalism, amongst other issues.   
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Witnessing these events unfolding on CCTV monitors did not discourage me 
from going on track with the officers.  Instead, it provided me with an understanding 
of some of the stressful issues that transit officers face which could contribute to 
their safety culture.  However, watching CCTV footage from afar did not provide me 
with the understanding of the transit officer safety and communication culture 
required by the research.  Consequently, I negotiated further with the security 
management and eventually gained permission to join the officers ‗on track‘.   
During the four months I worked with the transit officers on the lines, I gained 
a broad perspective of the transit officers‘ safety culture and communication 
practices across all areas of the system.  It became evident that, similar to police 
culture, there were specific cultural traits common to transit officers across the whole 
rail system (Chan, 1996; Crank, 2004).  On the other hand, there were also 
differences in the subcultures and communication practices of the transit officer 
teams reflecting the specific experiences and attitudes related to each of the five 
discrete but interconnecting railway lines.  Passenger demographics changed from 
line to line, with two of the lines in particular servicing lower socio-economic areas.  
These factors did not appear to influence desirability of working on the line.  Transit 
officers were very protective of their line, each team believing their passengers and 
their line were the best, with officers often reluctant to change lines even when there 
were promotion opportunities.  They did not want to leave the closely knit team to 
which they belonged.  This line loyalty resulted in some lines having more 
experienced officers than others. 
The time I spent on track with the officers informed the questions I later asked 
during the 41 voluntary ‗in-depth‘ interviews conducted with transit officers, 
supervisors and managers.  The interview phase was scheduled at the conclusion of 
the field work.  Interviews were taped, and were later transcribed and analysed for 
consistent themes.  Quotes taken from the interviews are used extensively throughout 
the thesis to highlight communication practices, and traits within the officers‘ safety 
culture, such as the meanings ascribe by transit officers to specific issues and events. 
Having obtained this ‗insider view‘ from the training, the analysis of my field 
work and interviews,  I was able to compare the RTO transit officer safety and 
communication practices with ‗best-practice‘ transit law enforcement agencies 
interstate and overseas.  I wanted to learn from these organisations the systems and 
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practices they have in place to achieve their high performance.  The lessons learnt 
provided resources and transferable ideas to help the RTO improve their 
communications, training, and above all to embrace and demonstrate that safety is an 
organisational core value.  Through this research I learnt about the compstat 
paradigm (Henry, 2003), a management theory on accountability which is widely 
used in best-practice organisations; how agencies subscribe to the ‗broken window‘ 
theory, where small things are taken care of before they turn into bigger issues 
(Kelling & Coles, 1996); plus issues such as the communication and scenario 
training that their officers undertake; along with how all incidents are investigated to 
determine the contributing factors,  together with how the results are actioned and 
communicated to all relevant parties to prevent a reoccurrence.  The findings from 
these organisations contributed to the recommendations submitted to the RTO 
management for their consideration to improve transit officer communication and 
safety culture (see appendix 4). The process I adopted to identify which agencies I 
considered to demonstrate ‗best-practice‘ to contact and visit, is discussed fully in 
chapter 7.  These included transit law enforcement agencies in America, Canada, 
Britain and Australia. 
As this thesis argues, through an understanding of the transit officer safety 
culture and a thorough examination of the communication practices of not only the 
transit officers themselves, but the supervisors and managers, successful strategies 
can emerge that reduce the safety risk officers face daily.  Additionally, in examining 
the successful training, practices and procedures put in place by high achieving 
transit law enforcement agencies, a comparison can be made to the RTO‘s practices 
and procedures. This exercise analyses and identifies the gaps. The generosity of 
these high achieving agencies in sharing their information allowed successful 
strategies that have been used in best-practice agencies to be recommended to the 
RTO management for their consideration.   
This project adds valuable research to the existing body of evidence on 
communication and safety culture in law enforcement agencies, particularly for those 
positions not employed directly by law enforcement agencies, such as the position of 
transit officer, or in some countries and jurisdictions called special constables, and 
addresses a critical gap in the literature around the impact of communication 
practices upon violence against officers.   
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1.5 Structure of Thesis 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters, however, it does not follow the classic 
structure of a thesis.  Rather than one chapter containing all the evidence, here the 
research evidence is spread over four separate chapters (chapters 4 – 7).  These 
chapters relate to different stages of the researcher‘s immersion in the transit 
officers‘ world.  Additionally, to facilitate a better understanding of the complex 
transit officers‘ working environment, chapters four to seven incorporate a mixture 
of findings, discussion and references to the literature. 
This chapter (chapter 1) provides the reader with information concerning my 
interest in the topic, the background to the project, the significance of the research, 
and an overview of my research journey. 
Chapter two focuses on the relevant literature.  The literature used to inform 
the thesis covers a number of domains.  This reflects the current lack of integration 
between the various elements relevant to the study.  For instance, this research 
examines whether external environmental factors may contribute to the prevailing 
safety culture of the officers, such as the ‗night time economy‘, or the use of CCTV 
in public places.  Organisational culture is also important, as is the specific literature 
on the culture of law enforcement officers, safety culture, communication, training 
and ‗best-practice‘ management in law enforce agencies.  As Crank (2004) argues, 
without having an understanding of the culture of police officers, any reform process 
to bring about change will be thwarted. 
Chapter three discusses the ethnographic methodology used in this research 
and in particular, the requirements of participant observation.  This was the form of 
ethnography chosen as yielding the best means of developing an accurate picture of 
transit officer communication and safety culture.  The chapter also examines the 
ethical considerations taken into account before embarking on the field work. The 
overall research question is documented, and broken down into a further four sub 
questions.  The process and method used for each step of the field work is fully 
documented and explained. 
Chapter four is written in a different voice to the other chapters.  This chapter 
describes  my gradual metamorphosis from being a manager prior to my enrolment 
in the PhD through the trainee process to eventually become a transit officer.  The 
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chapter describes my training, firstly as a trainee transit officer, and secondly my 
personal journey as a doctoral student engaged in the research process.  Schein 
(2004) advances the view that a shared history is necessary for a culture to develop.  
While the new transit officers were all strangers to one another at the 
commencement of the training, with no developed culture, this was to emerge over 
the course of the twelve weeks.  My enlistment in training provided me with a clean 
slate to observe how the culture of law enforcement officers begins to germinate in 
the classroom, defining who they are.  This has been previously suggested by 
researchers such as Van Maanen (1988), and Kleinig (2000). 
Chapter five provides an overview of the time I spent in the CCTV monitoring 
room.  Whilst this step was not part of the original research plan, it was added into 
the research at the insistence of the RTO management.  It provided a useful overview 
of the rail system at night, and introduced me to some of the issues transit officers 
have to cope with. 
In Chapter six I describe the role of the transit officer, and the duties they 
undertake, using many examples of incidents that occurred during the time I spent on 
track with the officers to illustrate certain points, and highlight cultural traits.  I 
explore the areas that may contribute to their experiences of work-related injury such 
as the equipment provided; less than adequate maintenance of railway infrastructure 
such as cameras; supervision; communication, including both two-way 
management/transit officer communication, and transit officer/passenger 
communication; plus the use of force in undertaking their role.  I conclude the 
chapter with an analysis of relevant statistics that are available in the public arena.  
Chapter seven is devoted to the knowledge I gained from visiting the ‗best-
practice‘ transit policing organisations.  As a result of my research, I had a number 
of areas that I wished to explore with these high achieving transit law enforcement 
agencies.  The focus areas included training of the transit police officers, and their 
use of field training officers once the trainees graduated and left the classroom; the 
training of supervisors; and the use of key performance indicators for each level of 
management.  I learnt about the ‗broken window‘ theory (Kelling & Coles, 1996) 
that these agencies subscribe to, and a behavioural safety program that one of the 
agencies has in place.  I examined the communication process in these agencies from 
many perspectives.  Communication practices investigated include: interagency 
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communication; internal communication within their own organisation; the 
communication the organisations have with their communities; and the interpersonal 
communication between officers and passengers.  I complete the chapter by 
discussing the benchmarking processes occurring between these agencies. 
In Chapter eight I discuss my research findings, and review these findings in 
line with the component factors identified by the Rail Industry Safety and Standards 
Board (2010) which, when addressed and combined with good communication, are 
designed to produce a culture of safety within an organisation. 
Chapter nine, the final chapter of this thesis, draws together the findings of this 
research project, and outlines some of the difficulties faced in undertaking the 
research which may have limited the value of the research outcomes.  This chapter 
also provides recommendations for the RTO management which, if dealt with, may 
reduce the risk of injury for transit officers.  The research project concludes with 
recommendations for future research in this area. 
1.6 Summary 
My thesis argues that an understanding of the communication and safety 
culture of transit officers can lead to improvements in their incidence of work-related 
injury.  To achieve this, however requires a number of changes that are outside the 
transit officers‘ control.  Instead, the injury rates experienced by transit officers can 
be partly attributed to political constraints, financial constraints and a militaristic 
management structure, located within a bureaucratic organisation where priorities lie 
in the ‗on time running‘ of trains, and keeping passengers happy, rather than 
providing an optimal safety environment for front-line transit employees.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2. INTRODUCTION 
This research embraces a number of domains within a range of literatures, the 
context of which are referred to throughout the documentation of this study.  
However, this chapter provides an overview of the areas of literature used which 
have contributed to the research background, and highlights areas where little or no 
previous relevant research was identified; for example the specific work role of the 
transit officer.  In this situation, attention was paid to literature surrounding the 
culture, role and training of police officers.  The literature relating to the field of 
ethnography is excluded from this section as it is discussed in detail in the following 
chapter.  
The structure of this chapter includes material dealing with:  
 the night time economy; 
 the use of CCTV in a public places;  
 organisational culture; 
 culture of law enforcement officers; 
 safety culture;  
 communication;  
 training; and 
 ‗Best-practice‘ management in law enforcement agencies. 
2.1 Night Time Economy   
The transit officers, who are the subject of this research, work predominantly 
at night.  Similar to other night time workers in security or policing roles, they may 
be called on to deal with the anti-social or violent behaviour of individuals, often 
caused by the over consumption of drugs or alcohol.  These  potentially disorderly 
people form part of what Hobbs, Hadfield, Lister, and Winlow (2003) label, ‗the 
night time economy‘; or as Melbin (1978) refers to it, a ‗frontier‘, where lawlessness 
18 
and violence are present.  This anti-social behaviour, usually occurring at night in 
public places for example stations and public transport, can leave members of the 
public feeling fearful of unprovoked violence from a stranger (Bannister & Fyfe, 
2001; Bromley, Thomas, & Millie, 2000; Hobbs, et al., 2003; Homel, Tomsen, & 
Thommeny, 1992).  However, there are individuals in broad categories of 
occupational positions employed to deal with such anti-social behaviour.  Relevant 
roles range from that of the volunteer dealing with drug or alcohol affected 
individuals  (T. Cooper, Love, & Donovan, 2007) through security officers, 
sometimes referred to as ‗quasipolice‘ or ‗para police‘ (Manzo, 2010), or ‗bouncers‘ 
(Chaney, 1998; Homel, et al., 1992) with no particular legal powers to deal with 
violent situations at one end of the spectrum, to police, who have full powers of 
arrest at the other end (Chan, 1997; Crank, 2004; Reuss-Ianni, 1983).  Transit 
officers do not have all the powers that police officers do, for instance transit officers 
do not carry guns or tasers, and their legal powers are restricted to the rail system.  
However, compared to security personnel who do not receive the training that transit 
officers undertake (Manzo, 2010; Prenzler, 2004; Prenzler & Sarre, 2004), the transit 
officers‘ role and responsibilities more clearly reflect the duties undertaken by police 
officers.  Additionally, transit officers on the rail system have similar powers of 
arrest to police officers for specific offences, whereas the rights of licensed private 
security personnel are restricted to making a citizen‘s arrest which are subject to 
legal restrictions, including criminal law, the use of force and deprivation of liberty 
(Prenzler, 2004).   
Alcohol consumption is a routine pastime in Australian culture and, at night, 
regularly takes place in pubs and clubs, where entertainment is often provided to 
attract consumers.  These venues frequently advertise various drink promotions, for 
example: ‗happy hour‘, where drinks can be purchased at half price during that time; 
or they promote ‗two for one‘ offers, where two drinks can be bought for the price of 
one.  These offers encourage high levels of drinking and possible drunkenness  
within a short period of time (Homel, et al., 1992; Prenzler, 2004).  Previous 
research conducted by Hobbs et al., (2003) found that central to this night time 
communal ritual of alcohol consumption within young groups, lies their rite of 
passage to peer approval and group status (Hobbs, et al., 2003).  Anti-social 
behaviour, including violence, disorder, criminal damage, vandalism and noise is not 
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confined to the surrounds of the drinking premises where the activities take place, 
but also impacts on exit routes from the city, which would include the use of public 
transport, and which can be the sites of further disorder (Bromley & Nelson, 2002; 
Hobbs, et al., 2003). 
Previous researchers have identified that transport workers are potentially 
exposed to a high risk of violence at work (D. Chappell & Di Martino, 2000; 
Milczarek, 2010), whilst other researchers, such as Dickson and Bevan (2005), go as 
far as indicating that for some railway workers violence is an everyday experience.  
However, Dickson and Bevan (2005) reported that audit inspections undertaken by 
the British Health and Safety Executive on six train operating companies in Britain, 
found that whilst the frequency and level of violence was a concern to the train 
operating companies, the true level of violence was not known.  Further, the audits 
identified that there was a general acceptance by management in those train 
operating companies that ―assailants bring the situation to the railway and therefore 
‗what can we do?‘‖ (Dickinson & Bevan, 2005, p. 449).  Although the risk of 
violence is well known, on analysis of the audits Dickson and Bevan (2005) also 
identified that recommendations from incident investigations to prevent future 
violent incidents occurring were extremely limited.  Australia is no different.  
Railway environments in Australia, like railway environments the world over, are 
subject to anti-social behaviour from a small proportion of the travelling public (T. 
Cooper, et al., 2007; Teague & Leith, 2008a, 2008b).  However, whilst the literature 
acknowledges the occurrence of violence on rail systems, it appears silent on the role 
of law enforcement officers, such as transit officers, working in a railway 
environment and dealing with this violence.  This study has therefore drawn from 
previous research undertaken in various environments with police (Beck, 1999; 
Crank, 2004; C. Wilson, Gross, & Beck, 1994).  
2.2 The Use of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) in Public Places 
Over recent years there has been a proliferation of closed circuit television 
(CCTV) cameras in public and private settings in a bid to increase security and 
combat crime (Smithsimon, 2003; Williams & Johnstone, 2000; D. Wilson & Sutton, 
2004).  A CCTV system can be described as a system where cameras are linked 
together in a loop or complete circuit and transmit images to a control monitoring 
room and/or to a recording system (Goold, 2004).  This is achieved by either a cable 
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or a microwave signal (Goold, 2004).  According to Bannister and Fyfe (2001), this 
growth in surveillance systems is the result of an attempt by British towns and cities 
to halt the decline of their commercial  areas as a result of the competition from safer 
and more secure out-of-town retail parks.  Governments and corporations worldwide 
continue to view cameras as an important deterrent by increasing the fear of 
detection for people engaged in crime and disorder offences in public places 
(Coleman & Sim, 2000; Williams & Johnstone, 2000).  As a result, some 
governments provide substantial funding for cameras and offer them as evidence to 
argue that they are taking steps to tackle crime (Goold, 2002; Newburn, 2001; Short 
& Ditton, 1998; D. Wilson & Sutton, 2004).  However, many in the community 
argue that these cameras are an invasion of personal privacy (Coleman & Sim, 2000; 
Prenzler, 2004; The Economist, 2007); whilst others question the deterrent effect 
these cameras have on crime (Short & Ditton, 1998; Sivarajasingam, Shepherd, & 
Matthews, 2003).  In spite of these arguments, Teague, et al., (2010b) highlight the 
advantages that these cameras can provide in a railway environment.  These include 
the accurate identification of offenders; the ability to track offenders across the rail 
system; plus the cameras assist in the speedy deployment of back up support for 
transit officers, should a situation warrant this.   
Although CCTV cameras are installed as a means of monitoring the activities 
of people in public places, Goold (2004) in his research with police found similar 
findings to research conducted by Lister, Hobbs, Hall, and Winlow (2000) with 
bouncers, that the use of the CCTV cameras could also provide protection for 
officers against complaints by a member of the public.  These complaints were 
usually based on an accusation that the officer had acted inappropriately in some 
manner, such as the excessive use of force against a member of the public.  Camera 
footage could be used as evidence in a defence against this claim.  Like the police, 
transit officers provide the front line of deterrence in the fight against anti-social 
behaviour and crime on the rail system and are subject to similar complaints from the 
public. 
According to Tilley (1997), the public feel safer knowing that there are many 
cameras in the area, although a number of researchers who investigate surveillance 
operations argue that the use of these cameras in CCTV contexts can lead to abuse 
such as racial profiling, the harassment of gays, and sexual voyeurism (Goold, 2004; 
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Smithsimon, 2003; Wells, Allard, & Wilson, 2006).  Nevertheless, transport systems 
worldwide continue to install cameras in their trains, buses and related infrastructure 
(Manning, 1997; Wells, et al., 2006).  As Williams and Johnstone (2000, p. 184) 
highlight, ―It is now the rule rather than the exception for any reasonably sized 
community to have CCTV surveillance of its public spaces‖. 
2.3 Organisational Culture 
A lack of specificity in definition, combined with confusion in the literature 
between the terms ‗organisational climate‘ and ‗organisational culture‘ have resulted 
in these terms being used synonymously (Glendon & Stanton, 2000).  Hale (2000) 
believes that the term ‗organisational culture‘ is trending to replace ‗organisational 
climate‘ as the dominant term in management studies.  On the other hand, Glendon 
and Stanton (2000) argue that there is a difference in the meanings of the two terms, 
with organisational climate being a more superficial concept than organisational 
culture.  Whereas Schein (1992, p. 9) views climate as one of the social concepts that 
relate to culture and describes it as: ―the feeling that is conveyed in a group by the 
physical layout and the way in which members of the organization interact with each 
other, with customers, or with other outsiders‖.  Glick (1985), writing twenty five 
years ago, suggests that the difference is in terms of applied methodology, and posits 
that both terms emanate from different philosophies.  This view is supported by Cox 
and Flin (1998) who argue that organisational climate originates mainly from a 
psychological framework using psychological approaches, whilst the notion of 
organisational culture is constructed from anthropological perspectives.  However, 
Denison (1996) views the differences between organisational climate and 
organisational culture as differences in interpretation of research findings rather than 
differences in the actual phenomenon.  Whilst noting the arguments in the literature, 
this study has used the term ‗culture‘ rather than ‗climate‘ to convey a more 
inclusive concept of the facets of a group or organisation‘s workings.  
Schein (2004, p. 17) defines the culture of a group: 
As a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learnt by a group 
as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal 
integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, 
therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to 
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.  
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Another way Schein (1992, p. 8) describes culture is ―the way we do things 
around here‖, while Crank (2004, p. 15) refers to it as ―collective sense-making‖.  As 
Hopkins (2005) identified, it may not be the correct way of doing things, but it has 
become the accepted norm.  These practices, or ways of operating, originate from the 
basic underlying assumptions that the group hold as important.  These are formed by 
the unconscious, taken for granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings that 
the group embrace as important (Schein, 2004).  Schein (2004) views culture as 
having three layers: 1) the bottom layer which is the underlying assumptions; 2) the 
second layer which are the values which the group hold as important, including the 
strategies, goals and philosophies of the group; and 3) the top level or visible signs 
and artefacts that the group embrace.  People attribute meaning to these artefacts and 
organisational symbols which include clothing, myths and stories, work practices, 
and the ceremonies and observable rituals that the unit adopts (Fielding, 1994; 
Schein, 2004).  Freckelton (2000) views the evolution of a group‘s culture as a way 
in which the group or organisation preserves its integrity and autonomy, 
differentiating that group from the environment, and from other groups.  Essentially, 
the group‘s culture provides it with an identity.  Schein (1992) posits that to really 
understand the culture of a group it is necessary to understand the basic underlying 
assumptions that the group holds and the learning processes by which the basic 
assumptions were developed.   
Hopkins (2005) whilst accepting the definition of culture promoted by Schein 
(1992) argued in his analysis of the findings of the Glenbrook Rail disaster by 
McInerney (2001) that the culture of an organisation can be shaped by external 
factors:  
It is clear that the culture of an organisation will be powerfully 
shaped by the needs of external stakeholders such as passengers or, 
in other contexts, shareholders.  Where stakeholder interest is 
championed by the press and politicians, as it is in the case of 
railway commuters, it becomes an irresistible force moulding the 
organisational culture.  
(Hopkins, 2005, p. 52) 
2.3.1 Culture of law enforcement officers 
A significant amount of literature has been written on the culture of police 
officers in organisations (Chan, 1997, 2000, 2004; Crank, 2004; Crank, Payn, & 
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Jackson, 1993; Fielding, 1994; Van Maanen, 1973; Waddington, 1999), with the 
majority of the literature concentrating on officers working within the operational 
arena.  Manning and Van Maanen (1978, p. 267) later cited by Chan, Devery & 
Doran (2003, p. 8) to describe the occupational culture constructed by police as: 
Consist[ing] of long standing rules of thumb, a somewhat special 
language and ideology that help edit a member‘s everyday 
experiences, shared standards of relevance as to the critical aspects 
of the work, matter-of-fact prejudices, models for street-level 
etiquette and demeanour, certain customs and rituals suggestive of 
how members are to relate not only to each other but to outsiders, 
and a sort of residual category consisting of the assorted miscellany 
of some rather plain police horse sense. 
This concept of police culture emerged from ethnographic studies of police 
which uncovered a range of occupational norms and values which are similar in 
police cultures worldwide (Chan, 1997; Crank, 2004; Manning, 1997; Skolnick, 
1985; Van Maanen, 1973, 1978a).  Skolnick (1985), refers to these standard patterns 
of behaviours as the common ―working personality‖ of police officers (Skolnick, 
1985, p. 91).  Similarly, Waddington (1999, pp. 295 - 296) advanced the view that 
these police cultural elements and behaviours were transnational: 
I maintain that there is indeed a police subculture whose core 
elements are to be found across a remarkably broad spectrum of 
police talk in a wide variety of jurisdictions.  Throughout the United 
States, which contains many significant elements of internal 
divisions between jurisdictions and law enforcement agencies, the 
core elements of the police subculture remain recognizably the same.  
Those elements are shared throughout the various jurisdictions that 
constitute the United Kingdom, including Scotland and even 
Northern Ireland. 
Further, Waddington (1999) noted these similarities were also evident in 
Canada, Australia and India.   
Some researchers highlight the difference in the culture between management 
officers in the police force and the lower ranks of police officers, who are often 
referred to as ‗street cops‘ (Reuss-Ianni, 1983) or ‗patrol cops‘ (Manning, 1997).  
Police officers often have to make swift decisions, sometimes with limited 
information on which to base their decision, and this can lead to mistakes being 
made (Crank, 2004; Spano, 2007).  Whilst both management and lower ranks share 
the same goal of combating crime and supporting public safety, the street cop 
24 
believes the ability to ―recognise, identify and respond to a situation rather than the 
internalization of standardized rules and procedures, characterizes ‗good police 
work‘‖ (Reuss-Ianni, 1983, p. 7).  In contrast, a competing ethos places the 
importance ―not in the traditions of the job, but rather in theories and practices of 
scientific management and public administration‖ (Reuss-Ianni, 1983, p. 6).  These 
differences of perspective help explain some of the reasons why management and 
operational police can find it difficult to communicate about the realities of their 
everyday experiences. 
A number of these studies have reported that the assumptions and values that 
the police officers hold are in response to their work environment (Chan, et al., 2003; 
Crank, 2004; Freckelton, 2000; Warren & James, 2000).  For example, police 
officers are often referred to as cynical, hard, suspicious and loyal to their fellow 
officers (Chan, 1996; Crank, 2004), although a study conducted by Metzger (2004) 
in an American police organisation did not identify any cynicism amongst the 
officers taking part in the research.  However, Metzger‘s (2004) finding may have 
been due to the method of qualitative research chosen, interviews and surveys, in 
place of an ethnographic study over a period of time, where the officers become 
accustomed to a field observer being present and begin to act naturally and 
spontaneously.  Spano (2007) found in his research with police that initially there 
were two observable outcomes when an observer was present.  His view was that 
behaviour polarised in response to being observed.  Officers became more proactive, 
possibly due to not wanting the observer to get bored, and were perceived to be more 
aggressive when dealing with calls.  Alternatively, there was evidence that officers 
sheltered observers and became less proactive.  Spano‘s (2007) research may have 
been compromised by short time frames; even so, over time, these reactions to the 
observer were negated.   
Researchers often refer to the social isolation of police officers which increases 
their collegial solidarity (Crank, 2004; Manning, 1997), with Fielding (1994) 
identifying their constant emphasis to on ‗the job‘ as an entity, or to their experience 
‗on the street‘.  He suggests these references serve to provide a solidarity display of 
their occupational group.  Many studies emphasise the danger of police work, where 
officers may be exposed to situations in which both their physical and psychological 
well-being is affected (Chan, 2000; Van Maanen, 1973; Warren & James, 2000), 
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whilst others refer to the unpredictability of the job in dealing with difficult and risky 
situations (O'Loughlin & Billing, 2000).  Similar to police officers, transit officers 
face comparable challenges every day. 
Previous researchers have identified that police organisations are based on a 
quasi-military structure and model (Auten, 1985; Crank, 2004; Manning, 1978, 
1997; Reuss-Ianni, 1983).  The paramilitary model‘s fundamental principles are 
centred on discipline and accountability, which provide the basis for many enduring 
features of police culture.  Rules proliferate within police organisations and complex 
systems exist to punish any violators  (Manning, 1997; Waddington, 1999) but, as 
Reuss-Ianni (1983, p. 64) identifies, this ―does not also confer unquestioned 
obedience‖.  The paramilitary model has led to a ‗them and us mentality‘ among 
colleagues, where the only people you can count on are your fellow officers.  The 
‗them‘ refers not only to members of the public but also to commanding officers 
(Crank, 2004; Terrill, Paoline, & Manning, 2003; Van Maanen, 1973).  Officers are 
rarely praised for work well done (Waddington, 1999), and quickly learn to ‗lay low‘ 
and ‗cover their ass‘; in other words, to keep out of trouble and avoid disciplinary 
action (Chan, et al., 2003).  Brown (1988, p. 9), cited in Terrill et al., (2003, p. 
1005), succinctly describes the police officers‘ relationship with their environment: 
What must be recognized is that patrolmen lead something of a 
schizophrenic existence; they must cope not only with the terror of 
an often hostile and unpredictable citizenry, but also with a hostile-
even tyrannical-and unpredictable bureaucracy.  
Cowper (2000) disagrees that police organisations are based on a ‗military 
model‘ and refers to the ‗myth of the military model of leadership‘.  Cowper argues 
that whilst missions and objectives are similar, the military model builds on 
successful operations in the past, has a ―lesson learnt‖ program which ―incorporates 
existing doctrine with detailed and open after-action critique designed to speed 
improvement in operational and structural methodologies‖ (Cowper, 2000, p. 243).  
In contrast, Cowper (2000) argues that police organisations fail to adopt the 
operational methods and leadership style displayed by the military, thereby 
diminishing the effectiveness of the military model.  This view is similar to that 
expressed by Chan (2000), who posits that accountability in police organisations has 
previously been based on internal discipline, such as departmental procedures and 
dress code, rather than effective decision-making.  In a crisis situation, commanders 
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of military organisations are always involved in their operations.  In contrast, senior 
police officials, who are responsible for the success or failure of an operation, may 
be removed from action on the street and may be reluctant to take the advice from a 
trained operational specialist who may be many ranks their junior.  In summary, 
Cowper (2000) highlights the need for police organisations to study and learn from 
the military model and adopt specific military theories and practices, suggesting that 
such a strategy may lead to safer and less violent outcomes when dealing with 
criminal activity. 
McCulloch (2000) argues that while soldiers and police officers share many 
common cultural aspects, including solidarity amongst the officers, a common 
uniform, shift work and the use of specialist language and codes; there are also 
notable differences in the way the police and military are organised and operate.  
Soldiers function as a part of a disciplined body while police generally have a high 
degree of operational discretion.  Additionally, the purpose of police discretion and 
soldier discipline is opposite.  Soldier discipline is aimed at overcoming inhibitions 
to killing; police discretion is aimed at avoiding harsh consequences.  This difference 
is further emphasised when any excessive force is used in a police and citizen 
encounter.  An officer is subject to departmental discipline, and may additionally be 
subject to common law assault charges.  However, O‘Loughlin and Billing (2000) 
question whether the use of excessive force, as opposed to intentional assault, is the 
product of a distinct police culture or ―whether it may be symptomatic of the body‘s 
natural ‗fight or flight‗ response, to which we are all vulnerable‖ (O'Loughlin & 
Billing, 2000, p. 70).  It can be noted here that the least experienced officers, like 
transit officers, are often the youngest, and these can be employed as early as their 
eighteenth birthday when ‗fight or flight‘ responses may be particularly pronounced. 
2.4 Safety Culture 
The relationship between the culture of a group or organisation and their 
experience of accidents and safety incidents has now been well established (Clarke, 
2000; Hopkins, 2005; Mearns & Flin, 1999; Reiman & Oedewald, 2006).   Hopkins 
(2005) argues that the leaders of an organisation are the ones that determine how the 
organisation functions and it is a result of their decision making ―which determines, 
in particular, whether an organisation exhibits the practices which go to make up a 
culture of safety‖ (Hopkins, 2005, p. 8).  However, as far back as thirty years ago, 
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Heinrich, Peterson and Roos (1980) identified the interactive relationship between 
psychological, situational and behavioural factors at the operator level in accident 
investigations.  Over subsequent years, other researchers such as Hale and Glendon 
(1987), and Pidgeon (1991), also identified the relationship between those basic 
principles, and expressed a similar view that it was necessary to look beyond purely 
technical reasons for an accident occurring, and to examine as well the behavioural 
circumstances which may have contributed to the event.  Reason (1997), in his work 
on managing the risks of organisational accidents, also identified this reciprocal 
relationship between three critical elements which he referred to as ―the person 
(unsafe acts), the workplace (error provoking conditions), and the organisation‖ 
(Reason, 1997, p. 17).  However, one prompt for this growing interest, particularly 
as it relates to high risk industries, was the release of the initial report by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the Chernobyl nuclear accident 
(International Atomic Energy Agency, 1986).  In this report, the culture of the 
organisation was identified as contributing significantly to events leading to the 
reactor meltdown.  Prior to that report, as I previously argued in Teague and Leith 
(2008b), simple worker error might have been found to be the cause (Hopkins, 
2000).  However, the Chernobyl report identified the entire organisational safety 
culture as problematic.   
As a result of the Chernobyl report, awareness grew of how the prevailing 
safety culture of an organisation may contribute to events.  This perspective 
informed other large-scale accident investigations.  Examples include the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Space Challenger Incident (Rogers 
Commission Report, 1986), the Exxon Valdez oil tanker grounding (National 
Transportation Safety Board, 1990), the Piper Alpha oil platform explosion (Cullen, 
1990), Glenbrook Rail Accident (McInerney, 2001), and the Longford Oil Refinery 
explosion (Hopkins, 2000).  In all these incidents the safety culture of the 
organisations were identified as significantly contributing to potentially fatal events.  
These reports and ancillary research led to the recognition by safety professionals 
and by safety regulators (particularly of high risk enterprises, such as the nuclear, air 
and rail industries), that traditional safety management systems based purely on 
hazard identification and rectification are inappropriately limited.  The contribution 
made by organisational culture to the safety of the overall enterprise must be 
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recognised.  This new perspective has resulted in regulators requiring organisations 
to demonstrate that they have systems of work in place which recognise, integrate, 
incorporate and monitor human factors as a crucial element in their effective 
management of safety and risk (Health and Safety Executive, 2005a; National 
Transport Commission Australia, 2006, 2008; Standards Australia, 2006a).  In the 
Australian rail industry, this is a requirement under legislation when rail 
organisations obtain their accreditation as railway operators from the Rail Safety 
Regulator (National Transport Commission Australia, 2006; "Western Australia Rail 
Safety Act," 2010).  Additionally, recognising the important contribution made by 
human factors to the overall safety experience, rail safety regulators require these 
elements to routinely be addressed in any accident or incident investigation 
(Standards Australia, 2006b).   
Hale and Hovden (1998) view this growing interest in safety culture as the 
‗third age of safety‘.  The first and second ages being (1) hazard control 
technologies, and (2) human factors.  DeJoy (2005, p. 114) comments however, that 
―much remains to be learnt about defining and measuring safety culture, as well as 
about assessing the overall impact of different types of safety cultures‖.  Cox and 
Flin (1998) are in a small minority when they suggest that the idea of safety culture 
has been over-sold, and there is a naive belief that it represents the solution to all 
health and safety problems, referring to it as ―a philosopher‘s stone to cure all ills‖ 
(Cox & Flin, 1998, p. 189).  Cooper (2000, p. 3) sees the situation in much more 
complex terms suggesting that ―safety culture does not operate in a vacuum: it 
affects, and in turn is affected by, other non-safety-related operational processes or 
organisational systems‖.  Similarly, Glendon and Stanton (2000) believe that 
organisational culture is not owned by one group but is created by all the 
organisation‘s members.  Conversely, Hopkins (2000, p. 74), in his examination of 
the findings from the Longford Gas Plant Explosion, was concerned that 
management viewed culture as a ―matter of individual attitudes – attitudes which can 
be cultivated at work, but which in the final analysis are characteristics of 
individuals, not the organisations to which they belong‖.  Hopkins (2000) believes 
that this outlook is common in the business world and contrasts this to the 
sociological and anthropological view of culture which is that culture is a 
characteristic of a group, and not an individual phenomenon.  Helmreich and Merritt 
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(1998) argue when organisational culture is examined from an anthropological 
approach ―each organisational culture is unique and socially constructed‖.  
A number of definitions of safety culture can be found in the literature, 
however a commonly used one is the definition that was originally developed by the 
Health and Safety Executive‘s Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear 
Installations (ACSNI) and subsequently adopted by the British Health and Safety 
Executive (M. D. Cooper, 2000; Dannatt, Marshall, & Wood, 2006; Health and 
Safety Laboratory, 2002). 
The safety culture of an organisation is the product of individual and 
group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies and patterns of 
behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and 
proficiency of, an organisation‘s health and safety management. 
Organisations with a positive safety culture are characterised by 
communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of 
the importance of safety and by confidence in the efficacy of 
preventive measures. 
Other definitions of safety culture have been developed over the years.  For 
example, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), argues that it exists as a result 
of ―the ideas and beliefs that all members of the organisation share about risk, 
accidents and ill health‖ (cited by Cooper, 2002, p. 4); and Guldenmund (2000, p. 
251), defines it as ―those aspects of the organisational culture which will impact on 
attitudes and behaviour related to increasing or decreasing risk‖. 
These definitions of safety culture, although varying slightly, have been 
developed from the general concept of organisational culture (Wiegmann, Zhang, 
von Thaden, Sharma, & Gibbons, 2004).  As Wiegmann et al., (2004) note, many 
well known books have also contributed to the interest, debate and general 
understanding of the importance of culture.  These books include ‗In Search of 
Excellence: Lessons From America‘s Best Run Companies‘ (Peters & Waterman Jr., 
2004).  Even so, Guldenmund (2000) suggests that the element missing in many 
publications on safety culture is the lack of an empirical model outlining the method 
through  which safety culture is rooted in the organisation‘s practices and systems.  
Published in the same year, Cooper (2000) offers a three-concept framework of 
safety culture, advocating that the importance of this lies in the dynamic reciprocal 
relationships between the different concepts, which he refers to as (1) psychological 
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aspects – members‘ perceptions about, and attitudes towards, organisational goals; 
(2) members‘ behaviour; and (3) organisational or corporate aspects.  
Helmreich and Merritt (1998) in their research in two environments, aviation 
and medicine, identified the interaction of professional culture, national culture and 
organisational culture as having the capacity to positively and negatively affect 
safety outcomes.  Hayward (1998), examining professional culture within the 
aviation industry, found that subcultures exist within the industry which can be 
labelled as occupational or work group cultures.  A professional culture may have a 
special expertise leading to a high sense of self-worth for the members (Hayward, 
1998).  Coady (2000, p. 62) refers to the requirement by some professions for 
―ruthlessness, toughness and suspicion‖.  The drawback is that such an attachment to 
professionalism can also lead to the feeling of invulnerability of members, which can 
become an integral part of the self concept endorsing unrealistic attitudes about 
members‘ performance capabilities when faced with various kinds of stressors 
(Helmreich & Merritt, 1998).   
The literature indicates that a positive safety culture is a way through which 
organisations can achieve higher safety standards and thereby reduce the potential 
for both minor incidents and large scale disasters (Antonsen, 2009; M. D. Cooper, 
2000; Hopkins, 2005; Reason, 1995).  Having identified this, I was keen to 
understand the characteristics of a positive safety culture in order to assess whether 
these same characteristics were, or were not, present in the security section of the 
RTO.  If some or all of the elements were absent, this might contribute to the high 
injury rate amongst the transit officers, as cited in the official source of ‗Hansard‘ 
record of proceedings of the West Australian Parliament (West Australian 
Legislative Council, 2009).   
Following on from this literature review, and in line with the preferred 
perspectives adopted by Rail Safety Regulators, I looked to the work of Reason 
(1997) to inform this research.  Reason 1997) argues that there are four principles of 
a positive safety culture which combine to create an informed culture.  An informed 
culture is ―one in which those who manage and operate the system have current 
knowledge about the human, technical, organisational, and environmental factors 
that determine the safety of the system as a whole‖ (Reason, 1997, p. 195).  Weick 
and Sutcliffe (2001) support Reason‘s (1997) description of an informed culture, and 
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refer to an organisation maintaining a state of ‗wariness‘ or ‗organisational 
mindfulness‘, because ―culture, mindfulness, and coping with the unexpected are 
visible in safety cultures, they illustrate what it means to create a more mindful 
organization‖ (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 128).  Such a conceptual framework is 
best obtained by the collection and dissemination of information relating to 
incidents, accidents and any near miss occurrences which will provide an overview 
of the state of the organisation‘s safety system.   
Reason (1997) describes the necessary elements to achieve an informed culture 
as being a ‗reporting culture‘, ‗just culture‘, ‗flexible culture‘ and a ‗learning 
culture‘.  Reason (1997) argues that each element is important, and management 
influence on the development of these aspects of safety culture is significant.  Whilst 
different researchers in the literature have in some cases used different labels for the 
various elements identified by Reason (Reason, 1997), many of the underlying 
concepts share significant features.  Reason‘s (1997) perspectives on safety culture 
have  been adopted by rail safety regulators both within Australia and Britain (Health 
and Safety Executive, 2005a; Standards Australia, 2006a).  For instance, these 
elements identified by Reason (1997), were used by the Australian Rail Industry 
Safety and Standards Board (RISSB), under licence from the British Health and 
Safety Executive (Health and Safety Executive 2005a, 2005b), to develop a toolkit 
for the rail industry (Rail Industry Safety and Standards Board, 2010).  This toolkit 
provides a consistent method of measuring an organisation‘s safety performance.  
These characteristics of a positive safety culture are briefly outlined below. 
2.4.1 Reporting culture 
A reporting culture requires trust to be developed between management and 
employees so that employees feel supported when they report safety issues (Reason, 
1997; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).  Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995, p. 712) define 
trust as:  
The willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another 
party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular 
action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor 
or control that other party.  
In organisations where this trust is present, employees are prepared to report 
accidents, and ‗near miss‘ occurrences, unsafe conditions, inappropriate procedures, 
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plus any concerns that they may have about safety, as well as their own errors 
(Hopkins, 2005; Reason, 1997; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).  In such an environment, 
employees expect management to treat them fairly (Flin & Burns, 2004); and as the 
Global Aviation Information Network (GAIN) (2004) theorise, an increase in 
reporting of incidents is not indicative of a decrease in safety, but should be viewed 
as indicating a healthy safety culture. 
2.4.2 Just culture 
An effective reporting culture is also a just culture, which is both transparent 
and dependant on how the organisation handles blame and punishment.  Reason 
(1997, p. 195) describes a just culture as:  
An atmosphere of trust in which people are encouraged, even 
rewarded, for providing essential safety-related information, but in 
which they are clear about where the line must be drawn between 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour.   
Therefore, the culture is not blame free.  Employees are accountable for their 
behaviour and any blatant disregard for rules or procedures would be subject to 
disciplinary action (Dekker, 2007; Reason, 1997; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).  When 
employees are clear where the culpability line is drawn, they are able to distinguish 
which behaviours are acceptable or unacceptable, and where punishment or 
disciplinary action will be taken.  The theory acknowledges human error, and the 
organisational safety system supports learning from past mistakes (Dekker, 2007; 
Global Aviation Information Network (GAIN), 2004; Hopkins, 2005; Reason, 1997; 
Standards Australia, 2006a).  It is therefore not a ‗no blame‘ culture as a total 
amnesty on unsafe acts would lack credibility amongst the workforce, rather it is a 
‗just culture‘ where natural justice prevails (Dekker, 2007; Reason, 1997; Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2001). 
2.4.3 Flexible culture  
A flexible culture enables an organisation to adapt to changing demands.  It 
encompasses the ability to move from a normal hierarchical organisational structure 
to a flatter model, enabling decisions to be taken on the spot in an emergency by the 
people who are expert in the area.  The structure then reverts to a more conventional 
bureaucratic model when the crisis has passed (Reason, 1997; Standards Australia, 
2006a).  As Reason (1997, p. 196) argues:  
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Such adaptability is an essential feature of the crisis-prepared 
organization and, as before, depends crucially on respect – in this 
case, respect for the skills, experience and abilities of the workforce 
and, most particular, the first line supervisors. 
This decentralisation of authority in a time of crisis allows teams to deal 
efficiently and effectively at the local area level, without being constrained by 
inflexible rules and procedures (Reason, 1997; Standards Australia, 2006a).  
However, this requires that members of the team are competently trained and 
practiced in handling emergency events.   
2.4.4 Learning culture 
To achieve the above elements of a safety culture requires the organisation to 
invest money and time in learning about what is already happening within the 
organisation.  Hopkins (2006a, p. 252) refers to a learning culture as ―a natural 
extension of a reporting culture‖.  This can be achieved by collecting information 
from the organisation‘s own data bases; involving employees in their own safety 
management system and listening to members when they raise a safety issue; the 
willingness and ability to learn from what has previously occurred; and to act on 
those lessons to improve the safety system (Reason, 1997; Standards Australia, 
2006a).  Learning organisations also seek out information from accidents that have 
occurred in similar organisations worldwide, and apply any learning from that 
accident to their own organisation (Hopkins, 2006a).  Weick and Sutcliffe‘s (2001, p. 
136) summary of a learning culture highlights the contribution it makes to a safety 
culture: 
The combination of candid reporting, justice, and flexibility enable 
people to witness best-practices that occur within their own 
boundaries and to move toward adoption of them.  An informed 
culture learns by means of ongoing debates about constantly shifting 
discrepancies.  These debates promote learning because they identify 
new sources of hazard and danger and new ways to cope. 
Regardless of the benefits of being a learning organisation, some companies 
grapple with the dilemma of exposing themselves to litigation.  On the one hand they 
need to know about safety risks to put processes in place to reduce the risk of 
accidents, but on the other hand, they fear this knowledge increases their legal 
liability should an accident occur (Hopkins, 2006a). In spite of the occupational 
safety and health legislation present in their country or state, organisations caught in 
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this quandary may subvert the reporting process, have audit reports that are written 
in a white-washed style, and keep confidential any written report which may expose 
weaknesses in the safety system (Hopkins, 2006a).  However, as Hopkins (2000) 
found in his analysis of the legal outcomes of the Esso Longford gas explosion, a 
failure to identify all the hazards and instruct employees about the safety risks did 
not lessen their legal liability (Hopkins, 2000, 2006a). 
2.5 Communication 
The importance of communication in relation to this study can be divided into 
two main components: (i) the flow of information within the organisation and in 
particular in the security area; and (ii) the personal communication skills that transit 
officers display when dealing with members of the public.  An overview of literature 
pertaining to these two categories of communication is discussed below. 
2.5.1 Flow of information 
The British Health and Safety Executive (2005b) believe the importance of 
communication within an organisation can be categorised into three main areas: 
―top-down (management to frontline), safety reporting (frontline to management) 
and horizontal communication (between peers)‖ (Health and Safety Executive, 
2005b, p. 11).  Reason (1997) identifies three main failures that can occur within 
such communication channels.  He labels these as: (i) system failures, where one of 
these communication channels is absent; (ii) message failures, where the 
communication channel exists but the information is not sent; and (iii) reception 
failures, where the information is misinterpreted by the receiver, or not 
communicated when required.  Communication messages can also be influenced by 
national cultural differences and leadership styles (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998).  In 
some nationalities the preferred communication style is direct and specific, while in 
others it is indirect and relies on the context to carry the full meaning (Helmreich & 
Merritt, 1998).  Leith (2003, p. ii) advances the view that ―successful communication 
between culturally diverse groups requires each to achieve an understanding of the 
other‖; each group may have a different perception regarding what constitutes a 
safety risk, or what makes a near miss incident (Bahn, 2009; Leith, 2008).  
An important communication pathway, as viewed by employees, is what 
leaders choose to pay attention to.  This shapes an employee‘s perception of what is 
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important (Bahn, 2009; Health and Safety Executive, 2005b; Helmreich & Merritt, 
1998; Schein, 1992; Westrum, 2004).  Researchers have previously emphasised that 
if an organisation is committed to a strong safety culture, then the highest levels of 
management need to show an unequivocal commitment to safety, and this 
commitment must also be understood throughout all the organisation (Health and 
Safety Executive, 2005b; Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Hopkins, 2005; Moray, 2006).  
This safety obligation can be communicated through the visible behaviours 
demonstrated by senior management, such as involvement in health and safety 
committee meetings; active participation in accident/incident investigations; and 
senior management taking time to tour the workplace (Health and Safety Laboratory, 
2002).  This active involvement by managers encourages two way communications 
and assists the fostering of trust between management and employees.  Organisations 
may be good at cascading information down to employees, but are often less 
effective in establishing two way communication channels (Health and Safety 
Laboratory, 2002).  A bi-direction communication process where employee safety 
concerns are listened to, acted upon, and feedback given to employees regarding 
their safety concerns, is an essential element in reducing safety risk, improving 
safety culture, and a vital step in the process of employees taking an active 
involvement in safety (Health and Safety Executive, 2005a).        
2.5.2 Personal communication skills 
Wilson (1992), referring to the work of Sullivan and Siegal (1972), identified 
that the perception of either party in a police – citizen encounter may shape the way 
in which an outcome is resolved.  If either person discerns hostility from the other 
party, the event is more likely to end with the citizen being arrested, regardless of the 
initiating offence (C. Wilson, 1992).  Further, Wilson (1992) draws our attention to  
studies conducted by Garratt, Baxter, and Rozelle (1981), and Sykes and Clark 
(1975) into police/citizen encounters, all of which found that police demonstrating 
even subtle variations in behaviour, which include non verbal cues, can influence the 
way a citizen reacts to a police officer.  More recently, research conducted by Chan 
(2000), also concluded that confrontation can sometimes be avoided by the use of 
good communication techniques.  Verbal communication consists of three 
components, with all three parts having the ability to influence the outcome of a 
police/citizen event.  A person‘s voice takes about 33 – 40 percent of the weight, 
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such as the way the message is said; the content takes up about 7 – 10 percent of the 
impact of what is being said, and non verbal cues such body language comprise 50 – 
60 percent (Thompson & Jenkins, 2004).   
Wilson, Gross and Beck (1994) identified in their study that the personal safety 
risk to police officers could be reduced by officers feeling comfortable with being 
assertive without raising their level of anger.  Wilson et al., (1994), consequently 
recommended training to help officers achieve those skills.  King (2011, p. 5) 
describes one of the key skills as the ability for officers to ―control themselves inside 
so they can exert control on the outside‖.  Thompson and Jenkins (2004), who had an 
understanding of police/citizen interactions from their work within the police force, 
published a book entitled Verbal judo: The gentle art of persuasion.  This book is 
based on the authors‘ training courses they developed and presented at police 
academies across the United States of America (USA) (Thompson & Jenkins, 2004), 
and subsequently delivered in other countries.  These non-USA presentations were 
undertaken following a licensing agreement with a training agency in that country 
(King, 2011).  The communication strategies used, whilst suitable for any situation, 
were primarily written for use by law enforcement agencies.  The aim of the program 
was to treat people with respect, while still endeavouring to get the person to comply 
with your request.  Thompson and Jenkins‘s (2004) book provides readers with a 
knowledge of these skills and the method to verbally diffuse a situation rather than 
escalate a confrontation, even though a person may be aggressive, abusive or simply 
non compliant with a law enforcement officer‘s request.   
The objective of the ‗verbal judo‘ training is to improve relationships and 
communications based on empathy.  The approach is based on a five step process, 
which is not necessarily sequential, but which is very effective when mastered and 
used correctly (Thompson & Jenkins, 2004, pp. 167 - 174).  These five steps are: (i) 
to listen –  where a person‘s body language must be congruent with listening; (ii) to 
empathise – here the skill is to let the person know that you understand the problem 
they have;  (iii) to ask – In this step you ask questions to find out the facts;  (iv) to 
paraphrase – At this stage the person puts into their own words what the other person 
is saying; and finally (v) to summarise – where what has been said is condensed into 
a succinct statement (Thompson & Jenkins, 2004, pp. 167 - 174).  These skills, when 
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adopted by an officer, enable the officer to be assertive rather than aggressive, 
thereby reducing their risk of injury (Chan, 2000; C. Wilson, et al., 1994). 
2.6 Training 
Organisations provide training to employees to equip them with the necessary 
skills to undertake their responsibilities safely and carry out tasks competently to a 
predetermined standard (Office of Rail Regulation, 2007).  Competence can be 
defined as ―a combination of practical and thinking skills, experience and knowledge 
and may include a willingness to undertake work activities in accordance with 
agreed standards, rules and procedures‖(Office of Rail Regulation, 2007, p. 2).  
Training for law enforcement roles such as police officers, begins with a period of 
intense learning in a police academy, university or an ‗in-house‘ accredited training 
school (Chan, et al., 2003; Crank, 2004).  Many researchers have highlighted the fact 
that police culture is nurtured from the time the cadet enters the academy or training 
school (Crank, 2004; Kleinig, 2000; Van Maanen, 1973, 1978b).  Trainers are 
usually ex policemen and use tales from the field to emphasise any learning.  Police 
cadets, whilst learning ―the lore of police work are simultaneously provided with a 
vocabulary of irony, danger, suspicion, and officer safety‖ (Crank, 2004, p. 226).  
The solidarity of police groups is generated from this early time at training, where 
officers are subject to strict discipline, obedience to departmental rules and strenuous 
physical training (Crank, 2004; Van Maanen, 1978b).  This solidarity amongst 
recruits manifests itself as loyal support for their fellow officers on the street 
regardless of what occurs (Chan, et al., 2003; Reuss-Ianni, 1983). 
Training is an important component of attaining competency.  Even so, this 
knowledge requires the skills learnt, such as in the academy, to be practiced and 
mastered in the field to demonstrate competency (Health and Safety Executive, 
2007; Office of Rail Regulation, 2007).  To achieve this, new graduates from the 
police academy or training school undertake further training in the field, for a period 
of six to twelve months (Crank, 2004), prior to being deemed competent (Beck, 
1999; Beck & Wilson, 1998; Chan, et al., 2003).  Researchers in the past have 
referred to policing as a craft (Bayley & Bittner, 1984; Crank, 2004) to identify the 
importance of practice as well as the importance of theory.  It can be imagined that 
an organisation that delivers its training solely in relation to theory, and does not also 
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provide training in the field, will be less able to handle safety challenges than an 
organisation where the training regime covers both theory and practice.   
2.7 ‘Best-practice Management’ in Law Enforcement Agencies 
Measuring performance is an integral part of any management system (Arezes 
& Miguel, 2003).  As Arezes and Miguel (2003) argue, whilst the main focal point 
of performance measurement is for internal purposes, there is a growing requirement 
to demonstrate to interested parties such as shareholders, regulators and insurance 
companies that an organisation‘s occupational health and safety risks are controlled 
(Arezes & Miguel, 2003).  Measuring performance, benchmarking and promulgating 
the results is one way management can demonstrate their accountability in this area.  
Benchmarking can be described as a management tool which enables organisations 
to measure their own performance against those of other establishments undertaking 
similar work, anywhere in the world (Dannatt, et al., 2006; Kreitner & Kinicki, 
2001).  It provides a ―systematic means of collecting the latest information on 
‗industry best-practice‘‖ (Dannatt, et al., 2006, p. 10).  However, to use this 
information effectively, organisations need to harness their own data before 
comparing and contrasting equivalent performance criteria obtained from similar 
establishments (Health and Safety Laboratory, 2002).  Knowledge of new ideas, risk 
management, operational processes, equipment or procedures obtained from other 
businesses provides information that organisations can learn from, use to improve 
their own performance and achieve ‗best-practice‘ in safety and risk management  
(Dannatt, et al., 2006; Kreitner & Kinicki, 2001).   
Measuring performance can be undertaken actively and reactively, or by means 
sometimes referred to as ‗lead and lag‘ indicators.  Relevant indicators can differ 
significantly.  Hopkins (2009b) advances the view that there is a distinction between 
measuring indicators of personal safety and process safety, suggesting that process 
safety measurements are measurements of the defences in place to prevent 
catastrophic events, such as damage to the environment, plant or multiple deaths 
(Hopkins, 2009b).  Lead indicators to measure performance constitute active 
monitoring of a business and can include risk assessments, surveys, monitoring 
inspections, audits, and any other information relative to the performance of the 
business (Health and Safety Executive (HSE), 1999).  
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Standards Australia Railway Safety Management Part 1: General requirements 
(AS4292.1) (2006a) documents the need for railway organisations to have a system 
of regular audits in place which are used to confirm whether railway safety policies 
and procedures are being complied with, and to determine the effectiveness of the 
organisation‘s safety management system.  These audits become part of the rail 
organisations‘ continuous improvement cycle (Standards Australia, 2006a).  The 
National Transport Commission Australia (2008) provides guidance for rail 
organisations to develop and monitor positive performance indicators or lead 
indicators, and to communicate the results of these indicators to relevant parties.  
This includes the development of a security management plan encompassing 
measures to protect people from crime.  However, there is no specific reference to 
monitoring the amount of crime or anti-social behaviour on the rail system.   
In contrast to process safety, personal injury is measured reactively or after the 
event (Glendon, 2009; Hopkins, 2009b).  This impacts the person rather than the 
plant.  For instance, examining performance in safety management would include the 
company accident and near miss data, and require systematic analysis of accident 
causation (Dekker, 2006; Reason, 1997).  Such analysis would identify all 
contributing factors which led to the event occurring, rather than merely attributing 
the blame to human error.  Hopkins (2005) argues that human error can be the 
beginning of an investigation, rather than the conclusion, believing the investigation 
should examine the reasons which led to the person making an error.  Reason (1990, 
pp. 8 - 9) discusses the differences between intended and unintended actions which 
lead to the errors occurring.  Intended actions may fail to achieve their expected 
outcome as a result of poor planning which Reason (1990, p. 8) refers to as a 
‗mistake‘.  This planning failure or mistake Reason (1990, p. 8) distinguishes from 
execution failures, which he refers to as ‗slips or lapses‘.  A comprehensive analysis 
of information around error, mistakes and lapses provides an opportunity to learn 
from past mistakes and highlights high risk areas.  This in turn facilitates the 
development and implementation of controls to reduce the risk of a further incident 
occurring.   
Many different ‗best-practice‘ law enforcement agencies overseas, including 
transit policing organisations, use a management system called ‗compstat‘ which is 
short for ―computer comparison statistics‖ (Godown, 2009; Henry, 2003; Serpas, 
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2008).  This multifaceted monitoring system is viewed by a number of law 
enforcement agencies as a critical component of the crime fighting process 
(DeLorenzi, Shane, & Amendola, 2006; Henry, 2003; Serpas, 2008).  Godown 
(2009, p. 1) sums up the system as: 
An innovative business management process, system, and strategic 
methodology that assists an organization in achieving its mission and 
goals.  The methods are transferable, compatible and replicable in 
any organization or environment.  In a police organization, compstat 
functions as a crime control process manifested in recurring 
meetings, usually weekly, during which the agency‘s performance 
indicators are reviewed critically for opportunities for improvement.  
This organizational management philosophy, concept, and tool 
combines a classic problem-solving model with accountability at all 
levels of an organization.  
According to Henry (2003, pp. 243 - 246), compstat was initially developed in 
the New York Transit Police organisation during the period that Bratton was the 
Chief.  At that time, crime was rampant in the subway and there was an urgent need 
to get it under control.  As Chief of the Transit Police during the mid-nineties, 
Bratton realised the importance of accurate, timely information and would 
commence each day with a briefing on the significant events that had occurred on the 
system during the previous twenty four hours.  This real-time information enabled a 
quick response to be made as crime conditions and trends changed.  The system: 
Permitted management to rapidly collect accurate crime statistics and 
to analyse the data in a useful and meaningful way so that informed 
decisions could be made about the deployment of resources and the 
type of strategies that would be most effective in reducing crime.  It 
also permitted management to quickly identify fluctuations and 
change in crime statistics, to rapidly assess the effectiveness of these 
decisions and strategies, and to monitor crime conditions to ensure 
that the strategies work. 
(Henry, 2003, p. 248). 
Whilst the compstat system has undergone many refinements over the years 
the philosophy of the system remains the same.  The computer program supporting 
its implementation is suitable for use in any business that wishes to harness 
information, demonstrate accountability and communicate results (DeLorenzi, et al., 
2006; Henry, 2003; Peak, 2009; Serpas, 2008). 
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A further crime fighting approach identified in the literature is the ‗broken 
window‘ theory (Blumstein, 1999; Bratton, 1999; Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Crank, 
1994; Henry, 2003; J. Q. Wilson & Kelling, 1982) which was also adopted by 
Bratton alongside compstat processes.  The broken window theory was originally put 
forward by Wilson and Kelling (1982) in an article in the Atlantic Monthly, and 
refers to the idea that if you leave a window broken in an unoccupied building the 
remaining windows will soon be broken, promoting a sense of disorder within a 
community.  Anti-social behaviour that is left unchecked can signal a similar 
response to perpetrators, indicating that nobody cares about the community and 
neighbourhood, leading to citizens developing a fear of going into their community.  
A reduction in everyday activity results in more serious disorder occurring, and in 
escalating crime (J. Q. Wilson & Kelling, 1982).  In other words, if something 
appears to be uncared for in a neighbourhood, others will not care for it either, and 
the number of things uncared about expands.   
According to Wilson and Kelling  (1982, p. 31) ‖vandalism can occur 
anywhere once communal barriers – the sense of mutual regard and the obligations 
of civility – are lowered by actions that seem to signal that ‗no one cares‘‖.  For 
example, graffiti in the subway signals to the community that officials have no way 
of stopping minor crime, therefore they have no hope of halting any serious offences 
(Kelling, 1991).  Bratton later adopted this theory for the New York Transit System 
with success in attacking fare evasion, graffiti, crime and disorder in the subway and 
railcars (Bratton & Knobler, 1998).  Levine  (2005) suggests that this theory can be 
applied to any business.  If an organisation fails to address the small things it will 
give the impression that something is wrong with the business. 
2.8 Summary 
Many spheres of literature were examined for this study, both to review the 
state of current knowledge and to identify any gaps or issues relevant to the work 
that transit officers undertake.  Previous research on organisational culture was 
examined, with particular attention paid to the culture of law enforcement officers.  
However, no research was identified specifically relating to the culture of transit 
officers, who have a law enforcement role with the ‗power or arrest‘, but do not have 
full policing powers.  Consequently, I referred to research conducted within police 
agencies for this study.  Significantly, whilst research on many aspects of the culture 
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of police officers was identified, there was little evidence of any linkage between 
safety and culture in law enforcement roles.  However, information relating to ‗best-
practice‘ law enforcement agencies did highlight the need to capture information to 
identify problem areas, reduce crime and improve performance and accountability.  
With the limited research available in this area, and the need to investigate all 
accident/incident occurrences, I relied on previous safety research undertaken in 
organisations considered high risk environments; even where these did not focus on 
law enforcement processes.  I was able to examine what previous researchers 
believed contributed to a safety culture in a range of contexts, such as in airline, 
nuclear and oil industries.  From this literature, I gained an understanding of the 
importance placed upon accident/incident investigations to examine all contributing 
factors to any significant event, and identified how this information could be used to 
prevent a re-occurrence of an incident.  This knowledge contributed to the formation 
of a theoretical base which I was able to build on in my research with transit officers 
as I examined whether their safety and communication culture contributed to their 
risk of injury.   
As transit officers work predominantly at night, I examined previous research 
undertaken on the ‗night time economy‘ which provided an overview of the 
difficulties people can encountered when working at night.  I studied the use of 
CCTV in public places and evaluated studies exploring the positive and negative 
impacts of CCTV upon law enforcement roles.  Good communication skills were 
identified in the literature review as being important for people in customer service 
positions, which particularly includes law enforcement officers.  The literature 
highlighted the importance of mastering these communication skills, and 
demonstrates that good communication can significantly alter the outcome of a 
citizen/law enforcement officer interaction.  Although training of transit officers was 
not identified in the literature, the importance of training for law enforcement 
officers was examined, revealing that many organisations require that officers are 
competent both in communication theory and practice. 
The following chapter discusses the method used to undertake the research and 
to achieve the answers to the research question.  It also addresses how the research 
contributes to closing the gaps identified in the literature review around the transit 
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officer workforce and management processes such as incident data gathering and 
analysis, injury rates and transit officer communication practices.      
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHOD 
3. INTRODUCTION 
More often those in the setting welcome the researcher as someone 
who can provide them with an audience and a voice  
(Lee, 1995, p. 15) 
 
Transit officers believe that people don‘t understand what they have to put 
with.  Transit Officer Steve told me ―I‘m amazed that you‘re actually allowed to be 
out here with us, because you are getting firsthand knowledge, you get to watch the 
way that we deal with things.  I think this is fantastic‖.  Transit officers themselves 
cannot speak out: they wanted a ‗voice‘.  They wanted somebody to understand their 
world from their perspective.  Over the years there have been many negative reports 
in the press, where somebody has accused a transit officer of using too much force 
(Pownall, 2010), or not dealing appropriately in some manner with a person of 
interest (Pownall, 2010 ; Stolley, 2010), or where the public is reported as feeling 
that the trains are not safe at night in spite of the presence of transit officers 
(Pownall, 2010 ; Rondganger, 2010 ).  However, the travelling public does not 
generally understand the situations that transit officers have to deal with, particularly 
at night; or the powers that the officers have, such as the power of arrest.  This leaves 
transit officers feeling that they are not respected by the public in the same manner 
that other first line response forces are: the police, ambulance officers and fire 
fighters.  Coupled with this issue, the RTO management‘s philosophy is that all 
statistics are confidential whether these be transit officer arrests, transit officer 
injuries, transit officer lost time, assaults on transit officers or any other crimes that 
occur on the railway system.  They are not for public scrutiny and not to be used or 
disclosed in any research findings.  As one of the more senior managers told me:  
What I do have a problem with is just politically we are not able to 
use them [statistics], because the media cane us, and they heighten 
the sort of anxiety about the perception of crime. ... It is hard and we 
are not recognised nearly enough and it is deemed that we are almost 
like viewed as the poor cousins.   
This management opinion supports the transit officers‘ views that they have a 
difficult job to do, and do not have a high profile.  However, the management‘s 
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decision not to use or publish statistics prevents the public profile of the transit 
officer being improved, as well as ruling out the use of a mixed methodology for this 
research; that is, I was unable to use quantitative data to support any qualitative 
findings.  In qualitative research the group or the community to be studied are the 
central actors of the research process.  Oppressed groups may view a sympathetic 
‗outsider‘s‘ interest as enhancing their identity.  As Harrington (2003, p. 610) 
believes, ―the interest of the researcher can be interpreted as conferring a flattering 
aura of ‗specialness‘ on that group‖.  This became evident in the transit officer 
situation as the research progressed.  On a number of times I was told by one of the 
transit officers ―we are lucky to have you here‖.  Importantly, the ethnographic 
researcher wants those who are studied to speak for themselves, by their own words 
and actions, whilst capturing the behaviours and attitudes that the group being 
studied portrays (Teague & Leith, 2008b).  However, the use of statistics would have 
supported the transit officers‘ voice in explaining the personal, psychological and 
physical risk that they face daily. 
The use of an ethnographic research method for this research project was 
predetermined in a signed Linkage Project Grant agreement between the RTO, Edith 
Cowan University and the Australian Research Council.  Concern had been raised in 
the RTO at the high injury rate sustained by transit officers, usually as a result of a 
violent interaction with a member of the public during an arrest.  Ethnography was 
viewed as the research method best able to provide an understanding of the issues 
that transit officers are exposed to and deal with, and the factors that contributed to 
those injuries.  Further, the tripartite research agreement provided the researcher with 
the funding to examine what ‗best-practice‘ transit police agencies do worldwide, to 
minimise crime on the rail systems and avoid injuries to officers.  I was recruited as 
the PhD Candidate to undertake this research project.  Even though the broad 
qualitative research methodology had already been decided, the method within that 
paradigm was left to my discretion.  Whilst the RTO had agreed to this ethnographic 
research protocol, it became apparent as the research progressed that they had not 
expected the research to be carried out in-depth.  As it was, the researcher became 
immersed in the transit officer world.  
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3.1 Research Aim 
The focus of this research was to gain an understanding of the transit officer 
communication and safety culture and how transit officers establish their own 
understanding of safety (which is not necessarily that of management).  The aim was 
to reduce the risk of injury for transit officers.  Using all the data that would be 
discovered during the research process, the objective of the research was to answer 
the following question:  
Can an understanding of communication and safety culture provide 
opportunities for improving the safety of transit officers?   
To answer this over-arching question, I broke it down further into four 
components: 
1. How are safe systems of work communicated to transit officers and is the 
transit officers‘ understanding of safety congruent with management‘s 
understanding of safety? 
2. Does the transit officer culture have the flexibility to deal with dangerous 
issues as they arise? 
3. Is the transit officers‘ safety culture a uniform culture, or are there different 
subsets of culture existing within the transit officer environment? 
4. What is transit officer best-practice in the public transport systems at both a 
national and international level? 
3.2 Significance of the Research 
The research is significant because, over the long term, it is likely to lead to a 
change in safety culture and improved transit officer recruitment, training and better 
communication skills.  An anticipated ‗flow on‘ effect from these outcomes is a 
reduction in occupational safety and health injuries among transit officers.  An 
improvement in safety would lead to reduced costs, and greater efficiency and 
reliability.  A safer system would help make public transport a more attractive travel 
option for the general public which would assist in relieving traffic congestion and 
lessening environmental impacts in terms of a reduced reliance upon private cars.  
Further, these outcomes would have the benefit of being replicable nationally and 
internationally.  The findings could potentially make a significant contribution to the 
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body of literature on occupational health, safety and communication issues in the law 
enforcement professions.   
Underpinning the above research questions I wanted to understand how 
officers interpret their roles and safety responsibilities.  I wished to investigate the 
job-related communication practices and whether these impact the outcome of an 
event; and I hoped to examine what preceded and followed an incident which led to 
an officer becoming injured.  Although I could look to the literature for guidance on 
safety and reducing the risk of injury for employees in an organisation, I had no 
specific data available from this particular organisation to determine whether the 
problem was uniform throughout the transit officer cadre; or confined to a particular 
rail line or location; or whether the type of injuries that were occurring were 
constant; or any other information that would narrow the research field or help guide 
the research process.  
3.3 Ethnographic Research 
Whilst there are other research approaches such as grounded theory and 
phenomenology in qualitative research; and other methods such as surveys, focus 
groups and interviews; this project was particularly suited to an ethnographic 
research protocol.  Ethnography is not a new method of research; however its 
application in an occupational safety and health context is comparatively recent.  
Ethnography is a broad ‗catch-all‘ term for a form of qualitative research that is 
undertaken within groups or communities over a sustained period of time.  However, 
a mode of ethnography called ‗autoethnography‘ has also emerged, which Gans 
(1999, p. 542) refers to as the ―climax of the preoccupation with self‖, also 
conceptualised as ―an autobiography written by sociologists‖ (Gans, 1999, p. 542).  
Ethnography is a research design which guides the researcher in choosing 
appropriate methods and to ―shape the use of the methods chosen‖ (Crotty, 1998, p. 
3).  In this research approach, the researcher wants those who are studied to speak 
for themselves; to provide their perspective in words and other actions (Hammersley, 
1992).  The subjects are studied in their everyday contexts rather than under 
experimental conditions created by the researcher.  The research data is gathered 
from a range of sources, but observations and/or relatively informal conversations 
are usually the main source of information.  However, this information can be 
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supplemented by other methods such as interviews.  The quality of the information 
gathered can be checked back with the participants to verify its accuracy. 
Ethnographic research originated in the discipline of anthropology where, 
traditionally, a researcher immersed themselves within a non industrialised group or 
culture in their natural surroundings, to capture the uniqueness of that group; and 
gain an understanding of the particular culture associated with that community. 
However, in more recent times this method of research has been successfully used in 
organisations to provide a deeper understanding of; ‗the ‗blue collar shop floor 
culture‘ (Hodson, 1991; Kriegler, 1980); how work is organised (Heath, Hindmarsh, 
& Luff, 1999; Orr, 1998); occupational groups and modern bureaucracies (Fleisher, 
1989; Van Maanen, 1973); safety communication with shop floor employees (Leith, 
2008); construction workers (Bahn, 2009); bouncers and legal risk (Monaghan, 
2004) and surveillance studies (Walby, 2005).  Over the last few years, with the ever 
increasing use of the internet as a means of communication, a new form of 
ethnography called ‗netnography‘ has also emerged, which is the study of online 
communities (Costello, 2009; Kozinets, 2002).  
As previously noted in Teague and Leith (2008b), in contrast to this in-depth 
method of research, the predominant method used in the past for studying 
organisational cultures and their effect on safety has been the survey method 
(Glendon & Stanton, 2000; Guldenmund, 2010; Hopkins, 2006b).  Examples of 
where surveys have been used to investigate occupational health and safety issues 
include manufacturing (Cheyne, Oliver, Tomas, & Cox, 2002; M. D. Cooper & 
Phillips, 2004; Zohar, 2000), air transport (Gill & Shergill, 2004), the off shore 
environment (Cox & Cheyne, 2000), the nuclear industry (Harvey et al., 2002), the 
heavy and light manufacturing industries, and outdoor workers (Williamson, Feyer, 
Cairns, & Biancotti, 1997).  Surveys have often been used in combination with 
safety audits (Grote & Kunzler, 2000).  However, the survey method measures 
people‘s perceptions of ‗how things are done‘ which may not necessarily coincide 
with what actually occurs (Antonsen, 2009; Hopkins, 2006c).  The idea that there is 
a gap between survey data and everyday life is supported by Guldenmund (2000) 
who argues that researchers from sociology, or the (social) psychological research 
tradition, have a reductionist approach and are ―inclined to assume that a given 
culture or climate can be described by a limited number of dimensions‖ 
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(Guldenmund, 2000, p. 226).  Schein (1992) argues that even if a questionnaire was 
designed covering many dimensions, one might still not know which of those 
dimensions are important to the group with regards to any particular issue. 
Glendon and Stanton (2000) assert that many of the survey questionnaire 
projects undertaken in the study of safety in organisations involved selected 
employee samples, often collected at a time of organisational change, which may 
have reflected a particular response bias.  They further allege that observational 
studies ―while superficially offering ecological validity, are often of too short a 
duration to be able to provide sufficiently large samples of behaviour‖ (Glendon & 
Stanton, 2000, p. 209).  Whilst noting that an ethnographic approach is time 
consuming (Hale, 2000; Hopkins, 2006b), a number of authors are now advocating 
that studying employees in their natural surroundings captures their social and 
cultural meanings in a systematic way (Glendon & Stanton, 2000; Guldenmund, 
2000; Holmes & Gifford, 1996).  Glendon and Stanton (2000) advocate the use of 
ethnography as possibly being the most valid methodology from an interpretive 
perspective, and assert that ―comprehensive ethnographic studies of safety within 
contemporary organisations are awaited‖ (Glendon & Stanton, 2000, p. 209). 
There are many similarities between ethnography and grounded theory (Glaser 
& Strauss, 1969; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).  However, the aim of the analysis in this 
situation is not to create theory as in the ‗grounded theory‘ process, but to induce 
theory through the ethnographic process, from the perspectives of the members of 
the culture being observed (L. Green, 2003).  Ethnography therefore is a research 
method that guides the research design process, and offers the framework for the 
research, which Crotty (1998) refers to in his book as the ‗scaffolding‘ that supports 
the research process.  In this situation, I was able to explore the transit officers‘ 
construction of aspects of their everyday activities.  Hammersley (1992, p. 13) 
argues that ethnography allows these phenomena to be represented in ―new and 
revealing ways‖ through the process of me being implanted in their world.  
Recognising that participants create their own meanings, this research applies a 
constructionist epistemology.  Understandings are constructed by uncovering 
concepts and themes through the research process, and exploring the meanings these 
concepts have for the participants (Teague, et al., 2010b).  Geertz  (1973, p. 10) 
describes this process as the ethnographer being faced with a ―multiplicity of 
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complex conceptual structures, many of them superimposed upon or knotted into one 
another, which are at once strange, irregular, and inexplicit, and which he must 
contrive somehow first to grasp and then to render‖.   
3.3.1 Participant observation  
Historically, participant observation has been the main form of ethnographic 
research (Johnson, Avenarius, & Weatherford, 2006), however, not all ethnographic 
research is participant observation; rather it can broadly be broken down into three 
main categories:  direct observation, where the researcher openly observes what is 
occurring within a group or community by following them around and recording 
their activities; covert observation, where the researcher is part of a group or 
community but does not disclose their background or their research motive within 
that environment; and participant observation where the researcher is a full active 
member of the group or community, but openly declares their research agenda 
(Bernard, 2000).  Whilst I immediately ruled out covert observation as a research 
method to use, on both ethical grounds and the need for the organisation to be open 
in their dealings with employees and passengers; I did consider the merit of 
undertaking the research using direct observation.  At first sight this method 
appeared to be a safer option than participant observation.  The high rate of injury for 
transit officers led me to consider the risk of injury to myself, as a participant 
observer, in their work environment.  I concluded however, that recording details of 
what I was observing could not only lead to suspicion from the officers, but could 
also lead to suspicion from the passengers as to what information I was gathering.  
This could result in a passenger becoming anxious and aggressive causing a situation 
to escalate, increasing the risk of injury to an officer or myself.  To successfully 
undertake ethnographic research, the researcher needs to build trust and rapport with 
the participants, thereby reducing the risk of reactivity, and increasing the validity of 
the data obtained (Bernard, 2000). Hobbs (Hobbs, 2006b) refers to the necessity of 
the researcher blending in with the rules, procedures and expectations of the locals.  
Following different transit officers around, recording what was occurring, would 
keep reminding officers that I was a researcher studying them and possibly reduce 
the validity of the data obtained.   
Whilst I was familiar with safety systems, I was not familiar with safe 
practices in security or policing work.  I found support for the use of the participant 
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observation method when conducting research into culture with employees in an 
occupation which is foreign to the researcher.  Brooks (2005) demonstrates this with 
lobster fishermen, Spano (2007) with police, Holmes and Gifford (1996) with 
painters, and (Leith, 2008) with shop floor employees in a refinery.  Brooks 
undertook his research with fishermen over a two and a half month period, ―to test 
the use of ethnographic method for exploring the nature of the relationship between 
occupational culture, workplace social organization, and safety management‖ 
(Brooks, 2005, p. 795).  Whilst Brooks (2005) believed his research would have 
been enhanced by the inclusion of more vessels and fishermen in the research 
process, he nevertheless believed that the ethnographic method used, participant 
observation, proved beneficial in ―guiding policy, management systems and injury 
prevention‖ in that industry (Brooks, 2005, p. 812).  Additional support for this view 
was found by Leith (2008), when he conducted his research into safety 
communication within a refinery.  Leith found that participant observation produced 
excellent qualitative data.  These outcomes sustained the view that an ethnographic 
method would be appropriate for this research project.  Whilst a number of authors 
view ethnography as an art or as a craft (Bernard, 2000; Gustavson & Cytrynbaum, 
2003; Rose, 1990); others are critical of the lack of training for observational 
research methods in Australia (Brooks, 2005); and a further group of researchers 
believe that participant observation must be learnt in the field (Bernard, 2000); 
which leaves the quality of the research and data obtained dependent on the 
experience and special characteristics of the researcher, and their ability to interact 
with the subjects (LeCompte & Goetz, 1982).  However, whilst I was cognisant of 
these issues, and the difficulties I might face as an older female achieving acceptance 
by a large group of male-dominated transit officers undertaking a policing role, I felt 
that starting as a new trainee transit officer and entering the field in the same manner 
that they do, coupled with my previous experience in counselling male ‗blue collar‘ 
workers, in a workshop environment with over fifteen hundred males, would stand 
me in good stead to fit in with the transit officer cadre. 
When deciding on the method I would use for entry to the organisation, I leant 
on the experience of previous researchers who have undertaken research in law 
enforcement roles, working as self acknowledged researchers.  These include 
Fleisher (1989), in his research with prison guards, and Van Maanen‘s (1988) 
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various research studies of urban police organisations.  These projects confirmed the 
greater acceptance of the researcher by both management and officers where the 
researcher undertook the officers‘ training.  Indeed, without the training, 
management informed Fleisher (1989) that he would have to be confined to an 
office, and the guards would come to him.  Van Maanen‘s (1988, p. 86) view of his 
situation was: 
The police, of necessity perhaps, are not gentle, impassionate sorts 
who can easily tolerate a deviant in their midst.  The working style of 
an ethnographer is sure to reflect this. [ ....] the police will certainly 
be watching closely to determine, on the one hand whether or not 
they can ‗depend‘ on the researcher, and, on the other hand, whether 
or not they can ‗take the researcher out‘ without adverse 
consequences arising should the need arise. 
Although Van Maanen (1973) made no effort to conceal his research 
intentions, the fact that he had undertaken the training provided him with an identity 
that was acceptable to other rookies in the service and to the higher police ranks.  
This gave Van Maanen a role that was familiar to the police, rather than the 
unfamiliar role of ethnographer, and that familiarity enabled him to access data, 
information, and collect observations that would not normally have been available to 
a researcher who was not similarly trained.   
I quickly realised from the literature that undertaking fieldwork does not 
automatically guarantee me valid and reliable data.  The importance of being 
accepted by the group as an active member of the workforce, so that they would 
continue their normal mode of operating, contributed to my decision to enter the 
field as a trainee transit officer.  This decision was further consolidated by the 
knowledge that researching a seemingly dangerous occupation, without the 
competencies that other transit officers possess, would increase the risk to my safety 
(Hobbs, 2006a).  I fully intended to declare my motivation for being there, but felt 
over time that I would gradually be accepted as one of the trainee cohort.  This 
would also enable me to compare what was being taught to trainee officers, as they 
were prepared both mentally and physically for their future role, versus the practice 
that would confront us all when we entered the field.  Whilst the organisation was 
concerned enough regarding the transit officers‘ high injury rate to facilitate this 
research being undertaken, there was no available data to assist me in mapping the 
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way forward in the research process.  I relied on the research objective and the 
questions I had developed to guide the development of the research progress. 
I concluded that achieving ‗insider‘ status would provide the greatest 
opportunity to understand the subtle nuances of behaviour and the language used 
among the transit officers, therefore I needed to enter the workplace as a participant 
observer (Baker, 2006; Hammersley, 1992; LeCompte & Goetz, 1982; Tope, et al., 
2005).  As Tope et. al. (2005), and Johnson, Avenarius and Weatherford (2006) 
assert, the role that the researcher adopts when entering the field determines the 
amount and type of information that the researcher obtains.  Nevertheless, 
controversy does exist between researchers on the merits of conducting participant 
observation versus interviews  (Tope, et al., 2005).  However, I concluded that the 
knowledge I would gain through participant observation both as a trainee and ‗on the 
tracks‘ would inform development of questions for the interviews that I planned to 
conduct after the training, during a period of four months in the field.  Grbich (1999, 
p. 123) defines participant observation as:  
A technique of unobtrusive, shared or overtly subjective data 
collection, which involves a researcher spending time in an 
environment observing behaviour, action and interaction, so that 
he/she can understand the meanings constructed in that environment 
and can make sense of everyday life experiences.  These 
understandings are used to generate conceptual/theoretical 
explanations of what is being observed. 
The advantages of using this method included the opportunity it afforded me: 
to get as close to the action as possible, as potential safety-challenging events were 
occurring; to follow anything up if necessary;  and to see firsthand what preceded an 
incident occurring.  On the other hand, the main disadvantages of being a participant 
observer is that it is time consuming, and the researcher becomes the phenomenon, 
or part of the phenomenon, and can become emotionally involved in the research 
setting, sharing the values and concerns of the participants (Grbich, 1999).   
One of my concerns when undertaking this research was not to let any 
preconceived ideas regarding transit officers cloud my research findings.  Although I 
had no experience with the work of transit officers, I had experience in a fairly senior 
management position within a different area of the same organisation.  I was familiar 
with the ‗insider versus outsider‘ debate which is evident in the literature, and which 
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is sometimes termed the ‗being native versus going native‘ debate regarding the 
merits and disadvantages of undertaking research in your own organisation (Chavez, 
2008; Humphrey, 1995; Kanuha, 2000).  In the case of the RTO, however, the transit 
officer section of the organisation was managed as a ‗discrete entity‘ with minimal 
interactions with other operational areas.  Coupled with this, I resigned from the 
organisation before embarking on the research project.  I certainly considered myself 
an ‗outsider‘ rather than an‘ insider‘.  Nevertheless, I was cognisant of the risk that 
my ‗management thinking‘ might influence my research undertakings.  My position 
was similar to that which Humphrey (1995, p. 288) addressed in his research, when 
he argued that insiders do not necessarily have any advantage in terms of prior 
knowledge of issues.  Humphrey (1995, p. 228) went on to say that: 
Researchers must explicitly locate themselves within the organisation 
and ask themselves how factors such as their role in the organisation, 
their particular network of contacts, world view, and way of 
expressing that understanding of the world, will affect the research 
process and the meaning and interpretations drawn from the research 
data. 
I was conscious that my previous position as a manager in the organisation 
could cast a shadow over the project, clouding my acceptance by transit officers as a 
participant observer.  This led me to consider the best ways of gaining their trust 
such as: completely immersing myself in their work life; undertaking their training; 
and not contacting any of my previous peers.  When commencing the research, I had 
not considered that acceptance by any of the managers in the work environment 
would be a concern.  I based this thinking on the fact that the organisation had 
initially commissioned the research in order to discover ways of reducing the risk of 
injuries to transit officers.  Nevertheless the issue of management acceptance turned 
out to be a problem.  However, there was an upside to this situation.  Transit officers 
soon became aware of the difficulties I was encountering with management, and the 
more difficult it became for me to work alongside them, the more the transit officers 
accepted me as one of their own.  This dynamic is discussed further in subsequent 
chapters. 
3.4 Ethical Considerations 
Before commencing this research project it was necessary to obtain ethics 
clearance from the University, by demonstrating to the University Human Research 
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Ethics Committee‘s satisfaction that my research would be conducted in accordance 
with the guidelines outlined in the National statement on ethical conduct in human 
research (Australian Government, National Health and Medical Research Council, 
& Australian Research Council, 2007) and the Australian code for the responsible 
conduct of research (National Health and Medical Research Council, Australian 
Research Council, & Universities Australia, 2007).  In my application for their 
approval, specific attention was given to the confidentiality and privacy of 
conducting research which involved the interaction of transit officers with 
passengers.  Whilst I was disclosing my motivation for being in the workplace to all 
employees, it was not feasible for me to declare my position to passengers who were 
unaware of my research role.  
The identities of all the transit officers, supervisors and managers taking part in 
the forty one interviews that I conducted at the conclusion of my time spent ‗on 
track‘, remain confidential.  Quotes that have been obtained and documented 
throughout this thesis have been assigned a pseudonym, and in some situations a 
different gender to protect their identity.  Occasionally, identifying details have been 
changed.  All interviewees were recruited from volunteers within the transit officer 
cadre, and from the supervisors and managers employed by the RTO.  Prior to the 
interviews, participants were given an information letter (see appendix 1) to read and 
an informed consent letter to sign (see appendix 2).  Before commencing the 
interview itself I verified that all of the interviewees fully understood the contents of 
both documents. 
Any observations made during the training and fieldwork, were documented 
using code names.  The audio files from the interviews were also transcribed using 
pseudonyms.  All transcribers of the interviews signed a confidential non-disclosure 
document prior to undertaking the transcribing.  All data obtained during the course 
of the research has been dealt with, stored and will be destroyed in accordance with 
Edith Cowan University‘s Policy on the conduct of ethical human research (Edith 
Cowan University, 2007) and the Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of 
Research (National Health and Medical Research Council, et al., 2007). 
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3.5 Process of Fieldwork  
The fieldwork for this research project can be divided into six distinct phases.  
In the first phase I undertook the transit officer training.  Phase two occurred 
unexpectedly when, having completed the training, I attempted to gain access to join 
the transit officers on track.  This was initially denied on the grounds of my safety.  
Negotiating with the ‗gatekeeper‘ resulted in an agreement that I would spend time 
in the closed circuit television (CCTV) monitoring room which would provide me 
with an overview of the rail system and the work of the transit officers, particularly 
as this unfolded over the duration of the night shift.  I spent four weeks in this area 
which is covered in chapter 5 of this thesis.  Following the CCTV work, further 
negotiations took place and management reluctantly granted me access to join the 
transit officers ‗on track‘, and this formed phase three of the fieldwork.  The fourth 
phase was spent conducting interviews with forty one RTO staff including transit 
officers, supervisors and managers working in the security section of the 
organisation.  The fifth phase was spent learning what ‗best-practice‘ agencies do to 
minimise crime on their rail network and injuries to their officers.  The sixth and 
final phase was spent completing the analysis of the data and writing up the thesis.  I 
will cover each of these phases in turn. 
3.5.1 Phase 1: Training   
At the starting point for this phase I had a meeting with the management of the 
security section of the RTO, and requested their permission to undertake the transit 
officer training.  I was referred to the training school where I met with the manager 
and coordinator of the training school to inform them both about the research project, 
and to obtain their agreement for me to commence as a trainee with the next intake 
of potential transit officers.  Negotiations took place quickly as a new training cadre 
was due to start the following week.  I commenced my training as a trainee transit 
officer and informed my fellow trainees and trainers that I was a researcher who 
intended to complete the training, and then commence work on track with them.  
This statement was at first met with suspicion, and some concern, from both trainees 
and trainers alike, although more so from the trainers who subsequently told me that 
they thought I was there to carry out an assessment on them.  Trainees later told me 
that they had initially thought I was there to ―suss-out whether they were suitable for 
the job‖. 
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I participated fully in the programme, and like other trainees spent evenings 
studying for the next day‘s tests and, like them, always worried about whether I was 
going to pass the course.  As Van Maanen (1988, p. 86) comments: 
In the [police] academy, for example, a researcher who did not 
participate in the program would have been [so] conspicuous as to 
preclude him from asking questions that might uncover the attitudes 
recruits might be forming toward each other, the staff, the 
department, or the work itself. 
Once I began working on the project I commenced my personal research 
journal and jotted down relevant observations and data.  However, the days were 
usually so busy in the training school, taking down notes, listening to lectures and 
going through the practical elements of the course, that this left little time for noting 
additional information.  Any hurried jottings I managed to record were usually met 
with curiosity from the group, and concern from the trainers, as to what I was 
documenting.  As a result, I developed the practice of making hastily written notes in 
the evening, prior to commencing the study for the next day.  I have documented my 
experiences and findings from the training school in the next chapter.  
I purposely ensured that all my time was spent with the trainees in the training 
school, and with the transit officers on track.  In turn, whilst I gained an 
understanding of the workings and language of the group, and of the meanings that 
people constructed, identifying myself with the trainees and transit officers limited 
the data I collected during the fieldwork to the lower levels of the security section of 
the RTO.  However, my intention in undertaking the research was to understand the 
transit officer culture, their perspectives on safety, and how their communication 
skills developed, therefore it was ‗their voices‘ that I wanted heard.  Nevertheless, at 
the end of the fieldwork I also interviewed some volunteers from supervisors, 
management and from the training school who wanted to add a management 
perspective to the research.  Whilst my self-imposed separation from the managers I 
had worked with before the research proved beneficial to achieving acceptance by 
the transit officers, it did create some friction with my former workmates.  This is 
discussed further in the next chapter.  
3.5.2 Phase 2: Closed circuit television (CCTV) monitoring room 
When I commenced this research project, I expected the process of data 
collection ‗in the field‘ to flow smoothly from one phase of the research to the next.  
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I expected to complete the training, follow my fellow trainees onto the track, and 
complete the fieldwork by conducting interviews with volunteers from among the 
transit officers, supervisors and managers.  However, as Lee (1995) notes, research 
in organisations where conflict may exist often leads to having to negotiate with a 
‗gatekeeper‘.  This was the situation I encountered when trying to join my fellow 
trainees ‗on track‘.  Lee (1995, p. 20) explains such situations thus: 
Granting access carries with it certain risks form the gatekeeper‘s 
point of view.  The research may expose unflattering or sensitive 
aspects of the situation, disrupt routine, or give voice to dissident 
elements.  In addition, such risks have to be taken with relatively 
little information about the background or motives of the researcher 
and with nothing binding the researcher to protect the gatekeeper‘s 
interests. 
When it became clear that the fieldwork was being viewed by the gatekeepers 
as problematic, negotiations took place and I agreed to add a stage between ‗training‘ 
and ‗the tracks‘ in which I would observe the work of the transit officers from the 
confines of the CCTV monitoring room.  I believe the gatekeeper was hoping I 
would not want to pursue going on track after visibly viewing what officers have to 
deal with. My experience in the CCTV room is documented further in chapter five of 
this thesis.   
During my time spent in the monitoring room, I was able to take copious notes, 
and ask questions about what I was observing without causing any suspicion from 
other people.  However, the data collection was restricted to observing what was 
occurring on the screens and the answers to my questions came from the shift 
commander and monitoring personnel.  Whilst these people were very helpful, the 
best way to form an understanding of an event is to be there in the midst of things.  
Hindmarsh and Heath (2000, p. 525) refer to CCTV cameras as ‗objects‘ which 
―provide personnel with the ability to identify and discuss problems.  Indeed, they 
often form the focus of collaboration and provide resources through which problems 
are managed‖, which was how the shift commander used them to deal with 
situations.  However, while I could observe the body language of the officers, and 
monitor events as they unfolded, I had no verbal interaction with the transit officers, 
or the wherewithal to hear their interactions with each other.  I also felt 
uncomfortable, since the research appeared to have become more of a covert 
operation, as the transit officers would be unaware that they were being watched by a 
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stranger.  Although I was observing their actions, which would be their normal mode 
of operation in view of the cameras; I was also keen to observe what occurred off 
camera.  Additionally, being only able to observe, prevented me forming any 
understanding of the transit officers‘ culture or communications skills or how they 
interacted with their supervisors, managers or passengers.  From the perspective of 
the CCTV control room, it appeared that a uniform culture prevailed throughout the 
transit officer cadre; however, it was not until I was on the tracks that I learnt there 
were different subcultures between the lines. 
After four weeks in this situation and further negotiations, I received reluctant 
permission to go on track.  As Lee (1995, p. 14) points out, when attempting to gain 
access to a particular area to undertake an ethnographic study, ―violent or potentially 
violent situations are often highly sensitive in the eyes of those who control access to 
them‖.  
3.5.3 Phase 3: On track  
Having received permission to join the transit officers on track, my name was 
forwarded to the roster clerk to be rostered for duty in the same manner as other 
transit officers.  Almost all my shifts were to be night shifts.  I was rostered eight ten 
hour shifts per fortnight in the general full time work pattern.  My experiences 
working with the officers are fully documented in chapter six.  Prior to commencing 
on track I wanted to initially brief all transit officers on the purpose of the research, 
my methodology and the outcome I was hoping to achieve.  I suggested to 
management a number of ways that this briefing could be achieved.  My preference 
was by briefing transit officers on each line prior to their commencing duty on track.  
If that method was unacceptable, I suggested distributing an information sheet via e-
mail to all the officers or, thirdly, making a presentation to the safety representatives 
from each line at the next safety meeting.  However, unbeknownst to me one of the 
safety meetings had recently been held, and the next one would be in a couple of 
months; and the other two suggestions management deemed as unnecessary.  My 
introduction to a new work area was to be an e-mail from the roster clerk to the 
supervisor on the line where I was rostered, indicating I would be joining their roster. 
In the first couple of months on track, I was not rostered with any of my fellow 
trainees, or even on the same line they were working.  I was disappointed.  I had 
developed a good relationship with my training peers, so I hoped I would have been 
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rostered with one or more of them.  I felt my acceptance by the newly qualified 
transit officers would have fast tracked my acceptance by other officers on track, as 
my previous peers could vouch for my trustworthiness.  It seemed I was having to 
start from scratch again to develop rapport with the officers in order to win 
acceptance as one of them.  I diligently followed the core participant observational 
techniques advocated by Goffman (1989, p. 126) where he suggests that: 
To try to subject yourself hopefully, to their life circumstances, 
which means that  although, in fact, you can leave at any time, you 
act as if you can‘t and you try to accept all of the desirable and 
undesirable things that are a feature of their life.  That ‗tunes your 
body up‘ and with your ‗tuned-up‘ body and with the ecological right 
to be close to them, [...] you are in a position to note their gestural, 
visual, bodily response to what‘s going on around them and you‘re 
empathetic enough – because you‘ve been taking the same crap 
they‘ve been taking – to sense what it is that they‘re responding to. 
Eventually the ‗grapevine‘ did its work, and word got around I was not a 
management stooge, but was there to learn the job from their perspective.  I believe 
the fact that I had taken the time and trouble to undertake the transit officer training 
was a huge positive for my acceptance by the troops. 
It was not feasible to take observational notes regarding issues as they occurred 
on track.  We were often on the move, on and off trains, dealing with issues or even 
just observing what was occurring.  I deliberately did not digitally record 
conversations, firstly because passengers were around; secondly, I wanted transit 
officers to accept me and act as they normally would; and thirdly I intended to 
conduct interviews at the end of my time on track.  I did however keep a small 
notebook in my pocket, which, when an opportunity arose, or something occurred 
that I wanted to make sure I did not forget, allowed me to jot down some notes, 
usually during a break.  I had anticipated some of the difficulties I would face taking 
notes in the field, so prepared for this by learning basic shorthand over the preceding 
nine months.  This assisted my ability to make quick jottings, and I used these 
jottings as reminders when later writing up my journal.  The transit officers were 
aware of my note-taking strategy and on more than one occasion, after an incident 
had occurred, I heard ―I thought that would bring the note book out‖.  Whenever I 
was questioned by the transit officers as to what I was writing in my short hand, I 
would always read it back to them.  Firstly this served to confirm that what I was 
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writing was correct, and secondly it gave confidence to the officers that I was happy 
to share with them what I was documenting.  My shorthand became a source of 
amusement to the officers, and when there was a quiet moment I was able to teach 
some of them the odd shorthand words.   
Working the transit officers‘ hours and their shifts, I quickly learnt what a 
powerful method of research participant observation was.  I became one of them.  As 
I became embroiled in their work environment, I felt the same injustices and 
frustrations that they did, and felt the same pride at a job well done as my fellow 
officers.  Rose (1990, p. 10) refers to this as being when the ethnographer and those 
studied ―inhabit the same historical moment‖.  I was conscious that being fully 
involved in the setting as a transit officer there was a risk of taking ongoing activities 
and meanings for granted (Adler & Adler, 1987).  However, this is more of a risk as 
an ‗insider researcher‘, where the researcher has been a prior member of the group or 
setting (Adler & Adler, 1987; Edwards, 2002; Humphrey, 1995).  I addressed this 
risk of ‗insiderness‘ at the end of each shift by using my journal as a debriefing 
exercise, to help clarify my thoughts and perspectives from the night‘s events.  I did 
find there was also a downside to participant observation.  When, according to my 
belief, an officer did not speak to, or act appropriately in dealing with, a passenger, I 
would feel very embarrassed, but there was nothing I could do.  On such occasions, I 
realised that I would be judged in the same mould by other people.  I would want to 
shout out that ‗really I was not one of them, just an observer‘; but I had to accept 
there was nothing I could do.  I was always very mindful of my position as 
researcher, to not jeopardise the rapport I had built with the transit officers and lose 
their trust, or take any action which could alter the process of events.  The only 
comfort I received from witnessing such not-by-the-book occurrences was that 
transit officers accepted my presence as one of them, plus I was seeing the situation 
‗warts and all‘.   
3.5.4 Phase 4: Interviews  
Towards the end of the four months on track I started asking the transit officers 
and supervisors if any of them would mind volunteering to be interviewed.  I was 
inundated with volunteers from both levels.  At this stage of the research, transit 
officers and supervisors had accepted my presence as one of them; and were keen to 
contribute to what they hoped would be a body of research that, if acted upon, could 
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possibly improve their safety at work.  Very rarely did I see a manager during my 
time on track, and I deliberately did not contact any of them to ask about interviews 
until I had left the field; thereby maintaining my allegiance to transit officers. 
Interviews were normally undertaken in the workplace, usually a crib room 
when other officers were out on track, or in a supervisor‘s office.  I arranged to do 
the interviews at times when I knew it was one of the quieter periods of the shift 
and/or also one of the quieter days.  The interviewees had to remain accessible by 
radio in case an emergency arose during the interview, requiring the officer to 
urgently assist.  Nevertheless, in spite of being contactable by radio, the interviews 
were confidential, and lasted on average for over an hour.  The whole interview was 
always digitally recorded with their permission and later transcribed.  Hand written 
notes were also taken during the interviews which I was able to use to indicate any 
emphasis in a particular area.  The foundations for my formal interview questions 
were my casual conversations and fieldwork experience on track, and included issues 
that I wanted to probe further, plus matters that transit officers wanted to raise 
themselves.  The interviews were structured to the extent that there were broad 
ranging, open ended questions, as advocated by Richter and Kotch (2004, p. 7), 
which all interviewees were asked.  I was careful to ask these questions in a manner 
and language that the transit officers clearly understood, and this enabled them to 
expand on their answers if required, through further probing (Creswell, 1998).  The 
initial answers dictated the direction of the interview and I noted a number of the 
answers reflected the officers‘ relative experience, their previous occupation, which 
rail line they were on, and the experience of the supervisor on that line.  It was a 
distinct advantage during the interviews to have completed the transit officer training 
and to have worked alongside the officers ‗on track‘.  This experience provided me 
with an understanding of their lingo; the variance of culture between the lines; the 
strong sense of transit officer solidarity with their mates; and the silo mentality that 
pervaded each rail line.  I was able to use probing questions to focus these issues and 
elicit further information where necessary.  My previous counselling experience 
enabled me to use open body language; probe answers efficiently; use effective 
listening skills to paraphrase and reflect back their answers, which verified that I 
understood what they were telling me; and adopt follow-on techniques such as 
nodding in agreement or understanding, to keep the information flow coming. 
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3.5.5 Phase 5: Data analysis 
Due to the lengthy time I spent in the organisation, ranging from my three 
months in training, to the weeks in the CCTV room and my time on track, I amassed 
a substantial amount of data working in the field.  I dealt with this information by 
commencing data analysis early in my fieldwork.  I used the principles advocated by 
Bogdan and Biklen (1982, p. 145) who define analysis as: 
The process of systematically searching and arranging the interview 
transcripts, fieldnotes, and other materials that you accumulate to 
increase your own understanding of them and to enable you to 
present what you have discovered to others.  Analysis involves 
working with data, organizing it, breaking it into manageable units, 
synthesizing it, searching for patterns, discovering what is important 
and what is to be learnt, and deciding what you will tell others.  
Whilst I wanted to understand the broader overall cultural landscape within the 
security section of the organisation, and the influence this had on the transit officer 
cadre, I also wanted to understand the differences in the culture between transit 
officers on the various rail lines.  I began the analytical process by writing up my 
field notes at the end of a shift reflecting on what had occurred during that night.  On 
my days off transit officer duties I would review these notes to obtain an overall 
sense of the data developing, and undertake a preliminary process of sorting through 
the data I had already accumulated, looking to identify possible concepts and themes.  
Agar (1996, p. 9) refers to the data in ethnography as ―the practices of everyday 
life‖.  I was endeavouring to capture these practices, with the data coming from my 
active participation in those moments alongside the transit officers (Agar, 1996).  
When I moved from one rail line to another, or from one part of a line to another, I 
would summarise my field notes from that particular area.  This enabled me later to 
compare and contrast the findings from the various areas where I worked.  From the 
preliminary analysis as the fieldwork was continuing, I sought to identify concepts, 
along with any cognitive principles and cultural themes developing.  Spradley  
(1980, p. 141) refers to these cultural themes as ―the elements in the patterns that 
make up a culture‖.  Whilst I discovered that some of these elements and cognitive 
principles held by transit officers were shared throughout the transit officer cadre, 
such as ‗don‘t dob in a mate‘; others were more specific to a particular rail line, 
resulting in the identification of different subcultures between the lines.   
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I used my initial analysis of the fieldwork data, and documentation, to identify 
areas where I wanted to probe further in the interviews with the transit officers, 
supervisors and managers.  Relevant sources of information included policies, 
procedures; general e-mails sent to all transit officers; relevant e-mails which had 
specifically been passed on to me by one of the transit officers or supervisors; plus 
formal records such as safety committee meeting minutes.  It was also important to 
note areas where data was absent, such as accident investigations, which also 
informed the research concerning the importance placed by management on that 
particular area.  Some of the interview questions were developed around specific 
identified concepts.  It was interesting to note how various answers highlighted that 
transit officers and management can have very different understandings of the same 
issue.  Leith (2008) had similar findings in his research with shop floor employees 
and management, in a refinery.   
As previously described, the interviews were all transcribed.  However, I 
always listened to the interview recordings again.  These reviews provided a greater 
feeling for the intensity of the comments and the emphasis that the person answering 
the question placed on certain aspects of the interview, indicating areas that the 
transit officers, supervisors or managers found more important than others.  Such 
information could not be gleaned by reading the transcript alone.  All the transcripts 
were also read a number of times.  The first time the transcript was read through in 
its entirety to obtain an overall view, and the second and subsequent times I would 
highlight domains, make notes from the transcripts and look for any areas of 
connectivity between identified themes.  Where I found that a number of transit 
officers on a particular line had the same perspective on a theme, I felt justified in 
identifying a reliable representation of the culture that prevailed in that particular 
area.  These insights and understandings gained from the interviews also validated 
the previous preliminary analysis of my field notes.  All of these findings contributed 
to highlighting the areas to explore in further research, to learn how best-practice 
transit policing agencies minimise crime, and to reduce risk and injury for the transit 
officers, or transit police officers, on their railway systems. 
3.5.6 Phase 6: Best-practice transit policing agencies 
The analysis of the research findings provided a number of areas that I wished 
to explore further with best-practice transit policing agencies.  I was keen to learn 
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what successful strategies they had implemented which resulted in their agency 
becoming one of the acknowledged best-practice transit policing organisations in the 
world.  The method of identifying best-practice agencies and choosing which 
agencies to work with, and learn from, is fully covered in chapter 7.   
These agencies all agreed to assist in my research.  Prior to meeting with them 
I had notified each one of the specific areas of practice that I particularly wanted to 
cover.  This facilitated the agency in preparing for my visit, enabling them to have 
supporting documentation available for each topic and, in many agencies, providing 
access to the people who specifically dealt with one or more areas of interest.  
During the meetings I was able to take notes and question organisation members 
further on any particular issue I was unsure about.  All agencies visited were 
generous with their time, showing me the areas of the organisation that I was 
interested to learn about, and providing me with available policies and procedures 
regarding the various topics I had requested information on.  
Analysing the information I obtained from these organisations, alongside the 
findings from my fieldwork and interviews with the RTO, I was able to develop and 
recommend strategies, which, if they were adopted and implemented by the RTO, 
could lead to a safer workplace for transit officers and improved safety and security 
for passengers.  The final report with strategies and recommendations to the RTO is 
attached at appendix 4.   
3.6 Summary 
Participant observation enabled me, as the researcher, to obtain a more valid 
picture of the everyday work and communication culture of RTO transit officers than 
other accessible research methodologies would have done.  It is an interactive 
process which involved, in this situation, my direct participation in the workplace, 
building strong relationships with the transit officers to tap into ―what people take 
for granted about their work, and thus, do not ordinarily discuss‖ (Jordan & Dalal, 
2006, p. 368).  This research method enabled the project to progress organically 
without being constrained by predetermined set dimensions.  I was able to view 
safety practices from the transit officers‘ perspective, which is not normally made 
visible through the RTO‘s formal communication channels, such as accident/incident 
reports and safety committee meetings and minutes (Teague, et al., 2010b).  
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Participant observation enabled me to capture detailed qualitative descriptions of 
what was being observed which Geertz (1973, p. 10) refers to as ―thick description‖.  
Thick description not only enables us to understand the flow of social discourse 
within a group but also enables us to understand, appreciate, and think concretely 
about concepts implicit in the discourse.  This leads to an intuitive understanding of 
what is occurring in that culture; enabling the researcher to speak with confidence 
about the findings (Bernard, 2000). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
TRAINING 
4. INTRODUCTION 
You can‘t start at the top and move down because then the people at 
the bottom will know that all along you really were a fink – which is 
what you are. 
(Goffman, 1989, p. 130) 
 
This chapter describes my entry into the organisation as a fledgling transit 
officer, and documents my journey from manager to PhD candidate to transit officer.  
The chapter covers the elements of training that myself and fellow trainees 
undertook, the development of the group culture as the course progressed, and 
includes my perceptions of the way in which the group gradually accepted me as a 
fellow trainee.   
Researchers such as Schein (2004) argue that a culture is only built up over 
time when people have been together long enough to develop their taken-for-granted 
common beliefs, perceptions, thoughts and feelings that together define the group 
culture.  According to Adler and Adler (1987), the best way to fully understand the 
development of these beliefs is to enter the setting as any new participant would do.  
Previous studies have also identified that many cultural characteristics that define 
law enforcement officers begin in the training school as the recruits undergo intense 
training and resocialisation (A. T. Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010; Conti, 2009; 
Conti & Nolan, 2005; Van Maanen, 1978b).  Commencing the field work with a new 
intake of trainees, where no common ground already existed, enabled me to be part 
of the process as the group culture germinated and developed.  This provided a rich 
understanding of the training methods and factors that mould the culture and identity 
of transit officers.  As Heslop (2011, p. 327) argues, this period in training is ―a 
process of becoming‖.   
Commencing the research project as a participant observer, I was cognisant of 
the need to discard my prior management thinking.  Mastrofski and Parks (1990) 
have previously argued that ―the most important characteristic of a good observer is 
a capacity to examine one‘s preconceptions and explore alternative 
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interpretations/explanations of what one observes‖.  Although I had previously not 
worked in the Division of the organisation I was about to enter, I was mindful that 
many employees may still remember me.  I was aware of the need to ―engage 
authentically with the community‖ (Drew, 2006, p. 40), and hoped my previous 
experience in the organisation would not impede my acceptance by transit officers.  
Regardless of a trainee transit officers‘ previous background all rookies 
complete the same three months training before graduating from the training school 
as a transit officer.  The training covers a diverse range of subjects including law and 
court procedures, customer service and communication skills, radio communication 
skills, railway safe working rules, first aid and baton and handcuff training.  The 
baton and handcuff training covers the skills necessary for self defence, use of force 
options and arrest procedures.  According to Van Maanen (1988) in his research with 
police, without being a participant in this training it would be difficult to ask 
questions, really get to know and understand the trainees and the relationships that 
existed between the trainees, trainers and the department.  I was interested to learn 
whether there was a difference between the theory taught and its practice, and if so, 
whether this could possibly contribute to the work-related injuries.  Bratton, revered 
as one of the ‗top American cops‘ by the American transit police agencies that I 
visited, found during his police academy training that the accepted way of doing 
work trumped the expected way of working (Bratton & Knobler, 1998).  Although 
Bratton (Bratton & Knobler, 1998) was referring to events almost forty years ago, 
more recent researchers have found the situation still exists.  A difference remains 
between the standard operating procedures taught in training and what actually 
transpires in the field (Bayley & Bittner, 1984; Beck & Wilson, 1998; Chan, 1996; 
Crank, 2004).  As Crank (2004, p. 69) found  
Standard Operating Procedure (sic SOP) [Crank‘s term] is a typically 
thick manual that defines the vast array of rules telling officers what 
they should not do in various circumstance, representing, quipped 
one officer, ―100 years of fuckups.‖  Representing the rules by which 
the organization seeks to coordinate its functions, the SOP provides 
little insight into the creative process officers use to deal with their 
most intransigent concerns – unpredictable police-citizen 
interactions.  
Bayley and Bittner (1984, p. 35) argue that there is no substitute for experience 
in policing and that ―training given in police academies is universally regarded as 
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irrelevant to ‗real‘ police work‖; referring to policing as a craft which is learnt in the 
field and fine-tuned as the degree of experience is achieved in the operational world 
(Bayley & Bittner, 1984; Chan, et al., 2003; Heslop, 2011).  Undertaking the training 
and working with transit officers on track provided the opportunity to examine 
whether this theory was relevant to the transit officer cadre. 
4.1 Gaining Entry to the Training 
The training department of RTO is a certified registered training agency 
providing training and assessment of competencies for students to obtain nationally 
recognised qualifications.  Among the competencies the transit officers obtain during 
their training are a level three certificate in security, a basic first aid certificate, a 
certificate of competency in radio procedures and a WPW07 (Safe Working 
Qualification).  This safe working qualification dictates the limit of the tasks they 
may undertake in the railway reserve, which extends to three metres either side of 
the operating rail line.  This safe working qualification is similar to requirements for 
transit police in other countries such as America, Canada and Britain where the 
officers undertake the railway safe working training after completing the basic police 
academy training. 
With the agreement of the transit officer managers that I could join the next 
intake of trainees, I contacted the training school.  Negotiations with the training 
school management took place rather hurriedly as a new school of trainee transit 
officers were due to start within a few days.  Initially I sensed some reservations on 
their part that I wanted to take part in the training.  However, as the meeting 
progressed, the trainers began to see many advantages that could evolve from the 
research.  The trainers had a concern that once the transit officers left the training 
environment, no further assessment took place on the job.  As far as the training 
department was concerned it was an unknown quantity as to whether the material the 
transit officers were taught in training was what they put into practice on the job.  
This was not the case in all other transit police organisations that I visited during the 
project.  Elsewhere, both in Australia and overseas, newly graduated trainees leaving 
the academy are placed with field training officers for periods ranging from twelve 
weeks, for example New Jersey (personal notes on meeting with New Jersey Transit 
Police), to twenty four weeks in San Francisco (personal notes on meeting with Bay 
Area Rapid Transit Police).  Whereas, one of the trainers explained to me after 
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completing the training in the RTO, the next time a transit officer saw a trainer was 
when they came back to the training school to undertake their yearly refresher 
training.  The trainers were unable to evaluate whether what was taught was what 
was done, and although the officers had been passed as competent in the school, 
were they competent carrying out the tasks in the field?   
Whilst the training school management were helpfully suggesting parts of the 
training they felt were more beneficial for me to undertake than other parts, I was 
conscious of the need to remain with the trainee transit officers at all times.  The 
trainers had difficulty comprehending my need to do this but it was duly arranged 
that I would commence training with the next intake of transit officers.   
Having previously worked in the building where the training centre is 
accommodated I was familiar with the layout of the place.  However, on the first 
morning I viewed the building in a different light as I was venturing into the 
unknown.  As I made my way to the lift I was greeted by numerous familiar faces all 
keen to say ‗Hi‖ and interested in what I was doing.  The most common assumption 
was that I had come back as a consultant, not as a poor stipendiary student 
undertaking research.  I tried to keep conversations brief as I wanted to be in the 
training room with plenty of time to spare to get my bearings. 
I remember feeling concerned at the time as to whether knowing so many 
people in the building would be a disadvantage to the research project.  It did turn 
out to have a downside, but not the way I had expected.  Having been part of 
management prior to leaving the organisation, it quickly became apparent that my 
previous peers expected me to spend coffee breaks and lunch times with them.  
However, on undertaking the training I made a conscious decision to avoid renewing 
any of my old ties and turned down all offers.  As RTO is a hierarchical organisation, 
many people did not understand why I chose to spend my time with trainees, and in 
the process I offended some of those people.  Van Maanen (1988) took a similar 
decision when undertaking research in a police academy as he believed that a strict 
formality normally exists between recruits and trainers and any connections with the 
management would be treated with suspicion by fellow trainees.  The upside to my 
decision was fellow trainee transit officers realised that even though I knew so many 
people in the building, I always chose to spend my time with them.  This assisted my 
acceptance by the transit officers as a colleague. 
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4.2 Introduction to the Organisation 
I arrived at the training room with time to spare.  I glanced around the room 
with some despair; the room was empty.  The desks had been set out in a 
semicircular position facing the front.  There was one large file and one small file on 
each desk, and each set of files had a piece of cardboard with a name written on it 
placed at the front of the desk.  There were eleven settings in total, but no setting 
with my name on it.  A feeling of insecurity washed over me as I surveyed the room 
and realised I was not meant to be part of the semi-circle.  How pleased I was that I 
had time to spare, and I decided to take matters into my own hands.  I found an extra 
desk and chair and placed them at the back of the room where I could certainly 
observe all that was going on and not upset the placing already set.  As I completed 
this bit of furniture moving the training coordinator arrived in the room with the 
trainee transit officers.  Many of them had arrived very early (even before I had) and 
had been taken to the transit officers‘ amenities area for tea or coffee. 
As the first training session started, there was no time to introduce myself as 
everyone quickly found their name and sat down at their appointed desk.  The first 
part of the day was taken up with a welcome from the training coordinator, who then 
introduced some of the trainers, issued name badges to the trainee transit officers, 
covered the dress standard required during training and the requirement to keep each 
venue used clean and tidy.  The first two days were purely an introduction to the 
RTO.  The initial introduction was quickly followed by welcomes from one of the 
transit officer managers followed by the General Manager of the Division.  The 
General Manager provided an overview of the organisation and explained to the 
group where the security division fitted into the whole picture.  Whilst the managers 
were not surprised to see me and usually greeted me with a wave and said hullo, I 
noted these acknowledgements prompted some inquiring looks in my direction from 
the group of trainees.  I was concerned at the impact this may have on the 
ethnographic study and whether it would alienate me from the group; however the 
trainee transit officers came to see my past connections as an advantage, as they saw 
them as a way of conveying any message they had to management.  However, over 
time, as Van Maanen (1988) found in his research with police, the trainees came to 
realise that as a trainee I had no more influence with management than they did. 
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One of the speakers was unavailable that morning which allowed an 
opportunity for everybody to introduce themselves to the group, and provide some 
information about their background.  Gazing around the group I estimated the 
group‘s ages to span from the early twenties through to fifties.  The group consisted 
of nine males and two females plus myself.  Their backgrounds were varied and 
included two ‘new Australians‘, a couple of people with past security or police 
experience, and a few with military experience, either as a member of the forces or a 
member of one of the military reserves.  A couple of the group had previously 
worked in customer service positions and a few of the group had martial arts 
expertise. 
Although the training coordinator had introduced me as being there to 
undertake some research, it was not until the coffee break that the opportunity arose 
for me to introduce myself fully to the other trainees.  I explained that the research I 
was undertaking was from their perspective, and outlined the outcomes I was hoping 
to achieve.  We all went to the amenities area (an area that became very familiar to 
us over the next three months).  This area also provided many opportunities for 
meeting other groups that were either new like ourselves, or groups undertaking 
refresher training.  These groups ranged from passenger service attendants to train 
drivers. 
The first day progressed with a presentation from the Equal Opportunity 
Commission on Equity Awareness, an introduction to RTO human resources, a talk 
from the RTO Internal Investigator, the completion of all paperwork and the issue of 
the transit officer training uniform and manual.  The Internal Investigator painted a 
picture of how his section may become involved in an incident that occurred on the 
track, and explained the need to fully investigate anything that was referred to their 
area.  These referrals could be the result of a passenger complaint, a request from the 
State Ombudsman or the result of a police inquiry.  The Internal investigator 
reminded the group that ―there is always someone watching you‖.  Cameras were 
everywhere on the rail system and they not only recorded what passengers did 
wrong, they were also recording whatever the transit officer actually did.  Similar to 
findings from other recent research with law enforcement officers, the high degree of 
surveillance placed on officers was emphasised many times during the training 
(Conti, 2009; Conti & Nolan, 2005).  The Internal Investigator also highlighted the 
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need for good communication skills and indicated that there are some issues you can 
walk away from without escalating the situation.  He used the example of the ‗fuck‘ 
word.  For many of the passengers who use the train this word is a normal part of the 
language, which they may use when talking to their friends.  Depending on the 
context that the word is used in, it can sometimes be ignored and not escalated into a 
high risk situation.  
Later in the afternoon the transit officers‘ union representative addressed the 
group on the advantages of joining the union and what the union is doing for their 
members.  The representative spoke on the transit officers‘ job of providing law and 
order on the rail system and the requirement by RTO for the transit officers to issue 
summonses to passengers for non-payment or incorrect payment of fares.  (It was 
emphasised during the training that there were no exceptions to this rule).  The union 
representative emphasised how this situation with a passenger could escalate into a 
serious confrontation, for instance: if the person refused to provide a name and 
address; gave a false name and address; or would not follow a lawful direction given 
by the transit officer such as to leave the train.  In addition, it sometimes occurs that 
when the transit officer does a name check via the two way radio using the police 
mainframe computer, to verify the person‘s identity, it is found that there is a bench 
warrant issued for the person‘s arrest.  If the person refuses to accompany the transit 
officers willingly, this situation can lead to a physical confrontation to handcuff the 
person.  Such events can result in the transit officer being injured whilst on duty.  
The Union would provide support for the transit officer in managing their workers‘ 
compensation claim and could provide legal assistance if required.  The union also 
provides support for any member should they be under investigation as the result of 
a complaint received by the RTO from a member of the public regarding the transit 
officers‘ behaviour.   
I was able to introduce myself to the union representative following his talk 
and explain my presence there and the purpose of my research.  The person was 
supportive and highlighted a couple of issues which I made a note of to follow up at 
a later stage.  The first was that there was not enough use of communication skills by 
the transit officers and secondly the transit officers needed a suitable mentor when 
they first go out on track.  At that time, two new recruits could be put on together at 
a busy time on the worst line.  The union representative recounted a recent incident 
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where two new transit officers were on duty in the delta vehicle.  They were called 
upon to provide a rapid response when there was trouble on a train but unfortunately 
they could not find the station they were urgently radioed to attend.   
The first day concluded with the provision of a training uniform that the 
trainee transit officers were required to wear for the whole time they were training; 
completion of the induction paperwork and the issuance of transit officer manuals.  
There was none for me.  However, after further inquiries it was agreed that I would 
be provided with the manuals.  Although I was not being issued with any uniform, I 
stayed with the group until the process was completed.  I could see on their faces, 
and from the comments that were made as the uniform was being tried on, that the 
reality of what each person had embarked on had begun to sink in.  This was 
particularly crystallised when they were issued with their official belt.  As Hayden 
remarked ―it now seems real‖.  This belt has holding points along its length which 
enable officers to attach all the equipment they are expected to carry on duty 
including handcuffs, baton, torch and pepper spray.  As Chan et al., (2003) argue, 
trainees view the issuing of uniform as a significant step in their entry to the police 
community.   
Whilst I was not overly concerned at not being issued with uniform during the 
training period, I was concerned that I would later be conspicuous in the field 
without any uniform.  I endeavoured to overcome this issue during any practical 
components of our training on track, and later after graduation, by fashioning the 
clothing I wore to be as near the transit officers‘ uniform as possible.  This 
comprised of black pants, jacket and safety shoes.  When on track we also had to 
wear a high visibility vest, which along with my safety shoes, I already possessed 
from my previous occupation. Although my vest did not have transit officer on the 
back, from the front it looked similar.   
Everybody arrived early the next morning all dressed in their training uniform 
and with any belongings, such as their files and lunch, in their new transit officer 
bags.  These bags were black with a transit officer badge on the front which looked 
very much like a police badge.  (Later in the course I was presented with one of these 
bags, as they considered I was one of them).  There seemed to be a different air 
about the group that morning, with the uniform on.  Perhaps it provided more 
uniformity amongst them, or maybe they began to feel more part of the role that they 
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were embarking upon.  Although the training uniform was not exactly like the 
qualified transit officers‘ uniform, it still had an official appearance.  The group were 
allowed to wear their training uniform to travel back and forth to work, however the 
transit officers‘ uniform issued on graduation could not be worn outside work.  
Every person wearing  a transit officer uniform has to be on duty at that time.  
The RTO introduction continued on the second day with a large portion of 
time devoted to the RTO Employee Assistance Program.  This section was 
undertaken by one of the counsellors from the organisation that provides the 
Employee Assistance Program.  The counsellor explained to the group about the 
confidential counselling service they provide free of charge for employees and their 
immediate family members, paid for by the RTO.  The counsellor then outlined the 
range of issues that transit officers may use the service for, and described the process 
of ‗debriefing‘ that occurs following any harrowing incident that may occur while 
employees are at work.  These incidents include suicides which can be very 
traumatic with body parts strewn over the rail track.  Prior to showing a range of 
slides, the counsellor warned the group that some of the slides were very explicit and 
gruesome but the reality was that such events do happen on the track.  The 
counsellor explained the cumulative effect that this sort of trauma can have on a 
person, the symptoms that can be experienced and the help that is at hand.  In 
addition to the employee assistance program, the counsellor discussed fitness for 
work issues such as fatigue management and the RTO drug and alcohol policy which 
includes random drug and alcohol testing of all employees.  Agreement to this 
testing procedure is a condition of employment for all operational staff within the 
organisation.   
The afternoon continued with talks on the RTO telecommunications, 
environmental and occupational safety and health polices and concluded with a talk 
from the training coordinator who went through the timetable for the following days, 
detailing the requirement for punctuality and the necessity for the group to lay down 
some ground rules.  Animated discussion took place within the group, with the 
resulting outcome being that if a person‘s mobile phone goes off during a class, that 
person had to immediately perform ten push ups.  This was to occur under the 
watchful eye of the group to ensure there was no miscounting by the miscreant.  The 
same punishment was also to apply to a group member for each minute that the 
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member was late arriving for a class, whether it was at the start of a day or following 
a break.  Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce (2010) noted in research with recruits in a 
police academy, that this form of group self discipline was the start of officer 
solidarity as trainees begin to take responsibility and deal with the actions of their 
colleagues.  Everyone left at the end of the day eagerly looking forward to starting 
the ‗real‘ part of the training the following morning. 
4.3 Rail Safeworking Qualifications 
The next week consisted of learning the theory and demonstrating competency 
in the practical application of the RTO safeworking rules and regulations covering 
rail operations.  By definition, safeworking is ―an integrated system of operating 
procedures and technology for the safe operation of trains and the protection of 
people and property on or in the vicinity of the railway‖ (Standards Australia, 
2006a).  These operating regulations consist of the Network rules, the Appendix to 
the Network Rules and the Working Timetable.  These documents contain the RTO 
instructions, procedures and Railway By-Laws required for the operation of 
employees, equipment and trains safely over or near the railway line.  All railway 
employees learn these rules and regulations to the level appropriate for their 
designation.  The transit officer level of competency included electrification safety 
and awareness (the metropolitan rail system is electrified); communication protocols; 
the use and interpretation of radio, hand, light and flag signals and commands; 
operating trackside points, operating and manning  boom gates; and the ability to 
take action in the event of unsafe situations or emergencies occurring on the rail 
track.   
On successful completion of this component of the course, trainee transit 
officers are issued with a photo identification track access accreditation card stating 
their level of qualification.  This card must be carried at all times when they are on 
the rail track and produced when requested to do so by an authorised person, such as 
a safeworking inspector or rail regulator.  The trainer explained that a demerit system 
is in place which applies to all persons who have been accredited to work on the 
railway reserve.  This system provides uniformity of penalties for infringements of 
the safeworking rules and regulations, including suspension from working on the rail 
system for a specific period of time for serious breaches of the rules.  
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The first few days were spent in the classroom learning the rules, regulations 
and the theory underpinning the safeworking system before we went on track to put 
the theory into practice.  This theory included the ability to identify all parts of the 
track cantilevers and rails that carried the electrical components and to know what 
each component did; the rules and regulations on working in an electrified territory 
and the steps to take when an emergency occurred; or to prevent a situation 
escalating to an emergency.  I needed to pass the safeworking components of the 
training myself, in order to accompany the transit officers (without a personal 
lookout or ‗chaperone‘) as they undertook their various tasks on the rail reserve.  If a 
person is undertaking any work on the railway reserve they must notify train control, 
and if they need to work within three metres of the nearest running line, it is an 
essential requirement to have a lookout in place.  The lookout must be appropriately 
trained and qualified and their sole responsibility is to provide a warning to workers 
of an approaching train.  We also learnt about the automatic, semi-automatic, hand 
and flag signals; and the manual protection of level crossings and maze ways, should 
the automatic system fail.   
There seemed to be so much new information to absorb prior to testing and 
everyone was nervous, particularly as these were the first components of the course 
that had to be passed before going on track.  In my work in the organisation 
previously, I had not needed to be trained in how to undertake these tasks, so I 
completely identified with the feeling of nerves that the group voiced, which was 
also communicated by a feverish delving into the notes to clarify a certain point 
when one of the group members raised a question during a break.  The trainer was 
excellent and went to great trouble to try and explain everything as simply as 
possible, but however good the trainer was, the information still had to be learnt by 
the individual.   
The electrification theory paper on safety and awareness was the first test that 
we undertook followed by the safeworking rules and regulations for rail operations.  
We all passed, and what a relief it was for everybody to get two of the tests out of the 
way.  We were all looking forward to going out on track after a week in the 
classroom.  It made the training seem ‗more authentic‘.  We donned our compulsory 
high visibility vests and set out with our trainer, accompanied by a qualified lookout 
carrying an air horn whose job it was to warn us of oncoming trains.  The lookout 
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stayed with us on the operating rail system for the next few days while we completed 
this practical training and assessment element of the course.   
We learnt the difference between the various gauges of track and which was an 
up main and which was the down main.  This information was critical to know, for 
instance, to pinpoint a particular location accurately when required, or even to set the 
points on the track should the automatic system fail.  We learnt all about the different 
points (these are heavy movable blades which change the direction of a train from 
one track to the next), which are generally operated by motor, but may be required to 
be operated by hand.  Over a couple of days we learnt how to change all the different 
types of point systems we would encounter on track.  As the requirement for transit 
officers to crank points does not occur very often, the concern voiced amongst the 
group was remembering all this information should they be called upon to use it 
when working on the track.  Practising this task with the trainer there to prompt us if 
we made a mistake is entirely different from changing the points in the middle of the 
night with possibly only your partner there to assist you.  Further, the partner may 
have as little, or even less, experience.  
We learnt the action to take before entering and leaving a rail tunnel such as 
activating on entry, and locking on leaving, the ‗flashing man device‘.  This indicator 
provides an alert to train drivers that there are people in the tunnel.  As we walked 
through the tunnel, it felt eerie.  The tunnel was dark and engendered a sense of 
claustrophobia.  There was a narrow area for people to walk and stand in the tunnel 
for safety when trains were approaching, however, to me it did not feel safe.  As a 
train passed it caused quite a downdraft of air which was a bit unnerving.  There 
seemed to be a mixed reaction in the group to the tunnel surroundings, with a few 
people feeling similar to myself, but the more adventurous ones saw it as an exciting 
escapade.  Although there seemed to be so much to learn, and we knew that we were 
going to have to pass a test on it all, the group nevertheless enjoyed the days on the 
track.   
Our next exercise before we undertook our practical assessments was the 
manual protection of level crossings: the control of traffic at these crossings, and the 
use of flag and hand signals.  Manual protection is required when the automatic 
signalling system fails.  A replica of a level crossing complete with boom gates (big 
wooden arms that descend to stop vehicles crossing the railway line when a train is 
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approaching) has been erected at one of the rail depots.  This stands alongside a 
mock up of a rail carriage which is also used for the practical training of employees.  
The trainer demonstrated all the steps that we have to take when we arrive at a scene 
to manually protect a level crossing.  These include wearing high visibility vests, 
contacting train control to notify them that we are on site, checking the time of the 
next train at that location, and visually inspecting the boom gates for damage.  The 
boom gates have a failsafe system of failing with the boom arms down.  Transit 
officers normally work in pairs which enable both sides of the level crossing to be 
dealt with simultaneously.  We learnt how to raise the boom gate arms and lock them 
in position, and lower them again when a train was approaching the location.  This 
requires constant communication with train control to gain up to date information on 
train movements.  The trainer demonstrated the use of flags to control the vehicles 
during the day, and the use of a light at night.  The trainer made it all look easy; 
however, following his demonstration and his answering all our questions, we were 
all given a practice run doing each step of the procedure with the rest of the group 
watching.  This had the advantage of reinforcing the process in your mind as each 
person had their turn, but it also had the disadvantage that every person witnessed 
any ‗stuff-ups‘.  However, as this was only a practice run, we were all learning. 
Some of the group found remembering the sequence of steps to be hard, or 
they  would forget to lock the boom gate into position, but I found the hardest part 
was lifting the boom gate up to lock it into place.  The boom gate was so heavy!!  
There was supposedly a knack to it.  If you could lift it up so far, quickly enough, it 
gathered its own momentum and sprung up, just leaving the person with the task of 
locking it into place.  I tried and tried a number of times, but was unsuccessful.  I 
was the only one in the group who could not do it, and was sure that I would fail.  
Although a couple of the other trainees struggled with it, they nevertheless managed 
it in the end.  Eventually the trainer had to assist me get the boom gate up.  I felt 
deflated, particularly struggling in front of the group.  However, the trainer assured 
me that as level crossings are always manned by two people, it was quite acceptable 
to get your partner to assist you to lift the boom gate.  There had apparently been 
occasions in the past when other people had also been unable to lift the gate, but 
passed the assessment with assistance.  
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Looking back, perhaps my inability to raise the boom gate after trying so hard, 
cranking all the points with them (which is manually intensive), and walking the 
track, was the start of the process of a gradual acceptance by the group as one of 
them.  Regardless of the reason, the benefit at the end of the day was that I did not 
feel quite so much an outsider.  However, I felt disappointed that I was unable to 
complete a task unaided that the others managed to do. 
The next day was the practical assessment for this part of the course, with the 
manning of the level crossing assessment in the morning and the operation of points 
in the afternoon.  When we arrived at the depot we were all taken to the mock rail 
carriage to wait until it was our turn.  Mine was towards the end of the morning.  As 
each person came back from having completed their appraisal, the remainder of us 
were trying to elicit from them what questions they had been asked, so we could 
hone up on those questions before we had our own turn.  The first few of the group 
to return were ‗playing to the gallery‘, telling us how difficult it was.  However, it 
was not long before one of the group returned and put us out of our misery.  He told 
us all that if we could just remember what we had done yesterday we would not have 
any problems.  When my turn came along I was able to answer all the questions 
correctly and follow the correct procedure; however this time I asked the assessor to 
assist me lift the boom gate, so I could lock it into position.  This he did without any 
problems.  It appeared that everyone had passed this component so we all made our 
way back to the RTO building for lunch. 
Our next practical assessment after lunch was to crank a set of points.  The first 
person to return having completed this test was very kind to us all, reminding us to 
check that nothing was obstructing the rail points; even suggesting that we used a 
stick that may be lying nearby to clear any obstruction.  Essentially, any obstruction 
prevents the points changing and can cause a train to derail.  When my turn arrived, 
miraculously I remembered the names of the various track components, their 
functions, and answered all the questions accurately.  I found the stone that was 
fouling the points and removed it; conversed appropriately with the train controller 
and cranked the points in the approved manner.  I was thrilled to have passed the 
practical track work assessment and felt ready for the further challenges that lay 
ahead.  
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The next few days were occupied with fire extinguisher training, basic first aid, 
resuscitation skills and assessment, and familiarisation with the Emu Cab (the 
driver‘s cab of the electric train situated at each outer end of the car).  EMU refers to 
electric multiple units where there are two cars semi-permanently coupled together.  
Now, due to increased patronage on some lines, there may be three or more cars 
coupled together.  The group covered the layout of the train, and learnt how to open 
the train doors in an emergency and lower the train pantograph (the retractable frame 
mounted on the roof of the electric train which conducts the current from the 
overhead traction wiring equipment to power the train). 
4.4 Radio Operation   
This competency unit involved learning how to operate and correctly use hand 
held radios.  Those members of our group who had previous military, army reserve, 
police force or security experience had a distinct advantage over the rest of us.  They 
were already familiar with operating a hand held radio and using correct radio 
protocol.  I noted, similar to previous researchers with police, that trainees with this 
previous quasi-military experience were enjoying more approval from trainers than 
the rest of us did (A. T. Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010; Conti, 2009; Van Maanen, 
1973).  The few remaining members of the group, like me, had to begin with the 
basics: learning how to operate a radio; correct radio procedure; and learning the 
internationally recognised phonetic alphabet.  This system of communication links 
letters to words providing clear accurate communication.  I later experienced on 
track why this clarity of information is so important.  Although a few of the words 
were familiar to me such as C for Charlie or F for Foxtrot,  possibly because I had 
heard them on television or at the cinema, the use of other words appeared alien, 
such as S for Sierra or W for Whiskey.  I resorted to learning the alphabet ‗parrot 
fashion‘.  We all practiced by being given a letter and trying quickly to come up with 
the word.  The more we did, the quicker we got.  Even my family was given the task 
of firing letters off for me to reply with the word.  It all paid off, as now it is 
indelibly etched in my mind. 
There were also distinctive phrases and codes to learn, many of which were 
specific to RTO.  However there did seem to be logic to the use of some of these 
which assisted our learning.  For example, ‗logging on‘ meant ‗commencing duty 
and accessing the radio network‘.  Conversely the operational codes, which provide 
82 
the ability to transmit confidential information over the radio in minimum time 
without confusion to the receiver, were messages communicated by a series of 
numbers which had to be learnt by rote.  For example ‗Code 12‘ means that the 
transit officers are undertaking an arrest or ‗Code 10‘ indicates that urgent assistance 
is required by transit officers from all units, as it is deemed to be a life threatening 
situation.  We all diligently learnt these, realising the significance of their use.  We 
also learnt identity codes which were used as a means of identifying a person‘s 
ethnic background from a visual perspective.  These codes were often used over the 
radio to the control monitoring room (CMR) when an identity check is being 
undertaken on a passenger.  For example ‗IC1‘ is a Caucasian person or ‗IC6‘ is a 
person of African descent.  The combination of visual information and the personal 
details supplied at the scene can be verified as to whether they correspond with the 
computerised information in the police database.  
Although there did seem a lot to learn in this component of the course, we all 
found it good fun.  We practiced sending and receiving messages over the radio 
using our acquired knowledge of the various codes and phonetic alphabet.  In the 
practical assessment we were given a scenario where we had to liaise with the 
(acting) Transit Officer Supervisor and (acting) Shift Commander in the CMR using 
the correct radio modus operandi.  The written assessment for the communication 
systems component covered the theory behind the practical use of the radios, plus the 
radio communication policies and procedures that were in place in the RTO. 
4.5 Use of Force 
The next week and a half of our training dealt with the theory and practical 
skills required for the use of force, such as defending persons from an aggressor 
using oleoresin capsicum (OC) or ‗pepper‘ spray; controlling persons using empty 
hand techniques; controlling persons using a baton; restraining persons using 
handcuffs; and employing both baton and handcuffs.  This training took place at a 
football club where there was an oval, showers and a large room.  Together these 
provided the appropriate facilities for the theory and physical part of the training to 
be undertaken.  I was able to take part in the theory part of this component, however 
due to a physical limitation at that time I was only able to observe the physical 
training and assessment.  Although I was initially disappointed at this prospect, it 
never the less provided a rich opportunity to observe the interactions between 
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trainers and students, as well as affording the opportunity to study the different 
personalities of the other trainee transit officers and observe how they handled these 
physically and mentally demanding days.   
There were four extremely fit looking trainers all of whom had a military or 
police background with expertise in one or two areas of this unit.  As with police 
academies (Conti, 2009; Crank, 2004; Van Maanen, 1988), discipline was strict 
during this training, and punishment was swift and hard for even minor lapses by 
miscreants.  This normally took the form of ‗push ups‘ for the whole group or ‗push 
ups and squats‘ occasionally accompanied by a run right around the oval.  Even a 
yawn by one of the group, or a quick glance out of the window witnessed by one of 
the trainers, would be sufficient to instigate at least a dozen pushups.  Researchers 
such as Conti (2009), and Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce (2010), refer to it as police 
academy socialisation, which reinforces group loyalty and solidarity.  Academics 
argue that punishing the group for an individual lapse is a powerful motivator, 
ensuring what is considered appropriate behaviour for a police recruit.  As the week 
progressed the group requested me to keep a very close eye on them all, and ―to act 
as their spy‖, as they began to believe that the trainers were fabricating their ‗slips‘ 
to get everybody doing more ‗push ups‘.  I felt thrilled that the group had asked me 
to do this, and took it as a further sign of their acceptance of me as a colleague.  
I found these trainers were very focused on the dangers that transit officers 
face in their work environment and how quickly dealings with the public can 
escalate into dangerous situations.  The trainers felt responsible for ensuring that all 
trainees leaving the course were competent to deal with any situation that they might 
encounter; not only to protect themselves and their shift partner, but additionally to 
deal with offenders appropriately.  This deep concern, coupled with their martial arts 
backgrounds, appeared to manifest itself in the strict disciplining of participants that 
I witnessed during this training component.  Similar to findings by previous 
researchers with police (A. T. Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010; Conti, 2009), 
trainers made it very clear to the group that they would need to lift their standards 
and endure the physically demanding and stressful training in order to equip them for 
the potentially dangerous nature of their work.  Conversely our group, which had 
bonded together and had previously interacted well with the various different trainers 
(who had been from non-military or police backgrounds) in a lighter atmosphere of 
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banter and comradeship, were now having difficulty adjusting to the different 
requirements.  The morale amongst the group appeared to drop.  Some of the group 
were not quite as fit as others and found it very physically demanding, some resented 
the discipline expected by the trainers, and many of the group were very concerned 
that they were not going to pass the physical component.  This was not helped by the 
trainers indicating the potential for violence in their work, and the necessity for 
transit officers to have a superior fitness to the passengers they deal with.  However, 
the group felt their learning could be accomplished and their fitness standard 
achieved in a lighter atmosphere, and I heard muttered words uttered, out of the 
earshot of the trainers, such as ‗dictator‘ and ‗sadist‘. 
The theory component of this unit included our powers of arrest as transit 
officers; the use of force, which should only be that which is necessary and 
reasonable (as defined by society) to defend oneself against an unlawful assault and 
to lawfully achieve an arrest, or remove a person from RTO property.  In a 
confrontational situation we learnt there were three steps to managing the issue.  
These are to ‗defend‘, ‗control‘ and ‗restrain‘, and included the ‗how‘ and ‗when‘ of 
safely conducting a search of a person following an arrest.  The instructors stressed 
how important communication and body language were in dealing with unlawful 
behaviour and that only about two per cent of the time was the use of force required.  
The trainer pointed out that ―three seconds use of force requires approximately three 
hours of paper work‖ and underlined that it was certainly the last option to be used.  
He also emphasised that the batons were not to be used to effect an arrest, but were 
purely for our own protection and any misuse of the baton could lead to criminal 
action being taken against the transit officer concerned.   
Our group learnt how to ensure their personal safety, to move back, anticipate 
and defend against unprovoked assaults and how to back up physical action with 
verbal communication, leaving the offender in no doubt what action was required of 
them.  This approach would also emphasise to any onlookers that the transit officer 
was taking all reasonable steps to control the situation.  Such verbal communication 
also helps protect the transit officer should the RTO receive a complaint from any 
person that the officer had acted inappropriately.  However, it was stressed that in 
most situations communication skills can resolve issues and that the transit officers‘ 
approach, attitude and demeanour will often dictate the final outcome of any 
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confrontation.  Nevertheless, the transit officers were warned not to become 
complacent, and to always be aware of their surroundings and where other people 
were located in relation to a troublemaker.  However, I noted in many other transit 
police organisations that I visited, both in Australia and overseas, that they have 
moved to a more situational-specific process (personal research notes); for example 
the use of a ‗force continuum‘ (personal notes) which is discussed further in chapter 
6.   
The RTO has a rule that any person being provided with an OC (‗pepper‘) 
spray to use in a threatening situation must learn about the spray and the factors to 
consider before deploying it.  These include how to carry and use the spray correctly; 
the possible medical side effects for the person sprayed, plus the care of the person 
once the OC spray has been deployed.  After learning the necessary theory and 
demonstrating competency in that knowledge, the transit officers experience being 
sprayed in the eyes themselves.  The RTO believe that it is only after experiencing 
this that transit officers fully understand the consequences of using the spray.  
Nobody was looking forward to this procedure, as everyone was aware how painful 
and incapacitating OC spray in the eyes could be.  However, I noted as previous 
researchers have done, that the demanding, stressful and intense training led to 
increased solidarity amongst the trainees (A. T. Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010) 
and effectively emphasised the need to look after your partner.  People were buddied 
up before being sprayed to assist them in reaching buckets of water to wash away the 
residue of the OC spray.  All the trainees realised after their turn that it was not a 
resource to use lightly.   
Everyone had the weekend to recover from the OC spraying and on Monday 
morning, it was straight into the physical training.  Mats were placed on the floor in 
the hall to soften any falls during practice and every day started with a physical 
warm up.  The various stances were initially demonstrated by the trainers and then 
practiced repeatedly by the group to perfect the steps, which the trainer referred to as 
―programming muscle memory‖.  This practice was accompanied by a loud verbal 
―back off, back off‖ which reverberated around the room.  The group practiced 
defending themselves, deflecting blows and getting the person onto the floor which 
they learnt as sequences of actions, rather than individual movements, and then 
moving the person ready to escort them off the premises or transport them to the lock 
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up.  Each person took their turn at being the offender.  Similar to the use of pepper 
spray, the RTO believe that transit officers must experience for themselves the effect 
of any moves that they may carry out on an offender, so that they will fully 
understand the effects of their actions.   
This section of the training was very physically demanding, particularly as a 
couple of the group had previously not done very much exercise.  As the day 
progressed, it appeared that some were beginning to think the situation was real, and 
would forget for the moment that it was only training.  One of the transit officers 
developed a swollen forearm from blocking punches and many were feeling the 
effects of sore muscles, though no one complained to the trainers.  The trainers 
voiced their concern to the group that they did not think that they were mastering the 
moves.  As Conti (2009) found in his research with police, this was accompanied by 
shaming the individuals who were not rising to the required standard and saying they 
were letting their peers down, whilst reinforcing what the trainers considered to be 
the appropriate standards.  This resulted in a number of the group remaining back at 
the end of the day and practising further, anxious about passing their appraisal. 
The next morning an additional group of transit officers arrived at the venue to 
undertake their routine twelve-monthly refresher training.  The experience of that 
group ranged from four to ten years as a transit officer.  Both groups interacted well, 
and this was our group‘s first exposure to learning from ‗war stories‘ told by other 
transit officers.  As Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce (2010) identified,  ‗war stories‘ 
provide strong messages to the listeners, and these can undermine the formal 
learning process.  On this occasion we learnt what the group newly-arrived 
considered the best and worst parts of the job.  The best part was the comradeship 
that developed amongst the teams on each line; they get to know who they can rely 
on and who they cannot.  However, they also informed our group that passengers on 
the trains can pick out new officers and will ‗try it out on them‘ (hard luck stories).  
They informed our group that two new people can be partnered together, even two 
girls together.  Conversely, if they were paired with an experienced officer that 
person might object to working with such an inexperienced recruit.  By now, one of 
the two females in our group was concerned that she was going to be beaten up as 
soon as she commenced working on the line.   
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This particular day was spent learning to fall correctly, taking a person down, 
handcuffing and escorting that person; baton training which was undertaken initially 
using sticks to minimise any risk of injury to any of the trainees; and setting up the 
transit officer belt that carries all the ancillary equipment.  All tools on the belt had 
to be put in exactly the same place each time.  Again we learnt that muscle memory 
is relied on in an emergency and your hand automatically goes to the exact spot to 
reach for the particular tool that you require.  All weapons go on the person‘s master 
side, handcuffs in the middle of the back and the baton with the tip facing upwards 
situated next to the pepper spray.  Everyone had turns at being arrested and 
handcuffed and then doing the arrest.  Today the sound of ‗up against the wall‘ 
resounded around the room which was often supplemented by the trainer‘s ‗don‘t 
compromise your safety‘ as some of the group got too enthusiastic in the role play.  
The next day was more practice and more push ups, including extra push ups 
for incorrect footwork.  A number of the group had sore muscles and were now 
sporting strapping to hands and wrists with their bodies feeling the effects of the 
gruelling training.  The sticks were replaced by the batons, with the group learning 
how to pull out the baton and flick it open in one fluid motion.  Practical assessments 
were ongoing.  The group learnt how to safely search a prisoner, place them in the 
back of the delta vehicle and transport the prisoner to a lock up facility.  Every 
person had practice carrying out this process, as well as experiencing how it felt for 
the prisoner. 
At the debriefing session at the end of the practical training, the trainers 
expressed their concern that a number of the members of the group were barely 
competent in this ‗use of force‘ area, which did not help the trainees‘ confidence.  I 
later learnt, from a Canadian trainer experienced in the practical skills of transit 
policing, how a lack of competence in the physical requirements of the job can lead 
to transit officers becoming more aggressive when dealing with the public.  In turn, 
the more competent they were, the more confidence they were likely to have, and the 
less aggressive they might be in confrontational situations (personal notes).  
However, one of the trainers did offer to spend more time with the group if they 
wished to contact him in the future.  This did occur later, when as a group we 
decided that more physical training was required before going out on the track.  
Apparently this had never been requested by any other group previously. 
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4.6 Legal Studies 
Everyone was pleased to return to the classroom and allow their muscles to 
recover.  The next four weeks were taken up with legal studies.  The first week 
involved learning how to identify and manage disruptive and/or unlawful behaviour.  
This included monitoring passenger behaviour, identifying and resolving disruptive 
and unlawful activity, taking the appropriate action to control the behaviour and 
correctly documenting and reporting the incident.  Resolution techniques included 
problem solving, avoidance (call for assistance), smoothing (playing down 
differences between individuals), compromise and, as a last resort, resolving the 
conflict through the use of formal authority.  This led into learning the background to 
the law. 
I got caught in traffic on my way to training on the second morning back in the 
class room, and unfortunately arrived one minute late for the start of the class.  As I 
rushed into the room, in unison it appeared to be, the voices were raised shouting 
―push ups, push ups‖.  Yes, the penalty was ten push ups for each minute late.  
Thinking quickly, I realised that to be part of the group I needed to accept the 
punishment and try to do the ‗push ups‘ to the best of my ability.  I therefore got 
down on the floor and commenced the exercise.  The group all watched, counting 
each ‗push up‘ out loud.  As I completed the last one (after a fashion), cheers and 
claps erupted.  This could be heard quite some distance away.  Exhausted I crept 
back to my seat vowing to myself never to be late again. 
Back at our desks, we learnt the difference between statute and common law 
and the legislation relevant to the RTO and our position.  This included the duty of 
care owed to passengers; what constitutes an offence on railway property under the 
legislation; the various penalties that apply to each offence; and when we should 
arrest a person.  We studied our statutory obligations and the process to abide by 
following an arrest, including the duty of care that we owe to the arrested person.  
We were taught that the more common offences we would be dealing with in the 
normal course of our transit officer duties would only warrant the issue of an 
infringement notice.  These minor offences are punishable by fines, unless the person 
elects not to pay the fine and appear in court.  However, more serious situations 
could arise which would necessitate the issue of a summons or, where there is no 
other alternative, an arrest.  When an arrest takes place the alleged offender is 
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handed over to the police at the local lock up and required to attend court the next 
day.  
Each piece of legislation covered in the course included a written assessment.  
Like most of our written assessments, they were ‗open book‘ assessments.  In spite 
of this I, like the other transit officers, would be asking others what the answer to a 
question was, to save some time looking it up.  It became obvious later how 
important an in-depth knowledge of the law was.  Many times in the ensuing months 
I heard transit officers say that the assessments should have been ‗closed book‘.  
This would have forced them to learn their law more thoroughly.   
Knowledge of the legislation provided an introduction to the training segment 
on the preparation and presentation of evidence for court.  We learnt how to deal 
with a crime scene and the rules of evidence, which incorporated establishing the 
facts, gathering and securing the evidence including what constitutes hearsay 
evidence, which is generally not admissible, and the importance that our notebook 
entries be clear, concise, accurate, legible, in chronological order and recorded as 
soon as possible after the event.  We were taught how to take witness statements and 
to interview suspects and we learnt what rights the alleged offender had and how to 
take a statement from them.  We practiced with various written scenarios how to 
compile an arrest brief for use in court the next day, and a brief for a future hearing if 
the alleged offender pleaded not guilty to the charges.  The trainer provided an 
overview of presenting evidence in court and how to conduct oneself in a court 
Room in preparation for our practical test.  By now we were all feeling bogged down 
by the extensive amount of law that we had to learn and even undertaking a practical 
assessment provided a break in absorbing the ‗dry‘ subject we were studying.  The 
only light relief we had during the couple of weeks was a visit to the Law Courts to 
watch the procedures used in the court room.   
Our practical test was a simulated scenario, which was to take place in the 
mock-up of the rail carriage at the main rail depot.  The trainers had briefed various 
people to act as passengers.  We were to work in pairs and we were not going to be 
told anything about the circumstances beforehand, rather we had to deal with the 
situation as we saw it at the time.  The scenarios would vary between each pair, 
which meant that we could not get advance information from the earlier pairs to 
develop strategies to deal with the situation before our own turn.  We had to wait in 
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the crib room at the depot until we were called for our assessment, and at that point 
we had to board the train as we would if we were routinely conducting a ticket 
check.  The situation was to be filmed and sound recorded.  We later had the 
opportunity to view all the recordings and observe how we, and the other pairs, dealt 
with our particular scenario.   
I was undertaking my practical assessment with Hayden who, like me, had no 
prior police or security experience.  We were to be the fourth pair, which meant we 
had quite a wait before our turn.  As each pair returned and we heard the ‗war 
stories‘ of what they faced, we got more and more nervous.  Hayden and I discussed 
particular strategies, such as who would take the lead role and who would radio for 
any assistance if required, but apart from broad concepts we were unable to do any 
preparation.  One of the group, who had always believed that she would remain calm 
if a disruptive situation occurred on the train, admitted on her return that only when 
her scenario had finished did she realised how aggressive she had been, and 
commented ―that the adrenalin just took over‖.  Others reported similar reactions 
such as ―the acting was so real that you forget that it is an exercise‖. 
With this information in our minds Hayden and I boarded the train to conduct a 
ticket check.  We encountered a reasonably dressed Caucasian man who said he had 
a ticket but refused to show it to us.  No amount of reasoning would persuade him to 
show us his ticket. Hayden then asked the passenger for his details to issue him with 
an infringement notice.  The passenger refused to provide the details saying that ―he 
was a lawyer and he knew his rights‖.  He sounded very convincing and after a while 
you begin to think ‗maybe he is right‘.  As this was taking place we had to deal with 
interjections from other passengers.  The passenger continued to refuse to give his 
details, refused to leave the train and we ended up arresting him, getting him off the 
train at the next station, where we were met by the delta support vehicle I had 
radioed to transport the accused man to the police lock up.  Failing to provide a valid 
name and address when duly requested by a transit officer can constitute an offence. 
It was amazing how caught up in the scenario we became, and it proved to be a 
very valuable learning exercise for us all.  We also learnt that even if someone says 
that they are a lawyer, we should not feel intimidated.  The exercise highlighted how 
important it was to know the relevant law to adequately carry out our duties.  The 
next part of the assignment was to prepare the prosecution notice and the document 
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of material facts for the court appearance next day, and to prepare the court brief 
with our statement of evidence for appearance at trial the following week.  The court 
case was being held in the permanently–set-up court room at the state police 
Academy.  
We were not able to review the filming of the scenario until after the court 
hearing, so our briefs and statement of evidence were developed from our notes 
taken immediately after the event.  These took the next few days to develop.  In court 
we are not allowed to refer to the statement of evidence, so we needed to remember 
when and what occurred and what we had documented.  The trial was run like a 
normal court with a police prosecutor, a judge and a lawyer representing the accused.  
All of us could sit in the visitors‘ gallery until it was our case and then we had to go 
outside until we were called individually to give evidence.  Similar to a normal court, 
the lawyer for the accused could cross-examine us following our evidence.  It was 
obvious just watching the first case that it was nerve wracking to the individual who 
was giving evidence and being cross-examined.  We all sat in trepidation of having 
our own turn.  However, it definitely provided a valuable experience to prepare us 
for court appearances in the future, and in hindsight I probably coped as well as the 
others.  
Back in the class room we were now able to view the film of how we had all 
handled the various scenarios we had been given.  The group were amazed at how 
perceptions after the event concerning what had happened, and what had been said, 
could vary from what the video record showed had taken place.  A number of the 
group were surprised to see how aggressive they appeared on the film, particularly 
the ones having to deal with abusive passengers.  This also provided a good insight 
into how passengers could view their actions.  In a normal situation, cameras are 
continually running on the train, and if an incident arises that particular piece of 
footage is pulled up for evidence.  I found in my research that other organisations 
hired actors, or in some cases used youth workers, to take the part of passengers; and 
some conducted numerous different scenario events (personal notes).  When I visited 
the New Jersey Transit Police I found they had invested in a training simulator which 
enabled trainees to practice many different scenarios in the virtual realm whilst 
enabling the trainers to assess whether they had competently handled each situation 
they were presented with.  As part of the simulator training the trainee had to 
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articulate to the trainer why they had acted in a particular manner, which aided their 
learning process (personal notes). 
The group felt the scenario training was an effective learning tool; however 
more scenarios were required during the training to assist the trainees with their 
learning.  As transit office Peter stated: 
We do the one scenario which is sort of incorporated as an arrest and 
also court scenario and that‘s all we do, we just do the one 
scenario.... 
and 
...Whereas our scenario, the only outcome was arrest that was the 
only outcome [it could be] because it had to then lead into your 
scenario [sic referring to court case].  You couldn‘t go through any 
other scenario, you couldn‘t just remove them and that be the end of 
it, you couldn‘t caution them and that be the end of it, it had to end in 
an arrest.  So they should have scenarios where you know, the object 
of the act or whatever is not to an extent that would warrant an arrest, 
but some other course of action to get people used to the idea that 
you know, they don‘t have to arrest people, arrest is last resort... 
Or as transit officer Mike stated when arguing the case for more scenario 
training: 
Just a lot of time wasted with stuff that‘s not important like how to 
use a loud speaker to talk, to tell the patrons on the platform like 
[you] don‘t really need to learn that, that‘s pretty straight forward.  
Stuff like that and you think you could spend that time doing more 
play acting or scenarios.  
We now had to learn the legislation related to taking a person into protective 
custody and the procedures to follow when this occurred.  This learning was assisted 
by a visit to the police lock up, where transit officers would hand over the alleged 
offender to the police.  Having seen the facility with its extremely basic 
accommodation we all felt it was amazing that any person would do anything to end 
up there more than once.  All areas of the lock up are videoed and recorded.  A 
number of offenders could be allocated to each cell which had a toilet in the cell 
visible to everybody.  We viewed what is referred to as the ‗green room‘.  This is a 
padded room where violent or disturbed offenders are placed.  The green refers to 
the padding on the walls.  Apparently, a number of police have remarked that many 
of the transit officer arrests end up in the green room.  No reason was given for this 
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tendency.  The visit also covered where to park the delta vehicle to take the prisoner 
in to the facility, as well as the paperwork that was required. 
To celebrate being a substantial way through the training the group decided to 
have a get-to-gether at the weekend, including their partners.  Sam volunteered his 
place for the event and Hayden volunteered to take and set up all his karaoke 
equipment.  Everyone was going to pitch in with the food and take what alcohol they 
wanted to drink.  I was delighted to be invited. It was great to see the entire group 
out of the work setting and to meet their partners.  It was a very enjoyable night and I 
was certainly accepted as one of them.  The karaoke was in full swing and I ventured 
to have a turn myself.  Unbeknown to me, Hayden was recording all the singing.  As 
I entered the class room on Monday morning the recording of my singing was put on 
loud and clear.  What an embarrassment, I sounded absolutely terrible and as if I had 
had far too much to drink, which certainly was not the case.  Of course, it was also 
played for the trainers to hear.  However it did provide some light hearted banter to 
start the day. 
4.7 Customer Service 
A lot of time was now devoted to learning about the implementation of 
revenue protection measures which include the checking of tickets, knowing the 
various fare zones and concessions that apply, and the issue of infringement notices 
to passengers who cannot produce a valid ticket.  The last part of our training 
consisted of a number of basic elements of the course which, like the time devoted to 
ticket checking, fellow trainees referred to as ―a waste of time‖.  These included 
subjects such as telephone techniques; the transit officer code of conduct;  ticket 
zones and the time taken to travel from one zone to another; fundamental issues such 
as personal hygiene, and presentation; working effectively with others; making a 
public announcement; good customer service which included mapping a station; 
disability awareness including the practical component of putting a wheel chair on 
and off a train; quality systems; and working with people from socially diverse 
backgrounds.  As transit officer Mike later told me in an interview:  
Through training I was just going ‗this is ridiculous‘ and you waste 
your time on... . I can‘t even remember some of the stupid things 
they did, like going around mapping a train station, as you know.  
Why go and map one train station, what good is that going to be 
when you get out of the train; that took a whole day to do... 
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...But the whole day could have been spent doing scenario training or 
going to the police academy in their scenario training [or] even put 
us through riot training at the police academy just so they can get 
your adrenalin pumping and feel what it‘s like to work in a group.   
For most of us, the most interesting part of these rudimentary segments were 
short addresses from male and female Aboriginal police officers on Aboriginal 
culture, suggesting a few strategies we could use which could assist us in any 
interactions with their people.  We all found the presentations interesting and 
educational and wished this segment was longer.   
We were now down to the last few days and everybody was looking forward to 
finishing in the classroom and beginning work on the line.  We spent an afternoon on 
counter terrorism awareness and were presented with an overview of the RTO 
emergency management manual.  We spent a day on drug awareness which included 
the signs and symptoms of drug use.  A further day was spent on the barriers to 
communication and learning what factors contribute to effective listening skills, the 
use of open and probing questions, and a brief introduction to conflict resolution 
strategies.  The trainer referred to the content of this unit as ―common sense stuff‖.  
We were divided into pairs to practice, and took turns in role playing a difficult 
customer.  This gave us the opportunity to develop our skills at producing a win/win 
situation to reinforce the theory about resolving conflict.  However, as a group, we 
felt that this unit was skimmed over, leaving us without in-depth skills in this area.  
As one of the more experience transit officers later told me:   
They don‘t do it now, they don‘t do tactical communication.  Well 
that‘s what they need to bring in.  They need to bring the tactical 
communication in because a lot of the people we talk to, you can 
solve that situation through communication.  It can be solved just 
like that (click of fingers).  And it does work; we did it with Praxis 
[sic. Previous training consultants] and I found it very, very useful.  
This view was supported by many other experienced transit officers, who 
subsequently remarked to me that the newer transit officers were now graduating 
without sufficient verbal skills to deal effectively with difficult customers. 
4.8 Graduation 
Everyone was excited at finishing the classroom training although nervous at 
what lay ahead.  It was interesting to note how some trainee demeanours altered once 
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the uniform was put on.  As one of them stated ―it makes you feel powerful‖.  The 
training coordinator cautioned the group against letting their ‗ego‘ take over when 
out on the track.  He advised that people‘s egos could be dented by being personally 
verbally attacked or ignored, and that a dented ego could make a transit officer feel 
that ―I‘m going to fix this guy right up‖ or ―I‘ll show you mate‖.  I later heard these 
sentiments echoed by some of the more senior transit officers on track, such as 
transit officer Rory: 
Some of them go in.  They think because they get a uniform they 
think they‘re super human.  That‘s not the way to deal with the 
public.  You think you‘re Superman when you put this uniform on.  
You‘re not! 
We were advised that the trick is to remember that it is a role that you are 
undertaking, and what an aggrieved person may be saying is attacking the role, not 
you personally, one trainer remarked, ―the uniform provides you with anonymity‖.  
Conti‘s (2009, p. 411) view with all violent police/citizen incidents is that they ―are 
the result of status threats whereby the officer‘s demeanour toward the civilian and 
its reciprocation are either generating or suppressing conflict‖.  Conti (2009) argues 
that this perception aligns with previous research with law enforcement officers 
which found it was important to ‗maintain an edge‘ to protect personal safety while 
acting in the role.  The importance of role differentiation was endorsed by one of the 
group who had previously worked as a policeman saying ―you have to build up a 
resistance and learn to differentiate between work and outside‖.  
The final morning was taken up with the issue of the full transit officer 
operational uniform and equipment.  I was not issued with uniform or any 
equipment, which included passes to the transit offices and a key to the dead end of 
the railcar which is used as a ‗safe haven‘ at times when an officers‘ safety is 
threatened.  At the time I felt this exclusion was a disadvantage; however it did have 
one upside.  The trainees viewed this situation as management treating me badly.  I 
was often told by them that ―You are doing the same work as us; so you should be 
given the same things‖ (personal notes).  I had become affectionately known as the 
‗token transit officer‘.  A group photo followed with every graduating trainee in 
uniform.  I felt very honoured when the group insisted that I was part of their official 
graduation photo, even though I was not in uniform.   
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The afternoon was taken up with the presentation of a graduation certificate 
and a group photo for each person, presented by a member of the communications 
department.  The group was disappointed that the General Manager of RTO Train 
Operation (their head of department), the General Manager of Security (their head of 
branch) and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) were all unable to attend the 
presentation.  No one in the group had yet met the CEO or General Manager, 
Security.  The training coordinator addressed the group and emphasised that ―the job 
is as hard or as easy as you make it‖.  He pointed out that if you looked smart and 
professional you were less likely to be picked on than a person who did not take 
pride in their appearance.   
After congratulations were said all around and evaluation sheets on the training 
were completed, we departed the classroom for the last time.  As I left the building 
proudly clutching my certificate and group photo, I reflected on all that had occurred 
during the past three months and how different I had felt when I entered the building 
on that first day of training.  I was now ready for the next phase of my field work, 
joining my fellow trainees on track.  However, as Adler and Adler (1987) found, 
initial entry in to the field does not necessarily provide continued acceptance. 
4.9 Summary 
As a group, we were initially surprised that a number of the trainers referred to 
the transit officer unit as a para military organisation. However, over the three 
months‘ training I was to learn that in many respects transit officer culture mirrored 
that of law enforcement officers.  The military model prevailed; defining the person 
in uniform and reinforcing a culture of obedience, regimentation, solidarity, 
conformity and also pride in their position (A. T. Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, 2010; 
Conti, 2009; Crank, 2004).  Our trainee cohort had bonded well in a supportive 
environment and as one of the trainers pointed out during our last week, there was a 
level of warmth amongst our group.  He cautioned against ―taking too much of that 
warmth out on the line, as you have to be accepted‖.  These remarks caused some 
concern.  Over the previous three months a good comradeship had developed and 
whilst the trainer was saying this for our benefit, it caused people to have some fear 
of what lay ahead, wondering about the culture they were about to enter, and what it 
would be like.    
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CENTRAL CONTROL MONITORING ROOM 
5. INTRODUCTION 
Having completed all the training I was keen to commence working with the 
transit officers.  However, as described in chapter three, there was a problem about 
obtaining permission to join the officers ‗on track‘.  The manager was concerned that 
I would experience the full extent of the anti-social  behaviour and violence that 
transit officers are exposed to and deal with on a daily basis; and argued that the 
research could achieve its objective by my spending time in the central Control 
Monitoring Room (CMR), and later talking to transit officers, without putting my 
safety at risk.  As previously documented, the CMR is the room where operators 
monitor the closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras located all over the railway 
system.  Although there is no personal interaction with transit officers from this 
location, I agreed to spend time in this environment in order to progress the research.  
This chapter documents my experience, observations and learning achieved during 
this process of watching the cameras from the confines of the monitoring room.  
Over recent years a growing concern amongst developed nations regarding 
security in public places, including transport systems, has seen an increase in the use 
of surveillance cameras as organisations strive to improve safety and combat crime 
(Smithsimon, 2003; The Economist, 2007; Williams & Johnstone, 2000; D. Wilson 
& Sutton, 2004).  The RTO is no exception, with cameras installed on all stations, 
platforms and railway infrastructure (Acott, 2011).  Whilst concern abounds from 
citizens that the use of these cameras are an invasion of personal privacy, 
governments and organisations have continued to view them as an important weapon 
in the fight against crime and public disorder.  They argue that CCTV coverage will 
eventually be so widespread that we will take it for granted.  On the other hand, the 
concern demonstrated by citizens continues to be fuelled by provocative media 
headings such as ―You‘ll never walk alone‖ (Coleman & Sim, 2000) or ―Learning to 
live with Big Brother; Civil liberties: surveillance and privacy‖ (The Economist, 
2007, p.72).  Wilson and Sutton (2004, p. 225) argue that the use of CCTV is 
controversial because of its capacity to ―interrogate, control and marginalise‖, 
creating further fractures around social and economic divisions.  As a result, public 
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opinion has tended to be polarized on whether CCTV cameras are an invasion of 
privacy or a necessary tool for public order.   
In recent years there has been emergence range of qualitative research projects 
which examine the work of employees who are systematically coordinated  by 
managers from a distance (Goold, 2003, 2004; Heath, et al., 1999; Sanne, 2008). 
Often the researchers may remain unknown to the participant workforce in the 
research.  Even so, I wished to undertake the research with the transit officers as a 
participant observer.  Working directly with employees provides an understanding of 
the complex organisation relationships between work practices, workers and 
organisations (Bechky, 2006; Contu & Willmott, 2006; Orr, 2006).  I felt that to 
fully understand the transit officer culture and communication practices I needed to 
become part of their culture, rather than view their work from afar.  Whilst Walby 
(2005, p. 191) believes CCTV video images are ―a form of text which is central to 
the coordination of peoples‘ activities‖  and ―subsequently plays a role in 
reproducing social relations‖, many other researchers recognise the benefits of 
participant observation in qualitative research (Bechky, 2006; Contu & Willmott, 
2006; Orr, 2006). 
5.1 Commencing in the Control Monitoring Room 
A compromise was reached with management.  The short time I had spent in 
the CMR during the transit officer training, had been during the day.  However, the 
majority of the transit officers‘ work is at night, when the face of the rail system 
changes with the different passenger demographics using the system.  This is when 
the role of the transit officers comes into its own.  Anti-social behaviour and 
violence become far more prevalent at night as different subcultures claim centre 
stage.  During the day customer service assistants provide help to passengers, with a 
skeleton crew of transit officers in delta vehicles available as back-up support on 
each line.  Unlike transit officers, customer service assistants do not have the 
responsibility for dealing with law enforcement and any anti-social behaviour on the 
rail system. Ticket checking is mainly undertaken by revenue protection officers 
employed specifically for this function.  As I had previously witnessed night-time 
work during a few shifts of ‗on job training‘, I agreed with the transit officer 
manager that my induction to night life on the urban rail system would commence 
with a month spent in the CMR, giving an overview of the type of situations I could 
99 
encounter on track.  Whilst initially I had not factored this into my research 
timetable, the experience gained during this month proved beneficial.  
Following my meeting with the transit officer manager, it was agreed that I 
would begin my observations the following day, commencing work in the afternoon 
and working through until the last trains had reached their destinations.  The control 
monitoring room observed in this research is the central security hub of the 
metropolitan rail passenger system.  The entrance to the control room is not evident 
or accessible to the general public and control room operators enter and leave the 
building through swipe card access.  The link between the CCTV control system and 
the transit officers is the Shift Commander who is responsible for the operational 
management of incidents in both the control room and on the railway reserve.  The 
manager said he would notify the Shift Commander that I would be commencing 
work with them the next night.  I was given the telephone number of the Shift 
Commander to ring when I arrived outside the door, and he would let me in.  Strict 
security regulates entry to the monitoring room, and this is essential to maintain 
standards and protect the integrity of the system.   
Arriving at the entrance to the CCTV room to commence my first shift, I 
telephoned the number I had been given.  I stood there waiting for what seemed like 
an eternity watching the activities occurring at the main city station, not knowing at 
that stage that I was being watched.  I later learnt for security purposes that a camera 
was permanently focused on the outer entrance of the building to observe all persons 
wishing to enter the CMR.  Eventually the door was opened by the Shift Commander 
inviting me in to the inner sanctum.  Inside the first door is a lobby complete with 
table and sign-in book for all visitors to complete.  The inner entrance to the CMR is 
also security controlled and accessed by the use of an authorised security swipe card.  
Formalities having been completed I was invited into the CMR, introduced to the 
three staff watching the monitors and then given a desk to use.  Like other control 
monitoring rooms, the railway CCTV operators sit surrounded by banks of video 
monitors displaying images transmitted from cameras situated in the areas under 
surveillance.  This provides the operators with the ability to monitor activities as 
they are occurring on stations, platforms, car parks and other railway infrastructure 
and assets.  Similar cameras can be found and used in diverse situations such as 
shops, watching for shop lifters; hospitals, monitoring patients; streets, for 
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monitoring public disorder; with one of the main uses of these cameras being for 
security purposes (Goold, 2004).  
5.2 Overview of the CCTV System  
The Shift Commander, who sits at the back of the room directing operations, 
provided me with an overview of his role and explained the workings of the CCTV 
system.  The system includes an incident management and recording process with 
cameras that are capable of producing video evidence and still images in a format 
and quality suitable for presenting as evidence in court.  To maintain the integrity of 
this evidence, the system also includes an image storage system.  Station premises 
which have an office have cameras which can be operated locally; however, the 
CCTV operators can operate all cameras remotely.  This level of remote control 
enables the operator to change from one camera to another on a station, change 
stations, change the angle on the camera or zoom in or out of a situation, or pan left 
or right  as required.  Importantly, the operator also has the ability to communicate 
with people on a station if the situation warrants it, and passengers can communicate 
with the operator by pressing an emergency button located on the platform.  I later 
also saw how this system could be abused by passengers.  If the passenger requires 
assistance, the operator can view the situation and determine the appropriate actions 
to be taken.  Using the cameras, the operator can to monitor a person or group who 
may have attracted their attention, keeping them under surveillance until they have 
left an area.  However, researchers who investigate surveillance operations argue that 
a disadvantage of this capability is that it can lead to abuses such as racial profiling, 
the harassment of gay people and sexual voyeurism (Goold, 2004; Smithsimon, 
2003; Wells, et al., 2006).  Although, I saw no evidence of this occurring in the 
railway environment.  However, at a time when many people fear the creep of CCTV 
cameras into every aspect of their lives, they also accept that there are many 
advantages.  Using the cameras can facilitate more effective deployment of the 
police, transit officers and/or emergency services to areas where a problem is 
occurring.  The CCTV system also helps authorities to solve crimes and catch 
offenders, who often plead guilty when presented with the visual evidence (Williams 
& Johnstone, 2000).  
Initially, CCTV cameras were introduced into rail organisations as a means of 
monitoring passenger activities, to protect passenger safety, and to safeguard the 
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organisation‘s property, infrastructure and assets.  The organisation, like many other 
organisations, hoped CCTV cameras would act as a deterrent to crime by increasing 
the fear of detection and aiding the prosecution of petty crime, graffiti and vandalism 
that occur at stations and adjoining car parks (Coleman & Sim, 2000; Williams & 
Johnstone, 2000).  However, CCTV does not always solve the problem.  The West 
Australian daily paper, for example, depicted a youth spray-painting a train and 
captioned the photo: ―The teen doing this was convicted of graffiti-related offences.  
He received just forty-eight hours community service.  Is it any wonder they keep 
doing it?‖ (Jones, 2008a, p. 1).  Further into the paper was another picture showing a 
youth admiring his graffiti on a computer.  That  article was headed ―Young vandal 
revels in the adrenaline rush of his graffiti spree‖ (Jones, 2008b, p. 7).  Later in my 
research journey, I learnt from the American Transit Police in the cities that I visited, 
that there is a vast international culture of graffiti artists who will go to extraordinary 
lengths to get their work seen, photographed and put on the internet.  Workers in the 
CCTV centre argued that much harsher penalties are warranted to increase the 
deterrent factor and reduce the incidence of these graffiti offences and petty crime on 
the railway system.   
Regardless of whether an individual camera is manually switched to a 
particular station, all cameras continually record all activities around the clock and 
can be replayed later if required.  This facility is often called on to assist police with 
their inquiries when a person of interest may have used the rail system.  This 
occurred a number of times while I was working in the CMR.  My initial 
introduction occurred on the first night in the control room.  A young Asian lady was 
waiting to catch a train on her own at an unmanned station, when another lady, of a 
much bigger build, approached her, produced a knife and tried to steal her handbag.  
In trying to get away from her attacker, the young Asian lady fell backwards off the 
platform onto the track.  Luckily no train arrived at that time.  The attacker ran off 
the platform to a car driven by an accomplice who was waiting to pick her up.  The 
monitoring room operator was alerted to the situation.  The Shift Commander 
notified the police and immediately ordered the transit officers, who were patrolling 
the line in the delta vehicle that night, to attend to the incident.  Whilst the station 
was not being monitored at that particular time, the cameras were still recording all 
activities.  The camera operator was able to replay the video so the police could 
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obtain an accurate image of the attacker and the getaway car.  The same couple 
carried out a further two assaults elsewhere that evening before being apprehended 
by the police.  The police were able to use the images to alert other officers on duty 
to the appearance and details of the perpetrators and also used the images as 
evidence in the ensuing court case. 
I also witnessed the police using our surveillance system in different 
circumstances.  Around midnight on one particularly cold Saturday night, when I 
was observing the activities in the control room, a request came through from the 
police to actively monitor events on a particular station.  The police had received a 
call from three anxious young women requesting assistance as they were being 
harassed by a group of males.  The operator immediately switched the camera feed 
to that particular location and could clearly see three young women, scantily clad for 
the cold winter night, sitting on one of the platform seats laughing and talking, 
showing no signs of distress and with no evidence of any males in the vicinity.  The 
operator then observed one of the of the young women use her mobile phone to 
make, what we later learnt, was a phone call to another police station asking for their 
assistance.  The Shift Commander announced to the girls that they were under 
surveillance, and that they would be kept under surveillance until the train arrived.  
Police often receive mischievous requests for assistance, particularly from young 
women who are looking for a lift home.  In this instance, the operator was able to use 
the CCTV cameras to monitor the situation, saving the police attending a fraudulent 
call for assistance. 
5.3 Observing Night Life on the Rail System 
Watching the monitors in the CMR provided a rich picture of the behaviour of 
people from different socio-economic groups and the variety of problems that transit 
officers faced in dealing with some passengers.  Although the anti-social behaviour 
and arrestable offences were evident on all four lines, it became apparent that the 
type of problem and occurrence rate varied between the different lines.  For example, 
research conducted by Cooper et al., (2007) on the [South] line, which services one 
of the less advantaged areas, identified that ―some young people stay on night trains 
because it is unsafe for them to go home, especially at weekends‖.  I later met these 
young people when working on that line.  Each night they would be there, 
sometimes they would meet up with mates at various stations for social interaction, 
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usually catching the last train home.  The ages of these children appeared to range 
from about ten to fourteen years.  They normally bought a student day ticket which 
enabled them to travel all night.  However, as Cooper et al., (2007, p. 17) suggest,  
groups such as this ―may be perceived as threatening to others‖.  Although this 
particular group of youths are aware that there are cameras around, they are not 
apparently perturbed by this.  They feel safe on the network.   
On the other hand, Homel et al.,(1992, p. 679) comment that the ―fear of 
random, unprovoked violence from strangers now has a major effect on the lives of 
many ordinary Australians‖.  Such fears are exacerbated by groups of young adults 
loitering in public places and people will stay away from areas where they perceive 
they may be subjected to intimidation or violence (Bromley & Nelson, 2002).  I 
noted that the operator monitoring the CCTV cameras is able to pinpoint any 
potential anti-social group and bring it to the attention of the Shift Commander, who 
will alert transit officers to any problem situations and deploy them to that area.  
While CCTV coverage is clearly important, two stations were completely without 
cameras during my fieldwork.  One of those stations was only used when special 
events were on at the show ground, and the other station, where trains regularly 
stopped, was being rebuilt resulting in cameras not being available at that station 
until the building was completed.  Later in the research I learnt that the building had 
been completed and cameras are now operational again.   
The CMR operators pointed out other areas of concern with the cameras.  In 
one particular location the camera was pointed at a notice board, and in a new 
underground station a number of the cameras required adjustment to provide full 
coverage of the area.  Upon enquiry, I learnt from the managers that the station had 
still not officially been handed over to the RTO by the contractor.  As a result, due to 
warranty issues, the cameras could not be altered until such time that it was 
completely under RTO control.  Later, when I was working with the transit officers, 
I learnt that cameras were a source of frustration when they were not working, were 
incorrectly placed, or were not installed.  Transit officers viewed this failure of 
CCTV coverage as compromising their safety and many times I heard the remark 
―management does not care about our safety‖. 
Transit officers find a couple of northern line station CCTV locations to be of 
particular concern.  At one of these a bus interchange area is located on the top of the 
104 
station and passengers alight from buses to enter the station.  Whilst transit officers 
are expected to monitor and deal with any situations that arise, there is no camera 
located in the interchange area.  This leaves transit officers unable to view any 
trouble brewing, while camera operators are unable to monitor any passenger 
interactions with transit officers, or with other passengers.  I later observed a safety 
representative at one of the safety committee meetings that I attended raise the issues 
of cameras at bus interchange areas.  The manager advised that the area was beyond 
the direct control of the RTO Train Operations, as the area belonged to RTO Buses 
which was a different division of the RTO.  RTO buses did not want extra cameras 
installed (Safety Committee Minutes, March 2008).  The repair of cameras was a 
further source of frustration for the transit officers.  This is undertaken by another 
division of the organisation, and transit officers believe that delays in maintenance 
and repair compromise their safety.  This is discussed further under maintenance of 
equipment.  I later learnt that transit officers view corporate management as one 
entity, and do not believe that demarcation issues between divisions of the one 
organisation should be allowed to jeopardise their safety.   
 Goold (2004) in his research on the way that CCTV has been integrated into 
policing organisations and practices in southern England, found in all areas that there 
was a positive impact on the police‘s perceptions of their safety.  In police-led 
CCTV monitoring operations, police officers were able to provide a quicker, safer 
and more efficient response to incidents as a result of being able to assess the 
situation unfolding on the monitor in the control room (Goold, 2004).  Such video 
information provided details of the incident, including ―the nature of the disturbance 
and – where there is a possibility of violence – prior knowledge of which individuals 
are particularly dangerous‖ (Goold, 2004, p. 172). 
Privacy is a modern right; however public surveillance is now a fact of life.  As 
Goold (2002, p. 24) states, ―we draw a distinction between being watched by a 
visible police officer and a CCTV camera mounted on the side of a building‖.  
People do not know if somebody is watching them, or who that person may be.  This 
leaves citizens wondering if they are being watched by people with ethical standards, 
or a person with voyeuristic tendencies.  Knowing that information, they may choose 
to change their behaviour (Goold, 2008).  It became obvious when I was in the 
monitoring room that many passengers were unaware that they were under 
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surveillance.  Numerous times I noted that when the Shift Commander made an 
announcement to passengers on a platform to stop a specific behaviour, the 
passengers concerned, usually youths, would look around to see where the voice was 
coming from.  Not seeing anybody, they would continue the behaviour they had been 
told to stop.  This could vary for example from drinking on the platform, damaging 
property, jumping on to the tracks, etching markings into paint work, graffiti, 
smoking, to being generally abusive or fighting.  One particular episode brought 
home to me how naïve some people could be.  Some youths failed to stop drinking 
when requested to do so by the Shift Commander, and were then warned that transit 
officers were on their way.  The perpetrators actually started changing clothes in an 
attempt to confuse transit officers with any description they would have been given.  
The miscreants obviously failed to realize they were being watched the whole time 
they were doing this. 
When incidents occur on the track the Shift Commander is the overall ‗Chief‘ 
or ‗Person in Charge‘.  He is in radio contact with all transit officers and can 
immediately deploy them to a particular location if required.  The control room 
personnel also have a close liaison with the police, including access to the police 
mainframe computer, and direct contact with police communications.  These 
resources enable the Shift Commander to request immediate back-up from police, if 
and when required.  Access to the police mainframe computer is not hardwired, but 
enabled via a satellite connection.  A number of the people I worked with in the 
CMR expressed concern that this link can result in the computer crashing at a most 
inopportune moment.  As the police rail unit is situated immediately above the office 
of the CMR, staff feel that it would be logical and simple to directly hardwire the 
CMR computer to the police mainframe computer.  This would ensure the 
availability of important information when required, and alleviate transit officers‘ 
concern that their safety could be compromised if the wireless link were 
compromised at any point.   
The Shift Commander is the only person authorised to access the police 
mainframe computer and uses this to check issues such as the identification of 
passengers of interest, their age, whether there were any warnings listed for the 
person such as ‗drug addict‘, psychiatric illness, HIV positive or whether there were 
any ‗bench warrants‘ out for their arrest.  When the transit officers encounter a 
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problem with a passenger, which can range from having to issue a fine or summons 
to arresting someone, they need to get the person‘s details.  They radio the required 
details through to the Shift Commander, who checks the description and details 
provided against the information held in the police mainframe data base.  Although 
transit officers try to use the radio away from passengers, so that other people are not 
overhearing what is being said, this is not always possible.  As a result, the various 
codes we learnt in training are used during the radio transmission.  For example, a 
code seven is a suicide or a code ten is send all available transit officers to help us or, 
as I later heard aptly described by a transit officer, ―it really means we are in the 
shit‖.  If the Shift Commander wanted to convey personal private information on a 
passenger, such as ―be careful the person is HIV positive‖, ―has a suicidal tendency‖ 
or ―watch for needles is an intravenous drug user‖ or even ―has a history of 
assaulting a public officer‖, the Shift Commander would request the transit officer to 
phone him.  This ensured that no other person would hear what the Shift Commander 
was saying.  Each pair of transit officers had a mobile phone with them when out on 
track.  The information shared through these individual alerts to transit officers 
related to precautions they should take to deal with the person safely, not only for 
their own protection but also for the person‘s protection.  
I was pleased that I had learnt the language of coded alerts during training or 
the ‗lingo‘ as the transit officers called it.  While listening to the radio transmissions, 
I was able to understand what was happening.  Although operators are able to view 
proceedings on their cameras, verbal exchange is limited to the transit officer radio 
contact person in the CCTV room.  Radio communication between the transit 
officers and the CMR is essential for safety.  The strict protocols we learnt in 
training were usually adhered to by the transit officers, between themselves and with 
the control room.  This also extended to the phonetic alphabet which the transit 
officers used when conveying people‘s names over the radio, preventing any 
misunderstanding on the spelling of the name.  As I listened to the radios, it was 
fairly easy to pick up which were the newer transit officers on the line, usually they 
were the ones that were much slower in phonetically spelling out a person‘s name.  
However, there were exceptions to this such as the transit officers with previous 
military or police backgrounds. 
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The radio channel is open to all radio users on the same rail line, so other 
transit officers in the team can listen to what is occurring elsewhere.  However 
transit officers are not the only people using the radio.  Problems can arise when 
other people, such as customer service assistants (CSA‘s) or revenue protection 
officers use the radio for banal, trivial issues such as ―can you bring us some milk 
when you come down here‖? (personal notes, 2007).  Although Supervisors told me 
this practice was not acceptable, the situation sometimes still occurred.  This caused 
transit officers great concern.  They felt their safety could be compromised by one of 
these people using the radio channel at a critical time, and believed they should have 
their own dedicated channel.  As transit officer Mike related to me in an interview 
following a serious incident 
You‘ve got the Shift Commander telling them ‗keep the airways 
clear‘ and then you‘re still hearing them about five minutes later ‗oh 
Rev 1 where are you?‘ ‗Rev 2‘ .. it‘s like, ‗far out, if you want to 
organise your crib break get on the phone!‘ because that‘s all they 
always do, ‗what‘s your location?‘  It‘s like, can‘t we just issue them 
all phones? 
Similar sentiments were echoed by many transit officers during the interviews, 
such as transit officer Keith 
I mean we‘ve got a lot of other organisations using the radios at the 
same time, and I think they should, for non-operational issues ... be 
on another channel.  And I‘m talking about CSAs and those sort of 
things, they should be on another channel.  Because at the end of the 
day, really our safety is really about our communications to the Shift 
commander or to other transit guards. 
Each day when transit officers commence duty they are all issued with a radio.  
The first task the pair of transit officers undertake is to log on with the CMR, giving 
them their radio number and their assignment for the night, for example delta vehicle 
patrol, train duty or station duty.  The operator in the CMR records all this 
information.  Any time the pair book off track for any reason, they have to notify the 
CMR and log back on again when they recommence on the track.  This enables the 
Shift Commander to be aware of where everybody is placed on the system.  This also 
occurs if the transit officers are booking off track to take a prisoner to a police lock-
up.  They notify the control room operator that they are going off track and the time 
and mileage of the delta vehicle is noted.  When the transit officers arrive at the 
‗lock-up‘ they again notify the CMR operator who again notes the time and the new 
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mileage on the vehicle.  This information is logged onto the CMR daily running 
sheet, which can be accessed as evidence should a complaint be made by an alleged 
offender that a transit officer did not act appropriately in some way when 
transporting them. 
My admiration for transit officers grew as I observed via the monitors in the 
CMR some of the difficulties they faced.  Prior to my arrival on one of my shifts, 
two transit officers arrested a man at the City underground station.  I watched the 
replay of the film and realised the difficulties transit officers faced with some of 
arrests they undertake.  The particular gentleman arrested was of large build, and 
exhibited super human strength at the time.  It appeared from his behaviour, and 
from reports by the transit officers, that he may have been under the influence of 
something, possibly drugs.  The transit officers succeeded in arresting the person, 
and because of his condition transported him to Royal Perth Hospital to be checked 
by a doctor before taking him to the police lock-up.  I learnt that the doctor on duty 
at the time refused to examine the person of interest until police arrived with tasers.  
I could not help reflecting how much easier the transit officers‘ task would have been 
if they had also had access to equivalent weapons. 
Some evenings/nights were uneventful for the transit officers, but everyone 
knew that Friday and Saturday nights (and on some lines Thursday nights after late 
night shopping) were normally the busiest times of the week.  Watching the night‘s 
activities unfold on the monitors highlighted the diverse range of skills that a transit 
officer requires.  When a transit officer arrives at work they have no idea of the sort 
of issues they may have to deal with during the course of their shift.  Whilst this 
provides variety, it can also be stressful.  I witnessed the extent of this when I saw 
the CCTV system used in tragic circumstances.  A suicide occurred on the tracks just 
outside one of the stations.  When such a situation occurs the nearest transit officers 
are radioed to attend the scene immediately.  Although our training does try and 
prepare us for such circumstances occurring, until the situation arises no one is quite 
sure how they will react.   
When a person is run over by a train, passengers are taken off the train and the 
train remains stationary until the coroner has attended.  The transit officers‘ 
involvement in the situation can range from: escorting passengers off the train to the 
nearest station; assisting in line clearing, including locating body parts; to, manning 
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a level crossing.  This occurs if the stoppage of the train has caused the signals to 
fail-safe and the arms of the crossing are down, stopping the traffic.  On this 
particular occasion, two transit officers were already on the train and additional 
transit officers were called to deal with the situation.  Buses are organised for 
passengers until rail services can be resumed on that line.  However, there is 
normally a delay until the buses arrive.  On this occasion, the passengers on the 
platform were aware that an emergency had occurred; nevertheless, in spite of 
announcements being made, the transit officers were subjected to abuse from a 
section of the public and a number of the passengers kept pressing the emergency 
button complaining that their train was late.  When this happens cameras are 
automatically focused on the platforms by the operators to ensure that no one is in 
difficulty, requiring assistance.  Additionally, the operator carefully explained to 
passengers that buses were on the way and that the button was for emergency use 
only.  Despite this, a number of passengers continued pressing the emergency button 
until the Shift Commander eventually warned them that they would be fined.  I felt 
disgusted by this passenger behaviour and yet the transit officers I witnessed on the 
monitors appeared to remain calm and polite even under pressure. 
I learnt from the CMR operators that they have to undergo a medical which 
includes a psychological assessment to determine whether they will be able to cope 
with distressing situations that they may witness whilst on duty.  On this particular 
night the suicide occurred just outside the station, but on some occasions a suicide 
can occur at an actual station which can be witnessed by the CMR operator.  At 
present the average rate of suicide is about one a fortnight.  Additionally, accidents 
can occur at a station resulting in similar situations.  I learnt from the CMR operators 
that occasionally a passenger may take a short cut across the track to catch their 
train, and get hit by an express train going in the other direction.  Whilst the 
organisation recognises the effects of post traumatic stress on operational personnel 
dealing with a traumatic situation, and provides compulsory psychological debriefing 
following such an event, this does not extend to the control room operators who 
witness the event from afar.  However, I noted while I was in the monitoring room 
that the operators had developed a macabre sense of humour, which appeared to be 
their way of dealing with the stressors that confront them. 
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When I was in the CMR I swiftly learnt that what initially starts out as a quiet 
night can change dramatically.  One night, whilst I was watching the cameras and 
monitoring what was going on, I heard over the radio a very concerned transit officer 
voice calling for urgent back up.  The situation was out of view of the camera, but 
we learnt that a person was threatening to commit suicide by jumping off the 
overhead bridge on to the railway tracks below.  Further in to the research I had the 
opportunity to interview the transit officer concerned, who had felt frustrated in 
dealing with the situation as he wished he had more knowledge of how to deal with 
the mentally ill and said 
I found it quite difficult because not so much the attempted suicide 
but the person I was dealing with was sort of psychotic and had a lot 
of mental problems and I was trying to get through to him which 
usually works for me in dealing with people.  I think that‘s one of my 
stronger points in talking to people and trying to calm situations 
down.  I was just unable to do anything.  The guy just wouldn‘t listen 
to me and everything I seemed to say just seemed to arc this fellow 
up even more, so I felt a bit helpless in that situation.  We were able 
to stop him taking his life but not being able to get through to him 
was probably a bigger thing for me.   
The Shift Commanders that I worked with during my time in the CMR came 
from transit officer/policing backgrounds, were skilled in dealing with passengers on 
a local level, plus were experienced in directing operations from the central control 
room.  From their command position they see many issues which concern them.  
One such situation that they were very keen to tell me about regards the use of 
emergency vehicles.  I later found this concern was also mirrored by the transit 
officers and their supervisors on all of the rail lines on the system.  When a code 10 
is called over the radio by a transit officer, everybody on the same radio frequency 
knows that their colleagues are in danger.  The police are notified and all available 
transit officers are immediately dispatched to the location to assist the transit officers 
in distress.  The ‗delta vehicles‘ are driven by transit officers that patrol the line for 
that shift and are equipped in a similar way to police emergency vehicles, complete 
with flashing overhead lights and siren.  However, transit officers are not trained or 
authorised to drive the emergency vehicle in any manner other than complying with 
normal road rules.  This means that they cannot use the flashing lights or siren, nor 
are they authorised to travel at speed.  The transit officers are aware that their peers 
are in trouble and want to get to their aid as quickly as possible.  Any 
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communication over the radio by the transit officers in trouble can be heard by those 
going to assist, and their sense of urgency to get there is high.  I heard many tales 
from transit officers over the ensuing months of journeys to aid ‗their mates‘, where 
they risked travelling over the speed limit which potentially could result in a fine or 
the loss of driving demerit points.  Additionally, without advanced driving skills, 
they risked having an accident plus they risked being disciplined by management for 
not complying with the law.  As Tracey, one of the transit officers told me ―I lost 
four demerit points and copped a large fine, but I would do the same again.  Next 
time it could be me that needed the help‖.  
Later, I observed this concern raised by a transit officer safety representative at 
the transit officer safety meeting.  These meetings are required to be held on a 
regular basis in accordance with the occupational health and safety legislation, which 
also dictates the makeup of the committee as having an equal number of elected 
safety representatives and management ("Western Australian Occupational Safety 
and Health Act," 1984).  The manager stated that ―the police would not authorise the 
vehicle‘s use as an emergency vehicle‖ (Personal notes, 2008).  Transit officers 
argued that similar vehicles such as Alinta Gas or volunteer fire fighters were classed 
as emergency vehicles and could use their flashing lights when attending a call-out.  
They felt that their circumstances were far more serious and warranted further 
investigation.  However, one of the managers closed the subject indicating that 
nothing further could be done and the matter was ‗out of their hands‘.  The manager 
declared that turning the lights on while in transit to a situation was contrary to road 
laws and would not be endorsed (Safety Committee Minutes, March 2008).  This 
was a big issue for the transit officer safety representatives who had to report back to 
their members and who felt that their concern was being dismissed without further 
investigation. 
5.4 Transit Officer use of the CCTV System   
Although we learnt during training about how to use the surveillance system as 
a safety protection for ourselves, I was able to see the implementation of this from 
the CMR operators‘ perspective.  We were taught in training to remain with our 
partners and when approaching a person of interest to notify the CMR operator to put 
the cameras on us to observe how the situation developed.  As transit officer Jo told 
me  
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from experience you never know what‘s going to happen, someone 
might be looking a little bit dopey and stuff and the next thing you 
go talk to them and they see someone in uniform and start swinging 
and you end up with a fist in the side of your head all because you 
went over there a little bit complacent. 
The surveillance system provides a defence for transit officers particularly as 
they approach the possible offenders and deal with the situation that confronts them.  
The transit officers report that some ‗trouble makers‘ are quick to complain that they 
(transit officers) act inappropriately in one form or another, such as assaulting them.  
Where there is a complaint, there is always an investigation, regardless of whether 
the complaint appears to have substance or appears to be ill-founded.  The video 
record of the encounter provides some evidence of what occurred which can offer 
protection for the transit officers in the face of vexatious complaints against them.   
I also witnessed that the monitoring of transit officer behaviour extends to any 
interviews with an alleged offender conducted in a suburban station office.  There 
are roll-up shutters around the windows of the office which transit officers are 
required to open on entry.  A station camera is then focused through the window to 
monitor activities occurring in the room, providing a record of the actions taking 
place.  While employees in many occupations might regard this surveillance as an 
affront to their professionalism, the transit officers have been taught to request it, and 
the majority of the time view such observation as providing positive evidence for a 
court case if the person is charged; as well as being a protection for themselves, and 
a necessary part of the job.  However, Goold (2003, 2004), in his research with 
police officers found that  some ―had heard stories of officers being prosecuted for 
unlawful arrest or assault on the basis of CCTV evidence – stories that had left them 
anxious about being watched and the possibility of their own activities being 
scrutinized‖ (Goold, 2004, p. 180).  As one officer interviewed by Goold confessed  
It affects our thinking of things a lot because obviously the cameras 
are there to identify possible crime about to happen, or even people 
who are actually committing crimes at the time.  But having said 
that, it also records police actions.  Therefore when you arrive at an 
incident, you‘ve got to be aware of the fact that the cameras are 
watching you.  We are being recorded, the same as anybody else.  
Therefore what we do has to be right, it has to look right.  Therefore 
it makes it quite a priority for most officers entering the town centre 
– they‘re thinking, ‗I‘m on camera‘ (Goold, 2003, p. 194).  
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In only a small number of the interviews that Goold (2004) conducted were 
officers advised by their shift sergeants or local inspectors to use CCTV for their 
own advantage, for example providing useful evidence, and for their own protection 
against complaints about the use of unlawful or excessive force.  Officers mainly 
were just warned to remember that they were being watched by CCTV cameras 
when they were in the town centre (Goold, 2004).  Conversely, in this study I found 
that transit officers are encouraged to view the cameras as a tool: to provide evidence 
in a court case; to summon backup support if warranted; and to provide a record that 
is available for analysis of the situation in accident and incident investigations.  The 
Supervisor is able to view the footage, investigate the incident and recommend any 
training modification or corrective actions to be taken to prevent a recurrence.  The 
capacity for a supervisor to review an incident provides support to the transit officer 
that their actions were appropriate for the circumstances.  Although they are not 
currently used in this way, the videos and subsequent analysis could also provide an 
excellent learning tool for transit officers on other lines not involved in the event.  As 
Hugh, one of the experienced transit officers, later explained during an interview 
with me, he has a range of strategies when directing a person to leave the station  
I make sure my hands are always open like this (showing out-
stretched palms) and always making sure I‘m giving directions.  It‘s 
all on camera.  Directions always […] direction, direction, direction.  
Don‘t push; don‘t push, because if you push, that‘s technically 
assault.  Because you physically haven‘t placed them under arrest, 
they‘re actually leaving the station.  If you give them a little bit of a 
shove, you‘re in trouble.  They can have you up for assault. 
Should the person refuse to leave the station, or the situation deteriorates to the 
point that the person gets arrested, the camera footage can clearly demonstrate that 
the person was told to leave the premises and had not followed the transit officers‘ 
direction.  The person would not be able to claim that they had not understood what 
the transit officer meant. 
However, as Goold (2003) found in his research with police, I also noted that 
transit officers sometimes expressed concern that the cameras can work to their 
disadvantage.  If an incident develops out of sight of a camera or before the CMR 
operator has been alerted to a confrontational situation, cameras may not have 
captured the initial evidence of what took place.  This can result in an escalating 
confrontation between a transit officer and a member of the public being captured, 
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but not the initial circumstances that led to the event.  Some members of the public 
are quick to complain that a transit officer caused the situation to escalate or that the 
transit officer used excessive force to arrest a person.  Investigations can leave transit 
officers feeling distressed and compromised by a system that did not pick up the 
initial behaviour of the passenger/passengers, leaving the transit officers‘ subsequent 
actions open to criticism.  As Ray, one of the transit officers, later said to me in an 
interview 
I was a little disappointed with some of the comments made by 
management that came to me, and the fact that a decision was 
basically made on the incident without getting my feedback and my 
opinion sort of thing.  So they‘ve looked at the footage and go well, 
that‘s shit, he‘s stuffed up, so that operator (sic transit officer) needs 
his arse kicked.  And that was before I‘d even been contacted about 
it to talk about the incident, sort of thing.  So the mind was already 
sort of made up on it.  I was a bit annoyed and a bit disappointed by 
that.  And one of my comments was ‗well, I was there, you weren‘t‘ 
sort of thing. 
Even when the entire incident has been captured on camera, a transit officer 
can feel that it does not portray the event favourably for them, as Ian recounted to me 
during an interview 
And basically it was one of the first times when a person has 
threatened me and I believe that they were prepared to carry out the 
act and I wasn‘t prepared to risk injury to myself to prove anything 
to anyone.  And I warned him quite clearly on several occasions that 
his actions would result in being affected by pepper spray and he 
continued. 
So it wasn‘t the best looking footage in the world and it wasn‘t the 
most text book arrest in the world but I felt that there was enough 
there to justify it, but a few people disagreed with me. 
One of the things that quite annoyed me is I‘ve dealt with a lot of 
offenders since I‘ve been here and a lot of them have threatened me 
and I‘ve just [gone] yep, no worries.  Most people walk away as 
they‘re doing it and get louder and tougher as they walk, as you saw 
today.  But this person is actually standing there, both fists clenched, 
shaking his hands around, moving side to side, like really trying to 
shake me up and that‘s seen on the camera and they still told me that 
I did the wrong thing. 
At times watching the monitors it was difficult for me to distinguish between 
the revenue protection officers and the transit officers.  Both wore very similar 
uniforms, the difference being the colour of the writing on their arm badge and 
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transit officers wore cargo pants which the revenue protection officers did not.  I 
learnt that this was also a matter of concern for the transit officers as they felt that 
looking so alike, particularly when on camera, could compromise their safety.  Later, 
when working with the transit officers I found the issue was a ‗hot topic‘.  As transit 
officer Peter told me during an interview, he had personally raised the issues with a 
manager and basically got told  
that it was an ego thing for us and I said it wasn‘t an ego thing, it was 
a safety issue [....] 
I was pretty pissed off about that comment.  And I thought that the 
way some guys carry on about it probably is an ego thing, but the 
bottom line is it‘s a lot more than that, Xyz because an incident 
happened in the city and transit officers went to it and they could not 
distinguish on video who was transit and who was Xyz, so they had 
no idea who was who, which is a major concern.  Another incident 
where an officer has called for backup on a train and the guys have 
got off and just stood there, and he didn‘t realise that they are 
actually Xyz officers, so he effectively had no backup.  He thought 
he did but he didn‘t. 
5.5 Summary 
Observing the monitors, particularly at night, provided a rich picture of the 
different problems that confront the transit officers on the various rail lines. The 
railway passenger demographics alter as the young (and not so young) emerge to 
forget work and party the night away.  Hobbs et al., (2003) include this phenomenon 
in ―the night-time economy‖, which involves restaurants, clubs, bars, concert venues, 
night clubs, gambling establishments and the people who work in and patronise 
them.  The CCTV system enables known potential problem areas such as stations 
near pubs and night clubs, to be kept under close surveillance at appropriate times, 
particularly at closing time or prior to the departure of the last train.  Chaney (1998, 
p. 54) believes that during this night time period ―the pursuit of happiness becomes 
the only bench mark of value‖.  Alcohol – which is very much part of the Australian 
culture (Homel, et al., 1992) – becomes the drink of choice, which Hobbs et al., 
(2003, p. 36 - 37) state  
aids consumers in abandoning their regulated and constrained 
daylight personas and immersing themselves in the comparatively 
ambiguous and chaotic culture of the night.  Alcohol consumption 
provides both a culturally and legally sanctioned way of altering 
behaviour, and it is this opportunity to enjoy legitimized ‗time out‘ in 
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the form of hedonistic forms of experiential consumption and 
identification, that renders the night-time economy so alluring to 
young people 
Many of these people travel by train, which can result in transit officers having 
to deal with the anti-social or unsafe behaviour resulting from their excessive 
consumption of alcohol or, in some cases, drugs.  At times when watching the 
cameras this can be quite worrying, such as the occasion when a surveillance camera 
was placed on a crowded platform at a station which is located near a well-known 
night club spot.  All the young adults on the platform appeared to be in high spirits 
and many appeared to be intoxicated.  As we were watching the monitors, a young 
lady dropped her handbag onto the track.  A young gentleman immediately jumped 
off the platform onto the track to retrieve the bag for her.  A train was due to arrive at 
any moment.  The Shift Commander immediately made an announcement to the 
station for the gentleman to get off the tracks as a train was due to arrive.  We 
anxiously watched as the gentleman retrieved the bag and climbed back onto the 
platform with only seconds to spare.  It was lucky that the situation turned out well, 
but it could have had a disastrous conclusion.  
Whilst the time spent in the CMR provided me with an overview of the many 
problems and circumstances that the transit officers have to deal with, I nevertheless 
felt a sense of frustration at being unable to hear the communication between the 
transit officers themselves, and between the transit officers and passengers.  The only 
transit officer verbal communication I could hear was the formal, essential 
information provided over the radio to deal with the issues current at that time.  This 
situation did not convey any awareness of the culture which prevailed on the various 
train lines, nor did it provide any knowledge of circumstances preceding a transit 
officers‘ request for a camera to be focused on them.  I had not been discouraged by 
gaining an understanding of the situations I would face with the transit officers out 
on the lines; rather I was anxious to progress to the next stage of my research 
journey.  Having completed the requirement placed in my path, I again made an 
appointment with one of the transit officer managers to negotiate permission to join 
the transit officers on track.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
ON TRACK 
6. INTRODUCTION 
The degree to which one is an ―active member‖ affects the extent to 
which this sympathetic understanding is possible, and this is a 
function of one‘s social location 
(Fine, 1993, p. 281) 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the working life of transit officers gained 
during the four months I worked alongside them on track, and examines the safety 
culture and communication practices that these officers adopt as they go about their 
daily work activities.  Further, the chapter highlights differences in the cultures of 
the transit officers teams on each line that became evident to me over this period.  
These discrete line teams resulted from a management decision in 2007 that officers 
be allocated to specific lines.  Transit officers were initially asked to nominate their 
preference of line to work, and where possible these preferences were granted.  
Where a line had too many people nominated, a waiting list was commenced.  At 
that time, rosters were changed to an eighty hour, eight day working fortnight, with 
any additional time, worked as overtime such as extra time worked on a Friday and 
Saturday night, or an additional day.  This rostering plan became affectionately 
known as the X plan, signifying the four lines running from the central city to the 
outer suburbs.  A fifth line was added during the research period, however the ‗X 
plan‘ name remained.  Although management acknowledged the rostering system 
was more expensive, requiring additional transit officers, they felt that the benefits of 
line-specific teams outweighed the extra costs of the initiative.  In particular, 
management felt there would be reduced absenteeism, a reduced injury rate for 
transit officers, officers would not feel so isolated and a supervisor would be present 
on each line to provide operational support (Transperth Train Operations, 2006).  
Additionally, transit officers would become familiar with the regular passengers on 
their line, leading to a better community relations with passengers; they would learn 
who their trouble makers were, and become familiar with the officers they were 
rostered to work with on that line.  Transit officers welcomed the change.  As Mike 
stated  
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I‘d much rather work on a line because you know all the stations, 
you know the people you‘re going to deal with unless they‘re blow-
ins buts usually you know the regulars and you know the staff you 
work with as well; and from a safety perspective that‘s a good thing 
to know that someone is going to have your back or not.   
Many transit officers were now able to commence duty near where they lived.  
This greatly reduced their commuting time.  However, where transit officers had 
become familiar with a particular line, and have formed a bond with other officers on 
the line, they were reluctant to move.  As Patrick said 
I actually prefer the Port line.  I live way north and it‘s a long drive, 
it takes me an hour to get to work every day, but I prefer Port.  It‘s a 
good mix of passengers: lots of tourists and stuff out this way.  And 
I‘m sort of the person where once I get settled into a position I don‘t 
really like to move around.  I‘m pretty comfortable here now so I 
don‘t really want to change.  So that‘s another one of the reasons 
why I like it and it‘s quite a scenic line, you‘re right near the ocean 
and stuff which is a good thing for me as well I think. 
Or, as Jo said when other officers kept asking him why he does not work on 
the northern line near where he lives 
Because I don‘t want to, because I much prefer working on this line.  
I like working with the guys that I work with here.  I‘ve worked with 
these guys for years now and we‘ve got a good working relationship, 
we‘ve got a good rapport, the morale is quite high even on this line 
compared to the others.  I can‘t really speak for the other lines but 
we‘ve got quite a good morale here, we keep on boosting each other 
up and I really like that. 
The majority of the officers preferred the eight-day working fortnight (personal 
notes).  The bulk of shifts commenced at 14.45 hours, in time to monitor and control 
the behaviour of school children that use the public transport system.  Problems with 
passenger behaviour on the transit system mainly occur with children after school, 
and with adults in the evening and night.  When day time commuters have reached 
their homes a different demographic of passenger emerges to travel the rail system at 
night.  The officers work until the last train has reached the end station and 
passengers have left the station and car park.  This is usually around 01.00hrs on 
Sunday to Thursday and 03.00 hrs on Friday and Saturday.  Any arrests or issues that 
have to be dealt with result in a later finishing time.  
During the day, passengers are generally well behaved so only a skeleton crew 
of transit officers work.  These are based at the City station, the inner City 
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underground station, and the City Convention Centre station, with a transit officer 
crew in a delta vehicle (mobile) on each line, ready to respond to any situation that 
may occur. Until the majority of the transit officers commence work in the afternoon 
passenger ticketing assistants and customer service assistants, who possess no legal 
authority to respond to trouble, provide any assistance required by passengers.  The 
introduction of the X plan also saw the deployment of a separate revenue protection 
team whose sole function was to provide a ticket enforcement role.  As they have no 
responsibility for customer service, there is no ambiguity with their role.  However, 
since they have a fare enforcement function and are dressed like transit officers, they 
provide a visual deterrence for any anti-social behaviour by passengers. Revenue 
protection officers also provide a ‗monitor and report‘ function which can be acted 
upon by the transit officers in the mobile response vehicles, and transit officers are 
empowered to take action against anti-social behaviour (Transperth Train 
Operations, 2006).  The uniform worn by the revenue protection officer has 
implications which will be discussed later, however.   
When I commenced my fieldwork on the lines the new rostering system had 
been in effect for over a year.  It became evident as I moved from line to line that the 
groups on the various lines, apart from the newer Bay line, had already developed 
enough of a shared history to generate their individual culture.  Whilst the literature 
denotes that it is leaders who establish the culture of an organisation (Hopkins, 2007; 
Kotter, 1999; Schein, 1992) by emphasising priorities and allocating appropriate 
resources, it is well known that people within organisations actively construct their 
environment to best deal with the conditions that they face (Chan, et al., 2003; 
Paoline, Myers, & Worden, 2000).  These values and behaviours are usually 
transmitted to subsequent recruits as new employees want to fit in with the social 
norms of the group they have joined (Kotter, 1993).  These values and behaviours 
are rarely if ever discussed (Simpson, 2004), however Schein (2004) argues that the 
definition of culture will only give us the structural nature of culture, it does not 
identify the issues that lead to the assumptions and values that the group develop.  I 
was keen to uncover these in my quest to understand the culture and the safety 
values that the group on each line held as important. 
The nature of transit officer work means that transit officers frequently face the 
public when the public are manifesting their worst behaviour.  Passengers may be 
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disrespectful and/or resistant to the officers when they communicate with them, 
particularly if there is evidence of any wrong-doing on the individuals or group‘s 
part, or they may exhibit a lack of self control as a result of alcohol, drugs or mental 
illness.  Whilst the manner in which transit officers interact with members of the 
public is strongly influenced by rules, regulations and procedures; previous 
researchers of police interactions with the public have found that the greatest 
determinant of an officer‘s reciprocal dealings with an individual or group, is the 
civility or incivility that the person or group directs towards them (Fielding, 1994; 
Mastrofski, Reisig, & McCluskey, 2002).   
Police tend to stereotype people (Bayley & Bittner, 1984), and have a negative 
view of some citizens (Manning, 1978; Skolnick, 1985; Terrill, et al., 2003). 
Manning (1978) found this negative view provided them with an endless supply of 
material for the stories and jokes frequently told by police amongst themselves.  
Similarly, the transit officers‘ compendium of stories was vast.  Even so, Fielding 
(1994) refers to police stories as being exaggerated.  I learnt that transit officers did 
not need to exaggerate the stories they told, the details of actual events and incidents 
were enough to capture a person‘s attention as they recounted them.  Although I 
found transit officers sometimes expressed highly prejudiced or negative attitudes in 
in-group talk amongst themselves regarding cultural or social groups and citizen 
interactions, similar research previously undertaken with police (Cruse & Rubin, 
1973; Waddington, 1999) has indicated that such attitudes are not translated into 
action. Echoing this, transit officers generally dealt with people professionally and in 
a consistent manner.  Nonetheless transit officers, as previous researchers have found 
with police (Chan, 1997; Manning, 1997; Reuss-Ianni, 1983), can appear uncaring 
and may seem cynical and hard as they learn to cope with society‘s dislocation and 
the daily hostility that they face.  As Eddy told me: 
People that do mess with me are drunks, and people on drugs, so that 
makes it harder.  You can‘t get through to them.  You try to talk [...] 
what else can you do; and you are just trying to talk to them and 
people just, yeah, they kind of get to you.   
Reuss-Ianni (1983, p. 4) refers to police cynicism as ―alienation resulting from 
the inconsistencies in the variety of jobs they are exposed to, lack of resources and 
compromises they must make‖.  However, I also found the officers were exposed to 
frequent verbal profanities and verbal abuse such as ‗plastic cop‘, ‗wanna be cop‘, 
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‗failed cop‘, ‗transit pig‘ (personal notes) or as Nola reported to me following a 
particular incident, ―I‘m going to fucking kill you‖.  Profanity appeared to be a 
normal mode of speech of many of the people they had to deal with.  I felt at the end 
of my fieldwork that I was also becoming hardened and cynical after dealing with 
these people over the previous months.  As transit officer Steve told me: 
I can tell you one hundred per cent that the person that you are when 
you come into this job is not the person you are when you leave this 
job no matter what; you can get desensitised, you get hardened, you 
become a different person.  I think your compassion goes out the 
window pretty much because you deal with the worst of society.  
Anyone who says the general public are nice people haven‘t worked 
with the general public. 
Transit officers invariably lose their non-transit officer friends, partly due to 
the hours that they work; partly due to the fact that they feel only other transit 
officers will understand what they have to deal with on a daily basis; and as Skolnick 
(1985, p. 81) found, a policing role makes them ―less desirable as a friend‖.  As 
many officers told me, their line team become their mates and family, as they all 
work and socialise together.  Marcus summed the situation up: ―It‘s like a brotherly 
type thing, you‘re not working with friends you‘re working with family, so it‘s a 
good bond that we all have‖.  
The literature on police culture indicates group loyalty amongst officers is a 
defining aspect of their working life (Chan, 1996; Crank, 2004; Loftus, 2009; Reuss-
Ianni, 1983).  This cultural phenomenon was similarly reflected by transit officers.  
This strong loyalty was emphasised in Parliament by the Hon Troy Buswell Minister 
of Transport after talking to two seriously injured transit officers following a widely 
publicised incident: ―They are extremely proud of their job and the level of 
professionalism they display in what they do.  Remarkably, all they want to do is get 
back to work so that they can help their mates‖ (Western Australia Legislative 
Council, 2011a, p. 1).  Following the introduction of the X plan with each line 
developing its own distinctive culture,  transit officers bonded together and became 
protective of fellow officers on their line.  I frequently heard comments such as 
―make sure you cover your ass‖ and ―you don‘t rat on your mate‖.  I witnessed this 
taken to an extreme as an officer altered his online statement at the request of a 
colleague, whose behaviour may otherwise have been questioned.  The officer 
changing his statement later told me he felt uncomfortable, but was ultimately 
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prepared to cover for a mate who had not followed procedure.  Manning (1978, p. 
87) explains this phenomenon  
The manipulations of the rules that takes place among horizontal 
cliques, typically partners in an area, car, crew in the reserve room, 
or a team of people working plain clothes, allows participants to 
decrease the uncertainty in rule-enforcement and to protect 
themselves so that things don‘t come back.  
As well as loyalty to their mates, the officers also took pride in their particular 
railway line leading to group boundaries being developed.  The transit officers on 
each line thought their line was the best with comments such as this one from Peter 
―better group of guys, pretty much got the line under control, have done since the X 
plan started‖.  Another transit officer defended the passengers on his line as being 
the best, explaining in very blunt, transit officer terms ―they [transit officers on other 
lines] look down on our line, but at least our scum know they are scum, which is 
more than their scum do‖.  
While there were many advantages to the allocation of transit officers to 
specific lines, the X plan has also brought about a number of silos, as Rory stated:    
Everybody‘s jealous, like the Northern line have got their own little 
group, we‘ve got our own little group: South line have got their own 
little group.  You‘ve got the Bay Line that‘s just started up.  Port line 
have got their own little group.  So everybody keeps to their own 
selves. 
As a result of these silos ‗what happens on the line, stays on the line‘.  The X 
plan culture does not provide the opportunity to learn from incidents that have 
occurred on other lines.  Rather, the culture has developed where transit officers on 
one line protect their ‗own‘ and may make fun of the way transit officers on another 
line handle a particular situation.  If any analysis of an incident occurs, the findings 
are not used as a learning tool and shared with other lines to prevent a similar 
incident occurring elsewhere.  This separation of experience is perpetuated by 
management who do not allow transit officers to view the footage of an incident that 
occurs on another line.  Any violation of this ruling is subject to disciplinary 
procedure (Safety Committee Minutes, June 2009).  However,  research indicates 
that organisations with a culture of safety use incidents/accidents as a learning tool 
(Brooks, 2005; Hopkins, 2006b; Reason, 1997); analysing the contributing factors to 
the incident and developing strategies to prevent a recurrence (Brooks, 2005; 
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Reason, 1997).  In the RTO environment communication amongst the transit officer 
cadre normally only occurs in a vertical direction, with any communication 
horizontally occurring via ‗the grapevine‘.  This often results in misrepresentation of 
the facts of a situation, and in the officers involved in an incident being the subject of 
criticism or ridicule by other lines. This will be discussed further under 
communication.  
The cultural demographics of the passengers on each line varies.  As James 
explained about the Northern line    
A lot of it is to do with the standard of education [of passengers].  
The northern liners, they think they know everything.  They think 
they know the law, they think that their Dads and their lawyers can 
get them off.  They always hit you with, ‘My dad‘s a lawyer‘ and all 
this sort of thing.  So they think they know it all on that line, but they 
don‘t really.  Whereas on these lines you don‘t get that sort of thing.  
We deal with a lower economic type people.  They really can‘t 
afford to go to court. 
Or as Caroline explained, when saying why she liked the South line 
It‘s a little, you know what you‘re dealing with.  The people you‘re 
dealing with on that line.  You know, they know their place, you 
know their place and they all, there‘s an understanding there.  And 
you have probably a lot more trouble on that line but that‘s solely, 
usually with families or domestic cases like domestic arguments and 
things like that.  Not so much, yeah, not too bad.  And juveniles 
being drunk and what not.  I suppose it causes more things to happen 
on that line.  
The officers on the East line passionately believe their line is the best and that 
they have their line well under control.  There are more senior officers on that line, 
and some of these have not put in for promotion as it would mean moving from the 
East Line which they do not want to do.  They have come to know their passengers 
well.  As James stated 
We‘ve got senior people on this line and the people on the East line 
and staff have been here for three or four years and so the local 
people actually know us by first name.  We know a lot of the locals 
and the people by first names so that‘s a lot to do with it.  It‘s 
actually getting to know the users of your line and the ones that will 
misbehave when transit guards aren‘t around.  I reckon that‘s really 
what it is.  
Archie put the situation more bluntly 
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In the East line you seem to know, excuse the expression, ‗shit bags‘ 
and you know your ‗pieces of crap‘.  But you also build up a rapport 
with them sort of thing as well.  So even though they‘re ‗pieces of 
crap‘ they‘ll say g‘day to you, that sort of thing.  
In contrast, passengers on the Port line were a constantly changing group with 
tourists, backpackers, university students, sailors, day trippers and party goers 
travelling the line at night and on the weekends.  However, whilst the transit officers 
did not get to know their passengers as well as other lines, many of the officers 
enjoyed the variety of passengers.  As Wayne remarked 
A lot of areas along there is very popular among the tourists so I 
think that‘s the most pleasant line to work on because you‘re just 
dealing with a lot of international tourists, Japanese, European, this 
sort of thing and they‘re all quite easy to get along with and you have 
problems, but it‘s not on the scale as say the North line.  
6.1 Transit Officer Role 
Along with the passenger ticket assistants, customer service assistants and 
revenue protection officers, the transit officers are often the first point of contact for 
passengers on the RTO rail system providing information and help to passengers if 
required.  They also provide the frontline of deterrence for any anti-social behaviour 
that occurs on the system.  Transit officer core functions are passenger safety and 
security, and to minimise fare evasion (Public Transport Authority of Western 
Australia, 2002).  In order to accomplish these tasks they derive their powers from 
the Western Australia Public Transport Authority Act 2003 ("Public Transport 
Authority Act (WA)," 2003), Western Australia Public Transport Authority 
Regulations 2003 ("Public Transport Authority Regulations (WA) ", 2003), and the 
Western Australia Government Railways Act 1904 ("Government Railways Act 
(WA)," 1904). The powers they derive from the Western Australia Public Transport 
Authority Act 2003 align with aspects of the Western Australia Criminal 
Investigation (Identifying People) Act 2002 ("Criminal Investigation (Identifying 
People) Act (WA)," 2002), Western Australia Young Offenders Act 1994 ("Young 
Offenders Act (WA)," 1994) and sections 70A, 74A and Section 445 of the Western 
Australia Criminal Code Compilation Act 1913 ("Criminal Code Compilation Act 
(WA)," 1913), relating to disorderly behaviour in public, trespass, and damaging 
property.  Additionally, through definition as ‗an authorised officer‘ in the Protective 
Custody Act 2000 ("Protective Custody Act (WA) ", 2000), transit officers have 
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powers under the act to apprehend persons for their own safety, for the health and 
safety of any other person or for offences committed on RTO property.  They may 
use reasonable force to apprehend persons of interest during an arrest.  These pieces 
of legislation became ingrained in our minds during our training.  However, the 
powers and authorities transit officers receive from all these pieces of legislation are 
only applicable on RTO property (Public Transport Authority of Western Australia, 
2007c).  
The focus of the transit officer role has oscillated over time from what was 
previously a policing role to a more customer service role to a combination of both, 
back to a more policing role.  As a result of the initial purely policing role, a number 
of transit officers are authorised to exercise broader powers than those listed above.  
These officers were appointed as Special Constables in the past by the Chief 
Executive Officer of the PTO under the Western Australia Public Transport Act 
2003 ("Public Transport Authority Act (WA)," 2003).  Special Constables are transit 
officers who within the limits of the Authority‘s property, shall have, exercise and 
enjoy all such powers, authorities, and immunities, and be liable to such duties and 
responsibilities as any duly appointed member of the police force‖ (Public Transport 
Authority of Western Australia, 2002, p. 2.2).  Although most of these Special 
Constables have left over the ensuing years, or moved on to other positions within 
the organisation, some of them still remain.   
The changes in the transit officer role have caused some disquiet with the 
transit officer ranks.  As one officer summed it up 
A long time ago management said this was mainly a customer 
service job.  Then they changed their views and bring it back as a 
security position and they sort of get caught in between what sort of 
people they‘re looking for, whether they want big Brutus sort of 
people to do the security, or they‘ve got to try and get a fine mix sort 
of thing.  It really comes down to who they employ in the job  
These changes in the focus of the role have at times, resulted in a greater 
emphasis being placed on customer service training, instead of law enforcement.  As 
David explained, some  
guys that came into the transit officer job were expecting to be in a 
full-on customer service job where they had people that had come 
from banks and supermarkets that had never done any sort of 
security background work in their lives.  The first time they dealt 
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with someone that didn‘t want to be dealt with they copped a punch 
in the mouth and didn‘t like it obviously. 
6.2 Transit Officer Duties 
Transit officers can be rostered for their shift to undertake train riding duties, 
station duties or delta vehicle (mobile) duties.  Their shifts are rostered over a 
fortnight and normally comprise a variety of the three roles.  The majority of transit 
officers commence work at the end stations on their allocated line.  However, some 
of the officers are rostered to staff the busier stations along the lines the majority of 
which, similar to the end stations, are also bus interchange areas.  The end stations 
house the supervisor‘s office, the transit officers crib room, their shower and change 
facilities and, in some instances, a gym which the transit officers‘ have got together 
to equip and use.  The facilities located at the intermediate stations usually comprise 
of an office and toilet facilities, and in the newer or recently upgraded stations, a crib 
room. 
The transit officers arrive on duty in time to change into their uniform, and set 
up their rig belts holding accessories such as baton, pepper spray, torch, handcuffs, 
gloves and first aid kit.  They clean shoes in some instances, and get ready to be 
addressed by their supervisor at the commencement of the shift.  Apart from the 
officers who are rostered for duty at an intermediate station and start their shift there, 
the remaining transit officer shifts commence at the end stations with a briefing from 
their supervisor.   
Traditionally, policing has developed on paramilitary lines with policing 
organisations characterised by quasi-military features notably based on discipline 
and hierarchical control (Auten, 1985; Chan, 1997; Crank, 2004).  I found the transit 
officers followed these same characteristics even to the point of using similar terms.  
For instance, at the City main station, radios are collected from the ‗Quartermaster‘s 
Store‘; the briefing at the start of the shift is referred to by transit officers as a 
‗muster‘ where, similar to a military organisation, all the troops gather together to 
get any instructions before embarking on their duties for the night.  Any information 
that needs to be passed onto the officers occurs at that time.  However, I noted during 
my research that the quality of these briefings varied from line to line and also from 
supervisor to supervisor.  Some of the briefings were virtually nonexistent and were 
mainly ‗a gossip fest‘.  As James told me 
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They don‘t – like I don‘t know what‘s happened today.  No-one‘s 
told me anything.  They never tell you anything.  Nobody tells you, 
you‘ve got to go and find out yourself.  Like if you want to know 
what‘s happened today before I came on duty you‘ve got to go and 
find out.  So there‘s no way of asking. 
There‘s not [a] hand-over from musters or anything.  Any major 
incidents on the other lines.  There‘s no look outs to be kept for, and 
when there are, they just go from day to day and hope somebody 
picks whoever up somewhere along the line.  
However, one of the elements of a positive safety culture is to keep people 
informed as to what is going on in their organisation and to learn from incidents that 
have occurred (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Reason, 1997; Standards Australia, 
2006a).  I noted this routinely occurred at muster time in the high-performing 
interstate and overseas transit police organisations that I visited.  These benchmark 
systems used the muster to pass on any organisational information, any alerts for 
look outs to be kept for persons of interest, what had occurred on the previous shift 
and would also include any information to be learnt from previous incidents.  
Additionally, in some of the organisations visited, the officers would be required to 
sign that they had received the information.  In contrast, in the RTO, a number of 
transit officers felt the flow of information was not occurring and believed that the 
musters should be documented, so that supervisors would become more accountable 
for safety issues raised at these gatherings.  These officers felt frustrated when they 
raised a safety issue at a muster.  The supervisor would say that he would follow it 
up, but nothing further would happen and they would not receive any feedback.  As 
Harold said, who had raised the issue of spare uniforms to change into if theirs 
became stained with blood as a result of a conflict on shift dealing with a possible 
offender, or attending an accident victim ―If it was documented on the musters that 
information [about a request], management has to see it, they have to provide for us, 
it‘s safety equipment‖. 
However, in some situations supervisors did follow up on issues and used the 
time to inform and educate officers.  As Wayne told me ―There are some supervisors 
that are really good at what they do‖.  He went on to say  
Every day he‘d [the supervisor] come in and he‘d discuss any issues 
going on and he‘d say ‗look this is what is going on on the line guys, 
we‘ve had this incident and this incident and this incident‘.  He‘d 
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cover a lot of ground and then he‘d ask us individually ‗do you have 
anything you want to ask or add or whatever‘?  
The one commonality between all lines was that transit officers were normally 
punctual and ready to commence duty on time.  Even a few minutes‘ lateness by an 
officer was severely frowned on by the supervisor.  One particular day I arrived a 
few minutes late for the shift and received a lecture in front of the troops about 
‗being on time‘.  The officers I was working with that night did not let me forget it 
either.  My only comfort from the incident was that I was actually accepted and 
treated as ‗one of the troops‘, in that I could be chastised as they were in equivalent 
circumstances.   
Before the transit officers leave the office at the start of their shift, they all 
collect a radio and battery from the recharging pack in the office, test that it is 
working satisfactorily, and attach the speaking and hearing piece to the upper part of 
their uniform and the battery part to their belt.  Further, the officers collect their 
canister of pepper spray for their shift.  The use of pepper spray is strictly controlled 
and when not in use it is kept in a locked cupboard.  Before the transit officer is 
given the spray, the supervisor or senior transit officer weighs the can and records 
the serial number and weight of the can.  The officer signs that he/she has accepted 
the spray and at the end of the shift the process happens in reverse.  Any discrepancy 
in the weight of the can between the beginning and end of the shift must be 
accounted for.  If the pepper spray is deployed during the shift the appropriate ‗use 
of force‘ forms must be completed, along with the incident forms and all other 
relevant paper work.  
The officers rostered for duty at one of the intermediate stations commence 
duty at those stations.  They do not attend any muster or receive any hand-over.  
They usually obtain their pepper spray from the shift Delta crew, who will call into 
that station as one of their first tasks after leaving base.  The strict control of the 
weighing and signing for the spray always takes place.  In some instances I noted the 
supervisor delivering the spray to officers commencing duty at an intermediate 
station, checking on the officers and passing on any pertinent information (personal 
notes). 
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6.2.1 Station duties 
Following muster both the train riders for that night, and the transit officers 
rostered for station duties, commence their shift in the afternoons by manning fare 
gates; providing a uniformed presence on their allocated stations and meeting and 
greeting each train.  All the end stations are manned and some of the busier stations 
along the line are also staffed by transit officers.  Usually transit officers work in 
pairs at all stations, however it does sometimes occur that a pair may be separated 
prior to 7.0 pm in order to provide a presence at more stations.  Although statistically 
more incidents occur later in the evening, problems can occur during the day which 
leaves officers feeling concerned regarding their safety when working on their own.  
As Sam stated 
One thing tonight that I recognised was I‘m here working at ... train 
station and until 7 o‘clock [when]  ... is coming up from ... station, so 
single manning, and to be honest with you I was, wouldn‘t say 
scared, but I could see that [this] can possibly create situations which 
would be difficult.  Working alone in this line of work I think.  I do 
believe that if that‘s not rectified in time to come that [there] it could 
be an incident where people might regret [that] single manning is 
allowed until 7 o‘clock.  I think these days, especially with this 
particular line and maybe South line, anything can occur at any time.  
And I guess there has been incidents to prove that.  I think something 
needs to be done or rectified. 
The afternoon and early evening aspect of the transit officer role is 
predominantly minimising fare evasion and providing assistance to any passenger 
that may require it.  Any problems that occur during this time are usually related to 
school children.  At stations where there is a bus interchange area, the transit officers 
also keep a close eye on interchange places.  During the day school children often 
gather and socialise in these areas, bullying can occur and trouble can erupt between 
various school gangs.  Additionally, undesirable people can frequent these areas to 
prey on vulnerable children.  At one particular interchange station, transit officers 
ensure they are a visible presence to discourage drug dealing which they believe has 
been an issue previously (personal notes).  Further, there are problems sometimes 
with itinerant and homeless people loitering in stations,  required by the transit 
officer to move on away from the station and bus interchange area.  At nights these 
areas can be a problem with trouble often erupting as arguments develop or domestic 
disputes occur between intoxicated people waiting for their buses; people gathering 
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to drink and socialise; and homeless people trying to find a bench to lie on and 
shelter from the weather (personal notes).  These issues can escalate quickly, as 
Eddy describes 
The woman started an argument with her partner whilst we were 
there, because I think she had a clue if anything was going to happen, 
we would have stopped it anyway.  And yeah, she just came out 
speaking her mind and he snapped.  And I didn‘t see it coming, but 
he just came over and just starts walloping on her. 
On this occasion, transit officers were required to make an arrest. 
There are times when passengers try to take things on the train that are not 
allowed, such as furniture, a varying assortment of animals and on one occasion I 
saw a man with a shopping trolley full of large framed pictures.  Transit officers on 
these occasions have to refuse travel to the ‗would be‘ passengers with their 
possessions.  This one particular night, transit officers had already put the person 
with the shopping trolley off one train, however he must have caught the next one 
which required him changing trains at the station I was working on.  When the transit 
officers I was with saw him, they immediately told him to leave the station.  He then 
proceeded to try and sell the paintings outside the station whereupon the transit 
officers had to move him on again as he was still on railway property.  We all 
wondered where those paintings had come from, but it was beyond the transit 
officers‘ powers to resolve the matter. 
Transit officers also monitor the station car parks at night and see that 
passengers getting off the trains get to their cars safely (Public Transport Authority 
of Western Australia, 2007c).  During the day a number of the major car parks are 
looked after by a car park attendant, however after 21.00 hours the car parks are 
unattended.  Additionally, transit officers are responsible for inspecting their station, 
and reporting any vandalism that has occurred or any hazards they have identified 
(Public Transport Authority of Western Australia, 2007c).  It can sometimes happen 
that a transit officer or a pair of officers are rostered to work at a station for the first 
time, and do not receive any briefing or formal induction to the station.  As transit 
officers remarked, not being familiar with the station surrounds can be hazardous if 
an incident occurs before officers have time to familiarise themselves with the 
station layout and emergency procedures (personal notes).   
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As a part of the customer service role that transit officers provide, they are 
expected to have knowledge of the train times and bus routes in their area, and to 
develop a local knowledge of the station‘s vicinity, to be able to answer queries or 
provide directions for the travelling public.  They help passengers who require 
assistance with using the ticket machines.  These machines were often a source of 
frustration to the public when they were out of order, and passengers often vented 
their frustrations on the transit officers, as if it was their fault (personal notes). 
I quickly learnt when I first went on track with the transit officers that there are 
certain duties that ‗you must do‘ if you wanted to get accepted.  One was to work at 
.... station on a Thursday night, and the second one was to work on the ‗Zoo train‘.  I 
was always asked whether I had worked either of those two shifts, and it became 
obvious to me that it was rather like an initiation process.  If you survived those 
shifts and still came to work you were accepted.  Both these duties were on the same 
line, so I endeavoured to get myself rostered onto that line early in my field research.  
The ‗Zoo train‘ I subsequently learnt was the name the officers gave to the last train 
on a Friday and Saturday nights to one of the outer lower socio-economic economic 
suburbs.  I will further discuss that aspect of transit officer work under ‗train riding 
duties‘. 
The relevance of Thursday night at .... station is that the station is also a bus 
interchange area in close proximity to a very large shopping centre.  Many 
entertainment features such as cinemas, restaurants, pubs, pool hall and a nearby dog 
racing track are also located in the vicinity of the station.  Thursday night is the late 
night trading evening for the shops in the area, subsequently patronage on the line is 
very busy.  This station is also a meeting place for youths who travel the trains at 
night to escape family violence (T. Cooper, et al., 2007; Teague, Green, & Leith, 
2008).  As previously mentioned, the transit officer culture thrives on stories, and 
transit officers have a plethora of stories to tell of Thursday nights at .... station.  
Alcohol abuse and assaults used to be a frequent occurrence at the station, and the 
bus interchange area; with fights often breaking out between warring families or 
gangs, which transit officers would be forced to break up.  At one stage, the situation 
had become so bad that mounted police would be in attendance all evening.  To 
reduce the risk of incidents developing, people are not allowed to gather at the 
station.  If passengers appear to let trains go through the station without getting onto 
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them, transit officers move people on from the area to try and stop a melée 
developing.  To reduce the risk of injury to transit officers, as many transit officers 
as possible are present at the station.  One of the nights I was there, even though 
people were prevented from gathering at the station, there was an empty block across 
the road where a crowd started to gather.  As transit officers have no powers to act 
away from the bus and train interchange, we were only able to monitor the situation 
and provide a uniformed presence to deter loiterers accessing railway property.  I 
remember the feeling of unease that enveloped me as more and more cars started 
arriving at this vacant block.  It appeared to me, as the numbers grew, that word had 
got around that ....  station was the place to be; maybe as a result of youth access to 
quick communications such as texting.  The line delta crew and line supervisor 
attended, plus a number of transit officer train riders detrained to provide us with 
additional support.  However, after a lot of posturing by the group, they all suddenly 
took off without incident; leaving the area with a loud revving of engines, horns 
blasting and tyres squealing from ‗burn outs‘ as they drove away.  We all breathed a 
sigh of relief, and whilst a number of other incidents happened that night, they all 
seemed minor compared with what could have occurred.  
When transit officers work at stations such as .... , which is an intermediate 
station, they are concerned that their cars may be damaged whilst they are on duty.  
As no public transport is available when they complete their shift, they are forced to 
use their own transport.  However, at all end stations there are secure, locked car 
park compounds for their use, with quick and easy access to their office.  This is not 
the case at intermediate stations.  Although there are two car parking bays marked 
for RTO use at these stations, it is obvious to the general public that the vehicles 
parked there would belong to the transit officers, leaving the officers reluctant to use 
these bays at night for fear of damage to their vehicles.  People they have previously 
arrested, or people they have dealt with in the course of their duties, may harbour a 
grudge against the officers and see damage to a personal vehicle as a way of getting 
back at the individual or the system.  During the time I was on track with the 
officers, two vehicles belonging to transit officers on different lines were damaged.  
One of the vehicles, which was in one of the RTO car park bays, was damaged by a 
person stomping all over it, and the other vehicle, which the officer had parked as 
near to the office as possible, had the car windows smashed.   
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This situation also concerns transit officers accessing their vehicles at the end 
of a shift.  Before leaving the station the officers have to remove their rig belt and 
accessories, and then change out of uniform and lock up the station.  They make 
their way to their cars with none of the accessories they normally carry such as baton 
and pepper spray to assist them if they get attacked. Transit officers feel very 
vulnerable in these situations as incidents have occurred.  The officers endeavour to 
deal with the situation by both leaving together, neither one going to their car on 
their own, and neither driving off until both are ready to leave.  This situation has 
recently received a higher profile following the assault of transit officers leaving .... 
station at the end of their shift (Safety Committee Minutes, June 2009).  
6.2.2 Train riding duties  
Transit officers‘ train riding duties usually commence around 6.30 pm 
following their meal break.  The officers are required to board the train, randomly 
choosing the door through which they board , walking through the train, checking 
tickets, monitoring passenger behaviour and dealing with any situation that may 
arise.  If a situation develops at an unmanned station along their route, or a manned 
station that requires additional assistance, they may be required to disembark the 
train and assist in that area.  For instance, prior to the time I had my own radio, I was 
riding with two of the train riders on the midnight train to one of our outer, lower 
socio-economic economic suburbs and we were waiting for the train to depart the 
main city station.  I suddenly realised that the two transit officers had run off the 
train and were running down the platform toward the underground station walkway.  
At that time I was unaware what the problem was.  I debated whether to remain on 
the train (I was on my own with a train full of mainly-drunk, people), or to 
disembark the train.  (I would be on my own on the station), or what to do.  I chose 
to disembark the train and the train departed.  Although feeling vulnerable on my 
own on the station, I also realised that I would be visible on the CCTV screen in the 
monitoring room which I decided was the better option.  This thought gave me some 
comfort and it was not long before the transit officers I was working with that night 
returned.  Our train had been standing on the platform near the entrance to the 
walkway.  A call had gone out over the radio for any transit officers that were in the 
vicinity of the walkway to the Underground Station, and the officers were in a 
situation to respond immediately.  The radio message the transit officers received 
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indicated that a person was walking through from the main City Station to the 
Underground Station ‗king hitting‘ anyone they came across in the process.  The 
transit officers I was with immediately assessed the situation as being a higher 
priority than manning the train we were on, and acted accordingly.  Luckily the 
person had been apprehended by the time they got there, so they returned to the main 
station.  However, this situation emphasised how vulnerable I could quickly become 
on track.   
If a train comes to an emergency halt for any reason during train riding duties, 
it is the transit officers‘ responsibility to check on the driver‘s welfare, look after the 
safety of the passengers and deal with any situation that may have arisen.  For 
instance, there may have been a suicide on the track.  The driver always remains in 
the driver‘s cab and the transit officers have the responsibility of checking on the 
driver; the condition of the person that was hit; summoning emergency services; 
rendering first aid if the condition of the person warrants it and dealing with the 
passengers‘ queries and passengers‘ safety.  When a fatality occurs the train cannot 
be moved or the scene of the incident disturbed until after the Coroner has attended.  
In such circumstances the transit officers will liaise with train control as to when it is 
appropriate to detrain passengers to a safe place until a replacement bus can be 
organised.  Many transit officers find situations such as suicides traumatic, and they 
can lead to psychological injury.  Peter described what happened 
When someone decides to take the coward‘s way out and sit in front 
of the train, we‘re the first ones there, we have to identify first of all 
if the person is deceased.  Nine times out of ten, there‘s a guarantee, 
but you still need to make that initial, even though it‘s not a, it‘s a 
call that an ambulance officer has to make, but like I say, yeah, tell 
those ambos to hit the skids because this guy‘s still breathing sort of 
thing.  We have to ensure that the driver‘s alright, ensure the 
passengers are alright and we have to stand over what‘s left of the 
remains 
John also commented on the psychological effects of the job 
It‘s not just probably the physical side of maybe getting punched in 
the face or whatever else, it‘s that ongoing,‘ I‘ve just seen a person 
who‘s been spread over 150 metres by a 100 ton train.  How am I 
going to go home and tell my wife what sort of day I‘ve had?‘ 
There is an understanding between emergency services and news agencies that 
suicides on track are not reported in the news to prevent any ‗copy cat‘ incidents 
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occurring.  The transit officers endeavour to shield the passengers from viewing the 
scene on such occasions.  Consequently, the general public would be unaware of the 
trauma that transit officers may be exposed to, as opposed to ambulance, fire and 
police officers where the public has a deeper understanding of the nature of their 
roles.  Whilst transit officers have a debriefing session and are offered counselling 
following such an incident, the impact for some officers can be significant: for other 
officers, it might be the cumulative effects of attending a number of these events 
which can have a traumatic affect on themselves, and in turn an effect upon their 
families.  Families may be at a loss to understand the emotional impact this sort of 
trauma may have on a person.  Green (2004), in his research on post traumatic stress 
disorder in police officers, advocates family therapy in such circumstances, and 
believes that even just explaining symptoms of post traumatic disorder to the 
officer‘s partner can have a positive effect on family relationships.  However, in the 
RTO, families are not involved in the rehabilitation process or provided with any 
information on the possible effects of such a disorder. 
Friday and Saturday nights are busy nights for transit officers and are often 
characterised by a high number of incidents occurring.  People are out at restaurants, 
night clubs, the casino, parties and pubs and often want the evening to last as long as 
possible.  At the end of their night the merry makers congregate at the stations to 
catch the last trains back to the suburbs.  On these nights extra trains run until 02.00 
hrs. from the city to cater for this night time economy.  Winlow, Hobbs, Lister and 
Hadfield  (2003, p. 179), when conducting research within the night time economy, 
identified that ―many people can and do choose to discard normative behaviour in a 
number of problematic ways, and they do not take kindly to being told that some 
forms of their hedonistic excess are inappropriate‖.  As a result , these trains include 
people that are under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol and acting irresponsibly.  
As the Hon. Troy Buswell, Minister for Transport stated in Parliament:  
The unfortunate reality is that there are a few cowardly, gutless 
individuals who think that the way to finish a good night out is to 
attempt to assault one of our public officers.  These public officers 
go to work to help make the travelling experience safer for us ...... 
(Western Australia Legislative Council, 2011a, p. 1)  
Transit officers told numerous tales about fights that have broken out on these 
trains, each story seemingly outdoing the previous one.  I learnt how transit officers 
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had been injured and, in particular, how passenger behaviour on one line brought 
about the title of ‗Zoo Train‘ for the last service to the suburb.  After a recent brutal 
attack on two transit officers by passengers on one of those trains, the Rail Tram and 
Bus Union spokesperson Glen Ferguson referred to one of the late trains to an outer 
metropolitan suburb as ―the V Line Express, because there is increasing violence, 
vandalism and vomit‖ (MacDonald & Zaw, 2011 p. 9).  Once the 02.00hrs. trains 
leave Perth‘s Central station, the station is locked up as no further trains run until 
services recommence at 05.00hrs.  This enables some of the transit officers and all 
available Aboriginal Liaison Officers (there are four employed by RTO) to provide 
extra assistance on the final trains.  The delta vehicles also follow these last trains as 
close to the line as possible, ready to provide assistance if required and remove any 
person that is arrested.  However, in spite of all these precautions incidents still 
occur.  
After listening to all the stories that transit officers told me, it was with 
trepidation that I boarded the ‗Zoo train‘ for the first time.  I can still remember my 
initial introduction to this train.  The smell of stale alcohol and vomit was 
overwhelming.  The first person had started vomiting before the train had even left 
the station.  Unlike airlines, there were no sick bags available.  However, I noted that 
the transit officers provide a formidable presence, with officers available in all 
railcars to deal with any offenders.  As Angus described the last trains 
It is just like they are zoo trains and they are hard to control because 
they are all young juvenile kids and they know that they can get 
away with murder and they don‘t care, you know.  You try and say 
to them, ―Sit down and be quiet please‖, but two seconds later they 
are just fidgety people and they can‘t sit still and they just want to 
swing from the hand rails.  So the solution is, what do you do?  Your 
general duty of care is to make sure that these guys get home because 
they are juveniles, but really you just want to throw them off at the 
next stop and sometimes that happens because you have no other 
choice.  And you know, it is your last train and do you really want to 
arrest someone, especially an indigenous person, who then you have 
to give a juvenile caution and then get a responsible adult, which 
there is none, and then you are sitting there [at the lock-up] for hours 
for what?  
As this quote indicates, the transit officer cadre is torn between keeping the 
peace by getting troublemakers off the train; delivering young people to their home 
stations; and arresting persistent trouble makers.  This last option can raise further 
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problems, however, since the troublemaker may well be a juvenile and juveniles 
require special treatment which involves the hands-on presence of the transit officer 
until an adult caregiver can be located and arrives to assume responsibility for the 
troublemaking child. 
Often the transit officers are left to deal with the results of the social 
dislocation that is occurring within our communities.  Angus went on to describe a 
situation which had happened the previous night when he and his transit officer 
offsider could not get a parent to pick up the trouble making child.  When this 
situation occurs, transit officers have to contact a welfare agency which arranges a 
taxi home for the young person.  
There was two juveniles last night and we had to call Crisis Care and 
arrange a taxi to take one of the kids home, because mother was 
actually – whether she had a car or not, she claimed that she didn‘t 
have one and then she said, ―Well I will try and ring the father,‖ and 
the father actually lived in .... which is you know ten minutes from 
.... and refused to come down and collect his son.  
So that is what Crisis Care is there for, to pick up that slack.  So 
because we don‘t really convey people home to their homes.  ....It is 
not a problem getting them [Crisis Care] to come to [our] aid, it is 
just the time factor and it is not an immediate thing.  You‘re 
probably normally waiting an hour to an hour and a half for a taxi to 
come and then Crisis Care talks to the parents and then gets their 
permission and there is like a triangle of conversations that take 
place. 
Sometimes, on the train, transit officers have to deal with juveniles who are 
paint or glue sniffers.  Occasionally when people board the train they can smell the 
glue or paint, and at times see the telltale tinge of paint around the faces of young 
teenagers from sniffing the fumes.  These young people are usually difficult to deal 
with as they are invariably ‗high‘ from the fumes they have been sniffing.  John 
recalled how he felt when a glue sniffer spat in his face‖.  No one wants to be spat in 
the face and taste glue for two weeks because you‘re dealing with a sniffer and it‘s 
disgusting‖.  Other passengers on the trains are also affected by this solvent sniffing.  
The Hon Ken Travers stated in Parliament that a gentleman had complained to him 
―that in the middle of the day he had to get out of one carriage and move to another 
carriage because a group of youths were sniffing glue or solvents on that train‖ 
(Western Australia Legislative Council, 2011b). 
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Another challenging aspect of train riding is having to deal with groups of 
people on the train who are playing up.  As Nola explained  
Depending on what numbers you‘re dealing with and what they‘re 
doing, you can go up and have a quick chat to them and say ‗come 
on fellas, let‘s just take it easy a bit more‘, and then see how they 
react to that.  And if they tell you where to go then you‘ll call [for 
assistance from transit officers].  On this line we‘ve got a manned 
station every second or third, so then you‘d call for someone a 
couple of stations up.  So then you‘ve got four and then you‘re 
dealing; and then you can stop the train and then deal with them if 
they want to play games.  But they don‘t realise that at the time, 
they‘ll tell you to get stuffed and then you‘ll walk, take a few steps 
back and oh, ‘weak as piss, weak as piss‘.  And then you‘ll get to the 
next station, it will stop and two more will get on and then four of 
you, it‘s like ‗alright you‘re all getting off now‘.  It‘s like ‘what did 
we do, oh we didn‘t‘ so yeah. ...But you‘ve got to sort of pick your 
battles because if there was say six of them and you go in there with 
two and you know, which some people would do around here, they 
just don‘t think ahead what their options are to use to work smart and 
go home in one piece. 
Situations also arise when you think a passenger may need assistance; 
however, they may refuse help for many reasons.  For instance, on one of the late 
night trains to the suburbs, at one of the unmanned stations, a gentleman got on the 
train with his clothes torn and cuts and blood all over his face.  He acted as if that 
was just normal and went and sat down.  I heard one of the transit officers saying to 
him ―You look as if you have had a bit of a hard night Sir‖, and when the train 
arrived at the end station the transit officer inquired whether the man required any 
assistance or an ambulance.  The person refused to engage and just continued to look 
straight ahead as if there was nothing out of the ordinary.  We later heard that there 
had been a big fight at that station and from the CCTV pictures our passenger 
appeared to be the instigator.  I was talking about this incident to transit officers a 
couple of nights later.  They replied ―he must have been a newbie [new transit 
officer], we would have just ignored it unless he had asked us for assistance‖ 
(personal notes).  
6.2.3 Delta vehicle (mobile) patrol  
On each shift and on each line at least two transit officers are rostered for 
duties in a delta vehicle providing a mobile patrol, with the longer lines having two 
mobile patrols.  These transit officers usually spend the first few hours of their shift 
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staffing one of the busier, usually unmanned, stations on their line, if no higher 
priority occurs.  This typically entails covering the morning and early evening 
commuter, and afternoon school children, busy periods.  The station they man is 
normally situated approximately midway along the track, enabling transit officers to 
respond to an incident anywhere on their line in the minimum of time.  However, 
occasionally they may be called to assist on another line when circumstances such as 
a melée or suicide may have occurred.  The remainder of the delta shift is spent 
travelling their line, providing a roving presence, calling in and checking on all 
stations along the way.  The delta crew always follow the last train back to the end 
station ready to assist the train riding officers should any problem occur.   
When undertaking rostered duties with a delta crew I found one of the tasks we 
were given was to deliver a summons to a member of the public.  This task surprised 
me, as it had not been covered during our training and I wondered what instructions 
the transit officers had been given prior to undertaking the task.  The summons was 
to be delivered to the person‘s home address, which was not on railway property so 
the particular powers transit officers have are rendered void.  The summons was for 
an alleged offence that had been committed on railway property, so I was sure that 
the person receiving the summons would not be too happy to see them.  As Wayne 
informed me 
There‘s no real instructions, the only instructions initially when I did 
the first one was you do a cell call to base [radio to the central 
control monitoring room] and let them know you‘re going to a 
private address and then when you‘ve left that address you do 
another cell call and let them know you‘ve left the private address. 
On my further questioning on what was an acceptable time lag between the 
first and second radio cell calls to base, Wayne stated   
There‘s no instructions that I‘ve been given apart from ‗do a cell call 
before, after‘ and that‘s just been from a supervisor, it‘s not written 
anywhere or sent to me in an e-mail or wasn‘t in any training: 
actually it probably was just given to me by a more experienced 
officer when I went to do a summons...... 
The safety implications are amazing because you deliver a summons 
and someone‘s not happy about it and they can kill you like, you 
don‘t know what can happen.  But yeah there‘s no time limit on the 
cell calls as far as I‘m aware that if we don‘t call back they‘ll get 
back to you, they just note it down and they just carry on with their 
job watching the cameras.  
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The lack of a job safety analysis for the task concerned me, as did the absence 
of a set procedure for the officers to follow.  However, in my position as a 
participant observer I was not in a situation to comment.  A couple of weeks after 
this event, the transit officers commenced a ‗work to rule‘ campaign which was 
instigated by the transit officers‘ union in response to a breakdown in negotiations 
for a new enterprise bargaining agreement.  The delivering of a summons was one of 
the tasks that the transit officers refused to do as part of this campaign.  
As previously mentioned, one of the main issues that concerns the transit 
officers when they are on duty in the delta vehicle is the lack of emergency priority 
status for their vehicle.  When they are summoned to go to the aid of fellow officers, 
who may be outnumbered and dealing with a difficult situation, they want to get 
there as quickly as possible.  However, they have to comply with all the normal road 
rules.  They are not allowed to put the siren on or have the flashing light on the 
vehicle roof illuminated.  This begs the question as to why they have the capability 
for sirens and flashing lights, but they do.  Over the radio they can hear that their 
mates are in trouble but they have to follow all the usual speed limits.  Frank 
describes the situation as 
You hear someone on the radio screaming for backup, you‘re the 
closest and if you were to obey the laws and rules and policies of the 
RTO they‘d be dead by the time you get there.  Every single code 9 
or code 10 I‘ve attended we have sped, and on occasions broken 
other traffic laws.  But it‘s fairly advisable they‘d rather do that and 
lose their license and pay fines than be attending their mate‘s funeral. 
Or as Angus describes it 
When you are hearing your mates on the radio and they are in fear of 
their lives, you just really want to react upon it and get there as quick 
as you can 
Priority situations also occur when the railway boom gates may be down, due 
to a fault or accident holding up the traffic, leading to a large traffic jam.  The boom 
gates always fail safe in the down position.  Once at the scene, transit officers can 
manually lift the boom gates and direct traffic over the crossing.  Transit officer 
Harold refers to the conflicting standards that exist within the organisation in relation 
to these emergency situations.  Management wants them to get there as soon as 
possible to staff the boom gates and get the traffic moving.  
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They know we speed... They will instruct us to do the speed limit but 
they don‘t enforce it, or how can they enforce it.  And in saying that, 
they‘ll tell you to get there as fast as you can.  If that‘s the case then 
you get there as fast as you can ... you‘ll hear it from control when 
they‘re talking to us if there‘s boom gates down, ‘get there, get 
there,‘ find out what the issues are.  
A number of times when I was working with the delta crews we would have a 
radio call come through from the shift commander requesting us to investigate a 
report received by train control.  These reports were normally from a train driver 
who had seen juveniles or persons unknown near the railway track in a particular 
location.  Due to the dangers associated with the rail system, no person is allowed 
within the railway reserve unless they have the appropriate training, authorisation 
and also a ‗look out‘ if they are within three metres of the track.  Vandalism can be a 
problem on the track where juveniles may place objects on the line; coins between 
rails which affects the railway signalling system; throwing objects off bridges on to 
trains as they pass underneath the bridge; graffitiing railway property or, as 
sometimes occurs, accessing railway property to commit suicide.  I was amazed at 
the assortment of things that people would put on the railway line such as shopping 
trolleys, bins and rocks with no thought for the potential injury that could occur if a 
train derailed.  Accessing some of these locations involved ‗off road‘ driving, 
however I noted that transit officers had not received any advanced or ‗off road‘ 
driver training, nor had they been assessed as being competent in these skills. 
Sometimes animals such as kangaroos or dogs would gain entry to the railway 
reserve and the delta crew would be asked to investigate and deal with the situation.  
During my time working with the transit officers, they raised this as a safety issue.  
Some officers had received dog bites in dealing with such situations; they did not 
carry the appropriate equipment nor had they received training in how to deal with 
animals on the track (Safety Committee Minutes, March 2008).  This issue has since 
been resolved, and a notice has been issued to all transit officers not to deal with 
animals on track track.  The Shire Ranger should be called, however the Ranger 
would need to be accompanied on the railway reserve. 
The transit officers in the delta vehicles faced a major decision every night.  
Was it going to be fish and chips, Chinese, Italian, pizza or hamburgers for the 
evening meal?  This was one of the advantages of being on the delta crew, having 
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the flexibility of being able to buy your evening meal from a choice of places up and 
down the rail line.  Often we would be contacted by other officers on the line 
wanting to know what our decision for the night was, and asking if we could pick up 
some food for them at the same time.  The orders were phoned ahead and would 
always be ready when we went to collect them.  The shopkeepers usually offered a 
small discount for the transit officers; they liked to see the uniformed presence in the 
shop.  We would take the meals back to the stations to eat.  However, it did 
sometimes occur that we would just be sitting down to eat a meal when a radio call 
would come through which the transit officers would have to attend to immediately.  
When problems occur, either on the train or at one of the stations, the delta 
crew swing into action.  It may be to transport a person who has been arrested to the 
police lockup, or it may be to provide backup for other officers who are 
outnumbered.  At times the transit officers may receive intelligence, warning that 
something was going to occur at a particular location, or as the transit officer 
explained it to me one evening ―we‘ve been given the heads up that ‗a smash‘ is 
going to happen‖.  This particular information referred to a clash between two 
warring families that was going to occur that night at the main city station.  The 
clash did take place on the overhead bridge at the station, however the preceding 
intelligence enabled the city-based transit officers to have sufficient back up to deal 
with the situation. In these circumstances, the delta crew can provide additional 
support and transport possible offenders to the police lock up.  
6.3 Role Ambiguity 
Transit officers are not highly visible to members of the public in the sense that 
their uniforms are not distinctive from the revenue protection officers whose roles 
are limited to staffing fare gates and checking passenger tickets on trains.  At the 
moment a contractor, xyz Security supply the staff who work in revenue protection 
but whose uniforms are provided by the RTO and look almost identical to those of 
transit officers.  As previously described, the unique difference between the uniform 
is the colour of the wording and the actual words used on the uniform badge on their 
sleeves.  However, the revenue protection officers often lack the physical skills, 
sense of presence and communication skills; and do not have the training and 
responsibilities of transit officers.  Given that transit officers have a range of 
responsibilities which require officers to take action in specific circumstances, 
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problems can arise when members of the public fail to differentiate between the 
different roles and responsibilities of transit officers and revenue protection officers.  
This issue was raised in Parliament by the Shadow Minister for Transport – the Hon 
Ken Travers who said: 
If members get on a train, I challenge them to look at the officers.  
They will be able to tell who they are only by looking very closely at 
the badges that they wear.  The badge does not say ‘transit officer‘, it 
says ‘revenue protection officer‘.  The difference between these 
officers is that one officer has powers and a significant amount of 
training; the other officer does not. ... (Western Australia Legislative 
Council, 2011b, pp. p8751c-8753a) 
This situation also has a reverse effect when a revenue protection officer does 
not assist in a difficult situation, leaving members of the public wondering why a 
transit officer failed to provide assistance or deal appropriately with a public order 
event.  These circumstances leave transit officers feeling maligned and some 
consider their professionalism is being compromised by the revenue protection look-
alikes.  The transit officers are of the opinion that the general public view themselves 
and the revenue protection officers in the same way, since the uniforms are very 
similar.  As Angus states, in terms which echo views expressed by other transit 
officers, and which position the revenue protection officers at arms‘ length by 
referring to them as xyz officers rather than revenue protection officers:  
I‘ve spoken to quite a few members of public and received 
complaints from them about transit officers and talking more about 
the incident have found out that it was Xyz officers that are dealing 
with it.  So it‘s creating a bad image for us.  It‘s not Xyz, it‘s not 
revenue, it‘s transits that are copping all the flak for it.  [...] It is 
dangerous for us and it‘s a lot of bad publicity for us.  It‘s hard 
enough, the job that we do and the lack of respect that we do get 
from people, we don‘t need other people adding to it and making it 
harder.  
Or, as Sam expressed it, in the ‗down to earth‘ terms common to a number of 
transit officers: 
It is embarrassing for them to have a very similar uniform and deal 
with the public and then [we] deal with the public ourselves.  ‗Cause 
I find that some of them can‘t even speak proper English.  And their 
ability to infringe is, yeah they‘ll just infringe anyone without 
considering further to that.  You know, there‘s many reasons why 
people may not have a ticket.  I think just the background of many of 
the people, it‘s like nothing against them but they‘re from another 
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country, just about all of them, and it‘s like a second rate kind of fix 
to the problem for lack of transit officers.  But I do feel embarrassed 
to be wearing a uniform very similar to theirs.  Nothing against any 
of them, it‘s just the way I think it‘s been approached by either xyz 
Security or RTO.  I think it‘s dangerous.  And I do consider that a lot 
of complaints that are founded may come from Rev. Protection.  It‘s 
nothing against them, they‘re doing the job. 
As Wayne identifies, this ambiguity can result in situations escalating whereas 
without this confusion he believes the situation may not have got out of hand to the 
point where a person became violent: 
It‘s a big safety issue for the public and also it‘s a safety issue for us 
because then you get the bad people who think ‗these guys can‘t do 
anything‘, because the xyz officers can‘t, but then they come and 
deal with us and they think we can‘t do anything.  So they aggravate 
the situation further, and become more violent thinking that we can‘t 
deal with it and when we go to deal with it we‘re dealing with 
someone who‘s this violent [arms opening wide] 
It was rare to come across a transit officer who did not raise this ambiguity as 
an issue.  Further, they usually linked their concern to safety.  The majority of transit 
officer injuries occur during an arrest.  If these minor infringements could be 
prevented from escalating to an arrestable offence, it would assist in reducing the 
risk of injury for transit officers.  As a result of the public‘s confusion between the 
roles of the transit officer and the revenue protection officer, the public are generally 
unaware of the policing role that is reserved for transit officers alone.  Instead, they 
might think that a person in uniform is powerless to arrest them. 
A situation can start out as a person committing a very minor offence on the 
railway system: such as smoking, drinking or not having a ticket.  This would 
normally end up with an infringement notice, but the situation can escalate with the 
person refusing to provide their correct details for the infringement notice.  As a 
result of the ‗person of interest‘ refusing to provide their name and address or, 
alternatively, providing a false name and address, the transit officers are forced to 
take action and arrest the person, whereas revenue protection officers do not respond 
in this way.  Sometimes there is already a bench warrant out for a person‘s arrest, 
which is the reason why the passenger did not want to provide their details; however, 
on the other hand, many do not understand the policing powers that transit officers 
have on the railway system.  Transit officers feel that if the public were educated on 
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the powers that transit officers have on railway property, and if their role were 
clearly differentiated from the role of revenue protection officers, this would reduce 
the number of arrests that occur, increasing safety for both the public and the transit 
officers.  It might also prompt the public to appreciate and respect transit officers 
more.  As John describes it 
I think they [the public] just don‘t understand what it is [that transit 
officers do] so that ignorance leads to contempt.  People who use the 
trains every day will see you and they know you‘re there to do a job 
but I don‘t know whether it is respect or just ignorance to who you 
are and what you can do and what the police side of your role is.  
They know that you can help them out with a ticket but when they 
see you starting to deal with people and they‘re a little bit unsure of 
whether you can or can‘t you‘re going to draw that negative energy 
from the public because they‘re like ‗you can‘t do this, you‘re not 
police you can‘t get my name‘, it‘s really frustrating. 
The similarity of the two uniforms was raised as a safety issue by one of the 
transit officer safety representatives at the Transit Officer Safety Committee Meeting 
I attended.  The manager viewed the situation as a transit officer ‗ego‘ issue, and did 
not believe there was a safety issue involved (personal notes).  However, I noted that 
the minutes of the meeting did not reflect the transit officer ‗ego‘ issue as a reason 
for the status quo remaining.  Rather, it was documented as ―the practice will 
continue with the different badging and not wearing cargo pants‖ (Safety Committee 
Minutes, March 2008, p. 3): effectively, no change and the matter dismissed.  As no 
compromise could be reached (personal notes) between transit officers and 
management on the uniform issue, the transit officers decided to wear their high 
visibility vests all the time to create a point of difference.  Whereas revenue 
protection officers‘ responsibilities do not include any duties that require them to 
leave the safety of the platforms and station precincts, the transit officers, like all 
railway workers who may have to access the track, are issued with high visibility 
vests which must be worn on track-duty  occasions.  The transit officer vests have 
transit officer written across the back and are visible from a distance.  When worn 
over the normal transit officer uniform, the fluoro vest differentiates them from the 
revenue protection officers.  Transit officers wear these vests as a means of dealing 
with the ambiguity arising from the uniforms.  Wayne summed up the situation when 
explaining to me why they were wearing the fluoro vests at all times. 
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We started doing that purely to try and identify us over the xyz 
officers.  That was a union issue where we all voted and said ‗yep 
right let‘s do this until they change those uniforms‘ to just give the 
public a little bit of indication that we‘re not the same as this group, 
and we have different powers and a different role.  So that‘s just us 
taking our initiative; it‘s not from management, they‘re not looking 
after our safety even though we‘re addressing it to them.  So that‘s a 
big issue when you address safety issues to management and they 
don‘t deal with it appropriately, and then we end up dealing with it to 
the best of our ability and they can come up with simple ideas and 
then improve on those ideas, but it‘s not being done. 
6.4 Maintenance 
Transit officers have a high risk job compared to many other occupations.  
Daily they are exposed to a broad spectrum of risks ranging from violent, aggressive 
passengers (Dickinson & Bevan, 2005) to uneven surfaces when accessing the rail 
track (personal notes).  All employers have a ‗duty of care‘ to provide a safe 
workplace for their employees, minimising the risk of incidents and injuries 
occurring ("Occupational Safety and Health Act (WA)," 1984).  This statutory 
requirement is however a minimum requirement.  Researchers of safety in high risk 
organisations now advocate the need to move beyond mere compliance with the law, 
and use proactive methods, such as audits, for uncovering what is wrong with safety.  
The imperative with best-practice is to move beyond a tokenistic compliance which 
may seem to be little more than shielding the organisation from risk of censure to an 
active engagement with building a safe workplace (Hopkins, 2006b; Reason, 1997; 
Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).  Hopkins (2007, p. 113) refers to this as developing 
organisational mindfulness, where leaders  ―exhibit chronic unease‖, whileWeick 
and Sutcliffe (2001, p. 42) refer to mindfulness as ―the combination of ongoing 
scrutiny of existing expectations, continuous refinement and differentiation of 
expectations based on newer experiences‖.  Both these authors adopt the view that 
danger may exist beneath the appearance of normality, and leaders need to search for 
what might occur, rather than just checking for a sterile compliance with the safety 
system.   
Dickinson and Bevan (2005) found in their research with British train 
operating companies that the managers behaved as if violence that occurred on the 
rail system was either brought to the railway, meaning they could not control it or do 
anything about it, or was the fault of the staff (Dickinson & Bevan, 2005).  These 
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managers preferred to act is if violence was an unavoidable problem rather than 
seeing it as something which could be minimised or controlled as a result of 
company interventions.  These attitudes were similarly reflected in RTO, with transit 
officer injuries being treated if they were as accepted as part of the ‗nature of the 
job‘.  This philosophy is gradually changing, with the corporate executive assuming 
greater responsibility for putting officers in ‗harm‘s way‘ and looking at ways to 
reduce the transit officer incidents and subsequent injury rate.  However, managers 
tend to view the security section in isolation without considering the impact that 
other areas of the organisation may have on safety outcomes for the transit officers.  
John summed the situation up: 
I think the RTO perspective is different to the ground level transit 
officer perspective because we‘re the ones that are facing the 
problems, continuously dealing with the public, so we know what we 
need as tools to do this, but the support isn‘t there in its entirety from 
the organisation to do that.   
Hopkins (2006b, p. 881), in his analysis of the culture of rail organisations in 
New South Wales, based on the official inquiry of the Glenbrook rail crash, found:  
First, the railways were obsessively rule focused, in ways that 
hindered safety.  Second, the railway system was organisationally 
and occupationally fragmented, resulting in a culture of silos.  Third, 
there was a powerful culture of punctuality – on time-running.  
Finally, the culture was risk-blind, even risk-denying.   
My research found a similar railway culture existed within the RTO.  Risk 
assessments were not taught in the transit officer training, instead a very strict 
adherence to the railway ‗safe working rules‘ was promoted.  These rules cover the 
operating procedures the railway.  Failure to follow these rules leads to the person 
being disciplined.  Performance indicators for the division were based on ‗on time 
running‘, with passengers‘ satisfaction surveys undertaken on a regular basis.  
Further, the organisation is made up of a number of Divisions delineated by their 
business purpose and budget, operating independently under different managers, 
reporting directly to the Chief Executive Officer.  Within these separate Divisions 
are further divisions dictated by specialised occupations such that revenue protection 
officers are totally different from transit officers and both are entirely distinct from 
customer service officers.  This fragmentation has resulted in silos operating 
independently within the organisation with no understanding of the impact that 
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decisions about one area may have on the safety of other work groups, but 
particularly the transit officers.  This situation has resulted in people managing other 
work groups not considering occupational health and safety issues that might help 
reduce the risk of injury for transit officers.  Many examples of such lack of 
consideration occurred when I was on the tracks with the transit officers, such as the 
ones documented below. 
The busy Port station is also a bus transfer station and situated close to many 
historic, well-patronised pubs, night clubs and an abundance of dining venues.  
Frequent problems occur, particularly at night, as a result of intoxicated, disruptive 
behaviour by people leaving the entertainment precinct.  One night during my 
research there was a fracas in front of the station building.  The transit officer 
radioed the CCTV operator to ask for a camera to be placed on him and his partner 
and the people they were dealing with.  The operator informed the officers that the 
camera was broken, and no CCTV coverage was possible in that area.  These 
cameras normally provide: a safety defence for the officers, enabling the shift 
commander to monitor the situation; back up support to the officers if the situation 
warrants it; video evidence for any subsequent court case and, if needed, support for 
any action taken by the transit officers.  Additionally, this particular camera at the 
front of the station can normally be operated from the station office to pan the 
surrounding area for potential problems.  I subsequently learnt that the fault had been 
reported two weeks previously and was still waiting for repair.  A further two weeks 
later, while I was on duty in a delta vehicle, I again heard a request from a transit 
officer over the radio for the same camera to be placed on them, and again I heard 
that the camera was still broken (personal notes).  The maintenance for these 
cameras is undertaken by another division of the organisation.  The people 
prioritising the work for that particular section of the organisation may not realise the 
implications that the failed camera would have on the transit officers‘ safety.  As one 
of the transit officers recounted to me, following a workshop that he and another 
transit officer had attended: 
We were in a class with twenty other people from the RTO and they 
literally have no idea what transit officers did.  We sat there telling 
them stories about walking down train tracks picking up body bits 
and dragging people off trains with knives and guns and they just sit 
there and go, ‘You guys do what?‘ ‘How often does that happen?‘ 
‘Fairly regularly‘.   
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Transit officers were concerned that even where the camera coverage worked 
well it could be inadequate, such as occurs on some of the bus interchange areas.  
Decisions not to install cameras in these particular areas where events can quickly 
escalate into serious situations, emphasises the silo mentality of the organisation, 
leaving transit officers feeling vulnerable when working in those locations.  Transit 
officers also interpret the situation as demonstrating that management does not care 
about their safety.  David‘s words echoed the thoughts of other transit officers: 
It‘s almost like it is ‗okay we don‘t want to acknowledge that we 
have transit officers, cause to acknowledge them means that we have 
to acknowledge that we have problems on trains.  
As indicated, the operation, positioning and maintenance of cameras was a 
common safety concern amongst transit officers and certainly a cause of frustration 
that their safety could be compromised by the lack of a camera, the lack of 
maintenance or, in the case of the new underground station, the fact that cameras 
were placed in positions that only allowed a partial view of the platforms.  As Angus 
told me: 
Some stations with their camera footage is absolutely ridiculous.  
They set up cameras willy nilly wherever they like.  They need to 
improve, especially in the underground station, they have got one of 
their cameras that they can zoom in and out and swivel around and 
they have got an information board right in front of it, and it cuts out 
a lot of the vision of the platform, especially when we are dealing 
with offenders.  
Again this was raised as a safety issue by the transit officers with management 
representatives, who stated that alterations could not be carried out until the 
contractors, who had built the station, had completely handed the station over to 
RTO.  On another occasion, transit officers requested a CCTV monitor at one of the 
northern line stations which would enable them to view what was occurring on the 
upper concourse when they were on the lower level.  Management refused the 
request due to the cost (Safety Committee Minutes, March 2010).  It appears that this 
decision was taken without any risk assessment being undertaken, or an analysis of 
the kinds of financial and other burdens which can follow on from injuries to transit 
officers. 
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6.5 Equipment 
Transit officers have the perception that management do not appropriately 
assess the risks when deciding on particular types and brands of accouchements that 
form part of their uniform and equipment issue.  In particular, transit officers are 
concerned that the torch with which they are issued is bulky, heavy and provides 
poor illumination.  The torch is necessary when transit officers access the track and 
tunnels, away from the bright lights of the platform.  As many transit officers told 
me ―the torches are useless in the tunnels‖ (personal notes).  After the first couple of 
shifts working on track, transit officers soon learn from the more experienced 
officers that they can purchase a better torch, which is lighter, smaller and provides 
far better illumination than the issued one.  In spite of the transit officers known 
preference for this torch, management still issue the bigger version adding more 
weight than is necessary to carry around on their rig belts.  These leather rig belts are 
worn all day and any extra weight may increase strain on officers‘ backs.  Douse 
(2006) carried out a survey of United Kingdom (UK) police forces to determine the 
causes of back pain in the police forces in the UK.  Whilst the survey did not 
demonstrate an unequivocal  link between the carriage of equipment and back pain, 
it was determined that equipment weight may ―be a contributing factor, if not a 
direct cause‖ (Douse, 2006, p. 1).  Additionally, during an incident, the bigger torch 
carries a further risk of an offender grabbing the torch and using it as a weapon.  As 
well as purchasing the smaller torch, the longer-serving officers quickly advise 
newcomers to buy a pair of gloves appropriate for carrying out ‗pat down‘ searches 
on an apprehended person.  These searches are carried out to determine whether the 
‗person of interest‘ is concealing a weapon, including syringe and needle.  Although 
management does provide gloves in the delta vehicles and on stations, they are thin 
and not puncture proof, providing little protection for the transit officers.  In spite of 
transit officers asking the ‗person of interest‘ whether they have any concealed 
instruments and receiving no response or a negative response, the transit officers can 
still be exposed to the risk of injury as a result of the person‘s non disclosure.  
Although all precautions are taken ‗patting down‘ the person, injuries can still occur, 
particularly a needle stick injury.  Transit officers dread the thought of this form of 
injury which carries the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS, hepatitis B or hepatitis C.  
These incidents result in the transit officer being ‗in limbo‘ for the next three months 
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as they wait for the all clear from their blood tests, which in turn impacts on their 
relationships with their partner and family.  Jack describes such an instance 
occurring with one of his work mates: 
One of the boys [...], he got stabbed; he patted a guy down ‗have you 
got anything on you?‘ ‗Nup‘.  He patted the guy down and next thing 
he‘s got a needle in his wrist.  So he‘s going through months of 
testing.  Apparently his sex life dropped off because he was going 
through all testing, his missus said ‗no don‘t want to know about 
you‘. 
A similar outcome can also result from being bitten by an offender.  As 
Hayden recalled following such an event, ―It worried me in respect to my 
relationship with my partner and not knowing what you have caught and what you 
haven‘t‖.  
To reduce this particular risk of injury, the transit officers ensure they have the 
gloves in their possession at all times in case the need arises to carry out such a 
search.  The officers attach the gloves to their rig belt by a clip.   
A further equipment issue that transit officers often raised was that they could 
not clearly hear their radio at all times, particularly when there was a lot of 
background noise.  If they turned the volume up too high, passengers would be able 
to listen to what was being said.  However, I found that the transit officers, having 
identified a problem themselves, were very resourceful in trying to solve it.  In this 
instance I found many individuals bought their own ear piece for their radios, 
enabling them to have improved radio communication.  Transit officers, through 
their safety representatives, are now lobbying management to issue the radio ear 
pieces as part of the transit officers‘ basic equipment. 
6.6 Supervisors 
A common thread that emerged during my research on each rail line in RTO, 
was the lack of training for transit officer supervisors, both before and after their 
appointment.  There is a career promotion path from transit officer to senior officer; 
progressing from one stripe, through two stripes, to supervisor then shift 
commander.  While this path is available for transit officer advancement; there are 
no supervisory skills taught to the officers to equip them for the positions as they rise 
through the ranks.  Supervisors can find themselves  one of ‗the boys‘ one week, and 
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a supervisor the next, and this makes it difficult for them to carry out their new role 
without any additional training.  As Jo stated: 
He was just a transit officer, so we used to muck around and get up 
to virtually all sorts of mischief.  Now he has to elevate himself 
above that and I know he‘s finding it hard to be able to separate 
This was not the case in any of the other transit police agencies visited during 
the research.  In all other cases, transit police officer supervisors received 
comprehensive training specific to their role.   
As one of the Supervisors said:  ―I‘ve mentioned it at meetings as well, but no-
one seems to really sort of care too much about it.  [...] They give you an acting stint 
and you‘re straight in there‖.  Another supervisor felt that the transit officer 
management were trying to get further training for them, and would support the 
suggestion, but that a move to more training would be blocked by management 
higher up.  ―Unfortunately it would go to [....], who would push it up further and say, 
‗look we would like to get our people onto this‘, and it would be, ‗nup they don‘t 
need it‘.   
Candidates are selected for senior Supervisor roles from an internal pool of 
transit officer applicants.  When a position is advertised, transit officers apply for it 
by submitting an application following the public service guidelines.  This requires 
the applicant to demonstrate on paper how they meet the desired criteria for the 
position.  These applications are assessed and a short list of applicants is chosen to 
proceed to the interview stage.  There was a lot of disquiet amongst the transit 
officers during the time I was on track with them, that one particular officer had been 
promoted whom they considered to be the worst officer on the track for acting 
safely, had very poor communication skills with the public, and that person had now 
became responsible for the safety of the staff under his control (personal notes).  The 
perpetuation of this paper-based method of promotion without the support of 
additional skills ensures the continuation of existing work practices, including poorer 
work practices.  As Engel (2003, p. ii) found in his research with police officers, ―a 
field supervisor‘s style may have a profound impact on patrol officer behaviour‖.  As 
one of the supervisors told me: 
There was no further training, it‘s something we‘re really trying to 
push for [...] It‘s not that you can go to an interview and tell a story, 
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it‘s that you‘ve been able to demonstrate certain skills along the way 
so you‘ve been able to achieve a certification; you‘ve done this 
course or whether it‘s your ‗train the trainer‘ or some other course 
that the RTO puts in place.  So there‘s nothing there at the moment, 
so what you rely on when you go for your interview for promotion is 
past experience and you can draw from anything but you should try 
and keep it obviously relevant but there‘s nothing that stops a transit 
officer who has just come out on his first week on the job from 
applying to be a supervisor. 
Fred voiced similar concerns and went on to say: 
It‘s got to be merit and you‘ve got to have some time or demonstrate 
prior knowledge like let‘s say you‘ve been a sergeant in the police 
for 20 years and you came here then it would be quite reasonable for 
the organisation to look at you to become a supervisor or leader.  But 
I still think that they would need to do the pre-requisite or 
demonstrate pre-requisite knowledge or training.  If they want 
supervisors to be able to do the job properly and get the right 
supervisors they need to put in training levels or steps. 
Reuss-Ianni (1983) refers to two cultures of policing, management cops and 
street cops.  More recently Chan (1996), supporting a previous view espoused by 
Manning (1993) (cited in Chan,1996), identified a third culture of policing, 
Command, middle management and lower participants.  However, I found that the 
supervisors did not appear to fit in to any of those categories.  Transit officers did not 
view supervisors in the same way as they thought of the management above the level 
of supervisor, and supervisors did not see themselves as part of any management 
team. These supervisors created a fourth level, or lower level of management who I 
will call sub management and were in a category on their own.  Upper management 
or Corporate, and Middle management were removed from the day to day activities 
that occurred on the track, whereas supervisors were there on the ground with the 
officers, yet they were no longer ‗one of the boys‘.  The supervisors were in control 
of their line without additional skills to assist them educate, organise, motivate or 
discipline staff as necessary.  They were expected to deal with all the issues that 
might occur including following up any incidents that arose.  Many authors argue 
that the leadership style of supervisors in the police force is based on a paramilitary 
model (Auten, 1985; Morreale & Ortmeier, 2004).  The RTO was no exception, with 
a strict emphasis on following railway rules with no discretion for decision-making 
in those areas.  Further, a number of the supervisors had a previous military or police 
background.  Hence, with no further training for their supervisory positions, 
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supervisors did not have any other leadership model to follow.  As one of the longer-
standing supervisors declared to me when discussing the newer-appointed 
supervisors:  ―All of a sudden they‘re going ‗I don‘t know what the hell I‘m doing, 
no one showed me anything‘.‖  He went on further to explain:   
You‘re generally working on your own anyway, so across the board 
you work on your own from day one so you don‘t know where 
you‘re making mistakes, you‘ve got no one to give you all that 
guidance unless you seek it out. 
Besides the lack of guidance on their supervisory role, and in addition to the 
silos created on each line by the X plan, many supervisors were left feeling isolated 
and lacking collegial support at work.  As one of the supervisors declared to me: 
For me here I‘m the only supervisor, so I said to the guys one night 
after there was a big thing, I said ‗you‘ve got [...] other friends on 
this shift but I don‘t have anyone who‘s my friend on the shift [...] 
here, because I‘m the one making the decision that nobody is happy 
with, but you can go and bleat to all your peers here.  Whereas I‘ve 
got to deal with all [...] of you and make the unpopular decision and 
my only next friend is in the City and there‘s only a telephone and I 
can ring them and say ―hey I need to deal with a situation‖ but you 
guys have got the collaboration here already, so you need to 
appreciate that‘.  
Wayne believed the lack of supervisory training led some of the supervisors to 
resort to bullying in the workplace: 
There are so many issues that are coming about because of them not 
being trained and not knowing their job when they admittedly say 
‗look we haven‘t been trained; we‘re not sure sorry [...] give me a 
break.  I‘ve only been in the role for two months or something, I‘ve 
just been doing the same as you before this‘.  So there‘s a lot of 
issues there where safety is put in jeopardy because they don‘t know 
what to do in their role to look after your safety.  Bullying occurs 
because they don‘t know their position to the point where they think 
‗well I‘m the supervisor, you do what I say.‘ 
Wayne believed the supervisors were unaware what constituted bullying in the 
workplace, and that  some of the supervisors had not developed a coping style to 
―manage people and manage staff‖ in their role.  At the time of the research, there 
was no formal organisational policy on ‗bullying in the workplace‘, nor had training 
been provided for supervisors on this topic.   
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Although lacking in training themselves, a number of the supervisors 
endeavour to provide education and training to the transit officers on their line, using 
the musters at the start of the shift to address the challenges ahead; and gathering the 
transit officers at the end of the shift to debrief and learn from the events of the night.  
Supervisors on each line had different ways of trying to develop a cohesive staff 
culture.  One particular supervisor developed what he called an ‗E-Muster‘.  This 
was sending the notes of the briefing he gave at a muster at the beginning of a shift 
to all transit officers at intermediate stations and roving patrols on the line.  On 
several lines specific supervisors would always make a point of visiting the locations 
their transit officers were based at, passing on any relevant information and 
answering any problems that the officers may have.  On one particular line the transit 
officers looked forward to the Sunday barbecues which were held by their supervisor 
on a regular basis.  On another line, the less-busy Sunday shift provided the 
supervisor with the opportunity to spend more time educating transit officers, usually 
on some aspect of the law that was pertinent to them.  The transit officers were also 
encouraged to put forward a topic to be discussed at the next educational briefing.  
When an incident occurred, some line supervisors would use the CCTV footage to 
review the incident with the transit officers involved, discussing whether the 
situation could have been handled more effectively, or to praise them when they 
handled the situation competently.  However, many transit officers did not have 
access to this form of learning, as a number of supervisors did not take the 
opportunity to assist transit officers improve their handling of a situation.   
The supervisors were not given any performance indicators that they had to 
meet, so consequently there was nothing that management measured which would 
differentiate the proactive versus the not so proactive supervisors.  Supervisors are 
not made accountable for what occurs on their line, neither are they given the 
discretion to run the line as they think fit.  This results in situations being dealt with 
on an individual basis, without a clear proactive strategic direction to reduce the rate 
of crime and anti-social behaviour on any particular line.  Occasionally there would 
be a police blitz on a line addressing an issue such as ‗graffiti‘, where plain clothes 
police would be used.  Sometimes a couple of volunteers may be called for from the 
transit officers.  However, during the research, although supervisors were 
responsible for their line, such decisions were taken at a central management level. 
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6.7 Communication 
Communication, either direct or indirect, is a significant component of any 
organisational function (Kreitner & Kinicki, 2001).  As  Alvesson and Berg (1992, p. 
160) argue, communication flow is the way an organisation characterises itself to the 
wider community and forms an important basis for the development and 
maintenance of identity within the organisation.  Examining communication in the 
context of the RTO and the role of transit officers, the flow of information, or lack of 
information, is an important contributor to how transit officers view their value 
within the organisation.  Furthermore, as in any law enforcement role, 
communication is pivotal in transit officers‘ dealings with the public, and both their 
verbal and non verbal communication is critical in any exchanges(McKenzie, 2007).  
To discuss these issues I will separate communication into two categories:  
communication between management and transit officers; and transit officers‘ 
communication with the public. 
6.7.1 Management communication   
Two-way information flow from management through supervisors to 
employees and vice versa is important for the morale of the employees, their 
motivation and operational safety (Angiullo, 2009; Westrum, 2004).  A lack of this 
communication exchange has previously been identified as a contributing factor in 
many major accidents (Westrum, 2004), including rail disasters such as the 
Glenbrook Rail Disaster in New South Wales (Hopkins, 2005) and Ladbroke Grove 
Rail Disaster in Britain (Health and Safety Executive, 2005b).  Information flow 
keeps people informed of what is occurring within the organisation and usually 
includes issues such as safety statistics, analysis of incidents, accidents, near misses 
and safety audit results (Reason, 1997; Standards Australia, 2006a).  Communication 
enables management to pass on safety targets to employees and to establish the 
importance that management places on safety in the workplace.  This, in turn, 
determines the safety climate that workers work within.  Existing research has 
established the importance of leadership in the development of a safety culture 
(Health and Safety Executive, 2005b; Westrum, 2004).  As Leith (2008) found in his 
research in a refinery, even  a message sent by top management lamenting the 
frequency of accidents and incidents effectively conveyed to workers that 
management considered safety important.  However, in the transit officer security 
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section of RTO, no such message was sent, no safety targets were set and 
promulgated, no benchmarking with other organisations was undertaken, nor was 
any incident/accident root cause analysis provided.  Transit officers were unaware 
how their line performed compared with other lines or organisations.  This lack of 
analysis regarding accident/incident root causes, and whether there were common 
denominators between events, prevented a targeted approach to reducing the 
accident/incident rate.  Any analysis of an event that did occur usually took place as 
a result of legal proceedings against a passenger; following a passenger complaint 
against a transit officer; or for disciplinary action against a transit officer.  E-mails 
from management to transit officers would generally be reminders of rules, particular 
work procedures or related issues relevant to transit officer duties.  As previously 
discussed, information between the lines was not shared and this accentuated the 
communication shortfall.  Hence transit officers relied on the ‗grape vine‘ for 
information.  This was often not accurate and usually became embellished as a 
specific story got passed on.  
In the past, communication meetings had been held between the transit officer 
security management and representatives of the transit officers.  However, these 
meetings had been disbanded a few years before the research at the request of the 
union (interview notes).  Any communication meeting was now held between 
management and the Australian Rail Tram and Bus Union Sub Branch Secretary and 
two Union Delegates.  However, not all transit officers are members of the union and 
this caused consternation amongst non-members, who felt their voices were not 
being heard.   
As regards specific safety committee meetings, these take place infrequently.  
Safety representatives are elected for each line, but with the high turnover and 
movement of staff, a line may be without a representative for some time until a new 
election is held.  The meetings are generally poorly attended by representatives, who 
may not be rostered for duty at that time or cannot be released from duty to attend.  
Management may attend these meetings, but often the elected representatives feel 
their concerns are not being addressed with a few of them becoming disillusioned 
and not continuing in their safety committee position.  As one of the safety 
representatives told me: 
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It comes back to communication.  I find that no matter what you try 
and do in this place, every time you try and do it there is a road 
block, and there is a brick wall, there is something stopping you from 
doing it, and the biggest thing is talking over you.  I mean, [...] has 
just this inept ability to block you out and just talk straight over the 
top of you, and you know, you could sit there and talk till you‘re 
blue in the face, and he will talk over the top of you and not listen to 
a word you‘re saying. 
Prior to a meeting, a list of all transit officer injuries since the last meeting are 
provided to members of the committee.  However, the nature of the injury is 
provided in broad categories such as ―sprains and strains of joints‖, ―psychological 
issues‖ or ―open wound‖ (Transperth Train Operations Security Services, 2009a, p. 
1; 2009b).  Again, the summary of the incident is also provided in broad categories 
such ―stumbled to the ground during an arrest‖ or ―injured escorting offender to 
delta‖ (Transperth Train Operations Security Services, 2009b, p. 1).  Contributing 
factors to the event are not identified, explored or discussed to develop an action 
plan to prevent a reccurrence, nor is there information on which line the injured 
officer was working on.  Discussing incidents between lines at this cross line safety 
forum would contribute towards a safer workplace and break down some of the 
barriers between the lines.  Many transit officers interviewed during the research had 
no idea who their safety representative was, or who the Occupational Safety and 
Health Coordinator for the Division was, and had never seen any minutes of a safety 
meeting.  However, I did note the minutes of one safety meeting on display in an 
office on one of the lines during my fieldwork.   
Angiullo (2009) asserts that frequent open communication fosters a ‗sense of 
belonging‘ for the front line staff.  In line with this finding, the lack of information 
provided to the transit officers leaves them feeling ‗outcasts‘ of the organisation 
(personal notes).  While transit officers believed that most of the supervisors told 
them what they knew, they also thought  there was an information block between 
management and the supervisors.  Additionally, a ‗silo mentality‘ prevented the flow 
of information between rail lines.  Simon explained to me:    
There is a brick wall between the management and the officers, and 
not so much the supervisors, because I know that supervisors and the 
senior officers get continuous e-mails from the managers [normally 
relating to train running events], and that‘s not in regards to what‘s 
going on with the unit and all the rest of it.  And yet the guys don‘t 
get anything unless it seems to be a negative thing.  Other than that, 
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it just seems like you know, there‘s this brick wall.  ...  I think if 
there was more open communication between the managers and the 
guys, I think the place would be a bit more harmonious in how the 
troops see their higher ups.  
Or as James declared: 
Sometimes there are issues that we don‘t have input into or they just 
happen without us knowing.  One thing I find even with the shift 
commanders, individuals seem to put directives out without talking 
to other senior members, other supervisors.  Somebody will just put a 
directive across the e-mail system saying, ‗you will now do this‘.  
Then he signs his name at the bottom but it was never discussed with 
other supervisors or other shift commanders.  That just seems to 
happen. 
Such a situation occurred one night when I was working at a suburban 
underground station.  Our supervisor on the particular line that night, who was not 
based at our station, relayed instructions he had received in an E-mail from a 
different section of the organisation.  In future, transit officers were to lock the metal 
gates at the northern end of our station using a chain and padlock, at 6pm Monday to 
Saturday; 9.30pm on Thursday and all day on Sunday (Supervisor, 2008).  The 
particular gate concerned was the only exit and entry for people using the lift and 
stairs from the underground platform.  That particular exit provided quick entry to 
the shopping centre and at night was used as access to the night life of the area.  The 
only other way to exit or enter the station was at the southern end of the station by 
way of escalators.  No one knew why the directive had been issued; we were simply 
instructed to comply with the notice.  This caused numerous problems.  People with 
bikes, which were not allowed on the escalators, passengers in wheelchairs and 
passengers with prams had no other means of exit from, or entry to, the station.  
Furthermore, even though a notice had been put at the base of the stairs and outside 
the lift, passengers took no notice.  The travelling public would get to the concourse 
of the station and find their exit was barred by the locked gates, resulting in them 
having to go back.  When the younger night-time passengers started arriving, they 
would endeavour to climb over the tall metal gates, regardless of no footholds and 
the high risk of injury to themselves, rather than take the time to go back and exit 
through the other end of the station.  Furthermore, when transit officers were busy 
with other issues, people unable to use the escalators had difficulty contacting them.  
The only way this could be done was by using the emergency speaker on the 
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platform to talk to the operator in the CCTV monitoring room.  The operator could 
then radio a transit officer to unlock the gate and let the person out.  However, there 
is no means of communication for passengers to use at the approach to the station.  
Consequently, people entering the station from the locked end who needed to use the 
lift to access the platform had no way of contacting the transit officers.  Passenger 
tempers flared.  Transit officers were subjected to abuse from passengers due to the 
difficulties, inconvenience and extra time it took as a result of the gate closure.  A 
number of passengers missed their trains having to access the platforms from the 
other end of the station.  It quickly became obvious that no consultation with staff or 
risk assessment had been conducted prior to the directive being issued.  Days later, 
transit officers did eventually get the directive removed on safety grounds.  I later 
learnt the new rule had been put in place at the request of the shopping centre 
management.  
6.7.2 Transit officer communication 
Communication is defined as ―the exchange of information between a sender 
and a receiver, and the inference (perception) of meaning between the individuals 
involved‖ (Kreitner & Kinicki, 2001, p. 479).  Many communication experts theorise 
that the communication process is made up of three elements; body language which 
makes up fifty to sixty percent of the exchange; the voice, which is responsible for 
thirty three to forty per cent of the message, and the content element of the message 
which is only responsible for seven to ten per cent of the total impact (Kreitner & 
Kinicki, 2001; Means, 2007b; Thompson & Jenkins, 2004).  Body language, often 
termed non verbal communication, includes facial gestures, voice intonation (which 
includes tone, pace, pitch and modulation), and proximics (Kreitner & Kinicki, 2001; 
McShane & Travaglione, 2003; Thompson & Jenkins, 2004).  Proximics, which 
includes the physical distance from the person being communicated with, also refers 
to the way a person stands and carries themselves which contributes significantly to 
the passengers‘ perceptions of the power of  transit officers  (Hall, 1963; Kreitner & 
Kinicki, 2001; Thompson & Jenkins, 2004).  Transit police organisations which 
were visited overseas refer to this professional presence, or stance, as an important 
deterrent in terms of dissuading illegal or sense of anti-social behaviour, and it is the 
first step in a ‗use of force framework‘ adapted by a number of police organisations 
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which I will discuss later (New York Police Department Specialized Training 
Section, 2009; Transit Police Boston, 2009).  
An important aspect of the transit officer role, as with any law enforcement 
setting, is the ability of the officer to communicate in such a way that they leave the 
passenger in no doubt as to what they mean  (McKenzie, 2007).  David, one of the 
supervisors, described the communication role: 
It‘s about speaking to people and I guess they need to be able to 
speak to people of all walks of life, not just speak to the people that 
are the bad guys or not just speak to passengers that need help.  They 
need to be able to address anybody from any walk of life, whether 
they be, ... doctors, teachers, whether they are the Aboriginal man 
down on the street ... the middle Eastern couple that are .......  
Transit officer Max explained rather more bluntly how transit officers‘ verbal 
communication varied depending upon which line they were working on: 
Like the northern line has got your middle class white trash who 
think they know everything and they‘re a lot different to deal with 
than say your indigenous people that we deal with here.  There‘s a 
whole different customer service thing.  I mean on our train you just 
tell them to shut up and they shut up.  But on the .... train it‘s just not 
going to work that way.   
On questioning Max further on how he would handle the northern line 
passengers he replied: 
I‘ve found the best way to deal with them is just becoming very 
methodical.  You state [to] them the offence they‘re doing, the 
consequence of what‘s going to happen if they keep going the way 
they are, then proceed to an arrest if you need to.  Whereas on the 
Southern or Eastern line ‗just stop that, shut up and sit down‘.  They 
know where the line is. 
Particularly critical to the safe practice of transit officer duties is the transit 
officers‘ skill in defusing a confrontational situation.  However, during the twelve 
week‘s training only half a day was devoted to conflict resolution competence, 
resulting in many transit officers not feeling skilled and confident in dealing with 
potentially aggressive situations.  In other organisations which were visited during 
the research, far greater time was devoted to learning this skill, which was 
commonly termed ‗verbal judo‘ or ‗tactical communication‘.  The Massachusetts 
Bay Transit Police in Boston (2009) define in their course in these terms: 
162 
Verbal judo is the principle of judo itself:  using the energy of others 
to master situations.  It contains a set of communication principles 
and tactics that enable the user to generate cooperation and gain 
voluntary compliance in others under stressful conditions, such as 
hostile suspects, upset or frightened victims, or any action which 
places the officer and the community at odds with each other. 
Like other agencies visited, the Massachusetts Bay Transit Police in Boston 
followed the lecture room theory with numerous occasions of practising the skill of 
‗talking down‘ to achieve calmness during scenario training exercises.  This enabled 
their officers to become proficient in dealing with confrontational situations in a 
realistic, simulated yet safe environment.  However, in RTO, as well as only 
spending half a day on learning conflict resolution strategies, each transit officer 
only undertook one scenario training session.  As previously discussed, trainers took 
the part of passengers in each trainee‘s single session, which did not give the 
situation the realism achieved by other transit policing organisations.  The only RTO 
training scenario undertaken was constructed to end in an arrest.  There was no 
option to try and defuse the situation as the simulated circumstances formed the 
prelude to a court scenario, with transit officers having to prepare all relevant paper 
work and give evidence in a mock court.  The police Academy court room was used 
for the court exercise.  However, if the transit officers had learnt ‗defusing‘ skills, 
the scenario may have ended differently.  Any subsequent ‗talking skills‘ practice 
was not scenario-based or realistic, and took place in the class room with a partner 
from your group.  As one transit officer explained the situation to me: 
So your partner is there giving you a mouthful and it is someone that 
you know for a start, and it‘s like, ‗yeah good on you dickhead‘ and 
you treat it like that, and it‘s treated as a bit of a joke.  Whereas if 
they had something like the set up like they‘ve got at the academy 
[police] and have professional actors come in and someone you don‘t 
know, suddenly you‘re put in a scenario of someone you don‘t know 
going off in your face, giving you a bit of a shove.  It really puts a 
different perspective on how people deal with things and it really 
makes you stop and think. 
As no simulated situation was provided where transit officers could practice 
their verbal defusing skills, this resulted in many officers finding it difficult to deal 
appropriately with situations involving verbal confrontation.  Consequently, some 
officers ‗arced up‘ a situation, rather than ‗talking it down‘ to reach a compromise 
resolution.  While working alongside the transit officers on track, I observed that 
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people tended to respond to aggression with more aggression and the situation could 
quickly get out of hand (personal notes).  A particular issue could start off with 
something as small as ‗smoking on the platform‘ or ‗not having a ticket‘ and quickly 
escalate to a confrontational situation, particularly if the transit officer used an 
aggressive manner in dealing with the person.  These situations have the potential to 
result in a person being arrested rather than the situation being defused with a 
possible ‗win win‘ outcome for all concerned.  As previous research has shown, 
there is a positive correlation between the amount of aggression an officer uses and 
the risk  of resistance that the officer faces (Fridell, et al., 2009; C. Wilson, 1996; C. 
Wilson, et al., 1994).  On the other hand, officers who use assertion, rather than 
aggression, are more likely to achieve compliance.  As Ian reported to me: 
Once you‘ve worked with someone you can kind of see the way they 
talk to people and sometimes you just want to walk away from the 
train or platform.  Because sometimes it‘s just downright 
embarrassing and dangerous, because you‘re just going ‗why do you 
have a need to make this person so angry‘, you know?  Just talk to 
them.  Yeah, they might be a piece of shit, but kill them with 
kindness.  Because I mean, I don‘t understand people that want to be 
doing [court] briefs and action reports. 
A couple of times I witnessed a similar state of affairs.  I found the 
circumstances very uncomfortable and embarrassing to observe, and wanted to 
comment on the manner that the transit officer used in communicating with the 
passenger.  However, as a participant observer I was unable to take any action 
(personal notes).  A number of instances were recounted to me by transit officers 
where a fellow officer with poor communication skills ‗arced up‘ a situation which 
ended up with the transit officers‘ partner being injured; not the person with the poor 
communication skills who had precipitated the breakdown in communications.   
When working with the transit officers I found that there are a few officers 
who have undertaken ‗verbal judo‘ training in previous occupations.  These officers 
were able to apply the communication skills they had learnt with good effect.  As 
Mike told me: 
Verbal judo comes in very handy for me and that‘s from what I learnt 
from the police not from what I learnt here, because it teaches you 
not to just get straight hands on, like wrestling someone to the 
ground.  Try and talk them out of a situation. 
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Twice when working with the transit officers I saw different officers studying 
the book ―Verbal Judo: The Gentle art of Persuasion‖ (Thompson & Jenkins, 2004) 
during quiet periods late at night.  One of the officers had purchased the book and 
the other officer had borrowed a copy from the local library.  Both officers felt their 
skills in this area were deficient and were trying to improve them.  As McKenzie 
(2007, p. 79)  states, ―Knowledge equals confidence.  Competent, confident officers 
make solid decisions and fewer mistakes‖.  In contrast, one transit officer explained 
to me how he could also learn from transit officers who handled a situation badly: 
You learn as much from the bad ones as you do from the good ones.  
Just watching them deal with a situation that just made it much 
worse and going, ‗okay that‘s something to look out for, don‘t do 
that.  That‘s obviously not working‘.  You [can] learn [from the bad 
circumstances] just as much from seeing someone do it perfectly.  
6.8 Use of Force 
As previously discussed, one of the significant communicative elements of 
effective policing is the officer‘s presence or stance (Bayley & Bittner, 1984; Bratton 
& Knobler, 1998; McKenzie, 2007).  This refers to the professional demeanour and 
appearance the officer uses, their uniform, attitude and the body language they 
portray (New York Police Department Specialized Training Section, 2009; 
Thompson & Jenkins, 2004; Transit Police Boston, 2009).  This professional 
presence can act as a deterrent to a troublemaker and provides the first step in the 
officer‘s defence armoury.  The second step to take command of a situation is 
commonly referred to as verbal persuasion.  The officer‘s choice of words should be 
professional, tactical, controlled and aimed at achieving the goal of generating 
voluntary compliance with the transit officers‘ request (New York Police 
Department Specialized Training Section, 2009; Transit Police Boston, 2009).  The 
authoritative presence  officers portray must be matched by their verbal vocalisation, 
so that their appearance and vocal communication are congruent.  Bayley and Bittner 
(1984, p. 50) refer to the need for ―external calm and internal officer alertness‖ 
where an officer‘s presence can calm a situation before any physical intervention is 
required.  Nevertheless, no two encounters with passengers are the same, and a 
situation can alter very quickly.  Unarmed physical force is the next line of defence 
where the officer uses open empty hand combat to control and disable subjects and 
to defend themselves.  Transit officers are armed with a baton and pepper spray, but 
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are only authorised to use either of these to protect themselves or other people, and 
are permitted to use only such force as is reasonably necessary (Public Transport 
Authority of Western Australia, 2008).  Therefore, the training that transit officers 
undertake is always in terms of how the force to be used must be commensurate to 
the resistance displayed by the person.  Many of the officers did not like the baton.  
As transit officer Tom remarked to me: 
I find the baton is the most useless tool that we have got; absolutely 
useless.  I would prefer, if it came down to a crunch, I would prefer 
to use my fists, because once you have pulled that out and it doesn‘t 
work, what are you going to do with it?  You can‘t just drop it 
because then they are going to pick it up and .....   
Traditionally, most law enforcement agencies had a policy which guided their 
officers‘ use of force through a continuum (Smith & Alpert, 2000).  This continuum 
normally described an escalating series of steps that an officer may take to resolve a 
situation.  These ranged from the officers‘ presence through empty hand techniques 
to the use of a chemical spray such as OC (oleoresin capsicum or pepper spray); to 
the use of a baton to defend themselves and achieve an arrest (Aveni, 2000; National 
Institute of Justice, 2009; Public Transport Authority of Western Australia, 2007a). 
In some jurisdictions, officers are also empowered to use deadly force – a firearm, to 
protect life.  Additionally, in many police forces, officers are issued with a conducted 
energy weapon (CEW) commonly known as a taser.  These devices produce an 
electrical current which when fired at a person can momentarily stun them, giving 
police time to gain control of the situation.  Transit officers frequently told me that 
they felt they should have tasers which would make their job much safer.  Transit 
officer Rory explained the need for tasers to me:   
Because there are a lot more violent offenders.  Since I have started 
this job the amount of assaults on Public Officers, particularly us, has 
increased... Sometimes if you don‘t use your baton properly, you can 
get seriously hurt.  That‘s why I‘m afraid; that‘s why I feel scared 
now when I work out in the rail system.   
Transit officer Jane explained that there was a need for tasers to reduce the 
time spent on aftercare of a offender when they have been sprayed and incapacitated 
with oleoresin capsicum (pepper) spray, which is sprayed directly in the offender‘s 
eyes.  This causes the offender‘s eyes to tear and swell shut and their nasal passages 
to drain mucous profusely (Morabito & Doerner, 1997).  Once a transit officer has 
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sprayed a person, they have a duty of care to look after that person until they have 
recovered from the spraying.  This usually takes around forty five minutes, but can 
take up to a couple of hours.  However, Jane felt that the real reason transit officers 
did not have tasers was probably due to cost: 
We do the same job as police even though we are not police.  We 
still use the same legislation as them.  ... A can of pepper spray 
you‘re looking at  ... roughly about thirty bucks a can and then 
you‘ve got your training and you‘ve got your after care which is 
forty five minutes after that.  Speaking with other police officers, 
with a taser you know, the person will be disabled for about five 
seconds, you arrest them, there‘s no after care, there‘s no litigation 
against you, the person can‘t have after illness.  ... But then it 
probably means it does come down to cost because tasers cost over 
$1000 or whatever it is, where the old pepper spray is cheaper.   
I found during my research with other transit police organisations that tasers 
were a contentious issue throughout the sector.  Some transit police agencies were 
using tasers.  This was the case with the New York Transit Police Department, which 
found them a very effective instrument.  Others were not: for example, 
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Transit Police Department (personal 
notes).  Some police agencies, for example Vancouver Transit Police and the 
Western Australian Police Force, have been at the centre of a great deal of negative 
publicity due to either the death or a heart attack of a suspect following the use of a 
CEW.  Whilst these adverse events may have occurred anyway, the public 
perception blames the use of the taser.  Nevertheless, the literature has highlighted 
that there are fewer injuries both to the offender and officer when a taser is used and 
the research appears to contradict the belief that the use of tasers carries a significant 
risk of injury or death (Butler & Hall, 2008; Force Science Institute, 2008).  In some 
police forces the use of tasers is restricted to only specialized units or higher ranking 
officers , while with other police forces the tasers are issued to all front line officers 
(Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP, 2008).  
Previously, use of force frameworks have been depicted as a strict linear 
progression which gave officers the impression that they must progress through one 
level before going to the next level.  In contrast, research now highlights that the 
appropriate use of force is often not a linear progression, and such a perception fails 
to capture the dynamic situation of a potentially violent encounter (Hoffman, 
Lawrence, & Brown, 2004; Zanin, 2009).  As a result, use of force trainers were 
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brought together in 1999 from across Canada and the United States to develop a 
‗Use-of-Force framework‘ where officers ―continuously assess the situation and 
select the most reasonable option relative to those circumstances as perceived at that 
point in time‖ (Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2009, p. 1).  The outcome of this 
meeting resulted in the Ontario ‗Use of Force‘ model which has been adopted as the 
National Use of Force Framework in Canada (see below Figure 1).  Butler (2009, p. 
2) describes this decision-making tool as a ―graphical representation that describes 
appropriate and reasonable officer responses based upon subject behaviours in 
conjunction with the totality of circumstances in which the officer finds himself‖.  
Although this model is dynamic and not a linear progression, it is still at times 
referred to as a continuum.  Variations of this model were in place in all agencies I 
visited during the research.  Using this basic model, officers are taught to consider all 
options, continually assessing the risk and appropriate response, considering all use 
of force options available, including the option to withdraw from the situation 
(Australasian Centre for Policing Research, 2004).  Conversely, RTO transit officers 
are not familiar with a ‗Use of Force Framework‘ and remain concerned at the 
limited options available to them to deal with violent circumstances.  Compounding 
this situation, transit officers are now more reluctant to use oleoresin capsicum (OC) 
spray.  At one stage the spray was withdrawn for a number of weeks due to a 
flammability issue, and the officers believe that the new batch is not as effective.  As 
David comments: 
The initial stuff was outstanding; the new stuff is sometimes hit and 
miss.  Because it‘s got a little more water based in it now, the stream 
sometimes doesn‘t come out as a stream.  It will go left, right and 
centre.  It takes a lot longer to have an effect on the bad guys that 
have been sprayed.  Whilst the original stuff, with an initial spray, 
they‘d be down within 10 or 15 seconds.  This new stuff may take up 
to thirty to forty seconds for someone to start having the effects. 
In the past, researchers such as Morabito and Doerner (1997) viewed OC spray 
as a valuable non lethal tool to subdue violent suspects without inflicting serious 
injuries on those involved in the scuffle.  However, more recent research indicates 
that whilst OC is generally effective, it is less effective on offenders who are 
overweight, violent suspects or people who are under the influence of drugs (Adang, 
Kaminski, Howell, & Mensink, 2006; Kaminski, Edwards, & Johnson, 1999).  As 
Adang and Mensink (2004, p. 217) postulate, following a study on the use of OC 
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spray in the Netherlands, ― an all too easy reliance on pepper spray (at the expense of 
other options) is potentially dangerous to officers given the fact that OC is not 
always effective‖.  Exacerbating this possible reduction in effectiveness of the spray, 
transit officers are not authorised to use the spray to affect an arrest, rather they are 
only authorised to use this option when they need to defend themselves.  This leaves 
transit officers exposed to possible injury before they can employ defensive 
measures.  As one officer told me in reference to dealing with offenders, ―in the time 
it takes to work they could be on top of you punching you in the head‖.  Butler and 
Hall (2008) advance the view that no use of force incidents are considered safe due 
to the dynamic nature of such events which can evolve quickly and be extremely 
violent.  Hence, the circular incident management intervention framework takes into 
account the possibility of the rapid change in the nature of an encounter which the 
previous linear models did not do (Zanin, 2009).   
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Figure 1: National Use of Force Framework, Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
 (Zanin, 2009), Ontario Use of Force Model 
 
Hoffman et al., (2004, pp. 2 - 3) describe the framework: 
The innermost circle of the framework labelled ‗Situation‘ contains 
the ‗assess-plan-act‘ component that should be visualized as a 
dynamic as an officer‘s assessment of a situation is never ending.  
The process of continuous assessment also helps to explain how a 
behaviour (and response option) can change from cooperative to 
assaultive (or from communication to lethal force) in a split-second 
without passing through any other behaviour or force options.  
The area adjacent to the situation contains the various subject 
behaviour categories including cooperative, resistant, assaultive and 
grievous bodily harm or death. 
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Perception and tactical considerations are interrelated and are 
therefore contained in the same area, or ring in the model.  Factors 
that the officer brings to the situation that may be unique to the 
individual officer interact with both situational and behavioural 
factors to determine how an officer may perceive or assess the 
situation.  Further, the officer‘s perception of a situation may affect 
his or her assessment and, in turn, affect his or her tactical 
considerations. 
The outer area of the graphic represents the officer‘s force options.  
These options range from officer presence to communication skills, 
physical control techniques, intermediate weapons and lethal force.  
Though officer presence and communication skills are not physical 
use of force options, they have been included to illustrate the full 
range of factors that have an impact on the behaviour of the subject. 
Aveni (2000) raised concerns that with the introduction of the framework, 
organisations would use the model in lieu of developing their own ‗use of force 
policy‘, believing a graphical representation is easier  for officers to understand than 
the written word.  Whilst initially the graphic representation was referred to as a 
model, The Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police endorsed the model with the 
condition that the word ‗model‘ be replaced with the word ‗framework‘, which 
would form the basis of an organisation‘s own ‗use of force‘ policy (Hoffman, et al., 
2004).  This framework, as well as providing a guide for police officers to use, has 
the added benefit of providing a consistent approach that police training schools, 
policy makers, the legal establishment and public can interpret  and understand 
(Butler, 2009; Hoffman, et al., 2004).  However, the officer‘s perception of the 
danger they may be exposed to in a particular situation may vary from officer to 
officer, based on the officer‘s personal characteristics and experience, which can 
impact on the level of coercion that the officer uses in an encounter to control the 
behaviour of the offender (Aveni, 2000; Butler, 2009).  As transit officer Fred, who 
had previously been injured on duty by an offender, explained to me:    
It‘s made me not take a lot of crap that I did take.  I will jump in 
more quickly, but certainly not violently or aggressively, or even 
physically, but I‘ll try and stop it before it happens; because I‘ve 
seen how it can escalate from just something sort of not simple but 
you know, telling someone to .... stop yelling and screaming and stop 
swearing and then it went to an obstruction and then it went to an 
assault. .... It does make you ... look at it differently at certain 
offenders, and it makes you more aware that anybody is capable of 
hurting you.  If they‘ve been drinking or whatever, anyone is capable 
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of violence. .... It makes you look a little bit differently. .... So you 
are just a bit more defensive. 
Even though transit officers may not have been injured themselves, they will 
know other officers who have been injured.  This can influence their dealings with 
offenders, such as in the incident related to me by transit officer Ian: 
When [Heather] got punched at ...., the one that was over the news 
quite a bit and she ended up leaving because her injuries were ...., 
she wasn‘t able to come back.  So I think when more severe things 
have happened to other people, that I‘ve kind of gone, you know, it 
can happen, and it will happen. 
Additionally, research has identified that an officer will use more force when 
dealing with a person that is under the influence of alcohol, displaying signs of 
emotional or mental impairment, or acting in relation to a number of bystanders that 
are present during the encounter (Terrill, 2005).  However, the transit officers in 
RTO were concerned that they had not been trained to recognise somebody with 
mental illness, neither by their actions nor the way they speak.  This could result in a 
mentally ill person being treated the same as any other offender when they should be 
treated differently.   
How officers deal with any offender is closely scrutinised by the public.  As 
transit officer Sam recounted:  
If you have an aggressive person, you want to have a force option 
that makes you a level above them in order to control them and to 
remove them from the property or to restrain them.  ... [The] General 
public will stand and watch and maybe even record it and try and tell 
us that we can‘t do that, even get in the way of it.  So my opinion is 
that sixty per cent of the population would suggest that transit 
officers are thugs and forty per cent might appreciate the service 
that‘s there.  To be honest with you I don‘t understand why.  For 
those people that think we are thugs, I‘d love to take them for a night 
so they can see what our duties can be because there are times when 
it is difficult.  I guess in a sense you do put yourself out there, at any 
time you could be assaulted, which is common.  Certainly you have 
to have your wits about you or be thinking in many situations 
because you just don‘t want that [assault] to happen, which is quite 
possible and likely.   
Over the years, research has identified a perceived desire of officers to use 
force to protect themselves and their sense of identity, and to maintain the respect 
they believe they deserve.  When they consider that this respect is challenged, they 
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may use more force than is necessary to control the situation (Crank, 2004; Terrill, 
2005; Van Maanen, 1978a), and this propensity is even greater when third parties are 
present  (Felson & Tedeschi, 1993).  I also observed this dynamic on a number of 
occasions when on track with the transit officers who spoke of what they called the 
‗attitude test‘ with offenders.  This referred to the officers‘ perception of how much 
respect the ‗person of interest‘ had shown them (personal notes), which usually 
dictated how the encounter proceeded.  As Terrill (2005, p. 110) states ―Officers are 
socialized to ‗maintain the edge‘ and be ‗one up‘ on citizens not only to establish 
control, but to ensure proper respect‖.  When officers felt the offender spoke to them 
with respect, they were often more lenient with them than they might have otherwise 
been.  Fred provided some examples of these sorts of situations: 
You have someone who‘s younger and they‘ve done something 
wrong, they‘ve say, given you false details and false names, you 
could obviously arrest for that, and you do a name check on them . ... 
They‘ve turned around; they‘ve given you their correct details 
straight away, they‘ve said ‗I was scared; I didn‘t want Mum to find 
out ... we‘re supposed to be at the movies‘, that sort of thing.... 
I think a lot of times there‘s a bit of leniency there, because you look 
at it, if you charge somebody who‘s eighteen who‘s never done 
anything before, they‘re at uni., maybe they‘re doing a degree, that‘s 
going to follow them for the rest of their life, or at least 10 years.  So 
in that respect, you need to learn to, ... have not so much discretion 
but just you know, just work out what‘s going to happen to them at 
the end of the day. ... Are you going to give somebody a criminal 
record for a little mistake?  You know, I mean, if it‘s something very 
serious then of course, but with something as small as that they turn 
around and they go ‗look, I‘m really sorry, I didn‘t want mum to 
know.‘ 
I found transit officers were concerned that on many occasions they found 
themselves outnumbered by offenders, and had to deal with the situation with only 
their baton and pepper spray to defend themselves.  Although officers are able to call 
for backup support, this may take a while to arrive.  A potential multiple offender 
scenario had not been covered in the transit officer training, resulting in officers 
unsure of the best way to deal with such an incident.  One of the officers recounted a 
particular event that had taken place where they were outnumbered:  
I didn‘t panic per se at the time but after it was all over I was actually 
shaking.  Not because I was feeling scared, I do believe that‘s just 
the adrenaline rush that I‘ve dealt with a situation and it took me a 
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while to come down.  But yeah, that was very scary, and what we 
did, we didn‘t get trained for.  And in the end four offenders, two of 
us, fortunately two of the offenders were against two others, and two 
offenders didn‘t intervene. ... It could so easily have gone the other 
way and I don‘t know where we would have gone because we had no 
escape plans or no escape options from where we were on the 
station.  So it could have got very ugly very quickly. 
Transit officers in RailCorp Sydney Australia, like transit officers in the RTO, 
do not have the use of lethal force or the added protection of tasers at their disposal.  
However, Railcorp has developed their own ‗use of force‘ model as part of their 
Standard Operating Procedures (RailCorp, 2008) which incorporates explicitly the 
option of disengaging.  RailCorp‘s Tactical Options Model emphasises the need to 
continually assess and reassess the risk as conditions change, to disengage if 
―officers are out-numbered, or the situation is exposed, or officers are unable to 
preserve their own, customer or employee safety, or require specialist reinforcement‖ 
(RailCorp, 2008, p. 6).  This information is presented both graphically and written 
into their Standard Operating Procedures, and verbally taught to the officers as part 
of their training.  No one option is emphasised or recommended over another.  
Officers are taught to do a mental risk assessment of the situation, taking in to 
account the number of offenders, the environment that they are in and whether 
anybody is in imminent danger, and ―must select the best option or combination of 
options using the minimum amount of force to address the situation‖ (RailCorp, 
2008, p. 5).  Central to this decision-making process is the continuous risk 
assessment the officers undertake, including the option to withdraw until there are a 
sufficient number of transit officers or police back-up to deal with the circumstances 
safely and effectively (RailCorp, 2008).  In contrast, transit officers in RTO do not 
have such a model to follow, the risk assessment process is not emphasised, and 
hence disengagement until reinforcements arrive is low on the officer‘s option list.  
Transit officer Frank, who has a number of years experience, emphasised to me their 
need for training in this area;  particularly, concerning how to handle an incident 
with a number of offenders, and learning how to  assess the situation rather than 
rushing in without calculating the risk.  Frank went on to explain: 
There was very little scenario training for us.  We just got given 
these one or two exercises with two on two – two transit officers and 
two bad guys, that‘s the worst it ever got.  The reality out there can 
be a lot, lot different. ... The more scenarios you do the more you can 
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cope with the situation the better idea you‘re going to have when you 
are out there approaching various situations and how quickly a 
situation can change.  Also a lot more training in how to handle the 
outnumbered situations [is required] because all the training we‘ve 
done, we‘ve never ever been outnumbered.  It‘s always been a case 
of if you need help and it will not too far away, which isn‘t true.  It 
can be over half an hour away.  The fact of the matter is that very 
few transit officers, as long as they are professional, can contain and 
control a fairly large number of people.  But we don‘t actually know 
that, so as a result you get the initial two transit officers responding 
to a problem and there‘s no training given on how to assess the 
situation.  Like if it‘s going to be dangerous don‘t approach, wait for 
back up.  You‘re just told, go and deal with this problem and then all 
of a sudden you‘re like up to your neck, and you‘re in way too deep 
and it‘s hard to get out.  As a result, if it goes wrong there can be a 
lot of injuries. 
The RTO ‗Transit Officer Use of Force (Theory) Manual‘ does state ―Be 
prepared to disengage at any time.  No one is perfect; don‘t be tempted to be a hero.  
You may lose‖  (Public Transport Authority of Western Australia, 2007d).  In spite 
of this, I noted the culture of the officers did not appear to reflect that written 
statement in the manual.  As Crank (2004) identified in his research on police 
culture,  officers who were not prepared to face danger were thought of as a liability, 
and shunned by other officers.  Transit officers were similar.  They would respond to 
a situation without considering the danger, and did not want to be partnered with a 
person who may ‗freeze‘ in a violent or confrontational situation.  During the time I 
was on track with the officers, I was unaware of any incident occurring when an 
officer withdrew from a situation until back up arrived, though I was aware of many 
incidents where transit officers were injured (personal notes).  Transit officers were 
always concerned that their partner ‗had their back‘, which was a term they used 
frequently, meaning that their partner was there with them ‗backing them up‘ 
(personal notes) and covering their back.  Any weakness shown by an individual 
officer was viewed with disrespect by other officers and led to a reluctance to work 
with that officer.  Whereas any excessive force used is not viewed negatively by 
their peers (personal notes); rather, as Crank (2004) found in his research, it can be 
attributed and perhaps excused within the culture as an overreaction by the officer in 
the face of real or perceived danger (Crank, 2004).  
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6.9 Statistics 
The RTO wishes to keep incident statistics involving passengers and transit 
officers confidential.  As a result, statistics used here have been sourced from 
publically available information only.  These sources include: information obtained 
from proceedings of the West Australian Legislative Council; statistics obtained 
under the Freedom of Information Act 1992 ("Freedom of Information Act (WA)," 
1992) by The West Australian and published in that paper; and the broad statements 
relating to personal injury statistics obtained from Annual Reports available from the 
RTO‘s publically accessible web site.  For instance: 
In the latest year, the ... [RTO] exceeded the 10 per cent reduction in 
the LTI (lost time injury) incidence rate (excluding security services) 
with a 15.9 per cent drop.  It was encouraging that, even including 
security services staff, there was a 4.3 per cent reduction. 
(Public Transport Authority of Western Australia, 2011, p. 76) 
 
No further breakdown or analysis of injury statistics was provided in this latest 
report.  However, these figures and statement mirrored the previous years‘ annual 
report (Public Transport Authority of Western Australia, 2010). 
With the exclusion of security services the [RTO] exceeded the 10 
per cent improvement target for Lost Time Injury (LTI) Incidence 
Rate, with a 15.9 per cent reduction equivalent figure for the 
previous financial year.  With the inclusion of security services staff, 
this becomes a 4.3 per cent reduction. 
(Public Transport Authority of Western Australia, 2010, p. 57) 
 
The definition used by WorkCover for the LTI incidence rate is: the number of 
lost time claims for every one hundred workers employed (part time, full-time, 
casual and seasonal) (WorkCover WA, 2011, p. 34).  A lost time injury is classed as 
any injury to an employee where the employee has lost one whole shift or more.  
Disease refers to any illness which is caused by, or results from, the work 
environment. The annual report published in 2010 did include actual figures for the 
LTI incident rate. This stated: Including the security services the LTI was 7.77; 
without the security services the LTI was 3.39 (Public Transport Authority of 
Western Australia, 2010, p. 57).  No further breakdown of personal injury statistics 
was provided, and comparative figures were not provided in the subsequent annual 
report in 2011.  Comparing these 2010 annual report figures with available rates 
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from other industries, which range from 0.2 in the Finance and Insurance business to 
the highest rate which is 3.8 in Manufacturing business (Department of Commerce 
Western Australia, 2009), the number for the whole RTO organisation is well above 
high risk industry rates.  The lack of additional injury statistics prevents any further 
comparisons with similar or comparisons with high risk industries, or on other well 
known and accepted industry benchmarks. 
As far back as the 2003/2004 annual report (Public Transport Authority of 
Western Australia, 2004), the RTO has been attributing the organisation‘s high 
injury rates to the nature of the transit officers‘ role; referring to the anti-social 
behaviour that transit officers have to deal with, and the psychological trauma as a 
result of dealing with suicides, and suspected and attempted suicides, on the railway 
network.  Other RTO performance indicators in the annual reports include passenger 
boardings per service kilometre; on time running; accessibility; reliability; safety; 
and cost efficiency, which is calculated on the cost per passenger mile; and notifiable 
occurrences (Public Transport Authority of Western Australia, 2009).  Notifiable 
occurrences are specific occurrences as defined in the Rail Safety Regulations 1999, 
and are a legislative requirement under the Rail Safety Act 1998.  They relate to 
incidents that take place on the railway infrastructure, which caused, or had the 
potential to cause, serious injury, death or significant damage ("Rail Safety Act 
(WA) ", 1998; "Rail Safety Regulations (WA)," 1999).  These figures are expressed 
as the number of occurrences per million passenger boardings and per million train 
kilometres (Public Transport Authority of Western Australia, 2009).  Targets are set 
for issues such as ‗on time running‘ of trains, but no target has been established for 
the reduction of transit officer injuries, and none was discussed at the transit officer 
safety committee meetings I attended.  Additionally, transit officers were unaware of 
any injury statistic targets for the organisation (personal notes).  However, passenger 
satisfaction statistics are collected and analyzed.  Data is directly obtained from 
passengers using a passenger satisfaction monitor (PSM).  This is a survey tool used 
by a consultant on behalf of the RTO.  Included in these surveys is a measure of 
passengers‘ perceptions of safety on the rail system for both day and night, with the 
results provided in annual reports.  See figure 2 below.  
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Figure 2: Customer perception of safety , (Public Transport Authority of Western 
Australia, 2011, p. 29) 
 
As indicated by the graph, although there has been some improvement in the 
statistics over the last five years, passengers still perceive the rail system as being 
less safe at night.  This drop in perceived safety occurs even though the majority of 
the transit officer workforce is rostered during this period.  The survey also identifies 
that passengers feel safer on trains rather than at stations (Public Transport Authority 
of Western Australia, 2011), which may be a result of the transit officers‘ presence 
on most trains during the evening and night time, but not at all stations.   
Spencer (2009, July 11 p. 17), who wrote an article in The West Australian 
―Train travel gets more dangerous‖ obtained statistics for the article from the RTO, 
using the provisions available under the Freedom of Information Act 1992 
("Freedom of Information Act (WA)," 1992).  This legislation gives people the right 
to apply for access to documents held by state Public Sector agencies.  Spencer 
(2009, July 11 ) identified a nineteen percent increase in violent offences occurring 
on the rail system between January 1, 2009 and May 21, 2009 when compared with 
the same period the previous year.  Additionally, in the three years since 2006, 
Spencer (2009, July 11 p. 17) found there had been 1850 violent incidents occurring 
on the railway system, between 1
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569 assaults on members of the public and 539 offences against transit officers with 
748 cases of violent or intimidating behaviour (Spencer, 2009, July 11 ).  Referring 
to this particular article, the Hon Alison Xamon raised questions in Parliament 
relating to the definition of a violent incident, and the number of violent incidents 
that had occurred on the rail system between January 1, 2009 and October 2009.  
Responding to the Hon Alison Xamon, the Minister for Transport, the Hon Simon 
O‘Brien stated that the RTO defines a violent incident as ―an act by a person who 
assaults or attempts to assault or threaten others, including Public Officers‖.  A 
violent incident is also considered to be: ―action taken by a person to resist arrest by 
punching, kicking and thrashing which requires restraint‖ (West Australian 
Legislative Council, 2009, p. 1).  Responding further to the Hon Alison Xamon, the 
Hon Simon O‘Brien stated that three hundred and thirty six incidents occurred at 
stations and in their immediate surrounds, and fifty eight incidents occurred on trains 
during that period.  The Hon Simon O‘Brien expounded further: 
Transit officers attended and dealt with two hundred and seventy six 
incidents whilst the offence/s was still being committed or the 
offender was still present upon their arrival at the scene.  The Public 
Transport Authority does not have the information readily available 
with respect to the breakdown of the two hundred and seventy six 
incidents into train lines and to get this specific information would 
require considerable research which would divert staff away from 
their normal duties.  Accordingly, I am not prepared to allocate the 
States‘ resources to provide a response with this level of detail 
(Western Australia Legislative Council, 2009a, p. 1). 
The incidence of violence on the rail system was raised again in Parliament in 
August 2010 by the Hon Andrew Waddell with specific reference to one particular 
line: 
Of all the train lines in the state, the [South] train line has the worst 
record for assaults.  Since 2009 more than 51 passengers and 45 
public officers have been attacked while on the [South] line or at 
stations on the [South] (Western Australia Legislative Council, 2010, 
p. 1) 
Lacking analysis of the factors contributing to these events, and an 
understanding of where the violent incidents are taking place, particular trouble spots 
are not identified; emerging crime patterns are not detected; and there is no local 
accountability for events that occur on the rail system.  Without this information 
resources cannot be targeted to deal strategically with emerging crime patterns 
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(Henry, 2003).  Devoid of relevant information, it is not possible for managers to 
implement a systematic, targeted approach to reduce the violent behaviour and, 
consequently, reduce injuries to transit officers and the public.  This is very different 
from what happens during interventions when crime is successfully halted.  Henry 
(2003) believes that in the early 1990s effective leadership was the reason that crime 
reduced dramatically, and quality of life improved in New York.  As Henry (2003, p. 
9) states:  
any police agency‘s success in fulfilling its basic mission and in 
conducting its business depends greatly upon the kind of 
commitment, support, interest and coordination provided by its 
political leadership.   
In spite of this, it would appear from the statement above in Parliament by the 
then Minister for Transport, Hon Simon O‘Brien, that the Western Australian 
Government does not wish to encourage such leadership or provide any additional 
support to facilitate a strategic management approach to dealing with the violence 
occurring on the rail system.  However more recently, there has been increasing 
publicity around violence on the trains, and this has put pressure on the Government  
to improve the situation.  For example, an article published in The Sunday Times 
argues that ―one in 10 transit guards on Perth trains is off sick on workers‘ 
compensation‖ (Paddenburg, 2010, p. 37).  The opposition Labour Party has also 
exerted pressure in parliament.  The Hon Ken Travers, Shadow Minister for 
Transport, is pressing for a parliamentary committee inquiring into the violence on 
the public transport system (Western Australia Legislative Council, 2011c).  The 
growing concern was recently acknowledged by the Hon Troy Buswell, current 
Minister for Transport, who reported in Parliament that: ―we will engage with the 
transit officers, and we will invest and will leave no stone unturned in continuing to 
make our trains safe‖ (Western Australia Legislative Council, 2011a).  However, to 
date no definitive plan to reduce crime and injuries on the rail system has been 
announced.  
Although the RTO has reluctantly provided some information on the number 
of violent assaults occurring on the transit system, no information has been provided 
on how many of these incidents lead to transit officer injuries.  Nor is there any 
indication of the nature of the injuries received by transit officers.  Additionally, the 
above figures cited do not include incidents attended by transit officers that do not 
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meet the given definition of ‗violent‘, but which led to injury.  These can include 
events giving rise to psychological trauma, for example a suicide on track.  
According to WorkCover WA, the average cost for a lost time workers‘ 
compensation claim for all industries in Western Australia in 2007/2008 was 
$28,505 (Mahony, 2010, p. 3).  However, this figure would not include the 
organisation‘s internal costs such as recruitment, retraining and replacement.  Like 
all rail safety workers, transit officers have very strict medical standards that officers 
must meet prior to going on track (Standards Australia, 2006a).  Following any 
absence from work due to serious illness or injury (National Transport Commission 
Australia, 2004), transit officers require re-testing to ensure they still meet the 
medical standards in place for rail safety workers.  Reducing the injuries and thereby 
reducing costs would be a significant financial saving for the organisation.  During 
the 2008/2009 year there were a total of 115 workers‘ compensation claims with a 
reported value of $1,455,106 (Public Transport Authority of Western Australia, 
2009).  This figure would not include hidden costs.  No further information on the 
nature of the workers‘ compensation injuries was given.  In the 2010/2011 annual 
report, the carrying provisions for the workers‘ compensation at the end of the year 
was listed at $5,546,000 (Public Transport Authority of Western Australia, 2011, p. 
141).  The annual report defined the amount of the provision as ―the estimated 
outstanding value of claims plus any actuarial assessments of the previous years 
adjusted fund contribution as at the end of reporting period‖ (Public Transport 
Authority of Western Australia, 2011, p. 124).  This total was for the whole 
organisation and no further breakdown was provided.  
The management in the transit officer section of the RTO does not undertake 
any health and safety benchmarking, even with similar organisations or professions 
with comparable responsibilities.  Professions with some similarities to transit 
officers include police, transit police and other front line security staff in different 
environments.  Rather than evaluate their own performance and work to improve it, 
managers in the area keep a tight control on performance data.  For example, they 
will not allow the use of internal statistics in this thesis, or share and compare 
information with other transit security organisations I visited.  However, 
benchmarking need not only involve comparing statistics with like organisations, it 
can provide year on year evidence of improvement or deterioration, as well as 
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highlighting opportunities to learn from other organisations.  As the UK Health and 
Safety Executive  (1999, p. 1) explain, benchmarking is:  
More about continuously learning from others, learning more about 
your organisation‘s strengths and weaknesses in the process, and 
then acting on the lessons learnt.  This is what leads to real 
improvement. 
6.10 Summary 
This chapter has documented the transit officers‘ role including the various 
duties they undertake on stations, trains or in delta vehicle patrols, and has provided 
an overview of their experiences across the rail system.  During the research, I was 
able to examine issues which transit officers considered influenced their safety.  
These include the choice of equipment they are provided with; the ambiguity that 
surrounds the transit officer role in relation to revenue protection officers; the need 
for greater understanding of the transit officer role by other areas of the organisation; 
the variations in supervisor abilities; and the communication practices that exist 
within the transit officer cadre.  Barriers to sharing information between the various 
rail lines; blocks in communication up and down the hierarchy; and transit officers‘ 
feeling less than confident when communicating with the travelling public were all 
raised as communication issues.  Having undertaken the transit officer training, I was 
able to understand these transit officers‘ concerns.   
My deep immersion in the transit officer cadre enabled me to discover the 
different subcultures on each line.  However, despite these variations, there were also 
many cultural similarities between all transit officers.  These shared characteristics 
were similar to cultural traits identified by previous researchers with law 
enforcement officers worldwide, such as loyalty to their fellow officers and an 
attitude that says ‗you don‘t dob in a mate‘ (Chan, et al., 2003; Crank, 2004; Van 
Maanen, 1973).  Additionally, all the transit officers in the RTO shared a concern 
that they were isolated from the rest of the organisation. They considered themselves 
a ‗necessary evil‘ that the organisation had to have, but did not really want (personal 
notes).  
In spite of the restrictions placed by the RTO on sharing information with 
other organisations, both for comparison purposes and to improve outcomes, I 
nevertheless found similar organisations worldwide who embraced the contrary 
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view.  These organisations willingly passed on information that might assist in 
improving communication practices and transit officer safety.  The following chapter 
details the lessons learnt from these ‗high achieving‘ organisations.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
BEST PRACTICE IN TRANSIT POLICING 
ORGANISATIONS 
7. INTRODUCTION 
The ten months fieldwork, including training, working with the transit officers 
and conducting the interviews had given me an appreciation of the many difficulties 
transit officers face on a daily basis.  During this time I also developed a deep 
understanding of the workplace culture, and the practices and communication skills 
that transit officers use.  Armed with this knowledge I wanted to learn from other 
organisations nationally, and internationally, as to what training and strategies these 
organisations have in place that control and reduce the injury rate for their officers; 
minimising crime and anti-social behaviour on the rail system; and reducing the 
divide between management and transit officers.  In other words, I wished to 
examine what is considered ‗best-practice‘ in transit policing.  I am using the term 
‗transit officer‘, ‗transit police‘, and transit special constable as being 
interchangeable in this chapter, since the discussion ranges across a number of rail 
services which use different terminologies for what is, effectively, the RTO transit 
officer role. 
Best-practice tends to be a ‗catch all‘ term which over the years has come to 
mean the practices which provide the optimum return for the business.  The idea that 
there is ‗best-practice‘ in an industry nevertheless provides standards and 
benchmarks which lesser achieving organisations can strive towards.  In this 
instance, I had identified communication skills and practices as being a significant 
factor in both organisational effectiveness and in the safety of RTO transit officers.  I 
therefore wanted to examine the communication training and practices of officers in 
these high achieving organisations.  Such communication included within the 
organisation; between transit police and management; how communication barriers 
across rail lines are dealt with; plus external communication; that is to say, transit 
police skills in communicating with the general public.  I was also interested in 
researching how these organisations dealt with the transition from transit police 
trainee in the classroom to operational transit police officer on the rail system, and 
what training supervisors undertook for their leadership positions.  Additionally, my 
184 
aim was to examine how other organisations investigated and dealt with incidents, 
and what strategies these organisations put in place to reduce the crime and anti-
social behaviour on their rail systems.  
My initial investigation into transit policing organisations was via the World 
Wide Web.  Criteria included what information an organisation had disclosed on the 
Web, especially as this related to their injury statistics; standards, policies and 
procedures.  I particularly focused my research on transit policing organisations in 
countries that had a similar culture to Australia, ideally they were English language 
based and had similar legal penalties for offences committed on the rail system.  
Focusing on countries meeting these general criteria, the transit police in the 
organisations chosen could be expected to encounter anti-social behaviour and 
violence on the rail system similar to that experienced by the RTO transit officers.  
This criterion excluded, for example, the transit police on the Singapore high speed 
rail line, where penalties are stricter.  The trains there are considered safe and 
passengers are generally well behaved.  The remaining organisations were examined 
further to determine the ones with the closest structural fit to that which positions the 
transit officers within the structure of the RTO.  Some of the organisations that I 
initially evaluated were excluded from the research in this next phase.  For example, 
I found that the transit officer-type cadre was sometimes not a distinct transit 
policing entity, rather they were part of a police force that could be moved to other 
duties.  No two organisations were the same.  In some instances the transit police 
were part of the Railway Authority with special police powers such as the Toronto 
Railway Special Constables; or authorised transit police such as the New Jersey 
Transit Police who report to the Rail Authority; or the New York Transit Police who 
are a discrete section of the New York Police Department (NYPD).  Transit officers 
in RailCorp Sydney Australia proved to be structured most similarly to the RTO 
transit officers.  RailCorp transit officers are responsible to the Rail Authority and 
have similar powers on the rail system as RTO transit officers, although they do not 
have the use of pepper spray.  RailCorp transit officers were also included on the 
basis of their much lower, and still declining, injury rate identifying them as being 
among best-practice organisations.  At the time of my visit to RailCorp, the New 
South Wales Parliament was evaluating whether the officers were going to be taken 
over by the New South Wales police.  However, this has not as yet eventuated.  The 
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Toronto Special Constables were in a similar position and were also included in the 
study.  In other areas of Australia, the officers that are on the trains provide a 
customer service function only, with the state police Force, who are not dedicated to 
the rail system, dealing with crime and any anti-social behaviour.  Queensland Rail 
is now in the process of evaluating the structure and role of their officers, and has 
been examining other models of transit officer duties including the RTO‘s model. 
Following my initial research, I personally contacted the short-listed transit 
police organisations and discussed my interests further.  My final selection 
comprised the British Transport Police Leeds, who cover rail transport in the north 
east of England, Great Britain; New York Police Department (NYPD) Transit Police, 
who police the metropolitan subway in New York; Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority (MTA) New York, who police the Long Island and Metro-North Railways 
in New York; Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) Transit Police, 
Boston; New Jersey Transit Police Department  Newark New Jersey;  Bay Area 
Rapid Transit (BART) Police Department San Francisco;  Metro Transit Police 
Department (MTPD) Washington; Special Constable Service Toronto Transit 
Commission and Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority Police Service 
(GVTAPS).  I also included RailCorp in New South Wales.  I arranged to visit these 
organisations to discuss their training and examine the strategies they have in place 
which may influence their low injury rates.  All of the organisations were proud of 
what they had achieved and were generous with their time in assisting this research 
endeavour.  
The majority of the transit police recruits in this national and international 
sample undertake basic police officer training at one of the police academies, 
colleges or universities prior to undertaking the rail-specific training with the 
relevant rail organisation.  However, a number of agencies have also established 
their own academy such as the MBTA Transit Police.  At the Metro Transit Police 
Washington, a stand–alone site has recently been established exclusively for Metro 
Transit Police training (Metro Transit Police, 2009).  All transit police training 
includes the specific legislation relating to railways plus the railway safe working 
practices and procedures necessary for officers who work on the rail track.  Where 
an agency has a rail system that extends into neighbouring states, officers are 
required to be certified to work in each of those separate jurisdictions.  Differences 
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between various states can include frequency and amount of retraining requirements, 
plus issues such as the number of hours to be spent on specific topics in the training 
schedule.  Transit officers at RailCorp, and Transit Special Constables in Toronto, 
undertake their own ‗in house‘ specific course tailored to their local railway 
environment.   
7.1 Field Training Officers 
The ‗best-practice‘ organisations visited for this research all have a field 
training program to assist newly- graduated probationary transit officers make the 
transition from being a rookie in training school to being an officer performing their 
duties competently in the field.  The program supports and assesses the officers‘ 
performance as they initially observe and learn from experienced officers, gradually 
implementing their newly acquired skills. The officers who are appointed as field 
training officers or,  as the Toronto Transit Special Constables refer to them, Coach 
Officers, undertake specific training such as ‗train the trainer‘ and/or ‗assessor 
training‘ to equip them to mentor and assess trainee officers in the field.  Trainees 
are paired up with a field training officer.  In some jurisdictions the trainees remain 
with the same officer for the whole time, whilst in other agencies they are moved on 
a regular basis.  This is the case with the BART Police Department San Francisco, 
where new graduates from training school are assigned a different officer every two 
weeks.  In RailCorp Sydney the transit officers spend three months in the training 
school, followed by three months with a trainer on the track.  The training is still not 
fully completed until the new officer has spent three months in a team environment.  
The field training officer positions are not necessarily a promotion, although the 
NYPD Transit Police do have a training officer assigned to each district.  Instead, the 
officers undertaking the positions hold a certain status amongst their cadre, and 
receive a small percentage increase per hour on their normal pay when undertaking 
the training task.  In the situation of the MBTA, transit police trainers receive extra 
vacation days per year.  The officers occupying these positions are experienced 
officers, who in some agencies have been recommended to the role by their 
supervisors; or have volunteered and been through a rigorous selection process.  The 
chosen officers are generally articulate and are chosen because they demonstrate 
high ethical standards.  When partnered up with a new graduate, the field training 
officer initially takes the lead role in any situation they encounter and, as the 
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graduate becomes more familiar with the practical application of their role, the 
training officer becomes the silent partner with the trainee managing the situation.  
This approach enables the field training officer to assess the trainee‘s competence in 
the field.  The field officer is able to advise the trainee of any improvements to 
performance that could or should be made; demonstrates effective communication 
skills with the public, and supports the newly- graduated transit officer as they 
develop confidence in dealing with various circumstances.  In some organisations, 
for example the MBTA, towards the end of the field training period the trainer may 
travel in plain clothes and just observe how the trainee deals with the various 
situations that confront them.  The field training officers fill in a daily workplace 
performance form and submit regular reports to the organisation based on the 
trainee‘s performance.  All elements of the training have to be practically 
demonstrated on track.   
In contrast to the above, when the trainee transit officers from RTO graduate, 
they are allocated to any area for eight shifts or less ‗familiarisation‘ with the rail 
system.  The new graduates are then rostered as a full member of the transit officer 
cadre.  However, as transit officer Nola, who is one of the more experienced officers, 
pointed out to me: 
They just don‘t have any confidence in themselves and I can see that, 
so the shit-heads that are out there are [also] going to see them like 
that.  And they won‘t make eye contact with people; they‘ll be very 
timid in what they say and ... they won‘t speak with any authority in 
their voice and tell people the way it‘s meant to be. 
The RTO officers are initially on probation and have a work book which lists 
the practical components of the transit officer role which have to be undertaken by 
the officers.  However, there is no formal assessment process of the performance of 
those duties.  The supervisor will sign off a particular element in the assessment 
book, even though they have not received any training themselves, either as being a 
supervisor or in assessing other staff members‘ competencies.  As transit officer 
Frank told me: 
Basically once they put the blue shirt on that‘s it, and you‘re 
considered fully qualified to do everything everyone else can do, 
which of course is ridiculous.  What everyone knows is different.  
But with no formal scheme for mentoring or on the job training, 
basically, you know, ‗watch and learn‘.  It doesn‘t work because you 
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get a lot of informal stuff when you work with someone who‘s got a 
bit of experience.  They‘ll tell you, you know everyone‘s got a 
different approach, watch, learn, figure out what works, figure out 
what you want to try and don‘t – and don‘t just believe there‘s only 
one way of dealing with something, there‘s always got to be a 
multiple choice.  It just depends on how you do it, the time and 
place. 
Currently, there is a disconnection between the training department and the 
officers on track.  The trainers are not able to spend any time in the field to evaluate 
whether the practices taught remain relevant for the tasks undertaken by transit 
officers.  One trainer told me that he realised that his operational experience had a 
shelf life: 
I would like to get my qualifications up to speed again and go out 
there as an operational transit officer and work the lines again, even 
if it is on a weekend or a Saturday night or something like 
that.....That way I can see if there is any major changes to operational 
tactics, major operational procedures and just have a look see and 
have a look at where we can improve on some of the training 
systems... 
After the initial training, the next time the trainers see the newly graduated 
officers is when they attend the training department for their twelve month refresher 
course in the ‗use of pepper spray‘ and ‗baton and handcuffs techniques‘.  
Consequently, there is not constant reinforcement of learnt skills.  Instead, as Schein 
(2004) predicts in similar situations, transit officers will, in their quest to fit in with 
their new environment, adopt the methods and practices of the group they are 
working with.  These practices may not be correct; however the status quo will be 
maintained and the existing culture will prevail.  Additionally, there is no formal 
feedback loop to the training department if an incident occurs on track.  As Dennis, 
one of the trainers, told me, the training department does not get to hear about the 
injuries transit officers receive; rather, any knowledge of possible shortcomings in 
transit officer training is gained by the ―grapevine and personal contact‖.  
7.2 Supervisor Training 
As previously mentioned in this thesis, all the ‗best-practice‘ organisations 
visited had detailed training and retraining for supervisors, both prior to commencing 
their supervisory positions, and in terms of ongoing training and support whilst in 
those positions.  Subjects covered in training included leadership and building an 
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effective team; safety and incident management including debriefing following an 
incident; investigation of incidents; effective communication skills to optimise team 
performance, including conflict resolution skills; monitoring performance and 
motivation of officers; team briefings; effective use of available resources, report 
writing, time management and fifteen-minute roll call management.  This roll call is 
the time spent at the beginning of the shift where the supervisor notifies the staff 
what has occurred on the railway system in the previous shifts, passes on any 
relevant information required for their shift, and uses any remaining time to educate 
the officers and enforce safety requirements.  Ongoing training for supervisors can 
include subjects such as advanced people skills, or a particular management or senior 
leadership unit which may be undertaken in-house, or at one of the police academies 
or universities.   
In a number of the agencies visited, the transit police officer may have 
undertaken a number of varying special assignments and roles before being 
appointed to a supervisor‘s position, often accompanied by additional training.  
These roles included K9 (canine) training in agencies which had dogs, for example 
the New Jersey Transit Police and MBTA Transit Police; an emergency vehicle 
operation course; special weapons and tactics (SWAT) team training, which equips 
an officer to be part of a highly-trained mobile response team; defensive driving; 
investigation training and plain clothes operations training.  Fifty per cent of the 
MBTA supervisors had previously been ‗use of force‘ instructors.  The actual timing 
and organisation of supervisor training varied between the organisations.  This 
ranged from the MBTA Transit Police organisation which had a two-week training 
course between each level of seniority to the MTA Transit Police which had a three 
to four week supervisors‘ course before a new supervisor commenced in their 
position.  All organisations had ongoing block training for supervisors.  I noted the 
American agencies were particularly geared to training which dealt with terrorism, 
with officers taking part in Patriot or Homeland Security Training.  Multi-
jurisdictional collaboration and training exercises were common; with national 
incident command, and city-wide incident management, protocols in place to deal 
with security-related issues.   
In the MBTA all lieutenants (similar to other transit police organisations, these 
are officers in a supervisory position, usually in charge of a particular area, line or 
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district) are required to spend time in the Internal Affairs Branch which investigates 
complaints from the public or wrong doings by any transit police officer.  The time 
spent in the branch provides these supervisors with an understanding of the process 
that occurs following a complaint against a transit police officer.  The time involved 
in examining all the details also hones the supervisor‘s investigative skills.  This 
experience enables supervisors to see that the Internal Affairs Branch is not out to 
charge an officer, or discipline an officer unfairly, but to carry out ‗due diligence‘ in 
their investigation to determine whether or not there was misconduct on the officer‘s 
part.  In contrast, in spite of a talk at the beginning of the transit officer training by 
the Manager, Internal Affairs, I found when working with the RTO transit officers 
and supervisors that there was a lack of understanding of the processes involved in 
the Internal Affairs Branch.  This resulted in officers telling me they regarded the 
branch as ‗a big black hole‘ (personal notes).  Complaints from passengers about 
transit officers were fully investigated by this branch, but as transit officer Fred told 
me:  
We take them [offenders] to court and they‘re innocent till they‘re 
proven guilty.  If somebody makes a complaint about us, we‘re guilty 
until we‘re proven innocent.  ... I don‘t know if that‘s government, 
that‘s procedure, that‘s the way it goes for us and coppers, but it‘s just 
ridiculous. 
Although transit officers and supervisors realised that the Internal Affairs 
Branch had a job to do, their main concern was about the time it took to do it.  If a 
supervisor spent a period working with the Internal Affairs Branch, this would 
provide an understanding of the processes involved.  Some of the more senior transit 
officers, such as transit officer Freda, realised there was a thorough process to follow 
but, like others, she was concerned at the delays in outcomes: 
You might get one e-mail from internals saying that the investigation 
is nearly coming to an end we just need to do this or you may not; it 
might just be hanging there, and you‘ll get a call to issue a statement 
and they‘ll call you to come in and do an interview and then it‘s just 
the waiting game.  Overall it‘s, the ‗Internals‘ have obviously got a 
job to do....  
If RTO supervisors rotated through the Internal Affairs Branch they would 
obtain a greater understanding of the workings of the department and could provide 
additional and relevant support to reduce the time lag between an initial complaint 
against a transit officer and the final outcome.  
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7.3 Key Performance Indicators 
Managers and supervisors in all the organisations visited have a range of key 
performance indicators (KPIs) which they are expected to meet.  Their performance 
on the job is evaluated against those indicators.  A number of the indicators were 
common between all organisations; however, there were also some indicators that 
were specific to a particular organisation.  Often certain KPIs were based on special 
problems that individual organisations had to deal with.  For example, one of the 
known problems that the British Transit Police have to deal with is the anti-social 
behaviour of soccer football fans as they travel by train to watch their teams play an 
away game.  The dates for these events are known well in advance which enables 
officers to meet together and start their planning three months ahead of the event.  A 
full operation -pecific risk assessment for the particular game is undertaken.  All 
identified risks are assessed as high, medium or low and procedures and control 
measures are put in place to reduce the risk.  Sometimes commanders, their 
supervisors and transit police teams receive intelligence reports indicating 
premeditated public disorder.  Alternatively, it may be known that ‗trouble makers‘ 
will be travelling on that day.  This information is incorporated into the risk 
assessment alone with the control measures to be taken, such as increasing the 
number of officers on duty that day to deal with any outbreaks of disorder.  The 
British Transit Police take into consideration where rival fans may meet up, which 
could result in injuries; and this possible scenario is incorporated into their risk 
assessment.  Additionally, all areas of the rail system which could pose a risk or 
hazard on the day are considered.  Crowd management at stations, overcrowding on 
trains, overcrowding trackside and communications and first aid all receive 
consideration, for example (British Transit Police, 2007).  Supervisors and their 
senior commanders are required to sign off on these risk assessments and ensure that 
officers have controls in place.  Whilst it is understood that risk assessments are 
dynamic documents which may require altering as hazards develop or change, 
requiring additional controls to eliminate or reduce the risk;  nevertheless, the risk 
assessment document is used to develop briefing notes for the event and, as the 
policy states:  
All supervisors are required by law to brief all officers under their 
command of the hazards and the control measures in place, to reduce 
or eliminate these risks.  Supervisors should record the names of all 
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those officers briefed, [and] provide them with a copy of this 
document, which should be signed for on the attached letter.  
(British Transit Police, 2009b, p. 1) 
 
Supervisors are responsible and accountable for ensuring these risk 
assessments, briefing notes, distribution lists and sign off by all participating staff 
are finalised. 
Supervisors in the ‗best-practice‘ transit policing organisations have 
responsibility for investigating and bringing to a close the crimes in their area of 
control; investigating all transit police injuries; reporting on them, and dealing with 
any safety issues arising.  Each person in the chain of command up to the Chief of 
the organisation has a responsibility for any and all injuries occurring to transit 
police officers.  An injury is taken very seriously and all injuries are investigated 
thoroughly.  The outcomes of these investigations are shared with all areas within the 
organisation.  Following the success that former New York Police Commissioner, 
and former Transit Police Chief, William Bratton had in reducing crime in New 
York in the early to mid nineties, both in the subways and on the ground  (Bratton & 
Knobler, 1998), law enforcement agencies have embraced and built on the Compstat 
model.  This was initially conceived by Jack Maple, and refined by Bratton and 
Maple to the point where it was usable (Henry, 2003).  Compstat is short for 
‗Computer Comparison Statistics‘ (Godown, 2009, p. 1), and is built on a 
management paradigm that assists an organisation to achieve its mission and goals 
by holding police managers accountable for their performance by the measurement 
of statistics (DeLorenzi, et al., 2006; Shane, 2004).  Briefly described, Compstat is:  
transferable, compatible and replicable in any organisation or 
environment.  In a police organisation, Compstat functions as a 
crime control process manifested in recurring meetings, usually 
weekly, during which the agency‘s performance indicators are 
reviewed critically for opportunities for improvement.  This 
organisational management philosophy concept and tool combines a 
classic problem-solving model with accountability at all levels of an 
organisation. 
(Godown, 2009, p. 1)   
 
As Peters and Waterman Jr. (2004) found in their analysis of what excellent 
companies did that made them so successful, continuous improvement paradigms 
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follow a double-edged approach by looking outward at the customer with innovative 
problem solving, in the transit officer case community and crime; and internally, 
where the organisation focuses on systems and processes such as  communication, 
autonomy, accountability, an open door policy and a focus on people (DeLorenzi, et 
al., 2006; Godown, 2009; Henry, 2003).  Peters and Waterman‘s approach parallels 
the Compstat paradigm.  As Shane (2004) identifies, the chief would set specific 
objectives and these send a message to all levels of staff within the organisation 
regarding what the chief considers is important.  In their context, Compstat can be 
used to ―ensure accountability is fixed and the desired results are achieved‖ (Shane, 
2004, p. 2).  For example, in the NYPD Transit Police, the incident statistics and 
details of investigations are reported weekly at the Crime Reduction Meetings held 
every Monday which involve all districts .  These meetings are chaired by the Chief 
of the NYPD Transit Police who reports to the Chief of the whole NYPD.  Crime 
Reduction Meetings are part of the transit police Compstat accountability process, 
where the police lieutenants from each area of the transit police system are 
accountable for what has occurred in their area.  The lieutenants can be questioned 
by anybody from any of the other areas on the information they present.  Crime and 
injury statistics relating to incidents that occur on the transit system are also 
published openly (personal notes).   
This accountability process ensures that lieutenants take responsibility for their 
district.  They know exactly what has occurred, where their problem areas are, what 
they are doing about them and will subsequently report on the steps they have taken 
to deal with the issues (personal notes).  Compstat was initially developed as a tool 
in the fight to reduce crime.  Over recent years however Compstat has continued to 
evolve as other police organisations extend and enhance the model to include other 
accountability data.  Following Bratton‘s appointment to the Los Angeles Police 
Department, Gascon, Assistant Chief of Police Los Angeles, with Bratton‘s support, 
set about improving  the ability of Compstat to assist all areas to perform at their 
optimum capacity and developed the ‗Compstat plus‘ program (Gascon, 2005).  This 
program enhancement built on the previous principles of Compstat including: 
analysis of statistics; inspection and accountability at all levels; and added the use of 
―more in-depth auditing methods, mentorship, and close collaboration‖ (Gascon, 
2005, p. 1).  Many authors view Compstat as the most important element in the 
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transformation of policing during the past fifteen years (DeLorenzi, et al., 2006; 
Godown, 2009; Henry, 2003; Serpas, 2008; Silverman, 1999).   
7.4 ‘Broken Windows’ Theory 
Wilson and Kelling (1982) highlighted an important indicator of a sense of 
disorder in a community when they advanced the ‗Broken Windows‘ theory.  What 
their theory refers to is that something as small and innocuous as a broken window 
can in fact send a signal to the community that a building is uncared for and that 
more serious crime might be condoned in the building and in the area.  As described 
by Henry (2003, p. 117) below:       
The ‗Broken Windows‘ theory suggests that there is both a high 
correlation and a causal link between community disorder and more 
serious crime: when community disorder is permitted to flourish or 
when disorderly conditions or problems are left untended, they 
actually cause more serious crime.  ‗Broken windows‘ are a 
metaphor for community disorder which, as Wilson and Kelling 
(1982) use the term, includes the violation of informal social norms 
for public behaviour as well as quality of life offenses such as 
littering, graffiti, playing loud radios, aggressive panhandling, and 
vandalism.  
When William Bratton became Transit Police Chief in 1990, which preceded 
his appointed to Police Commissioner of New York City, Boston and subsequent 
appointment to Chief of Los Angeles Police, crime on the New York subway was 
rife.  Fare evasion was high, thieves brazenly stole tokens at the turnstiles, homeless 
people lived and died in the subway, hawkers sold their wares, and aggressive people 
begged for money while drug dealers plied their trade.  This all contributed to the 
chaos that was evident on the subway system (Bratton, 1999; Bratton & Knobler, 
1998).  Using the ‗Broken Windows‘ theory, Bratton, with the support of Mayor 
Rudolph Giuliani, instituted a policy of ‗zero tolerance‘ on the subway system with 
full enforcement of all the subway rules and regulations.  Bratton believed that if 
people got away with minor crimes such as fare evasion, this gave perpetrators of 
more serious crimes the impression that they could get away with anything.  
Gradually the ‗zero tolerance‘ policy changed people‘s perceptions, and criminals 
came to realise that they would be vigorously pursued.  It took about six months for 
a culture change to be put in place to enforce all the rules and deal with crime.  In 
collaboration with other agencies and social service providers, an outreach program 
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was developed to deal with the homeless.  The disorder problem amongst school 
children was dealt with by instituting a truancy program and a safe passage program.  
Transit police found that about one in seven people arrested already had a warrant 
out against them, and they strenuously followed up all outstanding warrants.  A clear 
message was sent to the community that the subway system was firmly under the 
control of the transport police (Bratton, 1999; Bratton & Knobler, 1998).  Crime on 
the subway declined rapidly and continues to decline.   
All the American transit police agencies I visited subscribe to the ‗Broken 
Windows‘ theory.  Additionally, it was interesting to note that transit police I spoke 
with on the field trip knew about the theory, and were keen to pass on the 
information.  Putting this theory into practice has had a positive effect in the United 
States‘ transport environment.  In New York, for example, no train is allowed to be 
in service with a scratch on the window or graffiti on the rail car. The train will be 
taken out of service rather than be allowed to operate if it is in anyway defaced.  
Additionally, any graffiti anywhere in the railway environs is immediately cleaned.  
This policy helps develop a culture where the public are motivated to value the 
physical environment of the train and its surrounds; while such evaluation 
contributes to a low crime rate.  As Henry (2003, p. 18) advocates: ―if little problems 
were taken care of they would not develop into big problems‖.  Hence, the sustained 
and targeted ‗quality-of-life‘ enforcement delivered through the ‗Broken Windows‘ 
approach has been accepted by U.S. transit police as an effective crime fighting tool 
(personal notes).  The ‗broken windows‘ theory highlights a serious problem in our 
society where small details can signify much bigger problems.  The community feels 
safer, and the risk of serious crime occurring is reduced significantly, when ‗Broken 
Windows‘ are addressed (Henry, 2003; Levine, 2005). 
7.5 Behavioural Safety Program 
The Toronto Special Constables have introduced a program called CRIME: 
collectively reducing injuries and minimising exposures.  It applies throughout their 
cadre and is a peer-to-peer behavioural-based safety program, where one of the 
transit special constables evaluates the work method of one of their peers, to 
determine whether or not they are working with optimal safety.  At the end of the 
observation, the observer documents the findings and provides verbal feedback to the 
person being observed.  Supervisors also carry out observations on their peers.  The 
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aim of CRIME is to reduce injuries and develop and sustain a positive safety culture 
amongst special constables.  All officers are expected to undertake three 
observations per week, and this duty forms one of their KPIs.  Training is provided 
for the special constables prior to them undertaking these tasks.  The information 
from the observations is kept anonymous, and cannot be used for any disciplinary 
purposes (personal notes).  Management believes the program is helping reduce the 
injury rate and contributing towards an improved safety culture through the full 
engagement of the workforce in monitoring safe work practices (personal notes).   
An important aspect of a behavioural-based safety program is defining what 
constitutes critical behaviours.  This is combined with the development of specific 
checklists of what to observe.  The behaviours monitored in such a program must be 
specific; observable, that is overt behaviours which are countable and recordable; 
under the person‘s control; and monitored in an objective way (Geller, 1996).  As a 
result of the Toronto Special Constables‘ observations, unsafe behaviours which 
might previously have been unconscious, now become conscious and can be 
corrected (personal notes).  The Toronto Special Constable Services has devised a 
check list that is applicable to their specific tasks to determine whether behaviours 
are safe or at-risk (Toronto Special Constable Services, 2009).  These performance-
behaviours include body position, such as whether it is in the line of fire; eyes on 
task/hands; body use/ergonomics such as overextended/cramped and proper posture; 
tools and equipment such as the condition or use of the special constable equipment; 
procedures such as communication of hazards; the use of personal protective 
equipment such as a reflective vest, safety shoes and body armour; the work 
environment, for example walking and working surfaces; and particular special 
constable services operations such as maintaining interview stance, maintaining 
visual contact, working in pairs, how they perform take-downs, their use of OC 
spray and the professionalism of the way they go about their duties.  Any other 
exposures or safety concerns are also evaluated for safe or at-risk behaviours 
(Toronto Special Constable Services, 2009).   
On completion of a report the observer discusses the findings with the person 
under observation.  The specific at-risk behaviours are documented, why it was an 
at-risk behaviour is discussed; for example, what are the possible consequences; the 
reason why the person was carrying out the at-risk behaviour; and a solution to the 
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problem as this develops in the exchange between the observer and the observed.  
The outcome of the observation and discussion is documented (Toronto Special 
Constable Services, 2009).   
Behavioural safety programs in industry, such as this one, have grown in 
popularity over the past twenty years as organisations have introduced a range of 
strategies to reduce accidents and incidents in the workplace.  Previous studies have 
highlighted the success of such programs and the reduction of injuries that occur 
(Geller, 1996; Krause, 1997).  More recently, however, studies have identified a 
number of potential failings with these programs (DeJoy, 2005; Hopkins, 2006c).  
These programs are usually concentrated upon frontline employees, whereas 
management behaviour is critical in the development of a safety culture within an 
organisation (Anderson, 2004; Flin, 2003).  A number of researchers now argue that 
trust and open communication between management and employees is necessary for 
a safety culture to exist, and without this trust and communication behavioural safety 
programs will not be successful (Hopkins, 2006c; Petersen, 1999).  Anderson (2004) 
hypothesised that the focus on the individual draws attention away from process 
safety and ignores the latent conditions of risk and danger that may be present.  In 
particular, risks which are low probability but high consequence may be ignored.  
Researchers have previously theorised that a relationship exists between 
organisational culture, management error, the safety management system and the 
root causes of accidents (DeJoy, 2005; Hopkins, 2006c; Lunt, Bates, Bennett, & 
Hopkinson, 2008).  In contrast, the concentration on the behaviours of frontline 
employees tends to view employees as the main cause of accidents, rather than 
looking at issues that are under management control such as reviewing the safety 
system or designing-out the risks (Anderson, n.d.; DeJoy, 2005; Hopkins, 2006c).  In 
the railway environment this management-level perspective could include issues 
such as designing safer stations, better lighting, maintenance issues, fatigue, 
communication, training or identifying any other contributing factors that can lead to 
an incident.   
Whilst there has been some success with behaviour-based safety programs, 
concentrating on such behaviours to the exclusion of developing a robust safety 
culture and safety system will not directly address reasons for the risk-taking 
behaviour that employees exhibit, or other root causes of accidents in the work place 
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(Hopkins, 2006c).  In this research project, the essential requirements of trust and 
communication between employees and management are absent.  This makes the 
successful introduction of a behavioural-based safety program in RTO almost 
impossible.  The transit officers would almost certainly view the program as 
management trying to find fault with them.  As transit officer Peter remarked to me: 
One of my biggest gripes is there just seems to be so much discipline 
happening and not much recognition, which is quite demoralising.  
Basically a lot of the good deeds that get done just go unnoticed and 
all the rest of it, and all the bad things, no matter how, they all seem 
to be broadcast to the world... 
While I was working alongside the transit officers on track, a petition was 
started by the officers and was signed by about eighty per cent of the transit officers, 
to try and get rid of one of the managers.  However, the petition was not successful.  
In Nola‘s words:  
I don‘t think any of the troops really have any confidence in the 
management structure here, that‘s why the petition....Everyone‘s 
quite happy with this job, it‘s a great job, it‘s just the way it‘s 
structured through management. 
7.6 ‘Best-practice’ Communication 
In a safety-critical environment such as rail, communication is essential for the 
safe operation of the rail system.  As previously noted in this thesis, the importance 
of communication has been highlighted by previous rail accident investigations 
where communication was found to be a contributing factor to the events occurring 
(Hopkins, 2005).  Further, communication is the important channel that links the 
transit officer with the railway environment and with the passengers that use the 
trains.  Communicating with the public, working with transport uses, and instilling 
confidence that transit officers are labouring to provide a safe railway environment 
was very much to the forefront of the world‘s ‗best-practice‘ agencies.  Bratton and 
Knobler, (1998, p. 255) refer to their style of policing as ―the  three P‘s – 
partnership, problem solving and prevention‖.  This was approach of all the agencies 
I visited.  The transit police shared information with other agencies, educated and 
worked with their communities to solve problems, and used analysis of incidents and 
crime to prevent reoccurrences. 
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7.6.1 Inter agency communication 
I was impressed by the willingness of these ‗best-practice‘ agencies to share 
information; not only within their organisation, but additionally between 
organisations.  There was a general attitude of cooperation in their endeavour to 
reduce crime and improve safety and security on transport systems.  Analysis of all 
incidents was ongoing, and intelligence information was shared.  For instance, the 
MBTA Transit Police have an Intelligence Department which collects and analyses 
information about security, crime and safety on transport incidents locally, nationally 
and internationally.  The information is processed and presented in a weekly transit 
police bulletin – Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Transit Police Weekly 
Bulletin.  This document includes incidents that have occurred on their own transit 
system including suspicious events, unattended packages and the arrests that have 
occurred on each line.  Also included are upcoming events in the Boston region 
during the next week; pictures and descriptions of any persons of interest that are 
wanted for crimes committed on their system including the details and location of 
the crime; and pictures of graffiti and associated tags (an identifying signature mark 
left by the perpetrator of the crime).  These can all be shared with other 
organisations.  This MBTA Weekly Bulletin is accompanied by a request that any 
other organisation experiencing equivalent challenges, for example identifying 
similar tags, should contact the MBTA Transit Police Intelligence Department.  The 
MBTA Transit Police are proud of the work their officers undertake and photographs 
of any of their officers being presented with achievement or commendation awards 
are also included in the Bulletin.   
The Weekly Bulletin also addresses the current risk of a terrorist attack on a 
U.S. mass transit system.  In the past it has also included information such as 
―Indicators of Preoperational Surveillance and Preparations for an Attack‖ and 
―Suggested Protective Measures‖ from the Department of Homeland Security 
(Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, 2010a).  The Department of 
Homeland Security regularly issues alerts and other information to federal, state, 
local and tribal government agencies; the private sector, and other entities; to inform 
and alert these agencies regarding possible terrorist activities (Massachusetts Bay 
Transportation Authority, 2010b).  One of their latest concerns is the increasing 
sophistication of remote surveillance cameras and associated links to the internet 
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which allow terrorists to undertake surveillance from a distance (Massachusetts Bay 
Transportation Authority, 2010b).  Details of any new type of weapon, or new 
disguise of a weapon that the transit police discover when dealing with offenders, are 
also included in this weekly bulletin.  This ensures that all transit police officers are 
aware of new developments amongst criminals and terrorists.  Other information 
includes new technological developments related to transport or security such as the 
CCTV cameras recently being trialled at Logan Airport Boston, and at the port in 
Boston.  These cameras enable remote panning and focussing into a particular area; 
or have the capacity to follow a person without losing any of the peripheral vision 
that would normally occur.  All this information, along with any general news from 
the Department of Homeland Security, is provided to all transit police officers.  
Other interested transit police organisations and law enforcement personnel are also 
supplied with the Bulletin upon request.  The MBTA Transit Police have been kind 
enough to provide me with a weekly copy of their Bulletin throughout the period 
since my visit, and this has enabled me to keep up to date with the latest transit 
police security news from their area. 
The cooperation between the transit police agencies in various jurisdictions 
extends to assisting another transit police force when there is a particular event 
requiring additional security.  Such an event occurred not long before I arrived in the 
United States.  This was the inauguration of President Obama.  The Washington 
MTPD explained the planning that went into monitoring the security on the transit 
system during that time.  Transit police from many other jurisdictions travelled to 
Washington to assist them on the day (personal notes). The previous year the MTPD 
also dealt with the Pope‘s visit  to Washington.  As Chief Taborn states below, in the 
2008 annual report: 
In 2008, MTPD continued its commitment to excellence through 
increased partnership with over 40 Federal, state and local law 
enforcement agencies, as well as dozens of local fire and rescue 
agencies.  ....  In partnership with the Federal Transit Administration, 
the MTPD developed a model program for creating an Emergency 
Management division to consolidate all emergency planning, training 
and coordination activities within a single office.  This model will be 
used by transit agencies around the Nation to enhance their 
emergency preparedness, organization and capabilities.   
(Metro Transit Police, 2009, p. 5) 
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Additional interaction between the transit police agencies occurs at 
conferences, where the latest research is discussed;  the Chiefs of Transit Police 
meetings; interagency collaboration on  crime and terrorism; joint security exercises 
run by the Homeland Department; and transit police officers meeting up at academy 
or college training courses (personal notes).  In Canada, transit police also have the 
Canadian Police Knowledge Network (CPKN) where information is shared 
7.6.2 Internal communication  
In every transit police agency I visited, information from each rail line is 
formally shared with the transit police on all rail lines.  This includes 
incident/accident investigation outcomes and any recommendations for 
improvements; what has occurred during the previous shift on all lines; any people 
of interest to keep a look out for; any new policy or procedure or updates to existing 
policies and procedures; the outcomes of any crime analysis that has been 
undertaken, plus any other relevant internal or external information (personal notes).  
The interaction between the different areas provides a diversity of opinion when 
viewing the same event.  Additionally, all incidents and accidents were actively used 
by these organisations to learn from the event and examine the adequacy of their 
safety systems.  The information is normally conveyed at the routine musters at the 
beginning of each shift.  In many of the organisations, transit police sign a form to 
acknowledge that they have received the information.  These forms are collated and 
become evidence to support a key performance indicator for transit officer 
supervisors.  The forms demonstrate that the information has been conveyed by the 
supervisor to the transit police officers.  
E- learning was also common in these ‗best-practice‘ agencies.  This could 
take the form of accessing particular units online, or checking that lessons are learnt 
from a particular incident.  For instance, when an incident has been thoroughly 
investigated and the contributing factors identified, a CD of the circumstances can be 
made, which may incorporate actual CCTV footage of the event, a discussion of the 
incident and steps taken to avoid a reoccurrence.  The CD is distributed to all rail 
lines for the staff to view and learn from the information.  In RailCorp, for example, 
the transit officers sign a form acknowledging that they have viewed the CD.  The 
supervisor returns the form to a central repository where the information is collated 
to ensure that all transit officers have viewed the information (personal notes).  
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In organisations where the transit police liaise with, rather than report to, a 
train operating company, regular communication meetings are held.  Additionally, 
communication was strong vertically and horizontally within the organisations 
visited.  In these organisations the Chief or Head of the Transit Police would begin 
their day with a briefing on any crimes occurring on the transit system over the 
previous twenty four hours, any injuries to any of the officers, and the circumstances 
of the events.  The development of the Compstat paradigm is based on the 
acknowledged importance of timely and accurate information, as this is required to 
run the program successfully (Henry, 2003). 
In contrast to the open ‗two-way‘ communication which characterises ‗best-
practice‘ organisations, the RTO ‗s information flow was restricted, both 
horizontally and vertically.  In fact, it was a breach of rules for the transit officers to 
view any CCTV footage of anything that occurred on another line, or did not involve 
themselves.  At the time of my fieldwork on track, contributing factors to an event 
were not analysed so this did not enable any lessons to be learnt from the event.  As 
transit officer James told me: 
Seems to be a big secret.  Like all the footage here seems to be a 
secret.  They don‘t use it for training purposes.  All the incidents, 
even code sevens [suicides] and that, they don‘t talk about them.  It 
seems to be a big secret.   
Or as Peter said, referring to verbal information: 
I sometimes question what is being said to us, because it hasn‘t really 
come directly from up there [management] to down here, it‘s gone 
through a channel.  There‘s been a few times when things have been 
said and then later on, someone has said something else, and I go, 
you know, like, if you heard it directly from up there [management], 
whether it be in the form of a monthly newsletter or make sure the 
management came out and have a chat to us, then you‘ve heard it 
directly from the [horse‘s] mouth, but it‘s all sort of hearsay.   
As there is no formal means of communication, the employees develop their 
own informal way to convey information.  As Gilsdorf (1998, p. 175) found 
―Informal, non-hierarchical means of communication appear to fill in gaps between 
what employees want to know and what management has time, attention, or 
inclination to tell them‖. 
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7.6.3 Community communication 
The overseas transit policing organisations visited take a proactive ‗community 
involvement‘ approach.  This thinking originates from a ‗community policing‘ 
ideology (Henry, 2003), where police focus on a crime prevention approach, rather 
than just dealing with the issues once a crime has been committed (Kelling & Coles, 
1996; Silverman, 1999).  Community policing promotes the concept of the ―friendly 
corner cop‖ (Silverman, 1999, p. 61), who involves him or herself within the 
community; attending public meetings, community fairs and schools; committed to 
the transit police and the community working together to solve problems.  For 
instance, the British Transit Police in Leeds, where I visited, hold at least twelve 
problem-solving community partnership meetings a year (personal notes), half of 
which involve public consultation.  This program is called Police And Community 
Together (PACT).  The program was developed to listen to, and work with, the 
community to solve problems rather than transport police activity being solely 
directed by British Transport Police‘s own policing priorities (British Transport 
Police Neighbourhood Policing Team, 2010).  PACT meetings are held every eight 
weeks in various locations where any member of the public can attend and raise a 
community concern.  Issues that cannot be dealt with at the PACT community 
meeting, or which require a ‗problem solving action plan‘, are referred to the PACT 
panel.  The PACT panel also meets every eight weeks  and comprises ―volunteers 
from the Train Operating companies, passenger focus group members, railway 
chaplains, Salvation Army, local police and anyone else who can represent the whole 
area‖ (British Transport Police Neighbourhood Policing Team, 2010, p. 2).  The 
problem and the plan to address it are documented and regular feedback on the 
progress of the plan is given at both the PACT and PACT panel meetings, and 
posted on the internet (British Transport Police Neighbourhood Policing Team, 
2010).  Holding a minimum of twelve problem solving workshops a year with 
community representatives, in terms of the PACT meetings and the PACT panels, 
forms one of the performance indicators for the British transit police officer 
managers (personal notes).  The RTO does not have any similar type of program 
involving the community. 
The proactive approach demonstrated by these ‗best-practice‘ organisations 
leads to an enhanced transit officer profile within their respective communities, 
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enables children to view the transit police officers as approachable, and helps the 
transit police officer to reinforce the public message that there are significant 
measures in place to keep the rail system trouble-free, and that committing an 
offence on the rail system will not be tolerated.  Strategies for educating the public 
ranged from the Washington MTA transit police, sometimes partnered with the 
National Crime Prevention Council (NCPC), attending community events with 
‗McGruff‘ (the crime fighting dog mascot) to educate students on safety and crime 
prevention (Metro Transit Police, 2009); to the MBTA program called ‗operation 
stop watch‘, where the transit police unite with other agencies such as schools, 
courts, probation officers and parole divisions to deal with school truancy.  All 
agencies had various methods for developing intelligence on gangs and gang 
affiliations.  These ranged from representation on the state police‘s ‗youth gang 
force‘ to an e-learning program with the Ontario Gang Investigation Service, who 
educate law enforcement officers and  also target young people with programs such 
as ‘Say No To Gangs‘ (personal notes).   
In the past, RTO research has identified that ―collaboration between youth 
services and the transport authority can help each agency better achieve its own 
goals‖ (T. Cooper, et al., 2007, p. 78).  In that particular program, Drug Arm WA 
was present on selected train services, usually late night journeys on a weekend, to 
provide care for young people who were under the influence of drugs or alcohol (T. 
Cooper, et al., 2007).  However, funding for this project was only available for a 
short time, and whilst the success of the program was noted, the program was 
outside the RTO‘s control, and was not continued (T. Cooper, et al., 2007).  This is 
in contrast to overseas transport police organisations who adopt a variety of 
strategies to interact with the community and deal with anti-social behaviour on the 
transport system.  Such strategies include: conducting a public relations 
communication campaign around the likelihood of being convicted of assaults on the 
rail system; prominently displaying penalties for various offences committed on the 
rail system; and advertising the fact that the transit officer service has plain clothes 
transit police riding the trains, on platforms and near turnstiles to catch people failing 
to pay a fare.  The transit police organisations believe that the fear factor of being 
caught will deter some criminals from carrying out a crime on the rail system whilst 
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providing the added benefit of giving everyday law-abiding passengers the 
perception of a safer rail system (personal notes).   
Prior to the British football season commencing, the British Transport Police 
write to previous offenders reminding them of the standard of behaviour required on 
the rail system.  The letters sent include a list of penalties that can be imposed should 
the person reoffend on the rail system.  These penalties can include criminal 
convictions and prison sentences, notification to their employers and other 
government agencies, bans from licensed premises in city centres and bans on rail 
travel (British Transit Police, 2009a).  Football clubs support Transport Police action 
and will impose bans on any football fan who is arrested while travelling to or from a 
game (British Transit Police, 2009a).  The British Transport Police also undertake 
follow up visits with offenders, not necessarily confined to football fan incidents, to 
remind them that they will be watched on the rail system.  
In the RTO, education of the public is limited to educating young children in 
schools situated near the railway of the dangers associated with the electrified rail 
system.  This education is undertaken by the communications department within 
RTO, and does not facilitate positive transit officer interaction with children and the 
community that the ‗best-practice‘ organisations do.  RTO statistics for arrests or 
incidents on the rail system are not published, and only those obtained by journalists 
under the Western Australia Freedom of Information Act  ("Freedom of Information 
Act (WA)," 1992) are available.  Recently, notices have appeared in some of the 
RTO railcars that there are mandatory prison terms for ‗assault on a public officer‘.  
However, at the time of this research, no other offences or penalties were 
disseminated, neither was there communication about the authority that transit 
officers possess on the rail system.   
7.6.4. Interpersonal communication skills 
All the ‗best-practice‘ agencies viewed interpersonal communication skills as 
one of the most vital competencies that a transit police officer could develop. These 
skills include conflict resolution; behavioural assessment training, which builds upon 
an understanding the body language and traits of a person; and dealing with mentally 
disturbed individuals.  Means (2007a, p. 33) advocates that improvements in 
interpersonal communication will ―strengthen community relations, increase 
investigative effectiveness, reduce complaints and lawsuits, reduce the need for 
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force, and enhance officer and public safety‖.  The importance that ‗best-practice‘ 
agencies place on interpersonal communication is demonstrated by the 
comprehensive training programs they have in place, comprising both theory and 
practice.  The new ‗best-practice‘ recruit is able to develop and thoroughly hone their 
communication skills in a realistic, yet safe, environment through numerous scenario 
training exercises where officers are able to master the practical application of skills 
in different types of situations.  As previously documented, agencies, police 
academies and colleges bring in actors, youth workers or in some situations youths 
themselves, to provide realism to the scenario training. 
Training in conflict resolution, which is central to the ‗verbal judo‘ program, 
teaches officers how to respond to situations rather than just reacting instinctively.  
The MBTA refer to their program as the I.M.P.A.C.T project (Interpersonal 
Management Program And Communication Training), denoting the big difference 
that the acquired skills of conflict resolution can make to dealings with the public.  
The course includes ‗tactical communication‘, human relations and problem solving 
for law enforcement.  Means (2007b) defines ‗tactical‘ in this context as the method 
used to achieve a specific goal.  These skills provide necessary communication tools 
and empower officers to speak to anybody and achieve law enforcement objectives 
with the minimum amount of conflict (Thompson & Jenkins, 2004).  This training 
includes strategies with a demonstrable ability to neutralise anger shown by an 
individual, and helps officers learn to deflect criticism.  They are also taught to 
empathise with the individual while the officer learns how to control their own 
response to the situation (Kokko & Maki, 2009; Thompson & Jenkins, 2004).  Most 
agencies base their ‗verbal judo‘ or ‗conflict resolution‘ training on a five-step 
communication model developed by Thompson (Thompson & Jenkins, 2004, pp. 
167 - 174).  These five steps aim to achieve a person‘s voluntary compliance with 
the officer‘s request (Thompson & Jenkins, 2004).  Thompson and Jenkins (2004, p. 
167) refer to the five basic tools required to achieve voluntary compliance as: ―listen; 
empathise; ask; paraphrase; and summarise‖.  These are a different tool kit compared 
with that used by the British Transport Police who refer to their five-step model as: 
―simple appeal; reasoned appeal; personal appeal; final appeal; and action‖ (British 
Transport Police, 2007, p. 7).  However, regardless of which model the agency uses, 
the purpose remains the same: to achieve compliance with the officers‘ request while 
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―treating people with respect and dignity as the circumstances permit‖ 
(Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, 2009, p. 1).  
In contrast to this in-depth  communication skills-development undertaken by 
officers in these ‗best-practice‘ agencies, I often heard the transit officers in RTO 
complaining that that they had insufficient training in this area.  This resulted in the 
officers feeling that they did not have adequate communication skills to deal with 
problem people (personal notes).  As transit officer Hadyn stated, when reflecting on 
his training: ―We need more verbal judo training for sure, because a lot of guys just 
don‘t have any‖.  Many other transit officers support this view.  For example, transit 
officer  Peter explained to me: 
I see a lot of new guys come out and I recognise it, it‘s the same 
mistakes that I made when I came out, but they don‘t really know 
how to talk to people.... I just think a lot of it sort of comes down to 
the way we‘re trained.  Because we‘re not trained to talk to people. 
Coupled with learning verbal communication skills, transit police officers in 
these proactive organisations undertake training in behavioural assessment.  In these 
units, the officers learn  to recognise and understand body language; certain 
behaviours and traits a person may have; and to continually observe the person‘s 
demeanour for informative warning signs such as ‗bladed stance – clenching fists‘ 
which is an indicator of aggression (Bay Area Rapid Transit Police Department 
(BART), 2009, p. 2).  These highly trained officers are encouraged to go up and talk 
to people as a lot can be learnt about somebody by just talking to them (personal 
notes).  This is particularly relevant when an officer may view a person who is 
loitering, watching what is going on.  These agencies view where a member of the 
public is standing back and observing as a concern, particularly with the constant 
threat of possible terrorist activity occurring (personal notes).  
The globally high achieving transit police agencies bring in mental health 
workers to educate officers on the best ways of communicating and dealing with 
people who are mentally disturbed, or who may have mental health issues (personal 
notes).  Previous researchers, such as Brennan and Brennan (1994) with the New 
South Wales police, have identified that people in law enforcement roles require 
special skills and training to recognise and support people with a mental disability.  
However, the depth and breadth of communication that may be required to more 
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effectively deal with mentally challenged people is not covered in the RTO training.  
As previously documented in chapter 5, transit officers such as Patrick felt frustrated 
and helpless dealing with such passengers. 
7.7 Benchmarking 
During my research, I learnt the importance that ‗best-practice‘ agencies place 
on sharing information.  This sharing includes both the giving and receiving of 
information with other transit police organisations as they work towards their 
common goal of a safe and secure environment for the travelling public.  The open 
networking approaches displayed by these agencies facilitate their ability to 
benchmark and learn from each other.  The original concept of benchmarking is 
associated with providing a reference point at a particular time, and later as a 
reference weight which was accepted as a particular standard (Health and Safety 
Executive, 1999).  This concept has widened further and is now used as a business 
improvement tool which enables an interested organisation to evaluate its 
performance against other similar businesses (Health and Safety Executive, 1999).  
Although this tool can be used in any area of a business, it has been adopted by the 
organisations visited to assess their performance and improve their safety and crime 
management systems.  Organisations can compare and contrast their performance 
year on year, or using another time period; and comparatively, against the 
performance of other like-minded organisations.  These high achieving agencies 
learn from other organisations rather than ‗reinventing the wheel‘.  Benchmarking 
provides knowledge about how to improve processes in all areas of safety; and 
assists in demonstrating compliance with relevant legislation within an organisation 
(Health and Safety Executive, 1999). 
To undertake any benchmarking exercise with another agency, it is first 
necessary to have an accurate picture of the statistics, systems and processes in one‘s 
own organisation.  However, as identified in the previous chapter, at the time of the 
statement made to the West Australian Parliament by the Hon Simon O‘Brien 
(2009), the RTO  did not have a breakdown of where incidents were occurring, or 
the contributing factors that lead to the events.  Nor did they intend to obtain that 
information  (West Australian Legislative Council, 2009).  This precludes the 
possibility of any internal benchmarking exercises to identify the poorer performing 
rail lines, for example, so that they could learn from the better performing ones and 
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improve their operations.  Additionally, this lack of available data prevents 
benchmarking and learning in a targeted way from ‗best-practice‘ organisations 
interstate and overseas, where successful strategies have been introduced to 
minimise violence and antisocial behaviour on the rail system.  If ‗best-practice‘ 
processes were adopted by RTO, the potential exists to reduce the injuries of transit 
officers on their rail system.  
The Code of Practice for Occupational Safety and Health in the Western 
Australian Public Service (Commission for Occupational Safety and Health, 2007b, 
p. 23) advocates that public service agencies should consult and collaborate with 
like-minded businesses and industry associations as an integral part of managing the 
risks in their organisation.  Codes of Practice are a minimum legal standard that 
organisations should aim to achieve, and this particular Code of Practice includes a 
list of tips for organisational leaders to achieve a robust occupational safety and 
health system.  These recommendations include ―benchmarking and/or mentoring 
arrangements with either Western Australian or other state/territory public sector 
agencies with similar functions or injury risk profiles‖ (Commission for 
Occupational Safety and Health, 2007a, p. 48). 
7.8 Summary 
Adopting the challenge of measuring safety indicators, and the incidence of 
accidents and injury; and comparing these internally between the different RTO rail 
lines, would help improve communication and information sharing; help achieve 
greater uniformity of practice within the organisation; and demonstrate to transit 
officers that their safety, alongside a reduction of crime and anti-social behaviour, is 
important to the organisation.  As Grabowski, Ayyalasomayajula, Merrick, and 
Roberts argue (2007, p. 1035), ―high reliability organisations clearly define what 
they mean by safety goals and establish safety standards against which they assess 
themselves‖.  Safety statistics, whilst very important, are just the ‗tip of the iceberg‘ 
in terms of revolutionising safety performance.  Even so, measuring safety events, 
enables real improvements to be made (Health and Safety Executive, 1999), and to 
be seen to be made.  Knowing what is occurring within the organisation, and 
learning how it could be done better by benchmarking externally with similar 
organisations, would further demonstrate management‘s commitment to the safety of 
employees and the public.  The organisation‘s preparedness to reduce risks through 
210 
benchmarking practices; and their ability to adapt to change and improve the 
organisation‘s image and reputation, would further demonstrate to employees that 
management is serious about their safety (Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, & 
Vázquez-Ordás, 2009).  These issues are discussed further in the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
DISCUSSION 
8. INTRODUCTION 
This qualitative research project has used a participant observation method to 
study transit officers in their normal work environment, capturing the meanings of 
organisational approaches and social interactions that contribute to the transit 
officers‘ communication and safety culture.  From this experience as an insider, I 
was able to focus on those aspects of the organisational culture that impacted on the 
transit officers‘ attitude and behaviours relating to increasing or decreasing their risk 
of injury in the workplace.  Referring to the role of the transit officer, The Hon. Troy 
Buswell, Minister for Transport, stated in Parliament: 
[It] is probably the most unforgiving and misunderstood job in the 
public sector in Western Australia.  Ultimately, these people 
physically place themselves between very aggressive people on a 
very regular basis (Western Australia Legislative Council, 2011a). 
However, having this ‗inside vision‘ of the transit officer role has enabled me 
to evaluate the influences that shape their safety culture; the communication 
processes within the security section of the organisation and the skills they acquire.  
These skills determine how they react and deal with the risks inherent in their job; 
with particular reference to transit officer/passenger interactions.  Additionally, the 
competitive funding grant obtained for this research project, enabled me to learn 
from ‗best-practice‘ law enforcement agencies worldwide, the strategies they 
embrace to achieve their ‗best-practice‘ status and low injury rates.   
Importantly, this research goes below the surface of the official facade of the 
transit officer world, to discover the hidden layers that contribute to the work culture 
of these officers.  I found, as also indicated by Fielding (1994) Waddington (1999) 
and others, that what law enforcement officers are taught in training, and what they 
say they do, may not be what they actually do.  Using an ethnographic method, this 
research has been able to bridge the divide between what is taught, what is reported 
as being done, and what actually occurs when transit officers interact with 
passengers on the railway system.  Whilst my presence as a transit officer insider 
was initially treated with scepticism by some employees, this quickly gave way to an 
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embracing acceptance of my being ‗one of them‘, by transit officers and supervisors 
alike.  However, this reception did not extend to the management of the security 
area.  One of the managers told me that: ‗the timing is not right, we are going 
through an enterprise bargaining agreement process‘.  He felt this could lead to the 
transit officers ‗bagging‘ management.  I did not find that this was the case; rather, 
officers were just keen to ensure that I saw the full range of issues that regularly 
confronted them.  As transit officer Steve told me when I worked with him on track:  
I‘m surprised that they even let this happen because they like to have 
their spin on what goes out; whereas you‘re seeing things happen, 
especially doing what you‘re doing with all the lines.  You can see 
exactly what it is like.   
As mentioned in the literature review, ‗safety culture‘ is a term which most 
authors subscribe to, and which many have attempted to analyse with a view to 
determining and strengthening the factors that constitute an effective safety culture 
(Cox & Cheyne, 2000; Flin, Mearns, O'Connor, & Bryden, 2000; Glendon & 
Stanton, 2000; Guldenmund, 2000).  However, Hopkins (2002, p. 2) argues that all 
organisations have a safety culture, it is just that some organisations have a stronger 
or weaker safety culture than others.  He refers to ―a culture of safety‖ in preference 
to using the term ‗safety culture‘.  Nevertheless, for the purpose of this research, a 
safety culture and a culture of safety are treated interchangeably.  As previously 
defined and documented, a safety culture is the product of individuals‘ and groups‘ 
values, attitudes and perceptions regarding what constitute safe working practices 
(Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (ACSNI), 1993).  
However, as the concept of culture can be constructed as arising from shared values 
(Schein, 2004), the safety culture within a workplace can vary between discrete areas 
or work groups within the same organisation, resulting in a number of subcultures 
present within a particular occupational grouping (Health and Safety Laboratory, 
2002; Hopkins, 2005).  Thus the introduction of the X-plan in the security section of 
the RTO, where supervisors and transit officers are allocated to a particular line, 
whilst having many advantages, has also contributed to the reinforcement of 
differences between the lines.  This, coupled with an absence of protocols for sharing 
information between the rail lines, has compounded the situation of multiple safety 
cultures and strengthened the development of a ‗silo mentality‘ amongst the staff on 
each line.  This dynamic was reflected in observations of the transit officer cadre, 
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with each line having developed its own cohesive subculture amongst the officers; 
and each line believing their line is the best; thus preventing the development of an 
overall uniform ‗culture of safety‘ throughout the transit officer cadre.  For instance, 
transit officer Peter highlighted the difference between the line cultures when he 
explained how the transit officers on one particular rail-line had a competition 
between themselves: 
One line had a group of guys that were basically doing a point 
system, and every course of action had a set of points, an 
infringement had so many points, a summons had so many points, 
arrests had so many points, that sort of thing, and they were trying to 
see who could outscore each other.  So guys were sort of going out 
looking for things to outscore one another. 
However, on other lines such an attitude would not be tolerated by the more 
senior transit officers or supervisors.   
I discovered, as previous researchers with police officers have identified 
including Loftus (2009), Chan (1996), Crank (2004), Van Maanen (1978a) and 
others, that transit officers develop and share common values, attitudes and norms as 
they learn to cope with the stresses and strains of their working environment. 
The job carries both physical and psychological risks which can range from an 
assault by a passenger to dealing with the aftermath of a person who has chosen to 
use the rail system as a way of committing suicide, or who has been killed or 
seriously injured as a result of an accident.  Transit officers are normally first 
responders for such stressful events, and develop different ways to try and cope with 
the trauma.  Waddington (1999) refers to the workplace canteen as the ‗an important 
space for officers to talk about stressful situations they face coping with the trauma 
of their jobs.  His view was that the canteen enables police:  
whose actions on the street are normally ‗invisible‘, to engage in 
displays before their colleagues.  Here officers retail versions of 
events that affirm their worldview: the canteen is the ‗repair shop‘ of 
policing and jokes, [with] banter and anecdotes the tools 
(Waddington, 1999, p. 295).  
Transit officers were no different, and their crib rooms serve a similar role.  I 
noted that discussions at break times often featured a macabre sense of humour, 
which might appear irreverent to an outsider, but was one way through which they 
dealt with trauma.  As transit officer Jane explained:  
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A young Aboriginal boy tried to jump the gate on the Eastern 
concourse.  He ended up falling off the bridge hitting his head on the 
girders and ripping his head open.  Half his scalp was hanging out.  
... I go home from work, I don‘t talk about work as much and that‘s 
how I deal with things. 
The transit officers do not want to discuss these stressful situations with family 
and friends, but feel their colleagues understand the impact such events have on them 
psychologically.  Transit officer James explained: 
They are all stressful.  Every major incident is stressful.  You‘ve just 
got to be able to talk about it I reckon.  And you can‘t be too stuffy 
about it.  You‘ve got to joke as you‘re dealing with it.  You‘ve got to 
just carry on.  Hey, when you‘re dealing with death you‘ve still got 
to make fun, be jovial while you‘re doing it.  You can‘t be solemn 
just because of death otherwise you‘re not going to cope with it.  
You‘ve got to be able to just joke along.  
Transit officer Trevor explained how he felt following an injury: 
After the first time I was injured when the person fell on me, I was a 
bit worried when I came back to work, cause it was group of twenty 
that attacked us, I went on a train and there was a similar group of 
Aboriginal males on the train.  They weren‘t the offenders or 
anything, but it just, it brought back emotional, it brought back 
memories, and I was trapped on the train and I had to really, it‘s 
okay, I had to really control myself, cause I wanted to get off the 
train.  I thought no, I didn‘t want to let that beat me, so I just stayed 
on the train and I worked through it myself. 
The officers are socially isolated, partly by the nature of shift work, and partly 
by their law enforcement role.  This isolation extends to feeling alienated from the 
rest of the organisation.  This is made worse by a lack of recognition from the rest of 
the organisation regarding the difficult job they do, and by their perception that 
management do not visit their area to speak to ‗the troops‘.  As one of the more 
senior people told me:  
We are constantly battling the bureaucracy of the rest of the system 
to understand what we need to do the job. ... I guess if there‘s going 
to be a greater exposure of management to the floor then the 
organisation needs to understand that they can‘t load all the 
management practices onto us without giving us that support 
mechanism.  We just can‘t do it.  There‘s not enough hours in the 
day to do all the paper work requirements of a management job and 
to deal face to face with people on a regular basis.  It can‘t be done.  
It simply can‘t be done. 
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The transit officers are fiercely loyal to other officers within their group, and as 
previously described, will protect or cover for other officers: they ‗don‘t dob in a 
mate‘.  This social code is consistent with the findings of previous researchers who 
worked with police (Kiely & Peek, 2002; Loftus, 2009; Manning, 1997).  Transit 
officer solidarity is reinforced by wearing a common uniform, through the use of 
special codes and through the shared values they have.  Previous researchers 
working with law enforcement officers have highlighted how uniforms, codes and 
values help give meaning to their experiences, and sustain their self esteem 
(McCulloch, 2000; Paoline, et al., 2000).  Transit officer Jack summed the situation 
up thus: 
It‘s a good feeling coming from the guys at work; they might stir you 
up and have a bit of a joke but definitely the best thing about it is if 
something goes wrong you know they‘re there to back you up 
straight away; and that‘s a real mate. 
An important tradition through which new recruits learn about police work is 
the telling of stories (Crank, et al., 1993; Paoline, et al., 2000).  These ‗war stories‘ 
or ‗street talk‘ told by the more experienced officers provide an avenue for learning, 
socialising the new recruit into the culture (Kiely & Peek, 2002; Waddington, 1999).  
I learnt transit officers often expressed their views very strongly, although 
Waddington (1999) found that the strength of the views expressed may have no 
bearing on the way the police officers operate, rather it portrays their way of dealing 
with the difficulties that they may face on a daily basis.  I found listening to these 
stories perpetuated established procedures, with no reference to examining whether 
the actions discussed had been the correct way of doing things, or whether actions 
complied with the organisation‘s goals or procedures.  Warren and James (2000) 
refer to these ‗war stories‘ as reinforcing cultural values in ways which translate into 
operational practice, irrespective of formal legal or procedural rules.  As a result, I 
concluded that without active steps being taken to change the transit officer culture 
in constructive ways, the status quo would be maintained.  
In the RTO, on graduating from training school, the newly graduated transit 
officer can be rostered as an observer anywhere on the rail system for their few days‘ 
familiarisation.  Following this, the officer is rostered as a fully operational team 
member on their assigned line, which may not be where they undertook their 
familiarisation.  Although the officers have a work book which lists practical 
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competencies to be assessed, there is no formal method for assessing whether they 
have mastered those competencies.  However, the other organisations I visited 
during the research, such as Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) 
Transit Police, Boston; RailCorp, Sydney; and the Greater Vancouver Transportation 
Authority Police Service (GVTAPS); have appointed field training officers to assist 
their new officers in making the transition from the training school, to performing 
their law enforcement duties competently.  These field training officers are selected 
on the basis of exemplary performance and a commitment to building a strong safety 
culture.  The officers are appropriately trained with ‗Train the Trainer ‘and 
‗Assessor‘ qualifications, which enables trainee learning opportunities to be 
maximised.  Additionally, the field trainers have a significant impact on helping new 
officers develop appropriate attitudes, values and ethics, and on inducting new staff 
into their role in a manner which reflects the safety commitments of their training.  
Using this method of reinforcement, these attitudes remain with the transit officers 
throughout their career (Bloomington Police Department, 2001).  Newly graduated 
officers remain on probation until they have demonstrated to the field training officer 
that they are competent in all their required tasks.  In contrast, the old culture at RTO 
is maintained as new officers adopt the practices and attitudes prevalent on that line, 
and are denied the benefit of a one-on-one style of training and the imparting of 
appropriate attitudes to safety.  As Chan (1996, p. 114) noted, ―The transmission of 
this culture is not by a process of socialization and internalization of rules, but  
through a collection of stories and aphorisms which instruct officers on how to see 
the world and act in it‖.   
The Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) in Britain, similar to the regulators of 
other high risk industries such as the nuclear industry and the airline industry, 
recognise the importance of culture in the safe operation of the rail industry and 
developed a safety culture inspection toolkit (Health and Safety Executive, 2005a, 
2005b).  Recognising the need for such a tool in Australia, The Australian Rail 
Industry Safety and Standards Board (RISSB) obtained a license to use the safety 
toolkit in Australia.  The toolkit provides a consistent way of measuring safety 
culture in the workplace (Rail Industry Safety and Standards Board, 2010).  The 
development of the toolkit was based on elements which had been identified by 
Reason (1997) as contributing to a positive safety culture.  Reason (1997) refers to a 
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culture that is focussed on being just, flexible, learning and reporting.  Combining 
these cultural ingredients, says Reason (1997), produces an informed culture which 
he believes is a safe culture.  The Rail Tram and Bus Union (RTBU), which 
represents a large proportion of the transit officers, support this view  and advocate 
the elements subscribed to by Reason as being the ―core components of a true safety 
culture‖ (Nanva, 2011, p. 60).   
The safety culture and improvement toolkit uses an easy-to-follow safety 
culture assessment questionnaire on the RISSB website which should be completed 
by a cross-section of the workforce.  The website enables an organisation to analyse 
the results, which then link directly to guidance for general and specific 
improvements and examples of good practice.  The questionnaire refers to key 
components such as leadership, the organisation‘s attitude to blame, a learning 
culture, communication and employee involvement (Health and Safety Executive, 
2005a; Rail Industry Safety and Standards Board, 2009).  Whilst all rail 
organisations are expected to identify and implement an effective safety culture, at 
the time of the research the RTO had not included the transit officer cadre in such an 
assessment (Safety Committee Minutes, December 2007, March 2008).  The RTO 
does not have to demonstrate the safety of the transit officers to the Rail Regulator, 
only the safety of the rail system.   
To structure this discussion of my research findings I will address the 
component factors identified by the Rail Industry Safety and Standards Board (2010) 
as combining to produce a culture of safety within an organisation.  This discussion 
only concerns ways in which these elements have been addressed in the transit 
officer security section, and does not consider how these elements have been 
addressed in the wider RTO organisation. 
8.1 Leadership 
A considerable amount of literature has been published on the importance of 
strong leadership emanating from the very top of the organisation, cascading down 
through management to supervisors, to influence the development and operation of 
safety culture (Angiullo, 2009; Schein, 2004; Westrum, 2004).  Previous research 
has found that different styles of management can influence the level of concern for 
safety shown by members in a group (Flin, 2003; Health and Safety Laboratory, 
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2002).  As Schein (2004, pp. 246 - 247) emphasised, one of the most powerful tools 
a leader has with which to influence culture is ―what they systematically pay 
attention to.  This can mean anything from what they notice and comment on to what 
they measure, control, reward, and in other ways deal with systematically‖.  
Consequently, if management does not demonstrate that they view safety or 
communication skills as important, then that is how safety and communication skills 
are viewed by employees.  The amount of time that is devoted to learning particular 
skills in training also highlights the importance placed on those skills.  For example, 
during the research period, RTO transit officer supervisors did not receive 
supervisory training specific to their role; neither did they have experienced mentors 
to follow.  This lack of further training impacts upon supervisors‘ performance in 
their role and adversely affects the respect given by transit officers to their 
supervisors.  The officers see the supervisor as being one of them one day, and 
struggling to be management the next.  As identified during the interviews with the 
transit officers, a lack of confidence can result in some supervisors resorting to 
‗bullying tactics‘ in an attempt to assert their authority.  In contrast, supervisors who 
have had previous supervisory or management training, such as those recruited from 
the military or police force, are more likely to exude confidence and be well 
respected by transit officers.  However, there is no opportunity for these few 
supervisors to mentor others.  The normal procedure of ‗what happens on the line, 
stays on the line‘, stifles the interaction and mentoring that could be achieved by an 
open communication and learning approach.   
In the RTO there has been no specific highlighting of the importance of 
reducing injuries amongst transit officers.  No targets or injury-reducing strategies 
have been developed and promulgated; transit officers are not kept informed of 
injuries that occur on other lines; and injury statistics in the transit officer area are 
not measured as a management performance indicator.  Opportunities for learning 
from previous incidents are not taken advantage of.  Transit officer injuries are dealt 
with at a local level, with the Chief Executive Officer and senior managers of the 
organisation viewing the statistics on a three-monthly basis at the Rail Safety 
Executive Committee Meeting.  Transit officer safety representatives receive a list of 
transit officer lost time, and non lost time, injuries at their safety committee 
meetings, which on average are every three to four months.  However, these statistics 
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are presented as a list with the accompanying graphs depicting broad categories of 
post incident analysis: injuries by nature, for example open wound, fracture; injuries 
by bodily location, for example face or head; injuries by mechanism, for example 
being hit by moving objects, falls on the same level; and injuries by agency, for 
example machinery and fixed plant or human agencies (Security Section Transperth 
Trains, 2009).  No indication of year on year or period to period comparisons, or 
incident and contributing factors analysis accompany the report.  In contrast to this 
lack of attention, issues such as ‗on-time running‘ of the trains, and ‗passenger 
boardings‘, are discussed on a weekly basis at the Executive Director‘s meeting.  
Although there are limited forums in which  action reports about injuries and 
incidents are addressed, one of the managers explained to me what happens in his 
area: 
I read all the action reports daily.  I go through them and I analyse 
what‘s out there.  By reading the action reports I get a good picture 
of what happened out there the night before and it gives me a good 
picture of whats‘ happening generally.  So, if there‘s any that need to 
be reported, like if there‘s accidents or serious incidents that need to 
be reported to upper management, I put that in the ‗ifris‘ system 
[computer data base for reportable incidents to the Office of Rail 
Safety  under the Western Australia Rail Safety Act 2010  ("Western 
Australia Rail Safety Act," 2010)], they review those and I put some 
comments in there.  But generally, I view those and then they get 
taken by our Intel [Intelligence] people. ... Our intelligence people, 
what they do is they look at the action reports and they record them 
and they abstract them and then they take data from those and we 
gather statistics and information.  ... We look  at the data on a weekly 
basis and there is reports generated.  [A] statistical summary is 
confidential stuff that ...  we don‘t sort of publish it. 
Unfortunately I also was not allowed access to any generated statistics, but it 
appears that they relate mainly to infringement details which record the specifics of 
where passengers appear to break the rules.  In terms of injury figures, I had to rely 
on publicly available information: either statistics obtained by the press under 
‗Freedom of Information‘ legislation, or Parliamentary questions documented in 
Hansard, to obtain any statistical information for this research.  There were a number 
of different databases that collected information regarding the security section of 
RTO.  These data bases were not linked, however, neither did they have the ability to 
talk to one another.  One of the managers explained to me the reason behind the 
statistical confidentiality:  
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If we have a high amount of incidents, then we are actually deemed 
as ‗unsafe‘.  Whereas, if the police have a high amount of incidents 
they are deemed as being ‗effective‘. ... What I have a problem with 
is just politically we are not able to use them [statistics] because the 
media cane us and they heighten the sort of anxiety about the 
perception of crime on [trains]   
Hopkins (2006b) identified how social demands sometimes influence 
organisational priorities, and argued that it was the position of safety regulators: to 
ensure that safety was not overlooked.  However, responsibility for transit officer 
injuries appears to fall between two safety regulators, the Rail Safety Regulator and 
the Work Safe Regulator.  Transit officers are classed as ‗rail safety critical workers‘ 
which refers to the health standard and track work competency the employee must 
achieve to perform tasks critical for the safety of the rail system.  One aspect of rail 
safety work that transit officers undertake is ―work involving the management or 
monitoring of passenger safety on, in or at any railway‖ ("Western Australia Rail 
Safety Act," 2010, p. 15 section 17 (k)).  However, the Western Australia 
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1984 ("Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(WA)," 1984) still applies to rail safety workers under the Western Australia Rail 
Safety Act 2010 ("Western Australia Rail Safety Act," 2010, p. 17 Section 10).   
In comparison, peak international transit police organisations, such as the New 
York Transit Police Department, place considerable emphasis on minimising crime, 
including injury to officers, on the rail system.  As part of a compstat process, 
managers are expected to use a weekly compstat meeting to report on the crime and 
injury statistics for the area under their control.  The compstat paradigm is based on 
communication, information, accountability and results (Henry, 2003).  Incidents are 
analysed in a meaningful way, using a simple data management system to quickly 
identify fluctuations and changes in incident statistics.  Managers and supervisors are 
completely trained in investigative procedures, and are expected to have fully 
investigated the circumstances that led to the incident, and to determine strategies to 
prevent a reoccurrence. The outcomes of such investigations are shared with all areas 
of the organisation, and injury and lost time work statistics are benchmarked with 
similar organisations.  The importance placed on this accountability is highlighted by 
each person in the chain of command, up to the Chief Executive of the organisation 
having responsibility for any injury occurring to a transit police officer under their 
supervision.  These statistics become one of their performance indicators and this 
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enables both high and low performers to be identified and praised or motivated as 
necessary.   
8.2 The Organisations’ Attitude to Blame 
Reason (1997), and more recently Dekker (2007), refer to a ‗just‘ culture as a 
culture where people are encouraged and trained to work safely, where clear lines are 
drawn between acceptable and non acceptable behaviour, and where rule breaking 
involving defiance, recklessness or malice will not be tolerated.  It is a culture where 
there are systems and processes that promote the reporting of incidents and near-miss 
occurrences, to enable the organisation to learn from past mistakes (Dekker, 2007; 
Global Aviation Information Network (GAIN), 2004; Reason, 1997).  Whilst a just 
culture acknowledges that people can make mistakes and avoids apportioning blame, 
it does not provide immunity for actions that were deliberate and rule-breaking.  It 
examines all contributing factors to learn from the incident and open ‗no fault‘ 
communication is encouraged and rewarded to promote completeness of data 
gathering (Dekker, 2007; Nanva, 2011; Reason, 1997).  However, in the RTO, 
similar to the findings of Leith (2008) in his ethnographic research with employees 
at the Orco refinery,  management believe that the fundamental reason for accidents 
that happen to transit officers is that their officers fail to follow standard work 
procedures and safety rules.  This attitude results in RTO transit officer managers 
believing that injuries occur when transit officers make poor choices in the actions 
they take when dealing with a situation.  As Jock, one of the senior people within the 
organisation, said in relation to the transit officers: 
I would like to look at the cultural or psychological aspects 
surrounding law enforcement officers making conscious choices 
against directives, policy, procedure and training. ... In my role I 
continually see good officers making bad choices which effects their 
safety, the CCC [Corruption and Crime Commission] and people 
handling safety and workers‘ compensation ask the same pertinent 
question.  ...  As responsible managers we put directives and 
procedures in place to protect our people, and apply appropriate 
training, unfortunate[ly] officers continue to go against these 
provisions and make choices that jeopardise their safety.  
This management belief that transit officers‘ failure to abide by the rules and 
procedures is the main cause of any injuries occurring has the capacity to cloud 
management thinking, preventing deep analysis of all contributing factors to the 
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cause of an accident/incident, and focussing instead upon rule book protocols and 
transit officer compliance.  There was normally no investigation into contributing 
factors.  For instance, following one particular incident, management did not 
evaluate whether the officer had received adequate training for the task, whether 
there was a breakdown in communication which led to the event occurring, or even 
whether the equipment the officer had was adequate for the situation which had 
arisen.  As a consequence of this thinking, a significant incident would normally 
result in a global e-mail to transit officers, reinforcing a particular procedure, safety 
rule or law enforcement practice.  Transit officers quickly learn that ‗they became 
the problem‘, rather than incidents and injuries being used to identify deficiencies in 
the safety system.  This situation was compounded by a management belief that 
injuries sustained by law enforcement officers are a normal by-product of their 
profession and the environment in which they work.  As one of the managers told 
me: 
I guess the difficulty with the job that we do is that it‘s an unsafe 
environment.  No matter what you do, you can put all the secondary 
control measure that you like in place; unfortunately, the one element 
that you have no control over is the offender.  ... They don‘t 
understand occupational health and safety and they don‘t understand 
the law; so they‘re irrational in that approach and whilst you‘re 
dealing with people like that, it‘s extremely difficult to put safety 
measures in place that can protect the officers.  You‘re not going to 
be able to remove that risk. 
Therefore, these combined thoughts of management, looking for fault in 
officers‘ behaviour on the one hand, and being fatalistic about injuries on the other, 
have resulted in an attitude that the system generally is functioning well, but that the 
officer has done something wrong and is ‗the problem‘.  As a consequence, many 
transit officers adopt the attitude of ‗cover your ass‘ and ‗lay low‘.  As transit officer 
Eddy told me: ―I am just one of the workers that keeps under the radar and [I] keep 
my head down‖.  This desire among law enforcement officers to keep a low profile 
has been identified previously in the literature as being an officers‘ way of coping 
with their organisational environment (Auten, 1985; Manning, 1997; Paoline, et al., 
2000).  This thinking on the part of the officer evolves from a management style 
based on a paramilitary model of policing, where there is a conflicting set of 
expectations.  On the one hand an officer works autonomously, making swift, ‗on-
the-spot‘ decisions; however on the other hand they are controlled by rigid rules, and 
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by actions of managers that may seem to be arbitrary, leaving officers feeling they 
lack support and recognition for the decisions they do take (Beck, 1999; Chan, 2004; 
Terrill, et al., 2003). 
Any investigation carried out following a RTO incident is normally undertaken 
for legal purposes.  Such purposes arise from: providing evidence in court against an 
offender; following up on a complaint against a transit officer by a member of the 
public; following the ‗use of force‘ in any situation by a transit officer; or 
additionally, any event where management may think an officer has not acted 
appropriately.  The criteria examined in these investigative reports look closely at 
what occurred in order to attribute blame, rather than examining why the situation 
developed and whether there were any lessons to be learnt from the event to prevent 
a reoccurrence.  As previously documented, officers such as transit officer Fred 
believe double standards exist.  Members of the public are innocent until proved 
guilty, whereas transit officers are guilty until proven innocent.   
Wilpert (2008, pp. 374 - 375) argued in reference to the relationship between 
the regulators and the regulated: 
Only under conditions of an appropriate error culture, which is 
characteristic of all systems actors and which searches for the genetic 
conditions of errors instead of the usual way of searching for a 
culprit, will we open up the possibility to jointly learn from mistakes 
and errors.  
However, apart from the investigations undertaken in order to charge an 
offender, transit officers view all investigations referred to the internal investigation 
department as ‗falling into a big black hole‘; leaving them with a cloud hanging over 
their heads for months at a time until they hear the outcome of the investigation.  As 
Transit Officer Janet told me ―They‘ll keep us in the dark for a long time, and they 
probably won‘t even notify us‖.  Others, such as Transit Officer Rory, believed 
management was out to get them: 
It‘s their job.  They‘re there to sack you.  That‘s why they‘re there.  
That‘s what they‘re employed for.  He says you were using excessive 
force.  I try not to use excessive force.  I‘ve learnt now, don‘t push 
anybody, don‘t push them, don‘t check them.  If they‘re coming at 
you, yes, give them a check.  If they are coming at you and invading 
your personal space, you‘ve got every right to check them like that 
(holding up an outstretched hand). 
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Although, as one of the more experienced officers explained to me: 
The ‗internals‘ [Internal Investigation Department] have obviously 
got a job to do and they‘re not really out there to hang peoples, it‘s 
more of a – they have to go through the motions and dot all the ―i‘s‖ 
and cross all the ―t‘s‖ and look right into it.  I don‘t know if it‘s the 
level of complaints they get but it does take a long time. ... I had one 
that went eighteen months before I heard that it was all finished with. 
As Wilpert (2008) notes, it is difficult to establish a ‗no fault‘ culture.  Unless 
there is a commitment to search for the causes for incidents without attributing 
blame, there will continue to be self-defensive cover ups and obstacles to improving 
safety.  However, I noted in the ‗best-practice‘, low-injury transit police 
organisations that I visited that incidents were fully investigated to prevent a 
reoccurrence, rather than to attribute blame.  This culture of injury reduction first 
developed during early to mid 1990s among the New York Transit Police, resulting 
in a rapid improvement in the statistics when managers became accountable for 
crime and injuries that occurred in their district (Bratton & Knobler, 1998).  The 
introduction of the compstat process, which is built on a management paradigm that 
uses statistics to assist managers achieve their organisational goals, helped to change 
the culture.  This culture moved from an organisation being reactive, to being a 
proactive transit policing organisation.  Managers became eager to minimise injury 
and crime statistics, learn from an event and share information with other managers 
and districts.  The compstat program was transferable, compatible and replicable in 
other organisations and the success of the program led to the model being adopted by 
other transit policing organisations.  The compstat approach is in stark contrast to the 
RTO reactive model where accountability for transit officer injuries is not defined or 
viewed as a necessary component of the supervisory and  management system.  
8.3 Learning Organisation 
An organisation that has a strong learning culture is characterised by the 
organisation‘s ability and willingness to learn from their employees‘ experiences and 
from past incidents.  It captures all relevant information, analyses the data, processes 
information, then uses the lessons learnt to improve the organisation‘s safety system 
(Macrae, 2009; Reason, 1997; Standards Australia, 2006a).  However, in order for an 
organisation to capture all relevant information successfully there is a degree of 
required trust between people working at all levels within an organisation.  
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Compounding the ‗trust‘ issue, a lack of communication has been  associated with a 
lack of trust in organisations, leading to failed safety initiatives (Fleming & Lardner, 
2001).  As Conchie and Donald argue (2008, pp. 100 - 101), ―In environments where 
safety is critical, it is important that workers feel confident that others are acting in a 
safe way‖.  Nevertheless, they also believe that employees need to maintain a sense 
of wariness and also maintain personal responsibility for their own safety.  
Unfortunately, the communication barriers that are present in the RTO can contribute 
to an environment where trust seems arbitrary, leading to a culture within the 
organisation where learning is stifled.  Transit officers are unwilling to report many 
issues for fear of being labelled as the problem, instead of feeling confident that the 
information will be used as part of a constructive step to improve safety.  
Compounding this issue, transit officers feel that management does not respect their 
views on safety when their initiatives from their on-ground learning are not 
incorporated into the workplace safety system.  Issues such as purchasing a lighter 
torch, wearing their high visibility jackets at all times to distinguish them from the 
revenue protection officers, or their endeavours to purchase more appropriate gloves 
for use in searching an offender are not acknowledged by management.  This leaves 
transit officers believing their views to make the work environment a safer place are 
not considered important by management. 
A significant issue arising from the lack of incident analysis was the absence 
of a feedback loop to the training regime.  Using a closed system in which incidents 
inform training would enable the discovery of weaknesses in transit officer training, 
which might have contributed to an incident occurring, to be dealt with and remedies 
incorporated into future training, to reduce the chances of a reoccurrence.  In contrast 
to the RTO, the ‗best-practice‘ organisations used such incidents as learning 
exercises.  In the RTO, transit officer training is conducted by an organisation that is 
contracted to the RTO to deliver instruction in specific competencies that are listed 
in their contract.  However, the arrangement only involves delivering and assessing 
competencies in classroom context and does not include assessing transit officer 
skills and behaviours in the field.  Neither does it include assessing whether a change 
in training could improve transit officer safety.  As Transit Officer Jack told me: 
If the instructors got out and actually learnt what we did, and had 
some video evidence so that they can show the new people ‗this is 
what can happen‘, the training would be improved. 
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Whilst the RTO has established a training committee, it did not include any 
employee representatives at the time of the research.  During my fieldwork time at 
RTO I expressed an interest in attending one of the training committee meetings.  
However, I did not receive an invitation to attend and no minutes were available for 
myself or for transit officers to view the proceedings and decisions of the committee.  
I found transit officers were unfamiliar with assessing the risks that may be 
inherent in dealing with an incident.  This sometimes resulted in officers rushing in 
to deal with a situation instead of waiting until backup help arrived in order for a 
situation to be dealt with safely.  As one of the more experienced transit officers told 
me: 
You get the young ones who rush into it like a bull at a gate.  I try 
and speak to the young first and say, ―This is the way I operate.  I 
want to have a nice safe night, yes sure we might deal with a bit of 
violent situations, but I want to have a nice safe night.  I don‘t want 
you to get hurt and I don‘t want myself to get hurt.  I just want to get 
home safely in one piece‖.  That‘s why I try to explain to them, ―Just 
take it easy.  Just because you‘ve got a uniform on, doesn‘t mean 
you‘re a Superman‖.  A lot of them think they are, they think they‘re 
super men.  We‘re impregnable, we are.  
Or as another senior transit officer told me: 
It‘s not so much going against the rules; just a real lack of judgment 
... virtually no common sense you know when they are engaging.  
Whether you‘ve got seven males and they‘re just after one, everyone 
intoxicated, could be charged for a bit of agro.  They‘ll just put the 
blinkers on and then go in and grab that one offender right in the 
middle of all his friends.  That sort of thing. ... Nothing seems to 
switch on up here [touching head].  You know, that ‗this could go 
really wrong‘.  
Although the CCTV footage available to the RTO provides ample examples of 
such situations, which could be used for ongoing training and professional 
development, RTO did not take advantage of this material to instruct officers about 
alternative strategies that could be used to achieve safer outcomes.  This wealth of 
CCTV footage of incidents that have occurred on the rail system and bus interchange 
areas could be incorporated into training packages available for access by transit 
officers, either through online self-paced skill development packages or in a class 
room mode of instruction.  Both positive and negative video footage of transit 
officer/ passenger interactions with the public could be used as a learning tool.  
227 
Additionally, CCTV footage provides an excellent medium through which to 
highlight the importance of tactical positioning as regards a transit officer and an 
offender, and the need to assess the environment for any physical obstruction that 
may be present and cause a possible hazard; or alternatively which might be used as 
an aid.  As one of the senior people who had trained many years earlier as a ‗special 
constable‘ told me: 
It‘s repetitive training that has to be done with regards to things like 
proximity awareness.  With regards to what is around you in the rail 
car [or] on the station that you can utilise to protect yourself.  I mean, 
the centre pole in the middle of the doorway is one of the greatest 
tools I ever got taught to use to keep the distance between the baddie 
and myself.  Just by dancing around the pole; moving around and 
keeping that pole between the two of us. ... It‘s not taught, but there‘s 
a lack of experience out there also  
8.4 Communication 
A high level of communication between and within all levels of an 
organisation has been identified as a necessary component of any successful safety 
management system that seeks to minimise incidents and injuries in an organisation 
(Entec UK Ltd, 1999; Health and Safety Executive, 2005b).  The communication 
pathways should always be both ‗top down‘ and ‗bottom up‘.  As Angiullo (2009, p. 
144) advocates, ―Frequent open communication fosters a spirit of teamwork, 
encourages employee involvement in the organisation, and demonstrates acceptance 
of the organisation‘s goals and values‖.   
8.4.1  Manager/supervisor communication 
Open communication was missing within the security division of RTO, with 
transit officers not knowing what was occurring on other lines and feeling alienated 
from the rest of the organisation.  Transit officer Eddy explained: 
Anything that comes from the supervisor comes from upstairs 
[management] and it is something bad.  We are either not doing 
something or something has happened and we weren‘t there to do 
anything about it.  So other than that, that is pretty much all we get 
from the supervisor.  If we do a good job, the only people that tell 
you that you have done a good job is the guys that you have worked 
with and their colleagues.  
Or as transit officer Fred said: 
You get bombarded with so many crap e-mails about stuff that just 
means nothing to you that yeah, it would be nice to get, I suppose, a 
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lot of stuff to say what‘s going on, where the future lies, where the 
vision is or what‘s here and what‘s there, but you don‘t.  And I mean, 
like I said, ... none of us know anything. 
On some of the rail lines, musters were held at the commencement of a shift at 
which point, if a  supervisor did have any information, they would pass it on to the 
transit officers.  For example, this happened on the line on which transit officer Steve 
worked:   
We‘ve good communication because we have our musters every day 
and if something needs work[ing] on or we‘re not doing something 
right we have a good conference about it or we discuss it.  That‘s 
where it stops.  There‘s very little if any at all communication from 
supervisor up. ... The supervisors will get sent e-mails from 
management.  Their meetings with management are every [pause], 
you might have one this month and one next month, and then you 
might go six months without any meetings.  Obviously they‘re too 
busy or whatever the reasons.  I think probably the biggest downfall 
at the moment is communication. 
A few of the supervisors would also use musters to educate officers about 
safety issues and operational matters, however there was no consistency between the 
lines concerning what occurred during muster times or what information was 
transmitted at those musters; and no check or feedback process to ensure that 
important information was passed on.  On some lines it depended on who the 
supervisor was on duty at the time as to whether a muster was held.  On another line, 
there were no musters held at all.  This appeared to be partly due to the lack of space 
to hold a briefing, and partly due to the need to be on the line quickly.  As one of the 
officers explained to me: 
The reason probably for it, is because in our area, we can‘t have 
muster, you‘ve got 45,000 [exaggeration] Xyz officers [revenue 
protection officers] sitting in there [crib room] having theirs.  So we 
tend to miss out on getting one.  Also, you‘ve got to add to the fact 
that you know they want underground stations manned as soon as 
possible, so once the underground day shift staff get back, you know, 
you pretty much OC [oleoresin capsicum or pepper spray] are rigged 
up and heading straight back out there.  
Without the formal lines of communication, transit officers rely on the 
grapevine for information, and this may not always be accurate.  Effective 
communication channels, which were evident in the ‗best-practice‘ transit policing 
organisations visited, such as New York Transit Police, British Transit Police and 
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Massachusetts Bay Transit Police, enabled those organisations to interact 
purposively and cooperatively, achieving reduced injury rates for their officers and 
reducing crime on the transport systems.  Communication between all ranks of these 
organisations was seen as a vital element in the safe and effective operation of law 
enforcement duties.  Communications pathways included discussion around policies 
and procedures, statistics, training, hazard and incident reports and the daily musters.  
These communication channels could be audited, and officers at each level were 
responsible and accountable for information being passed on.  Additionally, such 
communication practices help officers feel valued and part of the organisation while 
assisting to reduce at-risk behaviours and enhance safe work practices.  Management 
conducted tours of rail lines during the times that transit officers were at work, and 
this provided an important mode of two-way communication.  If this process was 
adopted by the RTO, management would be able to listen to transit officer problems, 
provide feedback on good work performed, and pass on relevant information.  This 
would also assist in raising the morale of the transit officers.  Effective two way 
communication is considered important in ―preventing perceptions of isolation and 
thus the development of a separate set of behaviours or culture at the frontline‖ 
(Human Engineering, 2005, p. 11) 
8.4.2 Transit officer/passenger communication 
As previously described, communication is not only important to the internal 
functioning of an organisation, but good communication skills are also imperative 
for transit officers‘ interactions with the travelling public.  All the transit officers that 
I interviewed, who had no training in ‗verbal  judo‘ or ‗effective communication‘ 
skills prior to joining the RTO, felt that the transit officer verbal communication 
training was not sufficient for  them to carry out their tasks in an optimal manner.  At 
the time of the research, trainee officers only undertook one scenario exercise as 
opposed to other transit police organisations undertaking many scenarios using 
actors or youth workers to provide realistic situations for the trainees to deal with.  
Transit officer Mike summed the situation up: 
You‘re on a train that‘s not moving, your train is not even the size of 
a carriage, the actors are your lecturers and they‘re dressed in suits 
and it‘s not the way it is out here. ... A lot of people come out of it 
[training] and go ‗whoa this isn‘t what I expected, I didn‘t realise it 
was going to be this confrontational‘.  They train you like you‘re in 
customer service, not like you need to know security.   
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During my training, the one scenario exercise that was undertaken by each pair 
of RTO transit officers had to end in arrest, as this led into the next competency unit 
of the course, which was to develop a court brief and present evidence in a mock 
court case.  Trainee transit officers at the time of the fieldwork had no scenario 
where verbal defusing skills were used to ‗talk down‘ a situation.  This resulted in 
many officers finding it difficult to develop and use these skills when confronted out 
on track by a person ‗going-off‘ in their face.  Transit officer Sam felt that the course 
should be redesigned to cover that situation: 
If I was to have a training course you‘d have the verbal judo for a 
week before scenario training and then try and apply the verbal judo 
in two weeks of scenario training. ... Maybe that extension would be 
what you‘d expect to kind of get the habit going.  It‘s kind of [like] 
having a habit and then keeping it intact and utilised.   
8.5 Employee Involvement 
A flexible culture is characterised by the ability of the organisation to 
recognise the individual skills of the employees and the ability to adapt quickly to 
changing demands (Reason, 1997; Standards Australia, 2006a; Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2001).  Dekker (2011), Hopkins (2009a) both advocate a critical component of an 
organisation with a focus on safety, such as high reliability organisations, is the 
capacity to transfer decision-making to the people with the expert knowledge at a 
time of crisis.  This view is supported by the RTBU who argue that the employees at 
the coal-face are the people best able to make decisions when the need arises 
(Nanva, 2011).  In contrast to this depiction of a true safety culture, however, the 
RTO transit officers operate within silos, adhering to rules and keeping a low profile 
for fear of being classed as the cause of safety problems.  Organisational features 
such as these, which are completely opposite to the features of a proactive, positive 
safety culture, have been implicated as contributing factors in many organisational 
disasters (Hopkins, 2005).   
A flexible safety culture is matched by trust and respect being present between 
the hierarchical levels of an organisation, and is characterised by active employee 
involvement.  In such organisations, management keep employees informed of what 
is occurring within the organisation, and listen to the views of employees, taking 
them into account and respecting their abilities to deal with a situation.  However, 
transit officers complain that they do not see management; neither does management 
231 
provide them with information, or listen to their suggestions.  Transit officer Archie 
explained to me: 
I have probably spoken to him [manager] three or four times since 
I‘ve been here.  And I know of guards that have been here two or 
three years and they still don‘t know who he [security manager] is.  I 
see it as, it‘s not real mismanagement, it‘s more a lack of 
management.  They sort of leave the place to run to its own device.  
In one way it‘s good because they say ‗we‘ll leave the guards to do 
their own thing, we won‘t over-police them‘.  But in another way it‘s 
like, well people don‘t know what‘s going on, especially a lot of new 
people who‘ve just come into the job; they‘re going, ‘Well who are 
the bosses?‘ They never see them. 
Or as transit officer Harold told me, in a very heated way: 
Show us the information.  Information is knowledge and if you feel 
comfortable with that knowledge you can move on.  And I don‘t 
think that‘s going to happen because we never really had that 
information given to us properly.  That‘s why musters should have 
minutes and I want minutes to be going up to management and [they] 
can actually look at the minutes and go, yep we can answer that.  
Then send it back and then [it] can be held at the next muster, so that 
information is .... .  The more that we can communicate, the more 
knowledge we have which can affect different areas, [we] will work 
better.  And I think that‘s our biggest thing.  They‘ve got to treat us 
with a bit of respect and treat us like we‘re a professional unit and 
we can become that professional unit.  At the moment they‘re 
treating us like ... .  It‘s indecisiveness, they‘re not treating us like 
professional people.  
It [information] needs to be from us the lower levels to the upper 
levels, so ......... they understand with what we‘re dealing with, you 
know, the issues.  And if they are well informed they can actually act 
on it and they can send information back that will help us and put us 
in the right direction.  If we get a good communication going, the 
guys will feel better about it and they will know what‘s happening. 
Employees feel disempowered when they consider their opinions are not 
important to their managers.  One of the biggest issues that all the transit officers 
complained of, and which contributed to the feeling of disempowerment, was the 
issue of revenue protection officers being presented to the public, by the nature of 
their uniform, as if they were transit officers.  Whilst the revenue protection officers 
looked as if they were transit officers, they did not have the same powers or training 
that transit officers had.  They also stepped back in situations where trouble arose 
when the public expected them to step forward.  This impacted negatively upon 
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public perceptions of transit officers.  As previously described, officers kept on 
raising this issue about the misrepresentations of revenue protection officers, but 
management dismissed this issue as being unimportant, blaming the transit officers‘  
‗ego‘ as the problem (personal notes).  As Transit Officer Trevor reported:  
I‘ve only heard negative reports from members of public and, saying 
that we‘re now, we don‘t do anything.  We‘ve run away from jobs 
and left them alone to be beaten up and all this type of thing.  It 
reflects badly on us, cause they [revenue protection officers] look 
very similar to us.  Yeah I‘m not a fan of what‘s going on there, 
definitely not.  They need to be separated from us.  They need to 
look different cause they‘re not the same as us, and it‘s giving us 
quite negative reports from the public. ...  I‘m not happy with that at 
all.  
Transit officers felt that as well as not being respected by management they 
were not respected by the public.  A number of times when I was with transit officers 
I heard them referred to as ‗plastic cops‘, or ‗want-to-be cops‘ (personal notes).  It 
was obvious, at these times, that members of the public were unaware of the ‗powers 
of arrest‘ that transit officers possess.  However, management did not seem keen to 
address the issue of raising the transit officer profile with regards to the revenue 
protection officers, and were content to know that the travelling public could not 
discern the difference between revenue protection officers and transit officers.  In 
conversations with management, it was indicated that revenue protection officers 
received far less hassles from the public when they were dressed as if they were 
transit officers.  The downside of this was that transit officers received far less 
respect as a result of public confusion over roles and the unpredictability of a law 
enforcement response from different officers in similar uniforms.  Officers 
endeavoured to deal with this situation by reaffirming their own worth amongst 
themselves within their tight knit group on each line, and by wearing their high-
visibility jackets.  Frustrations over this ambiguity were usually played out in the 
officers‘ crib room. 
8.6 Summary 
Whilst there is a considerable overlap between a number of the issues above, 
organisations where these elements are addressed are characterised by a strong 
culture of safety (Rail Industry Safety and Standards Board, 2010; Reason, 1997).  A 
robust safety culture is one where there is strong leadership; incidents are analysed 
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for contributing factors, rather than to attribute blame; employees are appropriately 
trained; employees are informed; information is communicated through all levels of 
the organisation; employee opinions are valued, and silos are broken down.  During 
the fieldwork in the transit officer section of the RTO, however many of the 
important components of a strong safety culture were absent. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION 
9. INTRODUCTION 
This study set out to determine whether an understanding of communication 
and safety culture provided opportunities for improving the safety of transit officers.  
This ‗on the tracks‘ rail system research took place each day of the researcher‘s 
rostered workdays from 14.45 hours until the last train of the day had completed its 
journey.  Historically, this evening/night shift is the most challenging time for anti-
social behaviour on the rail system.  At other times, only a skeleton transit officer 
presence is on duty in case an incident occurs.  At the conclusion of the fieldwork, 
interviews took place with transit officers, supervisors and managers.  The questions 
asked during these interviews were developed from the ‗insider‘ knowledge gleaned 
during the fieldwork and articulated transit officer perceptions of how their work 
could be made safer.  The competitive funding made available for this study enabled 
lessons to be learnt from high achieving transit policing organisations worldwide, 
which contributed to the development of the recommendations presented to the RTO 
management to improve transit officer safety.  
Returning to the question posed at the beginning of this research, it is now 
possible to state that an understanding of communication and safety culture provides 
opportunities for improving the safety of transit officers.   
9.1 Subsidiary Research Questions 
Initially, the over-arching research question was broken down into four 
supplementary questions to assist the focus of the research.  These four sub-
questions were: 
1. How are safe systems of work communicated to transit officers and is the 
transit officers‘ understanding of safety congruent with management‘s 
understanding of safety? 
2. Does the transit officer culture have the flexibility to deal with dangerous 
issues as they arise? 
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3. Is the transit officers‘ safety culture a uniform culture, or are there different 
subsets of culture existing within the transit officer environment? 
4. What is transit officer best-practice in the public transport systems at both a 
national and international level? 
Whilst the subject matter of these questions has been addressed throughout this 
thesis, a brief summary of the answers to each of the components is provided below. 
9.1.1 How are safe systems of work communicated to transit officers and is the 
transit officers’ understanding of safety congruent with management’s 
understanding of safety? 
One of the more significant findings to emerge from this research was the 
discovery that there is a mismatch between the work safety culture communicated in 
the training environment and the safety culture that is evident ‗on the tracks‘.  Often, 
safety management is viewed as a one way communication system from managers to 
employees, which may not be congruent with the informal system that exists 
amongst the workers.  In the informal system (on the tracks), transit officers may 
adopt working methods that differ from those they were taught.  These methods may 
not promote safe work practices, but do fit with the culture on the line, and are in 
keeping with the practices of their peers.  Any attempt by management in which 
managers seek to understand the differing safety perceptions and meanings 
underpinning the various processes adopted by the transit officers, will be a way of 
interacting with the officers and promote shared understandings around transit 
officer safety at work. 
The majority of transit officer injuries appear to occur when an alleged 
offender resists arrest.  Often these situations are initially sparked by a small offence, 
with the event escalating when an offender refuses to provide their name and address 
to an officer, or provides a false name and address.  Transit officers believe the 
public do not understand their ‗powers of arrest‘, and the ability they have in real 
time to check the personal details of anyone travelling on the rail system against the 
police data base.  The officers perceive this lack of public awareness of their roles 
and competencies as being compounded by the presence of revenue protection 
officers who, although dressed in a similar uniform, do not possess the legal powers 
that transit officers do.  Transit officers believe that having these ‗look-alikes‘ places 
them in an invidious position.  From the public‘s viewpoint, officers dressed the 
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same should have equivalent powers, yet one day a revenue protection officer 
witnesses an offence and no action is taken; whereas the next day a transit officer 
witness a similar offence and takes action.  This creates passenger misunderstanding, 
and can leave an offender feeling they have been wrongly and unpredictably 
targeted.  The transit officers want the public to be able to discern revenue protection 
officers as being different from themselves.  Transit officers also feel unsupported by 
management, who wish to retain the status quo, whereby the shared uniform gives 
the public the impression of a bigger presence of transit officers.  This failure to 
differentiate between transit officers and revenue protection officers leaves transit 
officers believing their safety is compromised and their status diminished. 
Another major finding to emerge from the research was transit officers‘ belief 
that they are not given sufficient training in verbal communication skills.  The 
officers want more scenario training in this area to improve their negotiating and 
conciliation skills before they go on track.  Transit officers argue that the one 
scenario training exercise provided in training had to end in an arrest, and this meant 
there was no experience given in resolving a situation in a win-win way.  In contrast 
to this adversarial model, transit officers believe that if they were taught advanced 
communication skills they would develop more competence in handling conflict 
with passengers in the field; possibly enabling the resolution of a situation, rather 
than supporting an incident escalating to an arrest situation. 
This study found that in the workforce investigated, transit officers have no 
formal ‗use of force‘ framework to refer to.  This can result in differing perceptions 
between management and transit officers on the steps they should take to deal with a 
situation which requires the use of force.  A framework, which includes the use of 
communication skills, would remove some of the ambiguities and promote clearer 
understanding in such situations between management and officers.  Transit officers 
would continually assess and reassess situations considering all ‗use of force‘ 
options available at the time, including the option to withdraw until backup arrives.  
At present the officers are instructed only to take action if it is safe to do so, thus any 
injury that may result is seen as a failure on the part of the officer to assess the 
situation and follow regulations.   
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9.1.2 Does the transit officer culture have the flexibility to deal with dangerous 
issues as they arise? 
The evidence from this study suggests that whilst the transit officers may work 
autonomously, away from direct supervision by management, and at night when 
their managers are usually in bed, they are strictly governed in the actions they take 
by rules and regulations from both the rail safety, and law enforcement, jurisdictions.  
Transit officers are also aware of the CCTV cameras mounted around the whole rail 
system which can monitor their every move.  Coupled with these issues and the 
bureaucratic and hierarchical nature of the organisation, on-the-ground decisions are 
normally based on compliance with regulations, rather than addressing issues around 
risk assessment.  Transit officers very quickly learn that they can become the 
‗problem‘ from the managers‘ perspective.  This has led to a ‗lay low‘ mentality, 
which includes ‗cover your ass‘ and ‗keep under the radar‘.  The exception to this, 
and the unwritten rule amongst all the transit officers, is when one of their mates is 
in trouble.  In these situations, they will knowingly break rules and do whatever it 
takes to assist a fellow officer.  They all understand that next time it could be them 
that are in trouble, needing their fellow officers to come to their aid.  A shared transit 
officer ‗code of silence‘ (Chan, 1996, 2004; Kleinig, 2000) will surround any action 
taken by an officer in these circumstances. 
A further result from this research is that transit officers do not feel equipped 
to deal with high risk, high tension situations such as the gang fights, mêlées and 
family feuds which sometimes occur on railway property.  Transit officers wanted 
far more realistic scenario training exercises to deal with these situations, rather than 
the single arrest scenario that occurred during their three months training.   
9.1.3 Is the transit officers’ safety culture a uniform culture, or are there 
different subsets of culture existing within the transit officer environment? 
The understandings gained from the encounters with the officers on each rail 
line, and their interviews, provide a powerful insight into the development of 
subcultures on the different lines.  These operate in isolation from each other, and at 
a distance from management.  The allocation of transit officers to a particular line 
fostered a sense of ownership for their ‗own line‘ on the part of the officers, each 
group becoming protective of their line and believing their line was the best.  
Information was not shared between the various lines, and transit officers were 
expressly forbidden to look at any CCTV coverage of any incident that occurred on 
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another line.  Whilst these video clips might have provided a learning opportunity for 
all officers, management believed that transit officers on one line would make fun of 
the way officers on another line handled a situation.  This decision reinforced the silo 
mentality existing between lines and supported the development of discrete cultural 
groupings on each line.  This perception also failed to recognise the keenness of 
transit officers to use on-the-job incidents to develop practical policies around 
fulfilling operational requirements while staying safe.   
The research found there was no consistent, standardised training or mentoring 
for supervisory positions.  As a result the experience of supervisors varied between 
each line.  A few supervisors had previous supervisory experience in the military or 
police and made good use of ‗muster time‘, however other supervisors had none.  
Lack of specific supervisor training seemed to be a significant factor in the variances 
in communication, safety culture and practices observed on the various lines during 
the study.  Supervisors were not provided with guidance supporting newly qualified 
transit officers with further on-the-job training, nor required to assess novice transit 
officers‘ practical competencies in the field.  Newly qualified transit officers, 
therefore, adopted the current practices of the other officers on that line without 
specific guidance around best-practice safety and operational procedures. 
9.1.4 What is transit officer best-practice in the public transport systems at both 
a national and international level? 
The major outcome of the research relating to worldwide best-practice in 
transit policing agencies was the common commitment to training, and the 
accountability required, from all levels of management and supervisory staff within 
those organisations.  Staff were accountable for what occurred in their area of 
control, and were expected to know the details of all incidents as they happened, 
being able to report on the steps taken to prevent a reoccurrence.  Statistics were 
kept, analysed, and publicised to focus attention on particular types of crime or crime 
hotspots on the rail network.  Additionally, these statistics were used to benchmark 
the organisation‘s performance against like minded rail networks so that each could 
learn from the other.  With visibility and accountability individual performances can 
be praised, and further training provided for low achieving personnel. These 
proactive best-practice agencies took pride in their performance, and were 
continually seeking ways to improve. 
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This study of high achieving transit policing organisations found extensive use 
of field training officers to work with new recruits, once the officers had graduated 
from the academy or training school.  The practice of mentoring new officers 
reinforced the theoretical learning from their training environment.  Additionally, the 
use of field training officers achieved a more uniform culture of safety across all the 
areas and different lines within a particular network and ensured that all officers 
were competent in the practical components of their roles.   
Best-practice transport authorities communicated the outcomes from incident 
investigations to all areas of their own organisation and, where relevant, shared this 
information with similar agencies.  Findings from investigations were used to 
provide learning opportunities for the transit police officers, both in their initial 
training and in any retraining and refresher courses.  These best-practice agencies 
used audits to evaluate and monitor the health of their safety system, with a feedback 
loop to trigger improvements as required.  In their drive for high performance, these 
organisations developed expertise in strategic areas, and valued the input of 
personnel from inside and outside the organisation, mirroring the Peters and 
Waterman philosophy, ‗productivity through people‘ (Peters & Waterman Jr., 2004).  
9.2 Limitations of the Research 
When reviewing the findings of this research a number of important limitations 
to the study need to be considered. 
a. The most important limitation of this study lies in the fact that internally 
derived incident statistics were not available to assist in the research process.  
This, coupled with the lack of detail available about the events leading up to 
an incident, prevented any analysis of contributing factors, and precluded 
comparisons between areas and rail lines.  This meant that lessons could not 
be learnt from previous events.  
b. The current study was unable to access relevant reports such as an internal 
review of safety that was undertaken during the research process, and a 
yearly review of the X plan which included consideration of the operational 
effectiveness of the five different lines.  
c. Another source of weakness in this study was the lack of access to policy and 
management meetings in the security area of the organisation.  Such meetings 
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included a review of transit officer training, the corporate rail safety 
executive meeting, and some security and the divisional safety meetings. 
Access to the above information during the research would have enhanced the 
findings from this qualitative study, and could have provided quantitative 
information that might have supported, or contradicted, the findings offered here.  
Further, the research suffered when the participating organisation withdrew its 
support after almost three years of the research. 
9.3 Recommendations for Further Research 
It is recommended that further research is undertaken as documented below. 
a. Passenger-based research on perceptions around the role, responsibilities and 
powers of transit officers.  This would help confirm whether transit officers‘ 
perceptions of public opinion on their role, responsibilities and legal powers 
are correct.  It could inform education and awareness campaigns which might 
reduce the incidence of arrest and injury.  
b. Further research could investigate the value of advanced verbal 
communication and negotiation skills training, sometimes referred to as 
‗verbal judo‘.  Officers should have the opportunity to practice learnt skills in 
realistic scenario training.  This training could be trialled initially on one line 
and evaluated against the other lines for its impact in reducing incidents of 
miscommunication and negative outcomes. 
c. It would be valuable to develop, trial and evaluate the introduction of the 
compstat paradigm into the security section of the RTO. 
d. The application of the ‗broken window‘ policy to rolling stock offers a range 
of intriguing possibilities which could be usefully explored in further 
research.  Using this theory, rolling stock is withdrawn from service at the 
first sign of damage or defacing.  The rolling stock remains out of service 
until it is fixed.  Studies overseas have shown that passengers take pride in 
supporting a pristine environment, crime reduces on the network and, 
subsequently, injury to law enforcement officers also reduces.  Whilst the 
‗broken window‘ theory has been proven to work overseas, research has been 
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identified in an Australian context.  The practice could be trialled on one line 
and statistics evaluated in comparison to the others. 
9.4 Implications for Practice  
The findings of this study have a number of important implications for future 
practice.  These research findings have been presented to the RTO management 
(appendix 4), for their consideration and action as they deem appropriate.  
The confidentiality of accident statistics, coupled with a lack of management 
accountability and an absence of incident analysis of contributing factors, has 
resulted in there being no feedback loop into training.  Incident investigation tended 
to focus on whether the transit officer had followed the rules, rather than offering an 
analysis of contributing factors which could inform the training of future transit 
officers and possibly prompt a change in procedure.  This approach to incident 
investigation may, in part, have led to management and employees having different 
perceptions of safety.  In particular, transit officers are motivated to keep themselves 
‗safe‘ from managerial criticism.  However, complete analysis of incidents and the 
sharing of all information across the rail system would contribute to management 
and transit officers developing a shared understanding of safe work practices, and 
assist in breaking down the separate subcultures that exist on each rail line. 
With regards to transit officer training, officers believe that having additional 
training in verbal communication skills, and practicing these skills in scenario 
training, would better equip them to deal with aggressive, non-complying 
passengers, thereby improving their safety.  
This study has also highlighted the importance of appropriate training for 
supervisors, and the use of field training officers who have the skills required to 
mentor and assess the competencies of newly graduated transit officers straight from 
training school.  Field training officers can induct novices into rail line work in a 
manner which reinforces the culture of safety communicated in the classroom; 
leading to a more uniform culture of safety throughout the transit officer cadre, and 
ultimately impacting in positive ways upon the everyday safety culture of the 
organisation and its constituent parts.   
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9.5 Summary 
In summary, open two way communication between all hierarchical levels of 
the security section; the training of supervisors, the introduction of field training 
officers, plus the sharing of information across all rail lines, would seem likely to 
lead to an improved culture of safety.  As well as promoting uniformity of good 
practice across the organisation it would help break down barriers arising from an 
‗us and them‘ mentality between management and transit officers.  Ultimately, 
transit officers would be safer, passengers would be happier, and public transport 
would be more a desirable option and would operate more cost effectively.   
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Appendix 3 
Interview Questions 
1. Can you please provide me with an overview of your background and how long you have 
been with the RTO? 
 
2. Have you found the job to be what you expected?  Which aspects were different to what 
you had anticipated? 
 
3. How did you find the training? 
 
4. Did you feel the training adequately equipped you to do the job? 
 
5. What changes, in any, would you make to the training to assist with the performance of your 
duties? 
 
6. What do you think of the X plan? 
 
7. How many of the lines have you worked on?  Which is your favourite line to work on and 
why?  
 
8. What do you see as the differences between the lines? Have you been involved in any 
incidents and/or received any injuries?  Can you please tell me about them? 
 
9. What happened following the incident?  What was the outcome?  Was there any follow up 
from the event?  What did you learn from the event/events? 
 
10. How do you find the communication within your team and within the organisation? 
 
11. How do you learn what is occurring within the organisation? 
 
12. How do you learn what is occurring on other lines? 
 
13. How do you learn what is occurring within your team? 
 
14. What happens in your muster? 
 
15. What would you do if you had an issue that you wanted to raise with management? 
 
16. Can you think of any ways that transit officer safety could be improved? 
 
17. Is there anything else that you would like to tell me that you feel could assist this research 
project? 
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Executive Summary 
The research reported below has revealed a range of opportunities through which Transit 
Officers‟ injury rates may be reduced.  The recommendations we make are intended to 
achieve three broad outcomes which support injury reduction.  They aim to: improve the 
interaction with members of the public; support the leadership of the Transit Officer cadre; 
and take advantage of lessons learnt by equivalent transit authorities in other jurisdictions.  
All three outcomes have been shown to reduce the number of incidents and injuries of Transit 
Officer-like work roles while improving the environment for public transport customers.   
 
This three year research project has been grounded in a close engagement with the daily 
duties of Transit Officers and builds upon their own perceptions of how their work could be 
safer.  It recognises that the Rail Transport System (RTS) is committed to continuously 
improving safety practices with a view to preventing work-related injury.  Some of the 
recommendations that follow may already have been partly or fully addressed as a result of 
ongoing discussions.  However, these recommendations are presented in their entirety as a 
way of capturing the opportunities for improved safety that were evident during the field 
research in 2008, and reflected in the international fact-finding visits of 2009.  The 
recommendations resulting from this research are:  
1. Field officer training and on-the-job induction. 
2. „Verbal judo‟ and scenario exercises. 
3. Create training opportunities for continuous professional development from CCTV and 
other records of safety-related incidents, improving communication across the 
organisation. 
4. Specific training for Supervisors. 
5. Develop measurable Supervisor performance indicators. 
6. Commence weekly Compstat meetings of Supervisors and Managers. 
7. Give Transit Officers a clearly distinct uniform to reduce the ambiguity about the 
identity of Transit Officers. 
8. Publicise Transit Officers‟ arrest powers to the wider community. 
9. Institute a „broken window‟ policy for rolling stock. 
10. Continued public release of data about accidents and injuries to Transit Officers. 
11. Conduct an awareness campaign within RTS on the Transit Officer role. 
12. Introduce a „Transit Officer of the month‟ award. 
13. Benchmark with other public transport authorities, national and international. 
14. Review the current effectiveness of OC (Oleoresin Capsicum) spray and determine 
whether a suitable alternative is available. 
15. Implement a formal „use of force‟ framework. 
16. Further research. 
Changes to Transit Officer training to include additional instruction in how to defuse 
situations through conciliatory talk, using effective scenario enactments and role playing that 
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result in a win-win defusing of the situations under consideration.  Such a revised training 
schedule could be underlined by a post-training induction period of some months where new 
recruits work with established and experienced Officers, who are appropriately trained as 
Field Training Officers.  The aim is to induct new Transit Officers into best practice 
behaviours in the daily conduct of their duties, rather than have them experience a mismatch 
between safety as it is taught in training, and safety as it is practised on the lines, as can 
sometimes happen.  Transit Officer Supervisors also require training and induction specific to 
their role, and this will also improve vertical communication between Managers and Transit 
Officers.   
 
Across the organisation there is the potential to improve safety and injury-reduction 
awareness by working to reduce anti-social behaviour occurring on the rail system.  Breaking 
down communication blocks between line staff and management and sharing information 
between the lines will aid the process. Overseas Transit Policing organisations use the 
Compstat process which is based on communication, information, accountability and results.  
Strategies are suggested in this report for ensuring that what happens on the line, good and 
bad, is available to others to learn from.  In this way safe and injury-preventing behaviours 
can be practised and advanced across the organisation. 
 
In terms of relationships with the travelling public three key initiatives are offered.  The 
establishment of the role of the Transit Office as unique and unambiguous through changing 
the Revenue Protection Officer uniform to be readily distinguishable from that of Transit 
Officers.  An augmented public information campaign that tells passengers about the role, 
responsibilities and powers of the Transit Officer so that there is less ambiguity about when 
and whether the Transit Officer is likely to effect an arrest.  A proactive commitment to the 
highest standards of maintenance of rolling stock since this has been associated elsewhere 
with improved passenger behaviour. 
 
The wider community has a stake in the safe working environment of Transit Officers.  This 
shared responsibility would be made more evident, and enhanced, by the public release of 
injury data.  Globally, a number of organisations have people working in roles analogous to 
those of the RTS Transit Officer.  In these organisations, low and reducing injury rates are 
associated with active benchmarking and proactive exchange of useful information in both 
the local and global context. 
 
Strategies are provided in this report to improve the Transit Officer profile within the 
organisation and in turn improve Transit Officer morale and breakdown the „us and them‟ 
perception held by the Transit Officers.  Some concerns have been expressed about whether 
the current reliance upon OC spray means that the Transit Officers have access to the best 
available set of deterrents.  The implementation of a formal „use of force model‟ would help 
ensure that the deterrents available were employed using the appropriate response for the risk 
involved.   
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Introduction 
This report is a deliverable as part of a study co-funded by the Australian Research Council 
($103,000) and the Rail Transport System ($20,000) over the period 2006-2010, including a 
one-year extension.  Its purpose is to make recommendations for: 
 
(i) a short-term project to be funded by a $20,000 grant from the ARC (channelled through 
ECU) to trial a means of reducing workplace injuries among Transit Officers; 
(ii) long-term organisational responses to the injury rate experienced by Transit Officers. 
 
Quoting from the grant proposal, written at the time when Transit Officers were known as 
Transit Guards, the report‟s aim is to investigate: 
 
the work culture of public transport Transit Officers to understand better the 
dynamics of passenger interaction with a view to improving safety.  The 
significance lies in the unacceptable number of injuries sustained as a result 
of attacks upon guards.  The health and safety of transport guards and the 
travelling public has implications for public transport costs, its attractiveness 
as a transit option and the security enjoyed by passengers.  Improving the 
experience of public transport has flow-on environmental and economic 
benefits.  The project will feed into improved training for transit guards and 
positive culture and communication changes.  A key outcome will be a 
reduction in injury rates (ARC 2005, p.  2). 
 
The chief research methods through which this detailed, longitudinal project was realised 
were ethnographic fieldwork, interviews and reviews of best practice through visits to 
national and international leaders in public transport safety. 
 
The researcher/ethnographer, Ms Christine Teague, took part in a 12-week Transit Officers 
training course, a one month observation of the tracks in the CCTV monitoring room and four 
months‟ Transit Officer shift work rostered on duty alongside working Transit Officers.  The 
fieldwork interstate and internationally accounted for an additional two months of work, and 
the study has thus involved some 10 months of on the ground duties in addition to literature 
and publication reviews, data analysis and writing up. 
 
The recommendations offered arise from a combination of these sources of information and 
experience but are especially grounded in the work alongside the Transit Officers and the 
opinions shared by them in the confidential in-depth interviews.  As required by the ECU 
ethics committee, and as guaranteed to interviewees, pseudonyms are used in all quotations to 
protect the anonymity of the Transit Officers involved.   
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Background 
Transit Officers work in a challenging and sometimes arduous environment, and are often 
faced by members of the public whose behaviour may be affected by alcohol or other drugs.  
In the course of Transit Officer duties, as Fred describes: 
 
You‟re not dealing with rational people, you‟re not dealing with „people‟, 
most of the people you‟re dealing with are either drunk or under the influence 
of drugs, so they‟re not rational, they don‟t hear you, they don‟t understand 
what you‟re saying, they just have no sense of what‟s right or wrong, you 
know?  Especially being under the influence, so I mean, you can talk till 
you‟re blue in the face with somebody who‟s drunk or on drugs, I mean, all 
you have to say is one thing.  „Oh, can I see your ticket please‟, „oh, why do I 
need a fucking ticket‟, you know?  They just don‟t get simple everyday 
messages.   
 
Transit Officers may find themselves at risk of physical and psychological injury.  As Jo 
recounts: 
 
Within the first week of coming out of course I got smacked on the side of 
the head, but this lady had actually been certified, like, she was nuts.  She was 
completely mental and we were just standing on the train talking and I‟ve 
turned around to say something to my partner and she was fine, she was as 
calm as, and I turned around and talked to my partner and the next thing I 
know I ended up with her fist to the side of my head.  And I went „what the 
hell was that‟? And she went off, she went absolutely ballistic.  I ended up 
arresting her because it was assault on an officer whether she was mental or 
not so I ended up arresting her. 
 
Peter talks about the psychological effects of the job 
 
When someone decides to take the coward‟s way out and sit in front of the 
train, we‟re the first ones there, we have to identify first of all if the person is 
deceased.  Nine times out of ten, there‟s a guarantee, but you still need to 
make that initial, even though it‟s not a, it‟s a call that an ambulance officer 
has to make, but like I say, yeah, tell those ambos to hit the skids because this 
guy‟s still breathing sort of thing.  We have to ensure that the driver‟s alright, 
ensure the passengers are alright and we have to stand over what‟s left of the 
remains 
 
John also commented on the psychological effects of the job 
 
It‟s not just probably the physical side of maybe getting punched in the face 
or whatever else, it‟s that ongoing, I‟ve just seen a person who‟s been spread 
over 150 metres by a 100 ton train, How am I going to go home and tell my 
wife what sort of day I‟ve had? 
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One of the Supervisors crystallised the situation by saying: 
 
We give you the basics to keep yourself safe but there will always [...] I mean 
you‟re dealing with the public and individuals who are iced up or intoxicated 
or whatever else who are unpredictable to start with.  So it‟s not like using a 
piece of machinery where you can put actual protective safe guards in place 
and a list of rules right next to it and instructions how to press the on button 
and the off button, it‟s constantly evolving. 
 
Transit Officers share a range of functions with Police Officers but also experience a number 
of disadvantages compared with Police.  These can be summarised as including: 
 
(i) Transit Officers are required to deal with trouble face-to-face, as it arises.  There is 
generally no „cooling off‟ time between a summons for help and the Transit Officer 
arriving.  Steve summed the situation up by saying: 
 
Out here you‟re out of the training, into the fire, you‟re dealing with it 
and you do it every day, face to face contact, arresting, rolling on the 
ground, doing the whole lot.  A copper wouldn‟t even speak to as 
many people in his first 12 months as what we do in our first three.  
Plus not only that, with us something happens we‟re there on the spot, 
we‟re dealing with it in the heat of the moment and it‟s full on face to 
face, get down and dirty with the baddies.  Whereas out in the street 
something happens, someone rings the coppers, by the time they get 
there it‟s either defused or the baddies have gone away, there‟s not 
that instant [contact]. 
 
(ii) Transit Officers have powers of arrest and are protected by new mandatory assault 
legislation but they are not provided with stun guns (tasers) for self protection, and for 
use when there are a number of people involved. 
 
(iii) Transit Officers‟ jurisdiction is limited geographically, in relation to the railway 
reserve, and this can give some potential offenders the impression that if they can 
„break away‟ they will be able to evade consequences. 
 
There is also confusion in the minds of the public about Transit Officer responsibilities 
when people are involved in an affray, or when someone may be victim of an assault on 
property adjacent to railway property, and Transit Officers do not intervene.   
 
(iv) Transit Officers‟ powers of arrest, and their access to the police mainframe computer 
database via a shift commander, are imperfectly understood by the travelling public.  
This means that Transit Officers are treated differently from Police, potentially giving 
rise to fraught circumstances.  For example, a young person might give a false name 
and address, not realising that the Transit Officer can check this on the spot through 
radio communication with the CCTV monitoring room.  This can lead to a situation 
where a potential infringement notice may suddenly become a situation requiring a 
mandatory arrest (since this is the necessary response to the providing of false identity 
details).  Since most injuries to Transit Officers occur as a result of resisting arrest, and 
since an arrest in these circumstances may be totally unexpected by the perpetrator, 
these are the kinds of circumstances which may get quickly out of hand.  As Jo states: 
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The problem [is] the fact that people don‟t know where we‟re coming 
from, they don‟t know what kind of job we‟re doing.  I‟m not 
necessarily saying treat us like police but at least the police have a 
certain amount of respect and people know that if you do something 
wrong in front of a police officer you‟re going to get into trouble.  
They don‟t care if they do it in front of us.  I think that‟s the biggest 
issue.   
 
(v) Transit Officers‟ training is less extensive that that of Police Officers and is particularly 
light in terms of training in how to use verbal skills to defuse or scale down 
confrontations.  Although there is a training scenario which leads on to a mock court 
case, there are few opportunities during training to practice „talking down‟ a situation to 
reach a compromise resolution.  Half a day in the twelve week Transit Officers‟ 
training course was devoted to „conflict resolution strategies‟ and this is much less than 
is on offer to Police Officer trainees.  For example, the minimum time spent on verbal 
judo skills in the transit police agencies visited during the research was two days.  This 
formal training in conflict resolution was accompanied by many scenario training 
periods where the „verbal judo‟ skills learnt, were practised.  As Mike stated: 
 
Verbal judo comes in very handy for me and that‟s from what I learnt 
from the police not from what I learnt here, because it teaches you not 
to just get straight hands on, like wrestling someone to the ground.  
Try and talk them out of a situation. 
 
Transit Officers do not project the same level of deterrence towards offenders as Police 
Officers, for various reasons which include the above points.  This places them at a 
higher risk of injury because they must confront situations which the Police may be 
able to diffuse as a result of perceptions of their role and status.  Apart from struggling 
on occasions with the responsibilities of Police Officers, without their powers, other 
operational considerations also impact upon Transit Officer effectiveness and 
confidence. 
 
(vi) The comparatively new system of allocating Transit Officers to a „line‟ under the X-
plan has many advantages.  Those perceived by the Transit Officers include: 
camaraderie; the opportunity to get to know regular passengers; an environmental 
safety awareness of the station surrounds, and an awareness of the characteristic 
features of different stations at different times of the day and night.  One disadvantage, 
however, is that „what goes on on a line, stays on a line‟.  The opportunity to learn from 
events on other lines is consequently reduced. 
 
(vii) Transit Officers are not highly visible to members of the public in the sense that their 
uniforms are generally very similar to those of Revenue Protection Officers who lack 
the physical skills training, visual presence, communication skills, and other training 
and responsibilities of Transit Officers.  Given that the Transit Officer has a range of 
responsibilities which require that Officer to take action in specific circumstances, the 
actions taken can be unexpected when members of the public fail to differentiate 
between the different roles and responsibilities of Transit Officers and Revenue 
Protection Officers and expect Transit Officers to behave as Revenue Protection 
Officers do.   
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This situation also has a reverse effect when a Revenue Protection Officer does not 
assist in a situation, leaving members of the public wondering why a Transit Officer has 
not provided assistance or dealt appropriately with a public order event.  These 
circumstances leave Transit Officers feeling maligned and some consider their 
professionalism is being compromised.  The Transit Officers are of the opinion that the 
general public view both the Transit Officers and Revenue Protection Officers in the 
same way since the uniforms are very similar.  As Angus states, in terms which echo 
views expressed by other Transit Officers (and it should be noted here that The 
Contractor X currently has the contract for providing Revenue Protection Officers): 
 
I‟ve spoken to quite a few members of public and received complaints 
from them about Transit Officers and talking more about the incident 
have found out that it was actually Contractor X Officers [Revenue 
Protection Officers] that are dealing with it.  So it‟s creating a bad 
image for us.  It‟s not Contractor X, it‟s not Revenue, it‟s Transits that 
are copping all the flak for it.  […] It is dangerous for us and it‟s a lot 
of bad publicity for us.  It‟s hard enough, the job that we do and the 
lack of respect that we do get from people, we don‟t need other people 
adding to it and making it harder. 
 
Or, as Sam felt: 
 
It is embarrassing for them to have a very similar uniform and deal 
with the public and then [we] deal with the public ourselves. […] And 
their ability to infringe is, yeah they‟ll just infringe anyone without 
considering further to that.  You know, there‟s many reasons why 
people may not have a ticket. […] It‟s like a second rate kind of fix to 
the problem for lack of Transit Officers.  But I do feel embarrassed to 
be wearing a uniform very similar to theirs.  Nothing against any of 
them, it‟s just the way I think it‟s been approached by either 
Contractor X Security or Rail Transport System.  I think it‟s 
dangerous.  And I do consider that a lot of complaints that are founded 
may come from Rev.  Protection.  It‟s nothing against them, they‟re 
doing the job. 
 
Transit Officers such as Peter also view the situation where Transit Officers are easily 
confused with Revenue Protection Officers as raising safety issues: 
 
An incident happened in the city and Transit Officers went to it and 
they could not distinguish on video who was transit and who was 
Contractor X, so they had no idea who was who, which is a major 
concern.  Another incident where an officer has called for backup on a 
train and the guys have got off and just stood there, and he didn‟t 
realise that they are actually Contractor X officers, so he effectively 
had no backup, he thought he did but he didn‟t.   
 
(viii) Some activities carried out by Transit Officers involve actions for which they receive 
no training and which might appear to be beyond the areas in which they have authority 
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to act: for example, the serving of summonses to members of the public at their home 
address.  As Wayne said: 
 
There‟s no real instructions, the only instructions initially when I did 
the first one was you do a cell call to base and let them know you‟re 
going to a private address, and then when you‟ve left that address you 
do another cell call and let them know you‟ve left the private address.  
[…] There‟s no instructions that I‟ve been given apart from „do a cell 
call before and after‟ and that‟s just been from a Supervisor, it‟s not 
written anywhere or sent to me in an email or wasn‟t in any training.  
Actually it probably was just given to me by a more experienced 
officer when I went to do a summons.  […] The safety implications 
are amazing because you deliver a summons and someone‟s not happy 
about it and they can kill you, like, you don‟t know what can happen.  
But yeah, there‟s no time limit on the cell calls as far as I‟m aware; 
that if we don‟t call back they‟ll get back to you.  They just note it 
down and they just carry on with their job watching the cameras. 
 
(ix) Supervisory training and Supervisory leadership were noted as being deficient.  A 
couple of the Supervisors had commenced the Certificate IV „Front Line Management 
Course‟ held at the Australian Institute of Management, however the course is a 
generalised course and not specific to the tasks that the Transit Officer Supervisors 
undertake.  The majority of the Supervisors had not had any opportunity to undertake 
further training to equip themselves for the positions they hold.  This was not the case 
in any of the other transit police agencies visited during the research.  In all other cases, 
Transit Officer Supervisors received training specific to their role. 
 
As one of the Supervisors said: “I‟ve mentioned it at meetings as 
well, but no-one seems to really sort of care too much about it.  [...] 
They give you an acting stint and you‟re straight in there”.  Another 
Supervisor felt that the Transit Officer management were trying to get 
further training for them and would support the suggestion, but that a 
move to more training would be blocked by management higher up.  
“Unfortunately it would go to [name withheld], [that person] would 
push it up further and say, „look we would like to get our people onto 
this‟, and it would be, „nup they don‟t need it‟”. 
 
Without acquiring any additional skills it is difficult for a Supervisor to be working as 
one of the Transit Officer corps one day, and in a Supervisoryy position the next.  As Jo 
stated: “he was just a Transit Officer, so we used to muck around and get up to virtually 
all sorts of mischief.  Now he has to elevate himself above that and I know he‟s finding 
it hard to be able to separate”.  A few of the Supervisors take pride in maintaining a 
good team spirit with the Transit Officers on their line, and use the muster time to pass 
on any information they have and answer any Transit Officer questions.  These 
Supervisors also use the muster at quieter times, such as Sunday afternoons, to educate 
their team members.  Such strategies help overcome vertical communication barriers.  
However, these practices are not replicated in all areas.   
 
In the Transit Police organisations visited, muster time would be used to brief officers 
as to what has been happening on all the lines, to pass on any pertinent organisational 
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information, to alert as to any „look outs‟ to be kept for persons of interest, and to 
instruct in any learning from incidents to be shared.  One of the elements of a positive 
safety culture is to keep people informed of what is going on in their organisation and 
to learn from incidents that have occurred (R. L. Helmreich, 1998; Reason, 1997; 
Standards Australia, 2006).  Transit Officers‟s‟ believed that most of the Supervisors 
told them what they knew, but there was an information block between management 
and the Supervisors.  Simon explained: 
 
There is a brick wall between the management and the officers, and not 
so much the Supervisors, because I know that Supervisors and the 
senior officers get continuous emails from the managers [normally 
relating to train running], and that‟s not in regards to what‟s going on 
with the unit and all the rest of it.  And yet the guys don‟t get anything 
unless it seems to be a negative thing.  Other than that, it just seems like 
you know, there‟s this brick wall. ... I think if there was more open 
communication between the managers and the guys, I think the place 
would be a bit more harmonious in how the troops see their higher ups. 
 
In overseas Transit Police organisations visited, Supervisors were part of a Compstat 
process.  The Compstat paradigm is based on communication, information, 
accountability and results.  Incidents are analysed in a meaningful way, using a simple 
data management system to quickly identify fluctuations and changes in incident 
statistics. This enables a rapid assessment of the effectiveness of decisions and 
strategies taken on each line.  As Henry (2003) states “The number and type of 
performance indicators in the data base and in the report should be determined by the 
specific needs of the individual agency”.  Supervisors and Managers are accountable 
for the results which are discussed at the Weekly meetings.  Both high and low 
performers can be identified and praised or motivated as necessary. 
 
This range of circumstances relating to the public expectations of Transit Officers, and the 
organisation‟s expectations, indicates that the role of the Transit Officer occupies a 
challenging space in a challenging environment.   Potential ambiguities in the role, and in 
public recognition of the responsibilities, powers and restrictions applicable to Transit 
Officers can lead to misunderstandings and unnecessary friction.  In fraught circumstances 
such matters can escalate, leading to conflict and potential injuries. 
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Findings 
The research indicates that: 
 
Transit Officers would welcome a public information campaign which clearly indicates the 
nature of their role, their powers and their responsibilities.  As part of this communications 
initiative: 
 
(i) Transit Officer uniforms should be more clearly differentiated from those of other 
categories of RTS staff 
(ii) Transit Officers‟ powers of arrest and their ability to verify any personal details given 
should be actively highlighted 
 
Transit Officers seek more training in skills and strategies which can be used to defuse a 
tense situation.  Such training might be conveniently referred to as „Verbal judo‟, though this 
should not necessarily be taken to mean the copyrighted training course of that name. 
 
Transit Officers seek more scenario training.  To make the scenarios more realistic the 
organisation should consider the employment of actors, or youth workers and social workers 
who are familiar with the type of behaviours with which Transit Officers are routinely faced. 
 
Like with most workplaces, there is a mismatch between the work culture communicated in 
the training environment and that which operates „on the tracks‟.  The informal work culture 
(on the tracks) can occasionally give rise to practices and attitudes which may not promote a 
safe work environment.  This can range from the way to approach and talk to a person, to the 
use of force options, to developing spatial awareness.  One way to help promote a safer work 
environment and work towards a safer Transit Officer culture is to institute a Field Training 
Officer system, as operated in the leading low-injury organisations involved with this 
research.  These Field Training Officers would complete „train the trainer‟ and „assessor‟ 
courses.   
 
A Field Training Officer would be buddied up with a new recruit and would be responsible 
for providing a mentoring role to the new Transit Officer; assessing the competencies of the 
officer in the field.  New graduate officers from the training school would remain on 
probation until they had been assessed as competent in all practical areas by the Field 
Training Officer.  The Field Training Officers would be chosen from those officers whose 
work practices are exemplary and whose track records demonstrate a range of skills and 
experience while always maintaining professional standards of conduct and effectiveness in 
the role.  This practice is consistent with interstate and overseas organisations that 
demonstrate low injury rates.  The minimum time this Field Training process took in the 
organisations visited during the research was three months.  The majority of Field Training 
regimes ranged between four and six months long.   
 
Internationally, comparatively lower and actively reducing rates of injury are correlated with 
publication of those injury rates.  Making injury rates public helps persuade all parties 
concerned that reducing injury is a key objective for the organisation.  An open approach to 
investigating accidents and crises characterises (particularly) the airline industry and public 
medicine because it is accepted that the duty to understand causation of harm, prevent 
reoccurrence, and maximise the incidence of positive behaviour is more important than a 
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short term desire to reduce potential embarrassment.  (See for example Gawande‟s (2007, p. 
209 - 227) analysis of the impact of publicising the life expectancy of Cystic Fibrosis 
sufferers, associated with treatment by different clinics in the US.)  Additionally, see 
Helmreich and Merritt (1998) in reference to both the airline industry and the medical 
profession.    
 
Material supporting this recommendation also supports benchmarking across operators and 
jurisdictions.  Accepting that the RTS situation is unlike many others and is not directly 
comparable with any other authority, it is nonetheless possible to share with other equivalent 
organisations the overall desire to reduce injury rates, and to do this in a collegial and 
supportive exchange with like-minded industry players.  The comparative national and 
international research has established a range of potential partners for such an enterprise with 
which the RTS  might liaise.   
 
Internationally, key public transport authorities such as that in New York -  have had 
considerable success with a „zero tolerance‟ policy related to the travelling public‟s transport 
environment.  This is commonly referred to as „the broken window‟ theory and refer to when 
a train is withdrawn from service if it is damaged or defaced (Kelling & Coles, 1996; Maple 
& Mitchell, 1999): 
 
The „Broken Windows‟ theory suggests that there is both a high correlation 
and a causal link between community disorder and more serious crime: when 
community disorder is permitted to flourish or when disorderly conditions or 
problems are left untended, they actually cause more serious crime.  „Broken 
windows‟ are a metaphor for community disorder which, as Wilson and 
Kelling (1982) use the term, includes the violation of informal social norms 
for public behaviour as well as quality of life offenses such as littering, 
graffiti, playing loud radios, aggressive panhandling, and vandalism.  (Henry, 
2003, p. 117) 
 
All American transit police agencies visited subscribed to this theory.  It was interesting to 
note that all of the transit police that the field researcher spoke to were knowledgeable on the 
theory and keen to pass the information on.  Putting this theory into practice has a positive 
effect in the transport environment.  In New York, for example, no train is allowed in service 
with a scratch on the window.  This policy helps develop a culture where the public are 
motivated to value the physical environment of the train and, consequently, value more 
greatly the work of the Transit Officer. 
 
Internationally transit police agencies subscribed to the Compstat paradigm.  Using this 
theory, Supervisors, Managers and Executives are accountable for what occurs in their area 
of control.  The Compstat process involves the collection of data that is important to manage 
the agency and achieve the desired goals of the organisation, the analysis of statistics; the 
identification of any new patterns or trends emerging and presenting and sharing the 
information in a simple format.  
 
Transit Officers are aware of the importance of the CCTV cameras in terms of recording the 
actions of themselves and members of the public.  They are generally positive about this 
surveillance, seeing it as a protection for themselves.  As Hugh, one of the experienced 
Transit Officers explained, talking about when he was directing a person to leave the station: 
“I make sure my hands are always open like this (showing outstretched palms) and always 
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making sure I‟m giving directions.  It‟s all on camera.  Direction, direction, direction.  Don‟t 
push; don‟t push, because if you push, that‟s technically assault”. 
 
Such findings are in line with expectations from the literature.  For example, Goold‟s 
ethnographic work with Police Officers revealed one officer‟s views on the matter: 
 
It affects our thinking of things a lot because obviously the cameras are there 
to identify possible crime about to happen, or even people who are actually 
committing crimes at the time.  But having said that, it also records police 
actions.  Therefore when you arrive at an incident, you‟ve got to be aware of 
the fact that the cameras are watching you.  We are being recorded, the same 
as anybody else.  Therefore what we do has to be right, it has to look right.  
Therefore it makes it quite a priority for most officers entering the town 
centre – they‟re thinking, „I‟m on camera‟ (Goold, 2004, p. 194).   
    
Using CCTV footage, there is an opportunity to create opportunities to learn actively from 
safety-related events on all lines, thereby negating one of the few disadvantages of the X-
plan.  Training packages could be created which involve, for example, evidence prepared for 
court cases.  These could be used to suggest a range of possible and beneficial responses to 
specific challenges in the line of duty that may have resulted in injury.  Such training 
modules could be offered for Transit Officers to access securely in work time on work 
computers, designed with self-paced learning in mind, allowing for what happens on one line 
to inform best practice on all lines.  The important concept is: “that organisations and their 
members use the information to improve safety and act on the lessons derived” (Standards 
Australia, 2006). 
 
Transit Officers are now more reluctant to use Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray as a use of 
force option.  At one stage the spray was withdrawn for a number of weeks due to a 
flammability issue, and the Officers believe that the new batch is not as effective.  As David 
said  
 
The initial stuff was outstanding; the new stuff is sometimes hit and miss.  
Because it‟s got a little more water based in it now, the stream sometimes 
doesn‟t come out as a stream.  It will go left, right and centre.  It takes a lot 
longer to have an effect on the bad guys that have been sprayed.  Whilst the 
original stuff, with an initial spray, they‟d be down within 10 or 15 seconds.  
This new stuff may take up to 30-40 seconds for someone to start having the 
effects.   
 
Transit Officers are not familiar with the use of force continuum which is taught and practised 
in all other transit police agencies visited during the research.  Using this framework the 
officer is able to continuously assess the situation and select the most reasonable option 
relative to the circumstances as perceived by them at that point in time (Ontario Police 
College, 2000).  Research has shown that choosing the appropriate „use of force‟ option is not 
a linear process.   
 
Traditionally, „use of force‟ frameworks were based on a step by step incrementation and de-
escalation process in response to the level of aggression perceived in the disruptive or 
dangerous person.  However, law enforcement agencies now realise that linear models have 
failed to accurately reflect the dynamic nature of potentially violent situations (Hoffman, 
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Lawrence, & Brown, 2004).  Variations of the Ontario „Use of Force‟ model are in use in 
other agencies.  In these models the Officer is taught to consider all options, continually 
assessing the risk and appropriate response, considering all use of force options available 
including the option to withdraw from the situation (Australasian Centre for Policing 
Research, 2004) 
 
 
 
National Use of Force Framework 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Zanin, 2009)  
Ontario Use of Force Model 
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Recommendations 
1. Field Officer training and on-the-job induction 
This is the recommendation judged likely to have the quickest return on investment.  It 
involves identifying Transit Officers with exemplary low-injury safety records and 
positive performance of their duties and relationships with the public.  This cadre 
should embody the most desirable aspects of Transit Officer safety culture and it should 
be a compliment among officers to be identified as such.  The status need not be 
recognised with money, but could be indicated with an additional badge or emblem.  
These Field Officers are charged with working with newly trained Transit Officers to 
induct them into the role in a manner which complements and reinforces the safety 
culture communicated in the training programme, and which does not undermine it.  
The Field Officers should undertake courses in „Train the Trainer‟ and „Assessor‟ 
qualifications which will enable them to assess when the probationary Transit Officers 
are competent in the „field‟.  It is recommended that trainee Transit Officers remain on 
probation until deemed competent in all areas of their role by Field Training Officers.    
 
2. ‘Verbal judo’ and scenario exercises 
A number of Officers have commented that very little of their training concentrated on 
working through and role-playing high-tension scenarios.  Instead, most scenarios were 
about how best to act in the lead up to what might eventuate in an arrest and a court 
case.  Arguably, every arrest and court case is a failure of an opportunity to resolve an 
incident in a positive way.  So there is the potential to realign the training and the 
communication culture to improve the likelihood of a positive resolution to negative 
exchanges.  This desirable outcome can be promoted by paying greater attention to 
conciliation skills and win-win scenario training to resolve potential conflict with words 
alone.   
 
3. Create training opportunities for continuous professional development from CCTV 
and other records of safety-related incidents, improving communication across the 
organisation 
A range of materials exist which can demonstrate the escalation of interactions that end 
negatively, in either or both of injury and arrest, and which can be used to instruct the 
wider Transit Officer cadre.  Transit Officers have access to computers in their work 
time as part of their duties.  It is possible and desirable to identify key episodes and 
incidents that have whole of service relevance.  Using materials such as CCTV footage 
as components of online, self-paced training packages, securely accessed through 
workplace computers and servers, the organisation can overcome the one major 
disadvantage of the X-plan: the fact that what occurs on on a line, stays on a line.  
Using evidence of key activities, good and bad, the RTS can institute on-the-job 
training and professional development to reinforce a positive safety culture where each 
line learns from all the others.   
 
4. Training for Transit Officer supervisors 
Whereas the proposed training packages will help overcome the communication 
barriers that negatively impact the chance of an active safety culture spreading across 
the organisation, including between and across the different lines, supervisor training 
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will help improve vertical communication in the organisation.  Supervisor training 
should be relevant to the specific responsibilities of the position. At present, some 
Supervisors adopt inconsistent and sometimes ineffective approaches to communicating 
and leading their teams and few use the muster as a means of reinforcing safety 
messages or providing a conduit for two way communication up and down the 
organisation. 
 
5. Measurable Supervisor performance indicators 
It is recommended that the RTS provide a proactive strategic direction for Supervisors 
with accountability for their line.  Following the specific Supervisor training, instigate 
measurable Supervisor performance indicators 
 
6. Regular (weekly) meetings of Supervisors and managers 
The present patrolling arrangement makes it easy for people committing crime or anti-
social behaviour to move from one line to another. Regular (weekly) discussion and 
information sharing between Supervisors about incidents occurring on the lines can 
improve the ability to deal pro-actively with situations rather than reactively.  These 
meetings should include incidents that have occurred, investigations that have been 
undertaken and learnings that have arisen from the analysis of the incidents.  At present 
a tendency to „silo‟ thinking means information is not shared.  These regular meetings 
would have a triple effect; reducing crime and anti-social behaviour on the lines, 
making Supervisors more accountable for their line and assistance in providing support 
to reduce the line isolation felt by Supervisors. 
 
7. A clearly distinct uniform for Transit Officers 
Transit Officers occupy a role with a range of ambiguities.  In many ways, they are like 
Police Officers, but they are not Police Officers.  In some circumstances, they can act 
like Police Officers: but the situation changes with where they are standing and where 
the questionable behaviour is occurring. These spatial delineators of what is and is not 
railway property are unclear to the public.  Given this currently unavoidable ambiguity, 
it is not helpful if the Transit Officer role can be easily mistaken for other roles with far 
fewer powers and responsibilities such as that of a Revenue Protection Officers and or 
the Customer Service Officers.  This ambiguity can be addressed.  It is entirely 
appropriate to provide a unique identifier to the Transit Officer so that the public is 
more aware of their role and responsibilities.   
 
8. Publicity of arrest powers to the wider community 
Many Transit Officer injuries occur when passengers resist arrest.  The evidence 
indicates that, in some of these cases, resisting the arrest is linked with a 
misunderstanding of Transit Officer powers, in terms of both the power to arrest and 
access to the Police records which enable checking, for example, of names and 
addresses alongside relevant descriptions.  If young people were aware of these powers 
they might be less likely to give false or misleading names and addresses and thus less 
likely to find themselves subject to an unexpected arrest when they had not previously 
been behaving in an aggressive or disruptive way.  A targeted publicity campaign, 
along the lines of the successful RTS campaign to communicate the importance of the 
Student Concession Card, could significantly reduce the incidence of such „surprise‟ 
arrests, and the consequent and escalating incidence of resisting arrest.   
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9. A ‘broken window’ policy for rolling stock 
Public transport authorities with some of the lowest recorded injury rates, and some of 
the fastest dropping injury rates, also have a range of other policies in place to 
underline pride in the public transport system and the consequences of anti-social 
behaviour.  Among these policies but worthy of particular attention is that of the 
„broken window‟ approach.  Under this strategy rolling stock is withdrawn from service 
at the first sign of damage or defacing.  The impact of this action appears to be that 
passengers take greater pride in supporting and maintaining a pristine environment 
which has added benefits in terms of travellers‟ behaviour and costs of cleaning and 
repair.  Given the reduction in negative activity and the increase in respectful conduct, 
interactions between Transit Officers and passengers are also more positive and less 
likely to result in injury. 
 
10. Publicity of  injury rates 
Professions which have a risk of fatal accidents are usually active in investigating 
where human factors and systems fail.  This is especially true of medicine and the 
airplanes.  In these instances there is significant evidence to indicate that the 
publication of injury rates is positively correlated with the reduction of injury rates.  
Even though there are no appropriate grounds for cross comparison of RTS Transit 
Officer injury rates with the injury rates of other public transport jurisdictions, the 
publication of these injury rates could gain public sympathy and support and would 
provide valuable year on year data for evidence-based interventions in training and 
communications. 
 
11. An awareness campaign within RTS on the Transit Officer role and the difficulties 
that they face each day 
Transit Officers  perceive that other RTS employees do not understand how important 
their safety and security role on the rail system is, or the difficulties they face each day.  
This situation is compounded by not publishing their injury and incident statistics. It is 
recommended that an article be written for the Transnet news or similar, outlining the 
Transit Officer role and some of the problems they face.  This article could be followed 
up at intervals with  stories about particular situations that Transit Officers have 
successfully dealt with.  This will assist in improving the Transit Officer profile, 
improve morale and assist in breaking down the barriers between „us and them‟- Transit 
Officers and the rest of RTS. 
 
12. A Transit Officer of the month award 
Transit Officers are open to criticism from members of the public with complaints 
referred to the RTS Internal Review Section, the Police and the Corruption and Crime 
Commission.  However, the excellent work that the Transit Officers undertake remains 
comparatively unrecognised.  It is recommended that a monthly award in the form of a  
certificate be presented to the „Transit Officer of the month‟ by the Chief Executive 
Officer of RTS.  This will provide an opportunity to market the award to both RTS 
members and the general public, with the potential effect of improved morale amongst 
Transit Officers.   
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13. Benchmark with other public transport authorities, national and international 
Research of world‟s best practice in  the reduction of injury rates indicates that high-
performing organisations not only publish their injury statistics, they also benchmark 
against each other to share ideas, practices and the development of staff.   Such a 
strategy is also open to the RTS.  An added benefit is that staff members in these 
exceptional organisations are made aware that safety is a high organisational priority 
and that injury reduction is a focus of much management activity.   
 
14. Review of the current effectiveness of OC (Oleoresin Capsicum) spray and determine 
whether a suitable alternative such as captor would be more applicable  
It is recommended that the RTS reviews the „use of force option‟ of oleoresin capsicum 
spray, and determines whether there is a more effective, and suitable, alternative option. 
 
15. A formal ‘use of force’ framework 
It is recommended that the RTS implement a formal „use of force‟ framework where 
Transit Officers continually assess and reassess situations considering all „use of force‟ 
options available at the time, including the ability to withdraw until backup arrives.   
 
16. Further research 
Although all consultants and researchers like to recommend that their study has thrown 
up opportunities for further research, this is the case here.  There are a number of 
specific ways in which further research would illuminate injury-reduction strategies for 
the RTS.  Such research could involve conventional consulting practices or it might 
entail a further request for public funds; for example through the co-payment of the 
Australian Research Council, as has happened here with a 5:1 beneficial leverage of 
funding.  Particular areas in which further research might be considered include: 
 
 Passenger-based research concerning the recognition, role, responsibilities and 
powers of Transit Officers; 
 Further study of the opportunities for, and a mechanism for recognising, a Field 
Training Officer cadre; 
 Developing, trialling and evaluating instruction in targeted verbal communication 
and negotiating skills and scenario training, to reduce the incidence of 
miscommunication and negative outcomes; 
 An investigation of public perceptions of Transit Officer injury rates to inform a 
campaign around positive disclosure and the public‟s shared responsibility for 
respectful and collaborative engagement; 
 The development and trial of self-paced training packages to inform Transit 
Officers about relevant safety-related activities on their line, and on other lines; 
 Develop, trial and evaluate the introduction of the Compstat paradigm into the 
security section.  
 Monitoring the attitudes and effectiveness of a „broken window‟ policy which 
might initially be trialled on a single line.   
All of these research options could be written up for further research, deepening engagement 
with a number of strategies for reducing the risk of injury. 
 19 
 
Limitations 
The Rail Transport System is to be congratulated for supporting this research and the study 
team is deeply grateful for the opportunity to work with all levels of staff in this important 
investigation. 
 
This project has nonetheless experienced some limitations as a result of the research team not 
having access to:  
 
 details of Transit Officer work-related injury rates;  
 relevant internal reports;  
 policy and management meetings including some safety meetings, and 
 attendance at reviews of, for example, training; the X-plan. 
 
The methodological approach and the industrial environment, together with some personal 
circumstances on the part of the ethnographer, have meant that the project‟s duration was 
extended a further twelve months.  This is regretted given the importance placed upon 
interventions with a view to reducing injury.   
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Timeframe 
March Present draft report.    
April Refine final report.    
May 
Refine final report.  Confirm 
distribution list  
Recommend safety intervention for ARC 
funds 
June Present final report   
July Institute intervention  
August   
September   
October Receive feedback on intervention  
November Conclude research and sign off Final report prepared for ARC  
December Publications PhD completed and submitted 
2011+ 
Liaise when extended research 
possibilities arise 
Develop, prepare and apply for relevant 
competitive funding 
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